Mimetologies: Aesthetic Politics in Early Modern Opera by Villegas, Daniel
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
1-1-2016
Mimetologies: Aesthetic Politics in Early Modern
Opera
Daniel Villegas
University of Pennsylvania, daniel.villegas@me.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Comparative Literature Commons, Esthetics Commons, and the Music Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2077
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Villegas, Daniel, "Mimetologies: Aesthetic Politics in Early Modern Opera" (2016). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2077.
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2077
Mimetologies: Aesthetic Politics in Early Modern Opera
Abstract
In recent decades, mimesis has become a critical term for rethinking relationality, difference, and affect,
reconsidered against the notions of artistic autonomy and representation. While music—and sound in
general—seldom feature in these accounts, issues of musical autonomy and representation (aesthetic and
political) in music studies have given way to a concern with immediacy, relationality, and vibration that bypass
a revaluation of the discipline’s own accounts of mimesis, still understood largely as imitation. I propose a
radical revision of mimesis away from its traditional understanding to bridge these various gaps and to reaffirm
the necessity of thinking of alterity and difference in expanded conceptions of musical relationality. Music is
more central in ancient Greek accounts of mimesis, especially in Plato’s Republic, than current musicology
acknowledges. In close reading of these texts and drawing on the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and
Jacques Derrida (1975), I elaborate a critical methodology to analyze the logics of mimesis—the
mimetologies—as they are deployed in theoretical works and artistic performances. I propose to understand
mimesis in music not as imitation but as (1) related to the ancient Greek mousikē—the collective
performance of sung poetry and dance; (2) the production of originals out of copies (and not the reverse);
(3) the inscription of the ethos and laws of the community through musical practice; (4) a general process
involved in the production and negotiation of value, identity, and difference. This revaluation of mimesis
challenges narratives of emancipation and discontinuity that continue to privilege a Romantic philosophy of
autonomous music and which fail to offer rigorous accounts of music’s social inscription. In close dialogue
with musicological and philosophical historiography, I focus on the Artusi-Monteverdi controversy, the
Medici intermedi of 1589, and early operas, Peri’s L’Euridice (1600) and Monteverdi’s L’Orfeo (1607). As a
mimetic performance, music does not mirror or represent social orders but participates in their production
and regulation. I conclude that early modern spectacle and opera employed an ethos of allegrezza to inscribe
the laws of a patriarchal society in which sovereign power was preserved across Europe through marriage ties
and strictly male inheritance.
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ABSTRACT 
MIMETOLOGIES: AESTHETIC POLITICS IN EARLY MODERN OPERA 
Daniel Villegas Vélez 
Jairo Moreno 
In recent decades, mimesis has become a critical term for rethinking relationality, 
difference, and affect, reconsidered against the notions of artistic autonomy and 
representation. While music—and sound in general—seldom feature in these accounts, 
issues of musical autonomy and representation (aesthetic and political) in music studies 
have given way to a concern with immediacy, relationality, and vibration that bypass a 
revaluation of the discipline’s own accounts of mimesis, still understood largely as 
imitation. I propose a radical revision of mimesis away from its traditional understanding 
to bridge these various gaps and to reaffirm the necessity of thinking of alterity and 
difference in expanded conceptions of musical relationality. Music is more central in 
ancient Greek accounts of mimesis, especially in Plato’s Republic, than current 
musicology acknowledges. In close reading of these texts and drawing on the work of 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jacques Derrida (1975), I elaborate a critical methodology 
to analyze the logics of mimesis—the mimetologies—as they are deployed in theoretical 
works and artistic performances. I propose to understand mimesis in music not as 
imitation but as (1) related to the ancient Greek mousikē—the collective performance of 
sung poetry and dance; (2) the production of originals out of copies (and not the reverse); 
(3) the inscription of the ethos and laws of the community through musical practice; (4) a 
general process involved in the production and negotiation of value, identity, and 
difference. This revaluation of mimesis challenges narratives of emancipation and 
discontinuity that continue to privilege a Romantic philosophy of autonomous music and 
which fail to offer rigorous accounts of music’s social inscription. In close dialogue with 
musicological and philosophical historiography, I focus on the Artusi-Monteverdi 
controversy, the Medici intermedi of 1589, and early operas, Peri’s L’Euridice (1600) 
and Monteverdi’s L’Orfeo (1607). As a mimetic performance, music does not mirror or 
represent social orders but participates in their production and regulation. I conclude that 
early modern spectacle and opera employed an ethos of allegrezza to inscribe the laws of 
a patriarchal society in which sovereign power was preserved across Europe through 
marriage ties and strictly male inheritance.
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Introduction 
Mimetologies 
 
If Monteverdi does not have the (sole) honor of having invented opera, at least we could 
say he composed the first “mad scene” (and perhaps the first comic opera). Except, he 
never did. He found, while pondering the libretto written by Strozzi, that mimesis and 
music find their limit in madness, since,  
The imitation of this feigned madness [l’imitatione di tal finta pazzia] must take 
into consideration only the present, not the past or the future, and consequently 
must emphasize the word, not the sense of the phrase [l’imitatione dovendo haver 
il suo appoggiamento sopra alla parola et non sopra al senso de la clausula]. So 
when she speaks of war she will have to imitate war; when of peace, peace; when 
of death, death, and so forth.1 
To be fair, it was a high bar: the task was not the imitation of madness through music, but 
of feigned madness—the imitation of an imitation of madness. Monteverdi tried to work 
around this abyssal project by requesting a virtuosic singer—“a woman capable of 
leaving aside all other imitations except the immediate one, which the word she utters 
will suggest to her”—and requesting Strozzi to modify his libretto at various points, “not 
so much on account of the poetry, as of the originality,” so that “the crazy girl is not seen 
so frequently in action,” and that “each time she comes on stage she can produce new 
moods and fresh changes of music, as indeed of gestures [novi gusti et nove differenze di 
                                                
1 Claudio Monteverdi, in a letter (no. 93) to Alessandro Striggio. Venice, 7 May 1627. Denis Stevens, ed., 
The Letters of Claudio Monteverdi (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 319; 
Claudio Monteverdi, Lettere, Dediche, E Prefazioni, ed. Domenico De’ Paoli (Roma: De Santis, 1973), 
244; For a close reading of Monteverdi’s correspondence, documenting the various difficulties that forced 
the composer to abandon the project of writing “un’ operina” for Mantua on a libretto by Giulio Strozzi 
entitled Licori finta pazza innamorata d’Aminta (Licoris, the Feigned Madwoman in Love with Amyntas), 
see Gary Tomlinson, “Twice Bitten, Thrice Shy: Monteverdi’s ‘Finta’ ‘Finta Pazza,’” JAMS 36, no. 2 
(1983): 303–11. On La finta pazza and the development of the mad scene see Paolo Fabbri, “On the Origins 
of an Operatic Topos: The Mad-Scene” in Iain Fenlon, Con Che Soavità: Studies in Italian Opera, Song, 
and Dance, 1580-1740 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 157–195; Ellen Rosand, Opera in Seventeenth-
Century Venice the Creation of a Genre (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 346–360. 
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armonie come parimenti de gesti].”2 Strozzi complied, but Monteverdi still could not 
deliver. He fell ill.3 His copyist had been delayed, and also fell ill.4 Three months later, 
the project was cancelled.5 Gary Tomlinson suspects that Monteverdi halted production 
in July and began lying to Striggio, feigning to be working and faking his, and his 
copyist’s, illnesses.6 Working for the Gonzagas seemed to summon unbidden memories 
of earlier hardships: as he had stated since the beginning of the project, he nearly killed 
himself writing l’Arianna for them twenty years earlier.7 
I. 
I will venture to say (not without irony) that perhaps we would not have learned as much 
from musical mimesis if Monteverdi had actually written the music for La finta pazza. 
His failure, his break with musical mimesis avant-la-lettre, shows everything. Not only 
does he state in his letters what we take to be the general principle of his poetics—that 
the libretto sets the rules for the music, that the words indicate what is imitated, and that 
the music follows, repeats, redoubles what the words imitate—but he also overturns this 
principle, asking for changes in the libretto, so that he can write new, more delightful 
music. He tells us that musical mimesis breaks down the sense of the text as it imitates it. 
In order to produce the intended effect, music must not imitate the entire clause, but 
single words. And with the text goes narrative time: there is no past or future, only pure 
present. Music, that is, pushes the text itself towards madness. And with this breakdown, 
one might argue, it is music itself that survives.8 
                                                
2 Letter 94. Venice, 22 May 1627. Stevens, The Letters of Claudio Monteverdi, 323. 
3 Letter 99. Venice, 3 July 1627. Ibid., 337. 
4 Letter 104. Venice, 18 August 1627. Ibid., 352. 
5 Letter 108. Venice, 18 September 1627. Ibid., 368. 
6 Tomlinson, “Twice Bitten, Thrice Shy,” 310. 
7 Letter 108. Venice, 1 May 1627. Stevens, The Letters of Claudio Monteverdi, 368. 
8 The passage recalls the antimimetic complaints issued by Vincenzo Galilei in the Dialogo della musica 
antica, et della moderna: “Our practicing contrapuntists say, indeed, they hold steadfastly to have 
expressed the thoughts of the mind and affections of the soul in an appropriate way and to have imitated the 
words every time when in setting to music a sonnet, canzone, romance, madrical, or such, in which is found 
a line that says, for example, “Aspro core selvaggio, e cruda voglia,” which is the first line of one of 
Petrarch’s sonnets, they cause the parts to make many sevenths, fourths, seconds, and major sixths and 
provoke with those means a coarse, harsh sound little grateful to the ears…Another time, if a text 
introduces ideas of fleeing or flying, they call it imitating the words when they make the music mover with 
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Is this a formulation of Monteverdi’s poetics, of his late style only, or rather an 
extreme—paradigmatic—case, revealed by the imitation of madness?9 In any case, what 
it reveals is that there is never just one mimesis: music imitates words, which imitate 
things in the world (war, peace, death, and so forth).10 This is sung by someone who must 
imitate madness, thrice: firstly, a singer who plays a character, who ceases to be herself in 
order to be someone else; she gives up her identity for another—for a character—which 
(secondly) is herself playing at being someone else; someone deranged, who (thirdly), 
loses track of the passage of time; who fixates on words rather than on clauses; who sings 
instead of speaking. Exactly where, in this drift, do we place madness, or, to give it 
another name, hysteria? Even Monteverdi suffered from its contagion—did he not feign 
an illness? Did he not abandon his project because of an earlier trauma, caused by his 
patron’s abuse? 
In this contagion, in this proliferation of alterity, mimesis resembles madness. It 
imitates madness, and it finds its limit in madness, in extreme alterity.11 After 
Monteverdi’s failed attempt, Cavalli managed to write an opera on La finta pazza that 
became a success. Afterwards, opera thrived in “mad scenes,” in representations of 
madness—feminine madness, more often than not—which made of this convention the 
privileged moment for staging the virtuosic and enthralling power of the voice. This is no 
small paradox: the dramatic enchantment of music seems to stop when madness appears 
on stage: in this instant, representation—mimesis—disappears to give place to the pure 
voice. When imitating madness, music becomes itself: pure, absolute music. 
 
This story, and its variations, has been told. Its grandest stages are opera seria, German 
romanticism, Wagner. These are the endpoints of so many narratives of the history of 
                                                                                                                                            
such speed and so little grace that just imagining it is enough.” Vincenzo Galilei, Dialogue on Ancient and 
Modern Music, Claude V. Palisca, trans. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 221-2. 
9 This issue was first raised by Ellen Rosand, “Monteverdi’s Mimetic Art: ‘L’incoronazione Di Poppea,’” 
Cambridge Opera Journal 1, no. 2 (1989): 135; See also Gary Tomlinson, Monteverdi and the End of the 
Renaissance (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 205 n. 21. 
10 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981), 191. 
11 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), 138. 
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music and mimesis where music—vocal virtuosity, harmonic profundity, organic 
development—is always the victor. Music, breaking free from the shackles of an 
“aesthetic” demand that kept it bound to language and representation, liberates itself and 
appears as it “properly is”: pure music, with no admixture, subservient to no one, 
unhindered by representation, and abolishing narrative temporality to install its own 
present.  
That “hysteria” is at the center of this story of emancipation gives us a first hint of 
what is at stake in the relation between music and mimesis. What is clear is that, for the 
emancipation to occur, a subjugation must be assumed. Because “hysteria” or “madness” 
are no more real than what they seek to exceed: there is no hysteria as such, only modes 
of exposing—by miming them—the demands of a patriarchal system which imposes its 
own norms of behavior to its other(s).12 It is in this respect that mimesis imitates 
madness: it also does not exist outside of the strictures of power that define it. It also does 
not simply cover or conceal an essence that must be liberated, since it is in miming the 
patriarchal demands that hysteria appears in the first place. 
In short, there is no mimesis as such. Yet, at the same time, there is nothing 
outside mimesis. It is impossible to exceed, overcome, or escape it.13 There are only 
mimetologies, forms of regulating and determining what is proper and improper, pure and 
impure, original and derivate, model and copy. Mimesis is not a concept or a notion. 
Sometimes I refer to it as a “force,” if only to emphasize, in a Nietzschean sense, that 
there is nothing substantial about it and that it must always be measured against other 
forces—if patriarchy, or more generally, power, can be said to be forces too. What 
matters is that they are relational: power is nothing without the apparatuses, disciplines, 
bodies, and techniques that distribute it, without the subjects it produces, and the 
resistance that arises from their interactions.14 Similarly, mimesis does not exist outside 
of its relation to power, and to the same apparatuses, bodies and so on. 
                                                
12 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Elin 
Diamond, Unmaking Mimesis: Essays on Feminism and Theatre (London: Routledge, 2003). 
13 Derrida, Dissemination, 207; Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, p. 116. This 
statement, offered here axiomatically, will become clearer in what follows. 
14 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 
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But there is a twist, a complication, already evident in the fact that I am 
comparing mimesis to power, saying that mimesis resembles power, or as I said above, 
that it resembles madness. Mimesis is not only this relationality, this constitutive 
imbrication with power, but also, especially, its lack of any property other than the fact 
that it constantly seeks to become what it is not, that it seeks to resemble everything, that 
it is imbricated with everything. To speak of mimesis as contagion, however, is not 
simply to say that “everything is connected”—although that is one common mimetology. 
No sooner does one state that “everything is connected” than differences begin to appear: 
a center, a hierarchy, a tendency, a directionality, an origin or a destination. Mimesis is as 
much the connection as the difference that is thereby produced; it is both the connection 
and the separation, preceding and producing both. There will be much more to say about 
this anteriority and alterity below. What is important, for now, is to see that we can 
hardly speak of an overcoming or an emancipation from mimesis: to say that something 
is beyond or before mimesis would be to say that it is entirely isolated, disconnected, that 
it has nothing that precedes or follows it, that it is a pure presence and a pure event, pure 
identity without admixture or alterity, existing on its own instant or eternity, which in this 
case would be the same—the Same. 
II. 
The latest versions of the story of musical emancipation from mimesis invite us to 
experience pure vibration, the materiality of sound in its immediacy.15 Beyond—or 
before—meaning, we are told, is the affective power of sound. This liberating and 
affirmative battle cry makes audible the end of hermeneutics, interpretation, and 
criticism. After decades of dissecting the canon searching for the marks of power, gender, 
race, or what have you, of treating musical works like cyphered texts, we are hailed to 
                                                
15 References are too many to be mentioned here. I take Carolyn Abbate’s 2004 “Music—Drastic or 
Gnostic?” to be the first articulation of this turn, and recent works like Nina Sun Eidsheim, Sensing Sound: 
Singing & Listening as Vibrational Practice, 2015, and Volume 19 of Women and Music: A Journal of 
Gender and Culture (2015) as clear presentations of the academic, historical, and political stakes of this 
turn (see for example the essays by Holly Watkins and Melina Esse “Down with Disembodiment; or, 
Musicology and the Material Turn” or Ryan Dohoney, “Echo’s Echo: Subjectivity in Vibrational Ontology.” 
   6
turn to the very real, material, and palpable forces that are only experienced in the act of 
musical performance. The tyranny of representation and meaning is over. Constructivism 
and deconstruction are passé. It is a matter now of attending to the very real bodies, 
technologies, and affects that, in their presence, make us love music itself or make us 
vulnerable to its powerful effects.  
It would be necessary to write a history of mimesis in/as/and music to show that 
this latest turn to performance and materiality is but a return, a repetition of the call for 
the emancipation of music from its subservience to language, that is, of the triumph of 
absolute music. There is a certain madness in repetition.  
But it would be equally mad to write such a history. One would need to begin 
with “Pythagoras” (in scare quotes since there was probably no such “historical figure”) 
and explain what it means that music imitates the structure of the cosmos, which is itself 
musical. At the same time, one would have to explore what the ancient Greeks called 
mousikē—which, as is well-known, condenses the union of song, dance, and word—that 
fills the various roles of education, religion, politics, and spectacle in the Greek polis. 
One would need to deal with the obscure figure of Damon, who stressed the political and 
ethical effects of mousikē. But one would also, especially, have to reckon with Plato—
Damon’s student—and his banishment of mimetic practices (which he nonetheless 
described with unmatched insight), only to replace it with the “highest” form of 
mousikē—philosophy, as well as writing the first of a very long tradition of cosmological 
dream-myths about the “Harmony of the Spheres.” One would then need to examine the 
work of poets and tragedians, especially Sophocles and Aeschylus, and also the comedies 
of Aristophanes. And this would only be the beginning. Since then it would be necessary 
to turn to Aristotle—who did not turn away from tragedy—and his reincorporation of 
mimesis into philosophy, into a Poetics, and seek the place of music in other assorted 
texts—tellingly, in the Politics, where he says that music imitates character, ethos, and 
that it produces those same effects on listeners. We would even have to look in those 
texts of a certain “pseudo- Aristotle.” And none of this would be complete without 
elaborating on the various ways in which the Hellenistic tradition responded to these 
figures, with Aristoxenus, the Epicurean Philodemus—who may have been the first to 
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utter the cry of music itself—and Aristides Quintilianus, who formalized Aristotle’s 
succinct remarks on music and collected all the musical knowledge of his time. And the 
madness of the task would just start to become apparent since, from a strictly historical 
perspective, there would be a break here, as all of these texts would have gone missing 
for centuries. Does one write a history of what has disappeared or of what remains? 
We can imagine a second origin or a second beginning of our history then, taking 
off from the Early Christians, from Augustine and Boethius, that would make sense of 
their attempts to make sense of the Greeks: For example, by distributing the various 
mimetic powers of music into musica mundana, humana, and instrumentalis, a mimetic 
cosmo-musicology if there ever was one. Or in their continuation of the tradition of 
cosmological dreams and the development of harmonics, both extremely developed 
readings of the “Pythagorean” axioms. (I am already restricting this overview to the 
“West,” which does not even properly begin here).  
Not to mention the “invention” of musical notation, from the mimetic chiro-
musicology of the Guidonian hand onwards, since writing is always a matter of mimesis. 
Soon, as we know, the schools of Ars nova and Ars subtilior began relishing in producing 
works where so many different types of imitation were the norm (fill in your favorites). 
And here—to judge from the common curriculum, although this is still pushing the 
margins—we would finally find ourselves in “properly musicological” terrain. Not that 
this would offer us more solid ground, as only here it would start to become apparent that 
the opposition between orality and literacy which would offer a way to distinguish 
between “secular” and “sacred” music, and thus to make sense of the music that 
“remains” in notation and the music that is “lost,” is already compromised by mimesis. It 
is not surprising that the most promising works on medieval music seek to go beyond the 
limits of notation to recover the music itself, in all its sensuality.  
One would need to start all over yet again, because those early texts (first Plato, 
then Aristotle, Aristides, and all the works on harmonics and tuning as well as the 
cosmological dreams about the harmony of the spheres) reappeared in an entirely new 
context, that is, de- and re-contextualized, torn from their origin and read as carrying the 
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most ancient—hence original—knowledge on music. From the most philosophical to the 
most esoteric forms of Neoplatonism and Hermeticism, the connection between magic 
and music—which is none other than mimesis—was finally heard in the West. And 
perhaps here one of the largest paradoxes would show itself: that the Renaissance sought, 
with all its technical, mythical, magical, philological, and virtuosic resources, to model 
itself after—to imitate—the Greeks, to take up their knowledge, power, and authority, 
and carry it—magically—into the present. The Italian Renaissance is none other than a 
mad proliferation (and rejections) of mimesis. One would find at the same time 
affirmations of “good” kinds of mimesis over “bad” ones: imitation of the ancients; 
imitation of the masters; surpassing the masters by emulation; surpassing emulation by 
concealing emulation—and here (but not only here) it would have been the Church that 
rejected this mimetic madness.  
The new thing in the Renaissance was to imitate speech, imitating the ancients, 
who never had polyphony. And then the “modern” constellation: imitating the affections; 
expressing the affections; moving the affections (which has often been a stumbling block 
for the historiography of mimesis: is expression a form of imitation, or its opposite?). 
Only, of course, there was nothing modern about this: it is what ancient music always 
was. Is this—the stile rappresentativo—as crazy as it might seem, the moment when 
music “first” became subservient to mimesis, to language, as many accounts would have 
us believe? Or is it the beginning of music’s emancipation? At a time when hardly a 
single pronouncement was made about what mimesis was without it being contested—
from a text by Ficino to a text by Aristotle, back to Plato or Plutarch—everyone was in 
search of the via naturale alla imitatione. And somehow within all of this madness, opera 
was born in Italy from the specter of Greek music.  
We have circled back to Monteverdi and his “hysteric” where, in one and the 
same figure, music was the most subservient to words and the most emancipated. From 
here we would have to study the great early modern scientific treatises of Kepler, 
Mersenne, and Kircher, each of which attempts to portray the entire cosmos as a musical 
universe, bringing mimesis to unthought extremes and disquietingly close to modern 
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science—dare we call them “baroque”?16 And we haven’t even mentioned the idea of the 
imitation of nature that aimed to separate what these madmen had confused, now 
returning to the “true” Aristotle; establishing “Aesthetics” as the science of art which 
would become prevalent—as the story goes—in the eighteenth century; only to find its 
end “around 1800” with the rise of instrumental music, and to find that what better 
described these works was an “all-pervading” organicism, i.e. a total mimesis. This is 
where most accounts of the emancipation of music from mimesis begin and end. A very 
analytical reviewer of the eponymous book by John Neubauer,17 still a classic telling of 
this narrative, found its strategy to be problematic: 
[Neubauer’s] general strategy is to construe the notion of imitation so broadly that 
it is roughly synonymous with the term “refer.” Having done this, expression 
turns out to be a species of imitation since arguments for representation, self-
expression, or arousal of passion by music amount to so many theories about the 
                                                
16 The Baroque enjoys a weakened reputation among historicist musicology which, starting with Palisca, 
sees it as lacking any stylistic unity as a period, holding instead that “if there is a common thread that unites 
the great variety of music within the period that we call baroque, it is an underlying faith in music’s power, 
indeed, its obligation, to move the affections.” Yet even if this concession stands today in the New Grove 
Dictionary, current doubts about the effectivity of the term are more widespread. Richard Taruskin’s 
position is radical, as could be expected, and it seems to be an established one: “‘Baroque’ is a term that 
musicians do not need. Trying to justify it in any terms that actually relate to the music of the period has 
never led to anything but quibbling, sophistry, and tergiversation. All it is now is a commercial logo for a 
kind of ‘classical music’ that record companies and radio stations market as sonic wallpaper. Let’s try to 
forget it.” Richard Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music. Volume 1, (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
university press, 2010), 797. Not too distant from Palisca, then, Taruskin suggests referring to the period as 
“The Italian age,” the “Galilean period,” the “Cartesian period,” the “theatrical age,” or the “continuo age” 
depending, he holds, whether one wishes to emphasize aesthetics, philosophy, media or technique. 
Although recognizing that each of these characteristics remain in music today, the dismissal fails to identify 
a key problem in the history of music that arises precisely in this period, namely the appearance of a 
particular form of historical consciousness—modernity, for lack of a better name—that would begin to 
affirm itself more strongly and to impose the form of rationality that would produce the same attempts of 
periodization and hierarchization that Taruskin decries as “quibbling, sophistry and tergiversation.” 
However nuanced, specific, and descriptive the new nomenclature may be, it remains within the same logic 
of inductive periodization and generalization—it even emphasizes its effect by pretending a more scientific 
accuracy in its observations at the cost of their universalization. 
17 John Neubauer, The Emancipation of Music from Language: Departure from Mimesis in Eighteenth-
Century Aesthetics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). 
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means of musical imitation. No new aesthetics is forthcoming since the concept of 
mimesis remains intact.18 
As I see it, this is what Neubauer got right about such a project, although I am not saying 
that this is what he attempted to do.19 Whether it is Neubauer’s strategy to construe the 
concept of mimesis broadly, or that mimesis itself will not be easily reduced to a single 
notion, it could not have gone otherwise without ignoring “species of imitation” that do 
not cease to appear, without reducing them to a single narrative that makes such an 
emancipation possible.20 In fact, my problem with Neubauer’s work is that he does not 
take this strategy far enough, since what he locates beyond mimesis—the passage to 
formalism—is a “Pythagorean” conception of music, namely that music has its ground in 
number. But is this not another, if not the first, at least the most comprehensive, indeed 
cosmic, theory of music and mimesis, the one that started the whole story? 
 
If, as this survey suggests, music and mimesis have been linked for most of their history, 
then to write a history of music and mimesis would mean to write an entire history of 
music. One could say that the madness lies not in attempting to write such a history, but 
                                                
18 Philip Alperson, “Book Review: The Emancipation of Music from Language: Departure from Mimesis in 
Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46, no. 3 (1988): 443. 
19 The reader may see here an example of my general strategy of reading secondary literature that deals 
with mimesis and its history: since, as I argue in detail below, historiography is inseparable from the 
theoretical problem of mimesis, secondary literature must be treated as primary, i.e., in need of 
commentary and critique, of double readings that will outline their limitations as part of the history we aim 
to write. 
20 Thus, I consider Neubauer’s book—mainly its limitations—to still be central to the narratives of 
musicology, even as some attempt to dismiss it as outmoded. Further, the narrative of emancipation that 
drives traditional accounts of music and modernity has only been somewhat moderated by historiographical 
accounts that focus on discontinuity rather than progress or historic cyclicality. Both Michel Foucault’s 
“epistemes” and Jacques Rancière’s “regimes” identify a breaking point somewhere “around 1800” in 
which representation, already a restricted form of mimesis, would cease to organize thought (Foucault) and 
aesthetic experience (Rancière). The nature of this discontinuity in the case of music, however, is less easy 
to determine, and the few attempts to work it through have done so with the same restricted notion of 
mimesis in view, one which most conveniently suits well the modern narrative of an abstract or “formalist” 
absolute music. In this connection one can mention Mark E. Bonds, Music as Thought: Listening to the 
Symphony in the Age of Beethoven (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Daniel K. L. Chua, 
Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 1992); Gary Tomlinson, Metaphysical Song: An Essay on Opera. (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). These works take Neubauer’s work as their reference point with 
respect to musical mimesis. 
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in that no one has done it before. This is a good moment to interrupt this overview, which 
perhaps has raised more questions than it should have. For example, what kind of history 
is this presumed to be? What is the point of this rushed accumulation of names and 
references? After all, simply because something is long and complex, and because one 
knows which names to drop, does not mean that it is mad. Rather, the point of 
historiography should be to offer a lucid narrative, a clean account that synthesizes a 
manifold into manageable units, periods, or contexts.21 What I have written above might 
seem mad because it appears confused, but it does not mean history is mad. I would 
agree. Yet, by offering here such an overview of the history of mimesis and music up to 
c. 1700 under the form of a conditional, of a “would be,” and stating that it would be 
madness to write such a history, and by insisting in a presumed difference between what 
seems and what is, I am suggesting that historiography itself is a mimetic affair.22 It is not 
so much that to write a history is to compose a fiction—however “real” its elements 
might be. Rather, it is to say that to write a history is already to tell a story, to select a few 
elements among an infinite amount of texts and events, ignoring others, and to order them 
                                                
21 Such an account would look like what Carl Dahlhaus offers, a recollection of theories of imitatio naturae 
in music, which he extends as prevalent from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, locating the origin of 
mimesis in Aristotle, above all through the medium of dance and modified, almost beyond recognition, by 
imitatio in the Latin translation. He distinguishes six ways of imitation, which are presented first as types 
and then linked through a narrative of historical transformations. The types are:  
 1. Imitation of non-musical sounds. 
 2. Representation of spatial movement, or more generally the “habit” of using visual metaphors to refer to 
sounding events; these two merge in the concept of Tonmalerei: acoustic imitation on the one hand and the 
musical depiction of spatial movement on the other.  
 3. Imitation of speech intonations. 
 4. Depiction of emotion, closely and directly associated to (3), suggesting a correspondence with the 
former two (1 and 2), such that “the imitation of nature ‘outside’—the representation of acoustic 
phenomena and the depiction of movement in space or time—can be compared with the imitation of nature 
‘inside’, in the representation of intonations and the expression of affections and emotions.” The latter, 
furthermore, can be distinguished as “an aesthetics of effect, a theory of imitation and a principle of 
expression.”  
 5. Early Modern musical symbolism that relies on etymology as the identity between the essence of a thing 
and its name.  
 6. Pythagoreanism and Hanslick’s formalism joined as the depiction of nature as a whole, a mirror of the 
structure of the world according to proportion, number and weight, or similarly as an organism, a complete 
and coherent nexus of functions. Dahlhaus, 1985, 21. 
22 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). 
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in patterns that happen to be the same ones that literature employs. Historiography 
resembles fiction, it behaves mimetically towards it. Or else, as in the case of historical 
positivism, it imitates science. This is not surprising for anyone. What is surprising, even 
daunting, is to try write a history of mimesis even as one acknowledges that 
historiography is mimetic: this is what makes it mad, three times mad—like Monteverdi’s 
finta pazza.  
III. 
But fear not. This dissertation is not such a history, not even a story or a series of them. It 
is also not an analytical classification of types of musical mimesis. Much less is it a 
poetics (or a melopoeia, if that word had kept its meaning outside of Pound’s analysis), a 
theory of what musical mimesis is, or should be. We can say provisionally that it is all 
three. But it could be thought, perhaps, not as the combination but as their mutual 
exclusion, aiming to describe what is necessarily left out of each of these without being 
taken up by the others. In any case, it is an attempt to face the consequences of 
approaching historiography as being unavoidably conditioned by mimesis, by the play of 
doubling and referentiality that complicates the distance between an object of study and 
its historiographical framing.  
In other words, what brings the attempt to write a history of music and mimesis 
close to madness is not its sheer dimension—encompassing the entire history of music in 
the West—but rather that there is no simple way of demarcating it, of precisely defining 
the limits of the matter and treating it objectively. One has to select boundaries, starting 
and ending points, which will appear all the more arbitrary as one gives more reasons for 
their selection, as they already imply the narrative—the mimetic framing—that one aims 
to present. Even the most detached, factual description is already caught up in the same 
problematic, namely that it assumes a simple relation between what is and what appears, 
where the description attempts to reproduce its object in all its faithfulness: to be true. 
Thus, either one follows every minute detail of the discussions (which we cannot assume 
were clear for its actors), or else one synthesizes and rearranges the statements to provide 
a reasonable account. There might be other possibilities but, again, each of these implies 
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a mimetology: realism, thick description, analysis—the choice between these is a 
decision, a determination of what mimesis is. The first result of attempting such a history 
is at least the recognition that it cannot be made under a traditional separation between a 
historical object and a historiographical presentation.  
For Arne Melberg, the problem is the opposite: the task of writing a history of 
mimesis (in literature) is not only overwhelming, but it has already been done, once by 
Eric Auerbach in his 1946 Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature 
and again by two German critics, Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf. Both attempts, in 
his reading, reduce the multifarious nature of mimesis in their attempt to produce a neat 
narrative.23 Auerbach’s groundbreaking study works today better as the negative 
demarcation of what needs to be done. It was his insight that mimesis cannot be analyzed 
outside of its historical transformations insofar as it is the very process by which 
difference is produced. His work initiates the historical-conceptual approach to mimesis. 
Melberg, for one, finds that “his view of the very concept in question, mimesis, is 
simplifying in a way that makes [Auerbach] blind to differential movements.”24 Gebauer 
and Wulf, on the other hand, note that Auerbach “overlooks the question of power in 
history and thus fails to recognize the potential in having at one’s disposal the means of 
symbolic expression, which entails the power of interpreting social reality and in that way 
endowing it with form and meaning.”25 This remark, incidentally, also encapsulates their 
own stakes and interpretation of mimesis: mimesis is not limited to art because “symbolic 
expression” is also what constitutes social reality, so that controlling one entails 
controlling the other.26 Thus, they append to Auerbach’s Mimesis a different subtitle: 
Culture, Art, Society. In this exemplary work, they manage to cover the relation between 
culture and power—in literature—from ancient Greece to Derrida. Not only do they 
provide insightful readings of their sources but they do so through a conceptually solid 
                                                
23 Arne Melberg, Theories of Mimesis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1995), 9. 
26 A formulation that does not fail to call to mind Stuart Hall’s best works, even if Gebauer and Wulf do not 
mention him. 
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account of mimesis that is able to describe the historical variabilities of their object 
through a large corpus of primary sources. Most importantly, they produce an integration 
of these concepts into their own reading. They attempt to produce a work that is halfway 
between history and theory, which is historically grounded but conceptually articulated. 
The formulation of their approach bears quoting at length: 
Our object requires us to confront processes of historical transformation; it calls 
for a specific kind of intellectual recapitulation of historical movement. But our 
undertaking only makes sense given a minimum degree of comparability among 
the various usages of the concept; we will introduce frame concepts to this end. 
The only concepts suitable for such a purpose are ones that have themselves been 
part of the historical processes, as the intellectual product of the persons involved. 
We shall develop our frame of conceptual reference out of the history of mimesis, 
which means precisely that historical reflection serves to establish the frame of 
reference without which the reflections would not be possible.27 
And yet, even such an account finds itself compromised by the history it attempts to 
narrate. Again, Melberg identifies its limits: the need for periodization, their “frame of 
conceptual reference,” requires that, for example, they organize their narrative through 
the successive “discovery” in the history of mimesis of concepts like “trace,” or 
“simulacrum,” or “time”—the latter reserved for Lessing—even though all of these can 
be found everywhere in its history. Melberg’s solution is to bracket the question of the 
historicity of the concept: “the problems involved seemed overwhelming.”28 It is an 
elegant strategy. In place of a narrative where mimesis turns into repetition by the 
introduction of time, Melberg holds that “Mimesis is inherently and always already a 
repetition—meaning that mimesis is always the meeting-place of two opposing but 
connected ways of thinking, acting and making: similarity and difference.”29 In each of 
his four chapters, grouped under the names Plato, Cervantes, Rousseau, and Kierkegaard, 
                                                
27 Gebauer and Wulf, Mimesis, 4. 
28 Melberg, Theories of Mimesis, 2. 
29 Ibid. 
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he accounts for the problems of time, repetition, similarity, and difference (and a large 
number of theorists), without having to deal with the messy problem of (meta)history. 
IV. 
I cannot promise that what lies ahead will be anywhere as clean as that. The problems 
involved in ignoring historicity (or politics) seem overwhelming (and, after all, the 
relation between literature and mimesis has been combed repeatedly, which is not the 
case for music). Stated simply, this dissertation maps critically the various ways in which 
mimesis is conceptualized and employed in musical discourse and under the emerging 
paradigm of sovereignty in early modern Italy, specifically the period between 1558 and 
1650, that is, framed by Gioseffo Zarlino’s Istitutioni harmoniche and Athanasius 
Kircher’s Musurgia Universalis, in Mantua, Florence, and Rome. But these frames are 
arbitrary. The Istitutioni appears within the controversy between Artusi and Monteverdi 
c. 1600, as the background against which Monteverdi declares the rules of his so-called 
Second Practice (Part II: Second Origins; chapters 3 and 4). The Musurgia appears in a 
concluding epilogue, where I argue that it played an important aesthetic and political role 
in modernity, in the elaboration of a total political theater of the universe, a mimetic 
cosmo-musico-politics. These two extremes turn around a large section (Part III: 
Orpheus’ Modern Turn) dedicated to the figure of Orpheus in early modern spectacle, 
specifically in Rinuccini and Peri’s 1600 L’Euridice (chapter 6) and Striggio and 
Monteverdi’s L’Orfeo (chapters 5 and 8). This section elaborates on the notions of 
allegory, performance, and sovereignty in the baroque and the mimetologies that organize 
their relations, paradigmatically in the Medici 1589 intermedi (chapter 7), where the 
crucial political figure turns out to be Machiavelli, precursor of opera. Parts II and III 
look back to Plato, arguably the most important figure in the history of mimesis. In order 
to develop a critical strategy and a vocabulary for understanding the multiplicity of forms 
that mimesis takes in the context of the humanist de- and recontextualization of ancient 
Greek musical thought, I devote two chapters to the important philological investigations 
of the notion of mimesis that led to Eric Havelock’s postulation of the orality/literacy 
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paradigm to elaborate on the relation of music and mimesis in Greek mousikē and its 
transformations in Plato (Part I: Origins).  
If I could describe the trajectory of these parts as a narrative, I would say, as 
everyone does, that it all began with the Platonic proscription of mousikē from the ideal 
republic. Hence it begins before Plato, for what is this so-called mousikē? It turns out that 
we can only approach it through its banishing and dismembering, under the sign of 
Dionysus (Part I). It begins again when Monteverdi declares that his music, which seeks 
to find new harmonies and new affections, is “second with respect to its use, but first with 
respect to origin,” this origin being, presumably, Plato (Part II). This return to Plato did 
not deliver ancient music but a new, modern one. Now comes the twist: in aiming to 
recover the specter of Greek music, the humanists, and Monteverdi, resemble Orpheus. 
What they recovered, instead, was a new form spectacle with an aesthetics and a politics 
of its own: what Plato banished now returns and is made constitutive of the early modern 
Italian State (Part III).  
The figure of Orpheus is an appropriate trope to characterize the birth of opera 
and modern music in various respects. Figura is one name for mimesis, and Orpheus is a 
common figure of figura.30 As a trope, it is a repetition. But it is also a movement, a turn 
backwards, towards the past, which nevertheless moves forward in a particular way or 
mode—tropos. Moreover, the Orpheus myth stages a structural opposition between music 
(which enchants) and the gaze (which undoes the enchantment). The consequences of this 
opposition play out in important ways in early modernity, as the passage from an ancient, 
magical world to a modern, rational one. Instead of a transition, there is an inversion: 
vision, the spectacle, is affirmed, while music and magic are rendered invisible, marginal, 
and accessory—and yet constitutive. This is an important consequence of the specular-
speculative-spectacular-spectral determination of Platonic mimetology. The audible and 
the invisible cannot be presumed to constitute a before or beyond representation, since 
                                                
30 See “Figura” (1938) in Erich Auerbach, Time, History, and Literature: Selected Essays of Erich 
Auerbach, ed. James I. Porter and Jane O. Newman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
Orpheus figures here more as the musician in the myth than as the mythical author of the Hermetic “Orphic 
Hymns” that fascinated Ficino.  
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they are “always already” comprehended within the speculative and the spectacular.31 
This inversion occurs upon the theatrical stage, but also in “the stage of the world,” the 
theatrum mundi, which actualized the old notion of the Harmony of the Spheres. This 
entire story, of a recovery and transformation of ancient music, magic, and knowledge 
into a modern—indeed baroque—spectacle organized by mimesis, which serves to figure 
not only music but also the entire universe, is paradigmatically staged in Kircher’s 
Musurgia Universalis (epilogue). 
 
The principal methodological tool employed here, which I developed as I wrote what 
follows and which draws upon the work of Jacques Derrida and Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe, is an analysis of mimetologies—to be distinguished from Gérard Genette’s 
mimology and narratology.32 It is far from being a systematic approach, but could be 
formulated in the following postulates: 
v The task is to demarcate the logic (logics, since there is never just one) of 
mimesis—the mimetologies—which are the various ways in which one defines, 
under a specific form or figure, what mimesis is, how it behaves and what it does, 
often but not exclusively in terms of originals and copies. A mimetology, 
moreover, is also an onto-mimetology, defining what things so defined are as 
such.33 My focus will be on two specific mimetologies: that of ancient Greek 
                                                
31 Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 117 n. 118. 
32 Lacoue-Labarthe uses the term mimetology to refer to the logic in which a philosophical formulation of 
mimesis exceeds its regulation at the same time as it is being formulated. Thus, he describes the “Platonic 
mimetology” in “Typography” and discusses the “Aristotelian mimetology” in “The Echo of the Subject.” 
In “Diderot: Paradox and Mimesis,” he offers the following definition: “The logic of the paradox 
[formulated by Diderot], the hyperbologic, is nothing other than the very logic of mimesis. That is to say, if 
I may again be allowed the formulation, mimetologic. This means simply that the logical matrix of the 
paradox is the very structure of mimesis. In general. It is not by chance that the law of mimesis should be 
enunciated, and should never be enunciated in anything but, the form of a paradox. But neither is it by 
chance, inversely, that the logic of paradox is always a logic of semblance, articulated around the division 
between appearance and reality, presence and absence, the same and the other, or identity and difference. 
This is the division that grounds (and that constantly unsteadies) mimesis.” Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 
260. 
33 The coinage of onto-mimetological is a crucial reference to Heidegger’s onto-theology, a term that 
identifies the metaphysical forgetting of Being. Lacoue-Labarthe thus aligns himself with the project of the 
destruction of metaphysics, in which his reading of mimesis plays a large role to identify, precisely in 
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mousikē and the Platonic one, which is already multiple. Mousikē names a 
performative, embodied, enactive, and sonorous mimetology that grounds itself 
on myth. Contemporary names for it could be “Muse-ic,” or perhaps 
“musicking.”34 Of the two, Platonic mimetology is dominant: its crucial marks are 
an emphasis on vision and theory, on spectacle and speculation, and an 
ontological claim about what truly is, and what only appears to be, where the 
product of mimesis is a debased copy of the appearance, three times removed 
from what truly is.35  
v More importantly, Platonic mimetology aims to distinguish itself from that 
of mousikē, presenting itself as the “true” mimetology. The opposition between 
the two is irreducible to those between the audible and the visual, practice and 
theory, speech and writing, art and philosophy, physical and metaphysical, and so 
on. Yet it is everywhere imbricated in the production of these differences. 
Furthermore, since Platonic mimetology aims to come after mousikē, to follow it 
and replace it, Platonic mimetology reinscribes itself as being in opposition to 
mousikē and thus determines it as its other. Thus, it is never a matter of recovering 
one or the other, but of understanding their mutual constitution, their exclusive 
relationality. 
v Mimesis is a productive force. What it produces in the last instance is 
alterity, or difference itself. Thus, every operation in which it is involved is 
political at the most general level. Insofar as mimesis is a mode of production, a 
type of “technology” or “culture” which is nevertheless “natural,”36 one must 
always approach mimesis in relation to two fields, spheres, or forces: economy—
                                                                                                                                            
Heidegger, traces of this forgetting as a clue to the fateful outcome of the German philosopher in his 
involvement with National Socialism. Ibid. 
34 Muse-ic is the translation offered by Felicia McCarren, to translate Giorgio Agamben’s Musaïque, which 
he proposed to Lacoue-Labarthe as a translation for Walter Benjamin’s Musische, his German translation of 
Mousikē. Ibid., 62 and 152 n. 28. Musicking was suggested by Christopher Small as a verb that 
encompasses all musical activity from composing to performing to listening in any form or setting. 
Christopher Small, Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1998). 
35 Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 69. 
36 Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses (New York, NY: Routledge, 
1993). 
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understood broadly as the production, circulation, and consumption of all types of 
value37—and politics—understood as the differential regulation of what is 
audible, thinkable, and doable within a specific distribution of the sensible in a 
community.38 Mimetology, then, is a question of political economy. A 
mimetology does not only define how differences are produced, but distributes 
them among the various classes of a community (philosophers vs. artists; nobles 
vs. artisans; capitalists vs. proletariats; but also men and women; straight and 
queer; hysterics or madmen; scientists and magicians, and so on) while at the 
same time defining the place and function of these classes with respect to what 
such mimetology defines. 
v But mimetology is also a question of aesthetics. In a restricted sense, 
namely that mimetologies are most commonly deployed in or through art, as 
theory or as practice, as description or prescription. But more generally, since 
among the fundamental operations of mimetology (especially, but not exclusively 
the Platonic one) is the distribution of what truly is and what appears, what is 
thinkable and what is sensible, and so on. It is this distribution of the sensible that 
I understand more generally as aesthetic. It is only because of this anteriority that 
art came to be defined as the object of the science of “Aesthetics” in the 
eighteenth century. It also helps us see that art, from the beginning, has been 
political in aim and nature: if politics names the distribution of the sensible, then 
we can conceive of mimetology as what organizes the set of discourses, practices, 
technologies, and bodies by which such distribution of the sensible is effected. As 
we know all too well, no art is politically innocent. This, far from being a casual 
                                                
37 Jacques Derrida, “Economimesis,” Diacritics 11, no. 2 (July 1981): 3–25; Georges Bataille, The 
Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1988); 
David Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams (New 
York: Palgrave, 2001). 
38 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible, trans. Gabriel Rockhill 
(London: Continuum, 2004). 
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or empirical matter, is an essential condition of art; it has been its highest 
ambition since it has been defined as such.39 
V. 
All told, Melberg does have a theory about the historicity of mimesis. Modern theorists, 
he writes, become modern by emphasizing “the differential movements of what earlier 
was called mimesis,” that is, in opposition to earlier emphases on similarity and by a 
linguistic turn that is also an ontological turn.40 Such an emphasis on difference, 
according to Melberg, appear first in Heidegger’s definition of mimesis as Nachahmung, 
a “doing after,” a production that comes afterwards and is hence marked by distance.41 
The linguistic turn (in its “postructuralist” sense) complicates the conventional 
relationship between signified and signifier such that the capacity of literature to refer to 
the world (one sense of literary mimesis) becomes far from certain, whereas what is truly 
certain is that literature seems to turn upon itself. But this turn, Melberg notes, is not 
really new: both Plato (in the Cratylus) and baroque literature made it a point to 
demonstrate a certain autonomy in language: “[Shakespeare’s] Feste declares that ‘words 
are very rascals, since bonds disgraced them,’ thereby providing us with something like a 
motto for the linguistic aspects of the never very stable relations between sign and 
signified.”42 What the “ontological turn” means for Melberg is less clear. Comparing 
Shakespeare’s jester to Derrida, and succinctly summarizing his survey of the historical 
development of twentieth century theories of mimesis, Melberg writes that “the historical 
approach to mimesis outlined by Auerbach and emphasized by Gebauer and Wulf with 
the caesura of ‘modernity’ has—after Nietzsche and with Heidegger and Derrida—turned 
into different mimetic orders; and into a mimetical order of difference.”43 Except that, as 
he would recognize, such an ontology of sameness and difference was there since Plato. 
                                                
39 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Musica Ficta: Figures of Wagner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1994), xxii. 
40 Melberg, Theories of Mimesis, 5. 
41 Ibid. Heidegger’s interpretation of mimesis, pursued more explicitly in his 1936 lectures on Nietzsche, is 
well elaborated in Lacoue-Labarthe’s “Typography.” See also Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. David 
Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979), v. 1 pp. 162ff. 
42 Melberg, Theories of Mimesis, 5.  
43 Ibid. 
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The point being that we would not have been able to describe what happens in Plato as 
differential ontological orders of difference (instead of sameness) until the metaphysical 
notions of sameness and difference had been deconstructed.  
What this means is that, with respect to mimesis, analytic and historical 
approaches become indistinguishable. The way we make sense of the history of mimesis 
depends, to utter the ultimate platitude, on how we understand “history” and “mimesis.” 
In other words, theory comes first, to state the obvious. Melberg’s nod to Derrida and 
Paul de Man, who cap his study under the name of Kierkegaard, shows well enough that 
even such a succinct account of mimesis is only possible today under the sign of 
deconstruction. Not because deconstruction is last in the history of mimesis, finishing, 
synthesizing, or accomplishing its historical development. Rather, because by refusing 
closure and speculative synthesis, Derrida has been able to show how to maintain at the 
same time the historicity of mimesis and the theoretical rigor that is required to preserve 
the openness of the historical. For this dissertation, Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe’s most 
important move consists in making possible to show the difference between specific or 
restricted forms of mimesis (which aim for systematic closure or referentiality) and a 
general mimesis that makes the restricted ones possible while, at the same time, ruining 
their restricted systematicity by “remarking” their marks as being at the same time 
referential and self-referential, or in other words, a reference without referent.44  
This point merits closer examination. In Mimique, Mallarmé writes about a 
booklet or libretto by mime Paul Margueritte, entitled “Pierrot Murderer of His Wife,” 
where the author describes a mime that “mimes nothing.”45 The scene, Mallarmé writes, 
is “here anticipating, there recalling, in the future, in the past, under the false appearance 
of a present. That is how the mime operates, whose act is confined to a perpetual allusion 
without breaking the ice or the mirror: he thus sets up a medium, a pure medium, of 
                                                
44 Geoffrey Bennington, Interrupting Derrida (Routledge, 2014), 52. 
45 Having presumably murdered Columbine, Pierrot is seen miming “in the present” his preparation for the 
murder, the anticipation of all the actions that he will carry on, all the possible ways he might murder 
Columbine, miming each action and also miming her, until he decides on tickling her to death; except 
Columbine does not die; Pierrot does, in a hallucination. 
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fiction.”46 Hence, the mime is miming an act, in the present, that never happened. In other 
words, it has no referent and nothing to represent and yet mimes it, not unlike the feigned 
madness, the hysteria, of La finta pazza. We would be tempted to see this “pure medium 
of fiction” as a pure acting, of performance—a voice that breaks with its representational 
constraints and appears in its pure materiality, a voice and nothing more. The mime, 
imitating nothing, would seem “to go back, beyond imitation, toward a more ‘originary’ 
sense of alētheia and of mimesthai.”47 In other words, literature (or music) would allow 
for the unveiling of Being, of what is: of truth. That is, it would return to the Platonic 
mimetology, escaping one interpretation of truth (as homoiosis or adequatio) for another, 
equally metaphysical interpretation, as the presentation of the thing itself, as aletheia.48 
Thus, the important conclusion that Derrida reaches in “The Double Session” is that, 
Any attempt to reverse mimetologism or escape it in one fell swoop by leaping 
out of it with both feet would only amount to an inevitable and immediate fall 
back into its system: in suppressing the double or making it dialectical, one is 
back in the perception of the thing itself, the production of its presence, its truth, 
as idea, form, or matter.49 
In fact, Derrida shows, with Mallarmé it is never a matter of producing a pure language, 
detached from the world, without referent. For this would only mean that language is a 
                                                
46 Quoted in Derrida, Dissemination, 175. 
47 Ibid., 206. 
48 The two interpretations, that is, that Heidegger locates at the origin of metaphysics. Derrida’s focus in the 
first part of “The Double Session” is the relation of literature and truth as determined by mimesis, which, as 
he shows, oscillates between these two interpretations. In fact, he shows, all the possible variations of the 
relation between mimesis and truth are programmed in the “logical machine” of Platonism, which he 
sketches in the following manner: Either one holds that  
 1. the double simply repeats without adding or subtracting, thus 
  a. the double is nothing; 
b. the value of the model determines the value of the copy; 
c. since it doesn’t add anything to the model then imitation is bad in itself. 
 Or else, 2. Whether like or unlike, the imitator is something, since mimesis and likenesses do exist. It 
follows that 
a. the copy supplements the model and ceases to be nothing or a non-value; 
  b. In adding to the existing model, the imitator is unlike the model, even if the resemblance is 
absolute; 
c. as a supplement that replaces the model without being its equal, the imitator is in essence 
inferior even while replacing the model. 
49 Derrida, Dissemination, 207. 
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purely ideal (Platonic) entity—and Mallarmé is above all not an idealist. On the contrary, 
Mallarmé insists on the “materiality of the idea” but especially upon mimicry and the 
simulacrum: the mime does not simply act, he mimes—but there is nothing to mime. It is 
not a break with referentiality but reference without a (single) referent, without any first 
or last unit—without an original or an arche. Always at least double, or more than one, 
without having started from one. The crucial aspect, then, is that Mallarmé preserves the 
differential structure of mimesis—referentiality—but without the metaphysical 
interpretation that implies that something that is—either an act or an idea—is being 
imitated. It is not the simple affirmation of the simulacrum, but a simulacrum of 
Platonism: a mimesis of mimesis that preserves and exceeds simple referentiality.  
In the same way, as Irigaray and Butler show, hysteria and queerness mime the 
roles that a patriarchal system assigns to woman: there is no ‘Woman’ that other women 
must imitate, and it is by imitating this imitation without a model, by displacing 
(exaggerating) the imitation, that the “hysteric” or the “queer” appear within the 
patriarchal system.50 It is the displacement without reversal of a restricted type of 
mimesis, Platonism, made possible by a general mimesis. Instead of having a radical 
separation between signifier and signified on the one hand, or their collapse onto pure 
presence (both cases of a speculative solution that seeks to preserve meaning within a 
restricted economy), general mimesis shows how signifier and signified meet in a 
“medium,” in the sense of middle, neither/nor, but also in the sense of element, “a 
presence both perceived and not perceived, at once image and model, and hence image 
without model, neither image nor model.”51 In “The Double Session,” Derrida gives this a 
name culled from Mallarmé’s text, the hymen; yet, emphasizing the non-closure of the 
system (the condition of general mimesis), Derrida also gives us a potentially infinite 
number of names which serve as non-synonymous substitutions for this non-ideal/non-
                                                
50 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman; Judith Butler, “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” in 
Inside/Out, ed. Diana Fuss (New York, NY: Routledge, 1991), 13–32. 
51 Ibid., 211. 
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material medium such as the “trace,” the “pharmakon,” the “grammè,” the undecidable, 
and so on. 
VI. 
Acknowledging this reading, however, Lacoue-Labarthe notes that, in Mallarmé’s agon 
with Wagner—where the poet challenges the composer’s claim to a form of art that 
unifies all the arts under music—it becomes evident that Derrida’s description of 
Mallarméan mimetology is incomplete. Where Derrida was concerned with the 
(philosophical) relation between literature and truth, Lacoue-Labarthe demands taking 
into account the question of politics, or “aesthetico-politics.” In the end, he shows, 
Mallarmé is not unlike Wagner in assigning to art a political task, the “vocation” or the 
“mission” of defining,  
the mythological figure, where humanity, or perhaps a humanity (a people, for 
example), could recognize itself and get hold if its essence and its constitutive 
characteristic, less by ‘identification’ than under the direct effect—under the 
impression or mark—of the historial seal that is the type.52  
Wagner, gambling on simple reference, sought this essence in the Nordic myths. 
Mallarmé, on the other hand, negates defining an essence, but nevertheless preserves the 
structure of a model, a type, that imprints or types the humanity that comes. The type, a 
“Figure that No one is,” the pure presentation of a pure figure (yet modeled after Christ, 
as a post-catholic communion), represents the essence and the destiny of humans. This 
structure of the type, what Lacoue-Labarthe calls an onto-typology, is the form that the 
Platonic mimetology came to acquire in romanticism and up to Heidegger and which 
better describes the political stakes of mimesis: it is not just that a certain power 
dominates de facto the means of representation, but that art is assigned de jure the role of 
shaping or molding—giving a figure—to humanity in the future, a determination that 
puts not only Wagner or Heidegger but also Mallarmé and all such onto-typologies in an 
inescapable complicity with the Third Reich. What it shows is not that everything is 
                                                
52 Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 60. 
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political, or that a certain power uses art as a political tool among others, but that such a 
definition of art is “art itself, since it has been defined as such, in its highest ambition.”53 
Moreover, in order to elaborate upon the difference between Wagner and 
Mallarmé, on the stakes of their shared onto-typology, Lacoue-Labarthe pays close 
attention to the place and function of music within their conflicting mimetologies. 
Mallarmé’s objection to Wagner, Lacoue-Labarthe shows, is not just an opposition of 
poetry versus music. It is not that there is “too much theater,” but rather “too much 
music.” Music, that is, that gives itself too easily to fiction and enchantment. It only 
serves to maintain the illusion of identification, of characters, narratives, and stories. 
Wagner does not go far enough in his critique of opera or melodrama. For Mallarmé, 
reviving ancient tragedy is not an accomplishment, especially if it is only to suit the 
disposition of the German people, that is, to foreclose the political possibilities of art (or 
to overdetermine them).54 Rather, what Mallarmé wanted Wagner to have done was to 
have used music in order to interrupt and suppress drama: music should push theater 
beyond mimesis, forcing it to say something else, to allegorize.55 Monteverdi would have 
said: use music to imitate the word, not the sense of the clause; imitate the pure (feigned) 
present, not dramatic time. A single word imitates (allegorizes) war, peace, death or 
anything else. Rather, Wagner preserves what is most mimetic in theater and in music. It 
is a compromise between the decrepit form of theater and a determination of music that is 
too subservient to it: musica ficta.56 
What is musica ficta? Here, it does not mean the practice of supplementing under-
prescriptive notations in order to produce correct voice leading in polyphonic settings 
within hexachordal systems. Although it has everything to do with this, Lacoue-Labarthe 
means rather something like music-fiction, fictionalized or “fictioning” music. Fingo, 
fixit, fictum means to form, fashion, or mold, but also to feign, to act or contrive, to 
                                                
53 Lacoue-Labarthe, Musica Ficta, xxii See also, by the same author, Heidegger, Art, And Politics: The 
Fiction of the Political (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990). 
54 Lacoue-Labarthe, Musica Ficta, 69. 
55 Ibid., 68. Without this meaning, as we have seen, that Mallarmé’s was not an onto-typology in its own 
form. 
56 Ibid., 63. 
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simulate: mimetic music. The solecism is not Lacoue-Labarthe’s. Adorno used it in an 
essay on “Bourgeois Opera” published in Sound Figures, where he argues that “opera is 
governed by the element of illusion [Schein],” from which it cannot, and has not, been 
disassociated, even as modern opera aims to demystify it: “Schoenberg as an operatic 
composer [has] remained within the realm of expressive opera and thus of musica ficta, 
of illusion, both in aesthetic terms and in terms of its relationship to the text.”57  
Musica ficta is not simply the subordination of music to language or something 
like word painting, but music as it aims to mold or sculpt itself into something other than 
pure sounds (Adorno opposes it to the “musical economics of scarcity” of the avant-
garde), shaping music into a magical illusion, enchantment, or affection. This fictional or 
enchanting power of music—which for Adorno signifies art’s resistance to instrumental 
reason, the permanence of magic within a disenchanted world—is for Lacoue-Labarthe 
the essential complicity of art and politics, exemplified in the aesthetic politics of the 
Third Reich. Both authors locate its origin in the stile rappresentativo, a birth Lacoue-
Labarthe calls a (re)composition—since the ancient music it was modeled on, of course, 
did not exist.58 We know the story all too well:  
Either on the basis of ancient testimony about the art of song or on that of the 
principles of metaphysical linguistics inherited from Aristotle and the Stoics, 
music, putting itself at the service of the word to reinforce its power (imitating the 
poem), itself translated or expressed, that is to say imitated, the affects or 
passions, even ideas, whose verbal signifier was already understood as sensual 
presentation or expression. It was an expressionism.59 
Lacoue-Labarthe easily avoids here the presumed opposition between imitative and 
expressive music. It is also notable that he fails to remark on the mimetic impulse of the 
                                                
57 Theodor W Adorno, Sound Figures (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 17. 
58 The Second Practice, Lacoue-Labarthe writes, consisted in “[d]iscovering, first of all, that is, to say 
finding (again), what no discovery, in the sense of discovering a treasure, could give the hope of restoring: 
declamation in the antique manner…Modern music was discovered as the recomposition of ancient music. 
A banal program, up to romanticism and beyond, except for the fact that not a single score of this so-called 
ancient music remained. Consequently, let us talk about (re)composition. That essentially signifies that one 
subjects music to the “aesthetic” principle of mimesis, presentation or representation.” Lacoue-Labarthe, 
Musica Ficta, xvii. 
59 Lacoue-Labarthe, Musica Ficta, xvii. 
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Orphic turn of humanism in what he glosses over as the “banal program” of a 
re(composition) of ancient music, of modeling modern music after a music that has been 
lost. Does that not mean that modern music or musica ficta is also a mimesis without a 
model? Not only fictional music as illusion but also a music that produces the fiction of a 
past it never had, in a fictionalized present? But, more importantly, when writing that 
music “put[s] itself at the service of the word,” or that this is “a strange constraint,” does 
not Lacoue-Labarthe seem to imply that musica ficta is an accidental—not substantial or 
essential—determination of music, in other words, that somehow music is beyond or 
outside mimesis? Establishing whether this implication is true of Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
interpretation would require engaging with his reading of Adorno and Schoenberg’s 
Moses und Aron, which is far beyond our scope here.  
But what this limit shows is that, in his concern with Wagner’s role, which he 
sees—through Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Heidegger, Adorno, and Schoenberg—as the 
accomplishment of musica ficta, Lacoue-Labarthe has left untouched the narrative of 
music’s relation with mimesis and seems to consider musica ficta to be an entirely closed 
system. Like Derrida, their almost exclusive focus on mimetology through modernism 
fails to show that what is considered to be the “origin,” “birth,” or even the 
“(re)composition” of music as musica ficta has the same multifarious, contradictory and 
supplementary traces that they find in later mimetologies. It appears that, caught within 
the perspectival effects of a speculative historiography, a certain foreshortening makes it 
seem as if musica ficta had been a single act of submission and determination of an 
otherwise sovereign nonmimetic music. 
Here, then, a strategy like Melberg’s seems appropriate. One can assume, with 
Lacoue-Labarthe, that music submits itself to mimesis and turns into musica ficta around 
1600, which remains the only musical mimetology to be fulfilled with Wagner, to whom 
all modernism is still bound, thus demonstrating the inevitability of aesthetic politics; or 
else one can hold that music is always already musica ficta, which redoubles itself by 
being simultaneously modern and ancient (without a model) and that, like mimesis, is 
never just one. In this sense, we have to say that the idea of a “submission” is part of the 
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ideology that wants to preserve the ideal of music (visualized in a past or future 
emancipation) as an essentially pure medium of pure presentation—of the body or the 
divine, it does not matter anymore. 
Thus, if the deconstruction of modernism has shown that an escape out of 
mimesis is impossible given that 1. There is never just one mimesis and 2. All attempts to 
overcome restricted mimesis constantly reaffirm its dependence on a general mimesis; 
and if 3. Musica ficta is not a simple, restricted mimetology but is already the possibility 
of its own impossibility (as a closed system or a single determination), then in order to 
fully take account of the historicity of musica ficta one must attend not so much (or not 
only) to its presumed breakdown, emancipation, or fulfillment, but also to its origin—in 
the late Renaissance or in Plato—of an origin that never was one. Where to begin? 
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Part I 
The Myth of/at the Origin(al) 
 
Don’t you know that the beginning is 
the most important part of every work and that 
this is especially so with anything young and 
tender? For at that stage it is most plastic, and 
each thing assimilates itself to the model whose 
stamp anyone wishes to give to it. 
Plato, Republic 
 
It has not always been true that one ought to begin in the middle of things. For a very 
long time it had been obvious, customary, and even necessary, to—as the King told 
Alice—begin at the beginning, “and go on till you come to the end: then stop.” This basic 
principle has since long animated philosophy, history, and musicology as well. Begin 
with the simplest elements, with the primordial, with the origin. Everything important 
and crucial will be present at the origin and it will only be a matter of following the order 
of reasons or the evidence to arrive to a proper and complete end. To do otherwise, to 
begin by the middle, in medias res, is but a rhetoric device, a stylistic convention more 
typical of the Illiad or the Nibelungenlied than of philosophical or academic arguments—
it pursues effects, not reason, even as when one distinguishes with the rationalists 
between the order of knowing (ordo cognoscendi) and the order of being (ordo essendi). 
The rational mind knows to begin with the beginning. Whether it be the simplest 
elements, or immediate experience, or the most well-known things, something always 
shows itself as the necessary beginning and displays the path to its own development. 
This beginning, the origin, contains in itself what is essential to the object, its law, such 
that the arche determines its development and defines its end, its telos.  
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To begin with the beginning, to look for the origin, is the mark of a rational, well-
pursued investigation.1 Or the mark of a delusion, Nietzsche would later say—and this is 
a turning point we attend to—, the idealistic whim of believing that origins are lofty 
moments of emergence; that we can locate them and return to the place where discourse 
and truth were once together; that things develop organically, rationally, teleologically; 
that the purpose of philosophy is to account for these developments.2 Origins are only 
posited as an idealist trick that finds in them what it deposits: its own ambitions. Thus 
understood, origins are already the completion of the work, its foreclosure. Nietzsche’s 
distrust of origins marks the beginning of a philosophy without origin, an-archic. 
According to this Nietzschean argument, origin—pure origin—cannot be. An 
origin is never an origin without something that succeeds it and therefore contaminates it 
with its development. Development constitutes origin as the past of what is present and 
thus as nothing pure at all. If it is not pure, it thus never properly is, but is always 
becoming. An origin never is without already being underway and without receding in 
the past of its anterior futurity, its “it will have been.” That is, an origin is only present if 
it has already become what it is the origin of, what it would have been—but by then the 
present has already become something else, namely the past of what in turn it will have 
been. Never having been in the present, origin receives its determination from what 
follows it.3 These general ontological axioms translate into phenomenological experience. 
A sound, for example, does not begin without already having a duration, and hence a 
transformation, a development whose auditory spectrum characterizes it as a sound, 
whose relation to past and future sounds determine its rhythm, making the durationless 
origin of the sound an impossibility and, conversely, making the origin already a part of 
                                                
1 Although the two are not the same. Walter Benjamin distinguishes a “beginning”, which is continuous 
with what it begins, from a true “origin” (Ursprung), which is discontinuous from what it originates. One 
could speak of the difference between an immanent and a transcendent start. 
2 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, (Trans. Keith Ansell-Pearson, Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in The 
Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, (New York: New Press, 
2003). 
3 Alternate versions of this logic can be found—with differences that cannot be explored here—in the 
Freudian model of Nachträglichkeit and in Hegel’s Logic of Science, and especially in Lacan’s articulation 
of the two. Cf. Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,” in Écrits: The 
First Complete Edition in English. (Trans. Bruce Fink, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006), 684. 
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its duration: “there is no durational part of the sound that has not already begun.”4 
Moreover, the auditory spectrum of that sound, its timbre, is said to depend on the 
distribution of the partials produced by its fundamental: the fundamental produces 
overtones that allow us to perceive the sound as that sound, the “fundamental” being in 
no way audible by itself. 
 Nothing in this origin, moreover, preserves it from changing into something else. 
In fact, as origin of what becomes, it presents as necessary the possibility of it becoming 
other. It occurs just as much with repetition. Nothing is ever repeated without repetition 
constituting it as what is repeated. The origin is thus not only something which has 
already become something else, but also what is first repeated, a repetition that 
undermines the originality of the origin. Now, repeatability is structural to everything that 
is not a pure event. Further, it is the condition of possibility for something to be anything 
at all, instead of nothing. If something is, if it persists, it can be repeated. But this means 
that something does not have to be actually repeated for it to be determined as repeatable, 
a repetition which in fact alters it—by undermining its status as an event, by exposing its 
repeatability, constituting it as repeated and repeatable: repetition makes origin into 
original, an original which depends on the repetition that guarantees its permanence. 
Repetition and alteration, a repetition that alters, that makes origins derivate, that 
contaminates origins with becoming: this is the force of mimesis. 
We cannot begin without emphasizing the necessary impossibility of the origin, 
and of repetition as a necessary possibility, insofar as here mimesis is considered to be 
essentially concerned with beginnings and ends, with the production of originals and 
copies, with sameness and alterity—categories or modes of being that are indispensable 
for writing the history of anything. But to begin by signaling this impossibility is also to 
cast a doubt on the very possibility of tracing “the history” of mimesis as such. It 
becomes impossible to offer, either at the beginning or at the end, a concept or definition 
of mimesis and then explain its transformations as progress, degeneration, deviations, or 
                                                
4 Christopher Hasty, (Meter As Rhythm, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 70. 
   32
even variations.5 There is no proper to mimesis other than alterity itself, nothing that 
identifies it more than its permanent becoming other. Sameness, origins, and originals are 
rather like effects which, sometimes with powerful implications, have made it seem that 
we can even imagine a history of mimesis. If there is a history of mimesis, it is the history 
that mimesis has produced, what it has left behind: the idea of history that is the result of 
postulating and rearranging things and ideas in terms of beginnings and endings, origins 
and derivations, originals and copies. Where this history is lacking, an erasure has 
happened, and we know that mimesis has left its trace.  
Thus it is only by attending to this history, to its historiography, explicit or under 
erasure, that we can know anything about mimesis. Lacking any self-identity and any 
originality, lacking any origin, any arche, and therefore any telos, mimesis is not outside 
the history that attempts to bind it and write it down. That is why we must engage 
mimesis as a historical matter, through its historiography. The strategy is not quite 
straightforward but it results from the “nature” of its object: mimesis is unoriginal, 
anarchic. It appears and disappears from our sources. It even sets the rules for its own 
disappearance. This movement of appearance and disappearance, its constant arrival and 
departure, is the truth (aletheia) of mimesis, as it shows itself by coming back from its 
concealment and returning to it.6 This is the movement, the rhythm, by which we 
apprehend it here. We begin wherever we are.7 
 
A seldom visited account of the origin of music involves mimesis: In Pindar’s Pythian 12 
(490 BCE), Athena uses the dirges (goos) of the Gorgons to make a song (melos) for the 
                                                
5 “There never was such a thing as Mimesis, yet it Insists” is the refrain in Mladen Dolar’s presentation of 
the history of mimesis. Each of the historical forms mimesis takes, and the modes by which it was 
overcome, never were. At issue, therefore, is neither escaping mimesis not remaining within it, but to insist 
on it. Princeton University, April 15, 2015 https://soundcloud.com/non-all-4/mladen-dolar-april-15-2015 
6 Which, incidentally, might place mimesis before aletheia: mimesis produces the 
concealment/unconcealment of aletheia. See Jacques Derrida, Dissemination (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1981), 206; Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), 79ff. 
7 “We must begin wherever we are and the thought of the trace, which cannot take the scent into account, 
has already taught us that it was impossible to justify a point of departure absolutely. Wherever we are: in a 
text where we already believe ourselves to be.” Jacques Derrida. Of Grammatology. (Trans. Gayatri 
Spivak. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 162. 
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aulos.8 The goddess hears a threnody (threnos) pouring forth from the snaky heads of the 
Gorgons who mourn Perseus’s beheading of Medusa, and weaves them into a 
composition. 
[7][the art (technas)] which Pallas Athena once invented 
by interweaving (diaplekais) the fierce close-packed dirge (threnos) of the 
Gorgons  
that she heard pouring forth from under the unapproachable 
snaky heads of the maidens in their grievous toil, 
when Perseus cried out in triumph as he carried the third of the sisters (Medusa), 
bringing doom to wave-washed Seriphus and its people. 
… 
[19] the maiden (Athena) composed (teuche) a melody with every sound 
(pamphonon melos)9 for pipes (aulon), 
so that she might imitate (mimesaio) with instruments the echoing wail (goon) 
that was forced from the gnashing jaws of (the Gorgon) Euryale. 
The goddess invented it, but invented it for mortals 
to have, and she called it the tune of many heads (kephalan pollan nomon), 10 
In this lesser-known telling of the invention of the aulos, Pindar brings the instrument 
back into Boeotia from its Phoenician origins by avoiding to tell the latter part of the 
myth.11 In the common version, Athena disposes of the aulos as soon as she invents it. 
Marsyas—a Phoenician satyr—finds it, learns to play it, and challenges Apollo to a duel: 
                                                
8 Additionally, this is one of the earliest extant uses of words belonging to the mimēsis word group. More 
examples of these early accounts and the problems associated with their interpretation are explored in the 
next section. For the present discussion, see Deborah Steiner, “The Gorgons’ Lament: Auletics, Poetics, 
And Chorality In Pindar’s Pythian 12,” American Journal of Philology 134 (2013) 173–208 and Elizabeth 
Belfiore, Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1992), 17-21. 
9 The adjective pamphonon may be ambivalent, expressing either a melos that includes “all sound” or a 
melos that “calls out to all.” 
10 Pindar. Olympian Odes, Pythian Odes, (Trans. William H Race, Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1997). Translation modified after Steiner, “The Gorgon’s Lament,” 206. 
11 Steiner, “The Gorgon’s Lament,” 196. 
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Apollo wins and flays Marsyas as punishment for his hubris.12 Here, Athena—who 
helped Perseus slay Medusa—crafts the melody for the aulos in order to “imitate” 
(mimesthai) the Gorgons’ wail. We are not told anything about the instrument itself but 
rather about the melody she invented—indeed about a technē, a craft or an art—in which 
an aulētes, the aulos player Midas of Acragas and winner of a contest being eulogized by 
Pindar in the poem, “defeated Hellas” (6). Athena is still the archetypal aulētes, but also a 
composer, and a mimetēs, an imitator. In this event, this primal scene or tragic myth of 
origins, mimesis and technē are musically—or better, sonorously—involved with each 
other. 
What should we understand by Athena’s “imitation,” (or simply her mimesis, 
since the translation is already problematic)? It does not mean that the aulos sounds like 
any cry in general nor specifically Euryale’s cry, that it resembles it in any way. She 
crafts it “in order to ‘mimic’ [mimesthai],” not “in imitation of [mimema].” Why should 
Athena simply “copy” the cries of a monster?13 There is a purpose in her crafting that 
aims towards some kind of mimesis, but this results in something different than what 
constitutes its object. In fact, Athena weaves together (diaplekais) the wails of the 
Gorgons into a song. Not just any song but a melody with all the sounds (pamphonon 
                                                
12 Athena disposes of the aulos because playing it disfigured her face. Aristotle and Aristides Quintilianus 
offer other explanations of why this is so, namely that it was impossible to sing while playing, i.e. that the 
instrument hinders logos (for Steiner, Pindar affirms the a-logic nature of the aulos by ignoring the contest). 
Recent critics see it as the result of changing aesthetic and political ideologies which crystallize around the 
aulos. Richard Martin, “‘The Pipes are brawling’: Conceptualizing Musical Performance in Athens.” In The 
Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, Conflict, Collaboration, (ed. Carol Dougherty and Leslie 
Kurke, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 153-81; Peter Wilson, “The Aulos in Athens” in 
Performance and Culture in Athenian Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Wilson, 
“Athenian Strings; Homeric Strings in Hellenistic Athens” in Wilson and Murray, eds. Music and the 
Muses: The Culture of “Mousikē” in the Classical Athenian City. (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Eric Csapo, “The Politics of the New Music” in idem. For the aulos in general, see 
Thomas Mathiesen, Apollo’s Lyre: Greek Music and Music Theory in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 
(Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 177; Evanghélos Moutsopoulos, la musique dans 
l’œuvre de Platon, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1959), 81. See also Steiner, 195, who cites 
Pindar’s poem as involved in the politico-aesthetic revision of the aulos. For a “structuralist” reading of the 
Marsyas myth in a musicological context and an extensive list of sources and other relevant information, 
see Maria Rika Maniates, “Marsyas Agonistes,” Current Musicology (Spring 2000): 118-162. For a reading 
of the myth in connection to various themes of this dissertation, see John Hamilton, Music, Madness, and 
the Unworking of Language, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 35-41. 
13 Some authors propose, for example, to understand this mimesis as an expression of sorrow, or as a 
mythological account of the expressive capacities of instruments. Stephen Halliwell, The Aesthetics of 
Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 19. 
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melos), a song with many heads (kephalan pollan nomon). This weaving and sewing 
together into song is a well-known motive in Pindar. The rhapsode, rhapsōidos is he who 
sews together (rhaptō) the songs (aoidē), a “recomposed performer,” a recomposer.14 By 
weaving or sewing the rhapsode combines the multiple into a single strain, into a fabric—
a text—commonly described as poikílos, a word meaning varied or patterned and, in 
fifth-century writings about music, melic complexity.15 The many-headed tune of 
Athena—named, not incidentally, after a musical form performed in Pindar’s day, the 
Polukephalos Nomos—then, is one of these variegated fabrics, a text woven with an aim 
to mimesis by recomposing suffering into a song.16 
This creation or recreation, the product of a mimetic technē, is not “artistic” in the 
way we commonly understand it. Athena does not produce it for any “aesthetic” reasons. 
The nomos she crafts, in order to “mimic” the Gorgon, is not beautiful in any way.17 For, 
again, why should she partake of the mourning she helped cause? The poem simply says 
that “The goddess invented (or discovered, euren) it [the many-headed song], but 
                                                
14 Gregory Nagy, Poetry as Performance: Homer and Beyond, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 61. 
15 Nagy, Poetry as Performance, 66 and Steiner, 183. Athena’s iconic peplos is described as poikílos in 
Iliad 5. The nightingale’s song in Odyssey 19.521 is described as poludeukēs and poluēkhēs (which Nagy 
translates as ‘resounding in many ways,’ having many echoes). The scholiast Aelian explains this epithet by 
writing that the nightingale is “the one who makes imitation (mimesis) in a varied (poikílos) way. I follow 
the analysis of these passages offered in Nagy, Performance and Poetry, 44 and passim. 
16 Steiner, 184. Steiner shows how the poem incorporates other references that involve mimesis in diverse 
senses, among them to the “‘Pythian nome’ (Puthikos nomos) aimed to conjure up through sound the fight 
between Apollo and the snake guarding the Delphic site,” that is, it produces the mimesis of a mimesis. The 
Polukephalos Nomos is described by Lysias, who attributes its invention to either Olympus or Crates, 
auletes of the seventh century BCE. Matthiesen, Apollo’s Lyre, 62-3. 
17 Not because it resembles the Gorgon’s cries or not, but because it is never said to be. Steiner’s 
interpretation is, however, the opposite: she reads the difference between goos (v. 21) and threnos (8), as 
that of a “more primitive” sound and a “polished,” “sanitized” or “artistic” one, 177. Despite the 
philological evidence she presents, I find this interpretation problematic, as it relies on the opposition 
animal/divine, uncultured/cultured, raw/cooked, matter/form, using technē as a teleological means of 
transforming the one into the other. Belfiore carries the point further, writing that “In Pindar’s poem, 
imitation does not create a new reality, but instead gives meaning and order to human life by showing us 
the beautiful and beneficent aspects of what appears ugly and painful. The aulos music is beautiful and 
pleasant in itself, and it is at the same time an imitation of what is ugly and painful, the scream of a 
monster.” 19. By immediately making a reference to Aristotle’s Poetics (1448b10-12), Belfiore makes 
explicit the point I have been underscoring here: this idea of mimesis as artistic creation and imitation 
operating through a hylomorphic metaphysics is a much later construct, which she reinscribes in Pindar’s 
poem. 
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invented it for mortals to have.” In the poem, Perseus brings Medusa’s head to Polydectes 
in revenge for raping Danae, his mother. Weaving sounds into the Polukephalos Nomos, 
Athena gives mortals the gift of a technē that repeats Perseus’s heroic action. The cries of 
the remaining Gorgons are inscribed in a song that “mimics” them. This production 
preserves and carries over their cries. And in this preservation we see what “in order to 
‘mimic’ them” might mean. This, I advance, is not the production of an aesthetic object 
out of the suffering of the Gorgon. Here, mimesis might rather mean the apotropaic 
incorporation of the monster’s cries, a magical device to protect mortals just as Athena 
carries the likeness of Medusa’s head in her shield.18 
When, in book 3 of the Republic, Socrates, Adeimantus, and Glaucon set out to 
“purify” the city of the instruments, modes, and harmonies of “the city we recently said 
was luxurious” in the name of moderation (sophrosune, Rep. 399e), they reference just 
these musical elements.19 After having reviewed the content of Homer and Hesiod, 
criticizing their portrayals of the gods and their ideas about death, they move on to the 
music that accompanies poetic performances. The interlocutors agree to banish from the 
ideal State all the harmonic modes besides the Dorian and Phrygian, “which will best 
imitate the violent or voluntary tones of voice of those who are moderate and courageous, 
whether in good fortune or in bad” (399c). Socrates continues, 
[Socrates] “Then” I said, “there’ll be no need of polystringed or polyharmonic 
(poluchordias ge oude panarmoniou) instruments for our odes and melodies 
(oudais te kai melesin).  
                                                
18 The similarity between the apotropaic shield and the many-headed tune has been noted by many 
commentators, see notably Françoise Frontisi-Ducroux, “Athéna et l’invention de la flute.” Musica e storia, 
vol. 2, 1994, 239–67; For Belfiore, the identification of mimesis and apotropaic magic in this passage is 
only “implicit,” as she emphasizes, as Steiner, the transformation of a monstrous wail into a beautiful song 
(see note 17). Belfiore, Tragic Pleasures, 19. The relation between mimesis and apotropaic magic is a 
classic theme of the anthropology of mimesis since James Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic 
and Religion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) and Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic, 
(London: Routledge, 1972). For a critical account see Michael Taussig. Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular 
History of the Senses. New York, NY: Routledge, 1993). 
19 While suggesting that Pindar’s language seems to anticipate the “New Music” attacked in Plato, in both 
language, technical innovations, and emphasis on mimesis, Steiner warns against taking the poem as a 
manifesto avant la lettre of the New Music, moving on to underscore the more “classical” aspects of 
Pindar’s work, Steiner, 194. Likewise, I am not signaling the importance of the ode as much as identifying 
a series of motives and associations to be further developed. I draw extensively in what follows from Eric 
Csapo, “The Politics of the New Music,” in Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson, eds. 
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 [Glaucon] “It doesn’t look like it to me,” he said.  
 “Then we’ll not support the craftsmen who make lutes, harps, and all the 
instruments that are polystringed and polyharmonic (poluchorda kai 
poluarmonia) instruments.” 
 “It doesn’t look like we will,” he said. 
 “And what about this? Will you admit aulos-makers and aulos-players 
(aulopoious he aulētas) into the city? Or, isn’t the aulos the most “many-stringed” 
of all? And aren’t the panharmonic instruments themselves imitations (mimēma) 
of it?”20 
 “Plainly,” he said.  
The aulos is confirmed here as the model, the paradigm, of multiplicity, of complexity, 
panarmonia and poikília (399e).21 Plato’s criticisms to the new music share the language 
of his analysis of political institutions, of the entire enterprise of the Republic. The status 
of the aulos as irrational, opposed to all logos, “many-headed,” and even barbarian, is 
summed up in Socrates’s remark: “We certainly aren’t doing anything new in preferring 
Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his” (399c). As the declaration of a 
conservative restoration, it might not be as innovative. As the explicit articulation of the 
political aesthetics that organizes the boundaries of what is proper and improper, natural 
and artificial, regulated and irregular, and so on, around the aulos and especially with 
mimesis as the “condition of possibility” for this articulation, it is not only an innovation 
but one that would preserve its power for centuries to come.  
 
There are four tasks to be accomplished in the first part of this dissertation: (1) To offer a 
“philological” survey of some ancient texts dealing with the problem of mimesis, which 
include the Homeric Hymns, Pindar, Aeschylus, and Plato. These primary sources expose 
                                                
20 Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books, 1968; translation 
modified. All citations from the Republic are from this edition, and are referenced using Stephanus 
pagination. For a similar indictment, see also Laws 2.669d–e; Steiner, 193 and Csapo, “The Politics of the 
New Music,” 
21 Cf. footnote 11 above. 
   38
the diverse conceptual and semantic networks traced in antiquity around the concept of 
mimesis. The sources are read here as the site of contention of various interpretive 
tendencies, bounded at the extremes by Plato and Derrida. The second task (2) consists of 
a double demand posed by the problem of origins exposed above: to account for the 
earliest appearances of mimesis as necessary to understand the multiplicity of meanings 
of the notion throughout the periods examined here while insisting on the impossibility—
historical, philological, and philosophical—of reconstructing anything like an originary 
notion of mimesis: this double demand is covered under the motive of Dionysian 
fragmentation. (3) The main task is to offer a reading of the Republic and surrounding 
texts, in the context of a history of mimesis and with respect to music and the sonorous in 
general; the reading of pre-Platonic sources serves to prepare this reading and to 
introduce the corpus of secondary sources that complicate the attempt to locate and 
clarify the role of Plato in this history. (4) From this reading emerges the notion of 
mousikē as a performative assemblage of inscription and the notion of economimesis that 
will be used as a critical framework to situate both Plato’s text and its seventeenth-
century receptions, covered in Parts II and III. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ARCHAIC MIMESIS 
We turn to the gods 
but the gods turn us  
we turn to gods 
and are torn apart 
Euripides, Bacchae 
 
FRAGMENTS, DISMEMBERING 
The many definitions that Plato gathers under the problem of mimesis, his ambivalence 
towards its powers and the zeal he takes to regulate them, all point to an abyssal logic, as 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe calls it, that characterizes the improper property of mimesis, an 
excessive force that is always in difference with itself. All of these traits are part of the 
history of mimesis, a history determined by what Lacoue-Labarthe identifies as Plato’s 
onto-typotology. This onto-typology has programmed subsequent interpretations of 
mimesis as the imprint of a model, an eidos or a tupos upon a malleable matter (with the 
traditionally metaphysical identification of matter as feminine: materia/mater),1 leaving 
only a restricted and regulated space where aesthetics as the philosophy of art finally took 
ground. The essence of mimesis—if it had one—lies in the fact that it doesn’t have 
anything proper to it, that it doesn’t have any essence other than “absolute vicariousness, 
carried to the limit (but inexhaustible), endless and groundless—something like an 
infinity of substitution and circulation.”2  
This is Lacoue-Labarthe’s crucial insight into the nature of mimesis, as a result of 
finding Heidegger (but also Girard as well as Nietzsche) caught in the game, still 
programmed, of “simply” inverting Platonism and thus remaining incapable of escaping 
the Platonic onto-mimetology they aimed to subvert. Reflecting on the strategy that 
                                                
1 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), 126 n. 126ff. 
2 Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 116. 
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organizes his “Typography,” and with respect to the essence without essence of mimesis, 
Lacoue-Labarthe notes that, “the only recourse, with mimesis, is to differentiate it and to 
appropriate it, to identify it. In short, to verify it.”3 This is a strategic and programmatic 
demand, a necessary one for any attempt to come to terms with mimesis and its history 
for how could we presume that mimesis, in its dissemination and its alterity, could ever 
have something originary to it, if not pure transformation? And how to follow the traces 
of mimesis, how to avoid rehabilitating and generalizing Plato’s mimesis—or any 
other’s—over any other attempt to dominate it philosophically, over any other 
mimetology? And how to refer to mimesis outside of these mimetologies without again 
calling it “originary,” when it is clear that mimesis cannot have an origin, that there is 
nothing original to mimesis? One of Derrida’s suggestions is to use quotation marks 
around the word. The other is to go further, call it “triginary,” born three times, like the 
god Dionysus. We will explore these possibilities in what follows, attending to an 
“originary” moment which, as will be seen, is rather a transformation without origin, a 
Dionysian metamorphosis by which a certain notion of mimesis appears after several 
dismemberments. Attending to the abyssal logic that folds mimesis upon itself in its 
historiography, this chapter follows its traces through their dissemination in the corpus of 
ancient Greek writings (along with the historians, philosophers, and philologists who 
have recovered and aimed to reassemble its dismembered body), finally focusing on Plato 
as the site of the first philosophical engagement with mimesis, a “triginary,” and certainly 
definitive, transformation. 
I define what the nature of this transformation is further below, yet before we 
delve into Plato’s text we need to examine not only the history of mimesis before its 
philosophical debut, but more importantly its modern historiography. This gives us a first 
sketch of the multiplicity of meanings of mimesis, and puts us face to face with the 
challenges involved in making sense of this multiplicity. It also introduces us to the 
historical method used in this investigation, by which the object of study and the 
historical frame are co-constitutive: our notion of mimesis is the result of the modes of 
                                                
3 Lacoue Labarthe, Idem. 
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constructing it in the historical documents, while simultaneously the frames themselves 
become a historical object of study.4 Moreover, examining the “origin” of mimesis as the 
result of an initial dismembering and transformation already puts into question the notion 
of a “break” or a “rupture” with mimesis. If the history of mimesis is already the history 
of these ruptures, then no particular rupture can take preeminence over any other, no 
periodicity or development, no emancipation or departure from mimesis is possible, only 
transformations, only mimesis playing itself out, as history.   
Although Plato has a prominent place at the beginning of the history of mimesis, 
he did not coin the term: words stemming from the root mim- are attested as early as the 
eigth century, in the Homeric Hymn to Delian Apollo, dating from 600 BCE, while the 
etymology of the word itself—the oldest being most likely mîmos, is almost 
irrecoverable.5 In the Homeric Hymn, mimesis is already a sounding phenomenon with 
enchanting as well as deceiving capacities. A chorus of Delian maidens bewitches their 
audience by their ability to represent the voices of men: “Also they can imitate 
[mimeisthai] the tongues [phonas] of all men and their clattering speech: each would say 
that he himself were singing, so close to truth is their sweet song [aoide].”6 Among the 
earliest examples there are also three fragments by Pindar, and mimesis is related to 
sound or music in all of them. We already examined Pindar’s Pythian 12. The most 
polemic instance of pre-Platonic usages of mimesis is a fragment from Aeschylus’s 
Edonians (fragment 57, preserved by Strabo). It describes the arrival of Dionysus in 
Thrace: 
                                                
4 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1995), 4. 
5 Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, 17. There are doubts as to whether mîmos even belongs to the Indo-
Eurpean languages. The word is not part of the Ionian or Aeolian dialects. According to J.B. Hoffmann, it 
may be connected with the Sanscrit māyā, illusion or magic, an etymology that already locates an origin 
based in a meaning that is already at stake in the definition (J.B. Hoffmann, Etymologisches Wörterbuch 
des Griechischen, R. Oldenburg, Berlin, 1950). However, Hermann Koller rejects this interpretation based 
on the examples he examines, holding that whatever the original meaning is, it does not have anything to 
do with deception (Täuschen). cf. Else, 76. The problems with this interpretation and Koller’s position are 
examined below. 
6 Anonymous. The Homeric Hymns and Homerica with an English Translation by Hugh G. Evelyn-White 
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1914). Digital edition on 
perseus.tufts.edu; cf. Halliwell, 18. See below for an interpretation of this passage. 
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σεμνὰ Κοτυτοῦς δ᾿ ὄργι᾿ ἔχοντες 
* * * * * 
ὁ μὲν ἐν χερσὶν 
βόμβυκας ἔχων, τόρνου κάματον, 
δακτυλόθικτον πίμπλησι μέλος, 
5 μανίας ἐπαγωγὸν ὁμοκλήν, 
ὁ δὲ χαλκοδέτοις κοτύλαις ὀτοβεῖ 
* * * * * 
ψαλμὸς δ᾿ ἀλαλάζει· 
ταυρόφθογγοι δ᾿ ὑπομυκῶνταί 
ποθεν ἐξ ἀφανοῦς φοβεροὶ μῖμοι, 
10   ἠχὼ τυπάνου δ᾿, ὥσθ᾿ ὑπογαίου 
βροντῆς, φέρεται βαρυταρβής 
 
And, practicing the holy ecstatic rites of Cotyto . . . 
* * * * 
One man holds in his hands 
a pair of pipes, fashioned on the lathe, 
and plays out a fingered melody, 
a loud cry that brings on frenzy, 
while another crashes the bronze cymbals 
* * * * 
. . . and the twang of strings resounds; and terrifying imitators of the sound of 
bulls  
bellow in response from somewhere out of sight, 
and the fearful deep sound of the drum 
carries to the ear like thunder beneath the earth.7 
                                                
7 Aeschylus, Fragments, Alan H. Sommerstein trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 
57. Translation modified. 
The Myth of/at the Origin(al)—Archaic Mimesis 
 
43 
This passage is examined in a groundbreaking work that explored the archaic usages of 
mimesis to illuminate the multiplicity of meanings that the notion already displays in 
Plato and Aristotle, Herman Koller’s 1954 Die Mimesis in Der Antike: Nachahmung, 
Darstellung, Ausdruck.8 Koller recognized that the usual translation of mimesis as 
Nachahmung, imitation, was the result of a particular history, which not only over-
imposed a modern notion of mimesis upon earlier texts, indeed over the entire conception 
of Greek antiquity, but also left us with a particularly reduced notion of mimesis for our 
own times.9 Koller’s polemic thesis was that the original meaning of mimesis was not 
Nachahmung, but Darstellung or Ausdruck, that is, presentation or expression, or even 
better, performance or enactment: “durch Tanz zur Darstellung bringen.”10 There is 
already a wide diversity of meanings in Plato and before him, but even more important is 
the fact that neither Homer and Hesiod used any word related to mimesis, especially not 
when referring to something like “imitation,” “impersonation,” and even less 
“deception.” Instead, in its origin, according to Koller, mimesis is always used in 
connection with dance and music, mousikē—taking the mîmoi in the Aeschylus fragment 
as the original sense of mimesis, meaning “actors of a [Dionysian] cult drama.”11 Only 
later, in Plato and Aristotle, the meaning of mimesis shifted and was reduced to the sense 
of imitation as we find it in painting and poetry. For Koller, the original sense of mimesis 
appears already in the Damonian theory of music presented in book 3 of Plato's Republic, 
which the author reconstructs mostly through readings of Aristides Quintilianus. 
With this intervention, Koller began to historicize the Platonic treatment of 
mimesis while opening the possibility of relocating mimesis in the context of mousikē 
from which it had been displaced after centuries of post-Platonic “aesthetics.” It brought 
attention to a wide variety of fragments that preserved scattered meanings of mimesis, 
which broadly expanded its accepted meaning and pushed scholars to think beyond the 
                                                
8 Hermann Koller, Die Mimesis in Der Antike Nachahmung, Darstellung, Ausdruck (Bernae: A. Francke, 
1954). 
9 Idem, 10. 
10 Idem, 119. 
11 Idem, 13, 119. Koller considers the earliest testimonies to be the Homeric Hymn, Pindar's Pythian 12, 
and the fragment by Aeschylus. I elaborate on the wider sense of mousikē below. 
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usual translation of mimesis as “imitation.” In fact, it could be argued that it opened the 
possibility for a history and a historiography of mimesis.12 However, less because of its 
revolutionary thesis than because of his method and sources, Koller’s work was harshly 
received, especially in English-speaking Classics departments, prompting several 
refutations and mixed responses even today. Koller was accused of advancing “arbitrary 
hypotheses,” “misinterpreting” his evidence, and “neglecting” to include available 
evidence in Plato and other sources, especially in his treatment of pre-Platonic authors.13 
More paradoxically, the book and the subsequent polemic demonstrated the futility of 
                                                
12 The ritual and performative aspects of mousikē, for example, have now been elaborated upon to show to 
what extent the musical practices of the Greeks constituted the type of enactment that Koller aims to 
preserve for mimesis, for example in the pragmatic and performative dimensions of the poems, which 
characterizes the performance not solely as a speech act but as “a true cult act.” Claude Calame, “Choral 
Forms in Aristophanic Comedy: Musical Mimesis and Dramatic Performance in Classical Athens,” in 
Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson (eds.), Music and the Muses: The Culture of “Mousikē” in the Classical 
Athenian City (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). In addition to Murray and Wilson 
(2004), see especially Claude Calame, Choruses of Young Women in Ancient Greece: Their Morphology, 
Religious Role, and Social Function (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Gregory Nagy, Poetry as 
Performance; Eva Stehle, Performance and Gender in Ancient Greece: Nondramatic Poetry in Its Setting, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
13 J. Tate, “Die Mimesis in der Antike. Nachahmung, Darstellung, Ausdruck by H. Koller,” The Classical 
Review, Vol. 5, No. 3/4 (Dec., 1955), pp. 258-260; W. J. Verdenius, “Die Mimesis in der Antike by H. 
Koller,” Mnemosyne, Vol. 10, Fasc. 3 (1957) , pp. 254-258; Gerald F. Else ‘“Imitation” in the Fifth 
Century,’ Classical Philology, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Apr., 1958) , pp. 73-90, and Else, “Addendum to ‘Imitation’ 
in the Fifth Century,” Classical Philology, Vol. 53. No 4. (Oct. 1958), p. 254, are generally taken to have 
convincingly rebutted Koller’s thesis as a whole (e.g., Halliwell, 17). Warren D. Anderson “The Importance 
of Damonian Theory in Plato’s Thought.” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological 
Association Vol 86 (1955): 88-102 argues against Koller’s claims that Plato uncritically received Damonian 
theory. Mediating between Koller and Else, who sets out to expand and correct Koller’s evidence, Göran 
Sörbom compiled an even more expanded list in an attempt to settle the discussion. Sörbom holds mîmos to 
refer primarily to a Sicilian dramatic genre, more precisely the works of Sophron, which usually portrayed 
an unvarnished, low life, and which, Else argues, carried a pejorative sense for Athenians. For Sörbom, 
then, the original meaning of mîmos is metaphorical: “to behave like a mime actor” (a definition where 
original metaphoricity nicely folds mimesis upon itself: to mime is to mime a mime; I will return to the 
problems of discussing mimesis as metaphor below). He then takes up Else’s examples and reinterprets 
them according to his own definition, with varying results. See below. Mimesis and Art: Studies in the 
Origin and Early Development of an Aesthetic Vocabulary (Stockholm: Svenska Bokförlaget, 1966). Other 
works taking up the controversy that merit mention and which offer a more sympathetic reading are Eva 
Keuls, Plato and Greek Painting (Leiden: Brill, 1978), who accepts Koller’s thesis although denying the 
limitation to ritual and dance, thus preserving the broader sense of “enactment” while also focusing on “the 
object” and not solely on “the medium” of mimesis, i.e. not only how but of what something is a mimesis 
(p. 11). Halliwell, among the most rigorous and important voices in the discussion until today, rejects 
Koller’s position as resting on a wholly inadequate basis, and objecting in general to the possibility of 
reducing the semantic development of the concept to any neat chronology. He defines his position as more 
fluid than of Koller, Else, and Sörbom. (Halliwell, 2002, 15). Most of the criticism of Koller's book, in fact, 
seems to stem from such rigid interpretations, which focus exclusively on the philological aspects of his 
readings and take as definitive the schematic development that he aims to trace. 
The Myth of/at the Origin(al)—Archaic Mimesis 
 
45 
attempting to recover the original meaning of mimesis through an analysis of extant texts, 
whose fragmentary status and scarcity are only one part of the problem.14 Besides the 
initial debate, mostly limited to philological minutiae and entirely dismissive of Koller’s 
broader aim of recentering the role of mousikē, the polemic broadened the discussion on 
mimesis and its multiple senses even in archaic Greek usage, and brought to prominence 
a series of texts that merit examination here. Recall the polemic fragment by Aeschylus:  
and terrifying imitators [mîmoi] of the sound of bulls [taurophthongoi] 
bellow in response from somewhere out of sight [aphanous], 
For Koller, the word mîmoi in the passage refers to the participants of the ritual, actors. 
Else’s refutation is strong, and it has been accepted by most writers involved in the 
debate: Koller ignores the fact that the passage consists of a list of musical instruments 
and their corresponding sounds, including “the droning of bass flutes (bombykes), the 
clashing of cymbals (kotylai), and the twanging (psalmos) of stringed instruments.”15 
Koller has no grounds to hold that mîmoi refers to actors or persons at all. In fact, doing 
so precisely writes back into the poem a Platonic meaning that is not necessarily there. 
The “terrifying imitators of the voice of bulls,” Else advances, are rather bullroarers, 
called rhomboi in Greek, not unlike the churinga of Australian aboriginals but present 
worldwide in rituals of different types: a flat, thin piece of wood attached to a string, 
which the performer holds to whirl the piece of wood through the air. The device 
produces a deep, continuous sound that varies in pitch according to speed and the length 
of the string.16 But moreover, Else continues, it doesn’t even refer to the instrument as 
such but to the sound made by the instrument, “out of sight,” “unseen” (aphanous). The 
                                                
14 Thus Halliwell: “The search for origins is always an alluring but often a fruitless enterprise. Although 
several scholars have been greatly exercised over the origins of the Greek concept of mimesis, the thinness 
of available evidence has doomed their undertakings to at best the speculative, at worst the futile.” 17. 
15 Else, 74. The passage in Strabo where the fragment is preserved, Else adds, argues that the rituals 
Thracian and Phrygian rituals are essentially Dionysiac, and does it by comparing the instruments used in 
the rite. Idem, 88 n. 8. The Thracian setting underscores the link between the aulos and Phrygia. The cult 
devoted to the Phrygian Cotys is eventually incorporated into the Athenian cult devoted to Rhea (Cybele). 
16 Idem. Else cites J. E. Harrison, Thernis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion (Cambridge, 
1912), pp. 61-67; and others to defend this hypothesis. See Klaus Wachsmann. "Bullroarer." Grove Music 
Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press, accessed September 2, 2015. 
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“terrifying” effect is produced not by the instrument as such, itself quite unimpressive, 
but by the acousmatic effect—and acousmaticity, for Else, is crucial for all performances 
that employ the bullroarer: “In Australia [the churinga] is never shown to the women at 
all, to the boys only after they have completed the initiation, and then as a portentous 
secret.”17 Thus, the mîmos refers to the sound-effect of the bullroarers, a bull-like sound, 
which, Else finally concludes, probably underscores the sense of deception and mimicry. 
The Aeschylus play to which this fragment presumably belongs, Edônoi, is modeled after 
Euripide’s Bacchae, in which Pentheus is dismembered by his mother in a Dionysian 
frenzy for accusing the cult of being an imposture. The Edônoi, Else holds, portrays 
Lycurgus in a similar position of disbelief and futile resistance to the god, who similarly 
ends up dismembering his own son.18 The important point, the Else argues, is that the 
earliest appearance of mîmos gives precisely the sense of deception that is supposed to 
appear only with Plato. After reviewing all extant examples belonging to the mimesis 
word-group in the fifth century, Else offers three meanings of mimesis as current by 450 
BCE:  
1. “Miming” as direct representation of looks or utterances of animals or men 
through speech, song, and dance.  
2. “Imitation [emulation]” of the actions and character of one person by another 
3. “Replication” [only mîmema]: the image or effigy of a person or thing in 
material form.19 
Others take it as a metaphor. Sörbom, sees in the mîmos a reference to the Sicilian mime 
(see footnote 13), a metaphor that was progressively naturalized. From this position, he 
takes issue with Else’s classification which he finds unnecessary and even misleading, 
insofar as it places divisions in usages that are not clearly demarcated and blend into each 
other as the original sense of the metaphor fades out.20 Against Else, Sörbom emphasizes 
that both in its usage in the fragments, and according to ancient Greek painting and 
                                                
17 Else, 75. On the churinga, its function as totem and its connection with ritual, magic, and secrecy, see 
Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Karen Fields, The Free Press, 1995. 
18 Idem. 
19 Else, 79. Cf. Gebauer and Wulf, 28 for a gloss of this classification and an overview of the polemic. 
20 Sörbom, 20. 
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sculptures and other testimonies, both the Sicilian mime and the metaphorical usage of 
mîmos and its derivates aim not so much to realism or truthful reproduction (and hence 
neither deception) but to reproducing the general traits of the model, the universal, not the 
particulars of the individual.21 The intention behind a mimema “is to be recognized as 
made similar to something else or is for some reason or other just performed in a similar 
way to something else.”22 Hence, to return to the Aeschylus passage, the mîmoi need not 
refer to the bullroarers but, as Koller held, to the performers and to the act in general, that 
is, of making bull-like sounds as part of the ritual.23  
More recently, Halliwell joins Sörbom in maintaining a metaphorical sense in 
which the sounds of the bullroarers are personified as quasi-dramatic actors, offering the 
following translation for the passage: “terrifying, bull-voiced performers bellow from 
somewhere out of sight,” thus maintaining both the reference to the bullroarers and to the 
mîmos as dramatic performance or impersonation.24 Moreover, Halliwell preserves an 
association with musical performance (but not ritual dance) for the word mîmoi from 
which comes part of the force of the word in the passage. Citing the Homeric Hymn to 
Delian Apollo where the singers enchant their listeners by singing like them, so that 
“each would say that he himself were singing, so close to truth is their sweet song,” 
Halliwell concludes that from its origin, the word possesses a wider sense than mimicry 
or simulation: Both musicopoetic and visual arts are included. In fact, “on its fleeting 
appearance in relation to an artform, mimesis already hints at complexities of 
representational style and effect that can hardly be captured by a jejune notion of 
imitation.”25   
As Halliwell holds, the dissemination that marks pre-Platonic appearances of 
terms from the mimesis word group make it impossible to reduce its development to any 
                                                
21 Idem, 27. 
22 Idem, 33. 
23 Idem, 54. 
24 Halliwell, 2002, 17. 
25 Idem, 19. This position, however, itself outlines the limits of Halliwell’s otherwise rigorous and 
comprehensive analysis, insofar as he is oriented by and towards a notion of aesthetics that, to my mind, is 
all-too modern, even if carefully elaborated. I will return to this problem below. 
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neat semantic chronology, as the philologists interested in the concept have harshly 
learned.26 This vicariousness is present at the origin without origin of mimesis: Its 
meaning is marked by the absences, displacements, and erasures of its “archaic” history. 
It is disseminated through texts and bodies, corpora, or more precisely in fragments of 
bodies: the third birth of Dionysus comes after his dismemberment by the Titans—a 
dismemberment that is repeated by Pentheus and Orpheus.27 We face mimesis as the 
repetition of these dismemberments: never whole, never complete, and always placing 
ourselves at risk of a dismemberment without reason. Present in all its fragments, 
constantly reappearing as something else, mimesis is Dionysian: born not once nor twice, 
but three times; thriving on metamorphosis, constantly becoming other; arriving as a 
stranger to transform and destroy the identities of those who mock them and those who 
welcome them as well. Of mimesis, as of Dionysus, we can only say that it is coming or 
that it has been there—we can only appropriate it, verify it—we can expect it everywhere 
or everywhere wonder and despair of what it has left behind, and we gather the fragments 
only in a ritual of apotropaic mourning, an attempt to fend off our impending 
dismemberment. 
ORALITY AND ALTERITY 
Another form of integrating the opposing views of Koller and Else is offered by Eric A. 
Havelock in a footnote to his Preface to Plato. For Havelock, Koller is right in 
recognizing an element of “expressionism” or “re-enactment,” while Else is right in 
showing that it extends to the voice, gesture, dress, and action generally, not narrowly to 
ritual dancing and music.28 However, by generalizing these activities as a “direct 
                                                
26 I thus pass over in silence the extensive list of fragments analyzed by these authors. A discussion of 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia would be necessary insofar as he anticipates some of the crucial aspects of the 
Platonic position yet, insofar as they are limited to sculpture, they fall outside the limits of this dissertation. 
See Gebauer and Wulf, 29 and Halliwell, 124 and passim. 
27 William Storm, After Dionysus: A Theory of the Tragic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 21. 
28 Eric A. Havelock Preface to Plato. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1963), 59 n. 22. Along with Walter 
Ong, Marshall McLuhan and Jack Goody, Havelock’s work is central in the discussion around “the literacy 
thesis,” whose work elaborates on the research made by Milman Perry and Albert B. Lord on the oral 
nature of Homeric poetry. See Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, London; 
(New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013) (1983); Jack Goody, The Domestication of the 
Savage Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg 
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representation,” Else effectively reinscribes the Platonic sense of mimesis as it appears in 
book 10 of the Republic into the very texts whose “original” meanings he is attempting to 
rescue.  
The function of mimesis in Plato, and thus its pre-Platonic meaning, is of crucial 
importance for Havelock’s general claim that there is a radical difference between orally-
based cultures and those which appeared after the general adoption of writing—
specifically Greek alphabetic writing—and that Plato’s works are an attempt to come to 
terms with the transformations his own age is experiencing on account of writing (Plato’s 
written dialogues and his mode of arguing being already evidence of the influence of 
writing in his own thought). For Havelock and the proponents of the orality/literacy 
theory, the difference between an oral and a literate culture, which amounts to two 
                                                                                                                                            
Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962). The bibliography 
on the topic is broad and diverse. For an account of Havelock’s work in the history of mimesis along the 
lines traced here, see Gebauer and Wulf, 45 and ff. From a musicological perspective, the “orality thesis” 
has attracted the most interest in studies of medieval music, see especially Leo Treitler, With Voice and Pen: 
Coming to Know Medieval Song and How It Was Made, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Anna 
Maria Busse Berger. Medieval Music and the Art of Memory. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 
2005). It also forms an important theoretical underpinning approaches focusing on the history of the book 
as material object after Roger Chartier, in The Order of Books (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1994); see Kate Van Orden, Materialities: Books, Readers, and the Chanson in Sixteenth-Century Europe 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Van Orden, “Children’s Voices: Singing and Literacy in 
Sixteenth-century France,” Early Music History 25 (2006): 209-256. For an application to popular musics, 
see Paul Austerlitz, Jazz Consciousness: Music, Race, and Humanity, (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 2006). For a general account of the status of the question in musicology, see Francesca R. 
Sborgi Lawson, “Rethinking the Orality-Literacy Paradigm in Musicology." Oral Tradition 25, no. 2 
(2010); For a critique of Ong and McLuhan with relation to the opposition between ear and sight, “the 
audiovisual litany” that emerges from positing the orality/literacy split as Ong does and especially its 
theological and Catholic underpinnings, see Sterne, Jonathan. “The Theology of Sound: A Critique of 
Orality.” Canadian Journal of Communication 36, no. 2 (2011): 207–25; Sterne, The Audible Past: 
Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 16; and further, Ana 
María Ochoa Gautier, Aurality: Listening and Knowledge in Nineteenth-Century Colombia, (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2014). For Havelock’s late position on the orality/literacy debate and his relation to 
the so-called “Toronto School of Media Theory,” see Eric Havelock, The Muse Learns to Write: Reflections 
on Orality and Literacy from Antiquity to the Present, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). For a 
current adoption of Havelock’s theories to the analysis of ancient Greek poetry, see Gregory Nagy. Pindar’s 
Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) and 
Gregory Nagy, Poetry as Performance: Homer and Beyond, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); for a critique John Halverson, “Havelock on Orality and Literacy,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1992), pp. 148-163. 
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different “states of mind” is absolute, although its establishment took a long time since 
the invention of writing and its dissemination and adoption.29  
During the first two thirds of the fifth-century, Havelock holds, Greece was in a 
state of semi-literacy, an unequal adoption of literacy that saw no increase in fluent 
reading and hence experienced the persistence of the oral state of mind.30 This 
generalized oral culture, its formation and preservation, was under the monopoly of the 
poets whom Plato attacks in the Republic. For Havelock, all the diverse senses in which 
Plato uses the term mimesis in book three of the Republic— elucidation of which 
prompted Koller’s research—refer to various experiences which have in common the oral 
transmission of poetry as education in Greek culture. As attested by Plato’s text itself, the 
content and function of these poems was educative and political, not just aesthetic, and its 
public consisted of listeners, not readers. For Havelock, Homeric poetry is a repository of 
knowledge, an encyclopedia, which has the task of preserving and transmitting customs, 
values and laws, as well as practical, i.e. technical knowledge (ethē, nomoi, and 
technai).31 Now, according to Havelock and based on Parry’s and Lord’s analysis of 
Homeric verse, the preservation and transmission of this poetry in the oral state of mind 
depends on rhythmic and formulaic repetitions which exploit rhyme, assonance, and echo 
to articulate ideas and rhetorical figures and clichés with physical movements from the 
throat and mouth (singing) to hands and feet (dancing and instrument playing), enabling 
both the recollection of the formulas as well as the introduction of variations and changes 
in the ongoing composition of the poems. This acoustic assemblage of rhythmically-
organized physiological, affective, linguistic, and sonorous performance aiming to the 
                                                
29 Ong (2012), in fact, claims it was not entirely completed until the advent of print, and even still there are 
cases of “secondary orality,” a mostly oral-based state that is nevertheless permeated by writing. This is as 
good place as any to note the problematic ethnocentrism of Ong’s account, even if it is meant to broaden an 
understanding of oral cultures. The more he qualifies his position the clearer it is that “literacy” is a 
phenomenon restricted to a very limited sociocultural milieu, even hardly coextensive with “the West” as 
such. For an assessment of this problem, especially Ong’s role in the development of “Americanism” and 
its consequences, see John Hartley’s introductory chapter in Ong. 
30 Idem, 40. 
31 Idem, 87ff. Halverson “Havelock on Orality and Literacy,”, however, objects to each of these claims, 
especially to the specific type of knowledge that the Homeric poems in fact preserve, and the effective 
authority they could have had during the Classical period, pointing out that no statements remain that attest 
to the authority of Homer except for the skepticism or antagonism of a Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Plato 
himself. (Halverson, “Havelock on Orality and Literacy,” 155). 
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preservation and transmission of customs and laws is commonly referred to as mousikē.32 
Ancient Greek poetry is a performance, an enactment, in a way that eliminates the 
difference between the poet and the poem, as well as that between the performer and the 
listener.33  
Thus, Havelock writes, the effectivity—the production, retention, and power—of 
oral-based poetry in ancient Greece depended on the poet’s capacity of identifying with 
the poetry. “You threw yourself into the situation of Achilles, you identified with his 
grief or his anger. You yourself became Achilles and so did the reciter to whom you 
listened. Thirty years later you could automatically quote what Achilles had said or what 
the poet had said about him.”34 Archaic mimesis, from Havelock’s perspective, consists 
not in copying or imitating the aspect, sound, or behavior of something else, but rather in 
sympathetic behavior, in the “power to make [the poet’s] audience identify almost 
pathologically and certainly sympathetically with the content of what he is saying.”35 
Moreover, Havelock adds, all the early testimonies examined by Else et al. testify to the 
fact that mimesis, even in this earlier usage, reveal a type of skill that associate it with 
mousikē, but more generally to a skilled practice, a technē, another aspect of mimesis 
which comes under Plato’s attack.36 
Mousikē was thus a form of sociocultural performance that exploited the affective 
possibilities of poetic performance in a continual re-enactment of tribal folkways, laws 
and procedures, and which required of the listener to “become engaged in this re-
                                                
32 Idem, 150. On the notion of “acoustic assemblages” see Ana Ochoa, Aurality, 22. For various approaches 
within classical studies to the notion of mousikē, see Murray and Wilson, eds.; Henrichs, Albert. “‘Why 
Should I Dance?’: Choral Self-Referentiality in Greek Tragedy.” Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the 
Classics 3, no. 1 (1994): 56–111; Wilson, Peter. “Euripides’ Tragic Muse.” Illinois Classical Studies 24/25 
(1999): 427–49; Mousikè et Aretè: La Musique et L’éthique, de L'antiquité à L'âge Moderne: Actes Du 
Colloque International Tenu En Sorbonne Les 15-17 Décembre 2003, (Florence Malhomme and Anne 
Gabrièle Wersinger (eds.) Paris: J. Vrin, 2007). For an adaptation of the concept of “musicking” to a 
broader sense of practices that includes that of mousikē, Gary Tomlinson, A Million Years of Music: The 
Emergence of Human Modernity. (New York: Zone Books, 2015). 
33 Cf. Jean-Pierre Vernant, “Image et apparence dans la théorie platonicienne de la mimêsis,” Journal de 
Psychologie normale et pathologique, nº 2, April-July, 1975, pp 133-160, English translation in Vernant, J. 
P., and F. I. Zeitlin. Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays. (Princeton University Press, 1991). 
34 Idem, 45. 
35 Idem. 
36 Idem, 59 n. 22. 
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enactment to the point of total emotional involvement.”37 Understood in this way, 
Havelock notes, mimesis is far from having any meaning related to copying or imitation, 
since in fact these performances had no “original.” The poet reenacted the doings and 
sayings of heroes, not so much “imitating” them but re-enacting them in the present, 
losing himself in the performance and making his audience participate in the rehearsal of 
the tradition.38 Let us return for the last time to the Aeschylus fragment:  
and terrifying imitators [mîmoi] of the sound of bulls [taurophthongoi] 
bellow in response from somewhere out of sight [aphanous], 
Another important thesis of the orality/literacy paradigm holds that there are no 
abstractions in oral culture, there is no theoria or contemplation, in fact, no distinction 
between “subject and object,” and although effectively preserving cultural wealth, the 
laws and customs of a people, the form it is stored in is different than the “knowledge” of 
a literate culture. The oral mind, the theory holds, conceives of everything in flux, in 
action. It knows no universals, its formulations are always “time-conditioned,” which 
keeps them from becoming abstract or “eternal,” and barely uses the verb to be as a 
timeless copula, employing instead constructions where abstract concepts are personified 
and presented as engaged in some sort of sequential, meaningful action conveyed by 
other verbs and grouped in a chain of autonomous units joined by the conjunction “and 
                                                
37 Idem, 159. Wilson confirms this interpretation of mousikē, as “especially public performances of word 
with music, and often also dance and song which served vital social, religious, educational and what might 
be called political or parapolitical functions…. mousikē is analogous to the rituals of sacrifice, while much 
more variegated than they. Both should normatively serve as institutions promoting social, political and 
religious order and stability. Wilson, “Euripides’s Tragic Music,” 429-30. Henrich elaborates on its 
Dionisian dimension in Henrichs, “‘Why Should I Dance?’: Choral Self-Referentiality in Greek Tragedy,” 
1994. 
38 Even to the point of becoming a witness. Moreover, insofar as each performance introduces changes and 
transformations at “combinatorial and permutational” levels, each performance has to be considered an 
“original” in its own right, itself nevertheless repeatable. See Nagy, Poetry as Performance. In a profound 
analysis that cannot be summarized here, Nagy elaborates on Koller’s and Havelock’s positions, 
emphasizing the coextensive senses of re-enactment and imitation: “If you re-enact an archetypal action in 
ritual, it only stands to reason that you have to imitate those who re-enacted before you and who served as 
your immediate models. But the ultimate model is still the archetypal action or figure that you are re-
enacting in ritual, which is coextensive with the whole line of imitators who re-enact the way in which their 
ultimate model acted, each imitating each one’s predecessor.” Nagy, 56. 
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next…”39 Oral poetry, then, presents everything in action, and only considers abstract 
relations in terms of activities realized by personified actors.40 
From this perspective the mîmoi in the Dionysiac rituals of Cotyto may well be 
the human actors (Koller), as well as the bullroarers they play (Else) or even the sounds 
themselves, outside of any weak metaphorical sense (Sörbom and Halliwell). In any case, 
the word mîmoi is a personification, naming terrifying, “unseen” entities that sound like 
bulls (taurophtongoi) as they “bellow in response,” beings that are not themselves, that 
are something in addition to what they already are, a terrifying bellowing. The mîmoi are 
“terrifying” because they enact a “devocalization”—eradicating the human voice (phōnē) 
and supplanting it with inarticulate sound (phthongos). The other instruments in the list 
are referred to by the sounds that they make, the crashes of cymbals and the twang of 
strings, but the sound of the bullroarers exceeds their nature as instruments, hence they 
need to be called and identified as other. The omission of the instrument in the verse, its 
replacement by the mîmos is significant in itself and not “merely” metaphorical: mimesis 
displaces the particular, it takes the place of the particular, or rather presents the 
particular as being constituted by something other than itself. If it is a metaphor, it is 
because it effectively carries something else over to the place where it is not (meta + 
phorein), because it opens the space of its happening to the alterity that constitutes it. To 
be a mîmos is to become other, to make alterity a constitutive part of identity—hence it 
                                                
39 Havelock, 180 and passim; See also Ong, 49 and ff. In another influential work, Havelock examines the 
“history” of the verb “to be” by comparing the pre-Platonic and Platonic notions of justice. Eric Havelock, 
The Greek Concept of Justice: From Its Shadow in Homer to Its Substance in Plato. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1978). 
40 Havelock, 1986, 100ff. For a criticism of the problems with this divide between the aural and the visual 
along orality and literacy lines especially for its problematic theological overtones as expressed by Ong, see 
Sterne, 2003, 15-19. There, Sterne presents Derrida’s position as “an inversion of Ong’s value system,” 
stating that “deconstruction inverts, inhabits, and reanimates the sound/vision binary, privileging writing 
over speech and refusing both speech-based metaphysics and presence-based positive assertions.” Idem, 17. 
Sterne’s move is thus to abandon both deconstruction and the Christian identification of sound with 
interiority, aiming finally to “redescribe sound.” Indeed, that Havelock and Derrida were writing about 
Plato and the invention of writing during the 1960’s, unknown to each other and that no real engagement 
between the two ever took place is a remarkable coincidence, but the situation with deconstruction is quite 
more complex and it will be more useful to overcome the “audiovisual litany” without any simple 
inversion, but rather taking up the role of writing and mimesis in the constitution of the very dichotomy, as 
I suggest below. 
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matters little if the beings in question are “properly” human actors or bullroarers insofar 
as they are named by the terror that exceeds them. 
Moreover, what the word mîmos emphasizes—and here we find the first trace of 
an issue that will be crucial further on—is that what is terrifying about the bullroarers is 
their effect which, as Else rightly notes, greatly exceeds the object that produces it. That 
is, when something is called a mîmos, or more generally a mîmema, a difference is 
posited between such effect and the object that produces the effect, in other words, the 
medium that enables it. But attending to the effect of mimesis means ceasing to attend to 
such media. Thus, in addition to producing the difference between original and copy, 
mimesis also produces the difference between an effect and the medium in which it takes 
place, and forces us to ignore, even to repress, the latter for the sake of the former. 
Precisely this is what gives rise to the uncertainty around which the foregoing 
commentaries turn: we know of the effect of the “terrifying and “unseen bull-voiced” 
bellowing, but we know nothing about what produces them, and this ignorance is at the 
root of the effect. 
Crucially, without being the origin of mimesis, these earlier examples function as 
models for mimesis itself. They not only give us “archaic meanings” of mimesis but also 
themselves define what mimesis is and how it operates—we will explore this below as 
the abyssal paradigmaticity of mimesis. For Gregory Nagy, the chorus of maidens in the 
Homeric Hymn to Delian Apollo shows “the way for others to re-enact all other peoples, 
in all their varieties. These Maidens are models of mimesis by way of practicing mimesis: 
they can repeat everyone’s voice, mimeîsthai (Hymn to Apollo, 163), and everyone who 
hears the repetition will think that it is his or her own voice.”41 By repeating the other’s 
voice, the Delian Maidens take their place and in turn place the others in their place. 
Similarly, these bull-voiced mîmos model mimesis by re-enacting the undoing of the 
presumed self-identity of beings, by dramatizing in a terrifying way their displacement 
and the emptying-out of their materiality for the sake of expression. Thus, it is not 
enough to analyze this as an acousmatic sound when the effect of the word mîmos is 
                                                
41 Nagy, Poetry as Performance, 57. 
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effectively to displace, to detach and reattach sounds and sources, to engage affectively 
with a sensorial compound of sight and hearing and transform it. Mimesis is the 
production of the synesthetic assemblage that allows for Dionysus himself, the bull-
headed god, Taurocephalus, to appear on stage—as the actor in the tragedy re-enacts an 
act which itself re-enacts the coming of Dionysus—while at the same time keeping the 
materiality of the media that enables his arrival to remain unseen. 
There is a contagious “double mimesis” at stake in these performances.42 On the 
one hand, the poet’s reenactment of the heroic actions, his becoming Achilles; on the 
other hand the audience’s identification with the performance, indeed their own 
becoming Achilles. What is contagious in this case is not so much the model of Achilles 
or any other hero, it is not simply that “everyone acts like Achilles,” but more 
importantly that everyone’s identity is exposed to and penetrated by divine alterity. A 
similar duplicity is described by Nagy as a paradox, namely that “the archetype to be re-
enacted must re-enact, not just enact, in its own right.”43 And later, emphasizing a sense 
of continuity in mimesis that is crucial for his argument, and that can be read here next 
to—or as part of—contagion, and in general as the consequence of the penetration of 
identity by alterity that undoes the self, that “from the standpoint of mimesis, the 
rhapsode is a recomposed performer: he becomes recomposed into Homer every time he 
performs Homer.”44 The mimetic performance is an epidemic because it falls equally 
upon [epi] everyone in the demos, divesting the participants of their individuality and 
affirming the communal nature of the ritual. To participate of the gods is to abandon the 
identity of the self. Mimesis is the condition for this (dis)identification, of the opening to 
alterity, which now becomes necessary. 
And it is against this Dionysian experience of poetry, or more precisely against its 
institutionalization and monopolization by Plato’s rivals in Athens—the poets as well as 
the Sophists (whom we haven’t mentioned yet)—that the discussion of mimesis in the 
                                                
42 Gebauer and Wulf Mimesis, 47. 
43 Nagy, Poetry as Performance, 57. 
44 Idem, 61. 
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Republic is marshaled. Whatever we can make of the status of archaic mimesis and its 
relation to music, dance, imitation, and deception, all the authors we’ve examined agree 
in one thing: Plato’s intervention is definitive and, in the words of Gebauer and Wulf, it 
marks a break and a transformation in the history of mimesis.45 In the most general sense, 
this just means that Plato is the first writer to take up mimesis as a problem, to 
philosophize about it—the assessment of his statements about the matter is a different 
matter altogether. He brings mimesis into prominence, and his sustained engagement 
gives the notion a depth and complexity it never showed before, even if it never arrives to 
a unified meaning. The dissemination that characterizes archaic mimesis is by no means 
eliminated in Plato’s text, but it seems that we can still talk about a certain 
transformation. Having explored the problem of origins and archaic mimesis we know 
not to approach Plato’s text as an origin for mimesis. We know this is not its origin—or 
rather, it is not an origin. It is neither its origin nor an origin at all. We approach it as the 
site of a transformation, a metamorphosis—a third birth—that programmed the history of 
mimesis from then on.  
 
                                                
45 Gebauer and Wulf, Mimesis, 31. 
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CHAPTER 2  
PLATONIC METAMORPHOSES 
 
They sought to bind him with rude 
bonds, but the bonds would not hold him, and 
the withes fell far away from his hands and feet: 
and he sat with a smile in his dark eyes. 
 
Homeric Hymn to Dionysus 
 
WRITING (AND/IN) THE HISTORY OF MIMESIS 
For Gebauer and Wulf, the Platonic transformation cannot be understood without an 
awareness of the changes brought about by the introduction of writing as analyzed by 
Havelock.1 Not only do we encounter a new or specifically philosophical treatment of 
mimesis with Plato but, in fact, after his reformulations “the entire complex of language, 
bodies, images, medium, and social control underwent a change from the ground up.”2 
Through writing, the acoustic medium of communication changes into a visible object 
with the quality of being quotable and verifiable as fact. Its outcome is the very idea of 
theory, contemplation, theorein. The Platonic transformation, in this reading, consists in 
leveling a critique of the earlier modes of communication, gathering the diverse practices 
and their content under the name of mimesis for the first time, and isolating the 
conceptual knowledge that remained conditioned to time and the senses in these 
practices, by distinguishing between true knowledge (episteme) and received authority 
(doxa), between pure thinking (noesis) and sensorial experience (aesthesis).3 The result, 
in their reading, is that the type of practices associated with mimetic production—
specifically with mousikē—appear as a concern with becoming instead of being, with the 
many instead of the one, and with the visible instead of the intelligible. Moreover, they 
                                                
1 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1995), 45. 
2 Idem. 
3 Idem, 50. 
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argue, the monopoly held by the poets and the sophists of this type of knowledge leads 
Plato to relegate it to “a sphere of its own, aesthetics, which yields only a qualified form 
of knowledge.”4  
This transformation, however it is defined, appears as the non-origin of theory, of 
aesthetics, of philosophy as such. It also seems to begin a chapter in the history of 
mimesis in which the sounding and performative aspects of mousikē have a progressively 
limited role to play, being quickly overshadowed by painting, poetry, and especially 
tragedy. We can begin to talk then, even, of a redistribution of the sensorium, of a 
displacement from the aural to the visual, and from the visual to the intelligible. The most 
important transformation involved by this displacement, however, is that we encounter 
for the first time an unambiguous distinction between a models and copies, along with a 
hierarchization of their value and a regulation for their production. And this, in 
Havelock’s reading, would not be anything like an epistemic change nor an aesthetic 
revolution, as much as the unavoidable consequences of the rise of literacy.  
Thus far, we have entertained Havelock’s theory in the context of archaic mimesis 
and with respect to his discussion of Homeric poetry, but we haven’t engaged with his 
treatment of Plato. What is crucial in Havelock is that Plato’s text is, at the same time, a 
testimony—a document for the historian—of the general passage from orality and 
literacy as well as a crucial actor—an author for the philosopher—in the transformation 
as the regulator, codifier, and in fact programmer of the subsequent conditions for 
understanding and judging archaic and classical mimesis. Considering Plato’s role in the 
history of mimesis along these lines poses a fundamental question about the place of 
mimesis in the theory of literacy in general. How can we account for the privilege that 
Plato seems to have of being aware at any level of the massive transformations that are 
said to be taking place during his time? In other words, are we to read Plato 
symptomatically as a document of the transformations, or as the author of a doctrine of 
mimesis that rides upon these transformations while at the same time exposing the 
conditions for its own possibility? A more immediate version of the same question is 
                                                
4 Idem. 
The Myth of/at the Origin(al)—Platonic Metamorphoses 
 
59 
suggested by Havelock himself with respect to Plato’s own awareness of the 
transformations he was experiencing. The problem Havelock poses is, how was Plato 
able to reject the culture that had raised him or, in other words, “if the educational system 
which transmitted the Hellenic mores had indeed relied on the perpetual stimulation of 
the young in a kind of hypnotic trance, to use Plato’s language, how did the Greeks ever 
wake up?”5 
In approaching these questions, we encounter what is at stake in the Platonic 
transformation for the history of mimesis, as well as securing the place that we assign to 
Plato’s text in the entire scheme. We engage Plato as just that, a text, in which what is at 
stake is nothing other than its very condition as text, as a written text. That is to say, we 
seek to understand the role of writing in the history of mimesis by questioning the very 
notion of writing that is written into the history of mimesis. This is because writing is 
already in a problematic relation with mimesis, and the type of writing that has been 
taken as the condition for such transformation is already a result of the history it attempts 
to write: To write about the history of mimesis is to ask about the place of writing in that 
history. But questioning their relation might just jeopardize the entire possibility of 
understanding the nature of such transformation and thus of making sense of the history 
as a whole. Let us move more slowly. 
Havelock contends that philosophy is only possible through the type of reflexivity 
afforded by the growing literary culture, by the mediation that writing provides. Writing 
is a condition for the possibility of abstraction and logical thought, indeed for the 
emergence of abstract ideas as such, and it parallels the displacement of an acoustic 
orientation without fixity to a visual, static one. According to the “literacy thesis” in 
Havelock’s account, the very distinction between subject and object, between the knower 
and the known, is a result of the introduction of writing. Only poetry as written could be 
truly examined and analyzed with the sense objectivity which we know today and which 
was beginning to be experienced in Plato’s time. But this is not all. The entire mindset of 
                                                
5 Havelock, Preface to Plato, 208. 
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ancient culture was transformed by writing, specifically by the Greek alphabet which 
represents all sounds, not just consonants, thus presumably requiring no interpretation 
(the filling in of the vowels) for its decoding, freeing the mind from the task of 
memorization. Freed from this task, the “soul” becomes autonomous, independent of the 
content of what is memorized. Thus, Havelock claims, the very notion of a soul, of 
psyche, is at odds with the experience of the “Homeric mind,” and it does not emerge 
until Plato.  
The Republic is, as we said, both a testimony and the first articulation of the 
notion of soul. Or to be more precise, as Havelock writes, Socrates affirms and exploits a 
notion which was the slow creation of thinkers like Heraclitus and Democritus, a 
development which involves not only the semantics of the word psyche as opposed to 
“body” or “corpse,” but the very possibility of articulating the notion of a “self,” of an “I” 
that remains unchanged throughout its affections, a self-governing consciousness.6 This is 
because, in the Homeric mind, the self is inseparable from what it does, from its 
enactments and re-enactments—the self is simultaneously constituted and exceeded by 
alterity in a mimetic epidemic. The poem as a cultural repository exceeds the individual 
in order to be preserved and communicated. The educational experience of Homeric 
poetry, the identification of poets and listeners, implies that the content of the poem exists 
only in its embodied performance, it does not preexist it and it does not exist outside of it. 
Insofar as the entire acoustic assemblage is deployed for the preservation and distribution 
of the poem, the poem is coextensive with all the participants of the performance, from 
the memory of the poem to the affective engagement of the audience that ensures the 
actualization of the mores and customs it preserves and aims to maintain.  
The “identification” of the poet and the audience with the content of the poem in 
its re-enactment is necessary for the poem’s preservation, for its effect. From this follows 
that there is no way of understanding what the actual “content” of the poem is, since “its 
acceptance and retention are made psychologically possible by a mechanism of self-
surrender to the poetic performance, and of self-identification with the situations and the 
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stories related in the performance.”7 This means that the poem cannot be properly 
“understood” by the poet or the audience because both poet and audience remain within 
the mimetic epidemic, insofar as they merge with it, or are co-constituted by it. There is 
no way of remaining “outside” of the performance, just as there is no way of attending to 
the poem without getting carried away in its flow. And conversely, there is no way of 
maintaining any unified notion of a “self” or an “I” that is not in a constant becoming-
other, a self that is not at once a poet in performance and the hero he performs, who is not 
bound to the constraints of time that make up the poetic performance. The transmission 
of ethos mores and customs in this way implies that there is no interiority in which to 
ponder and reflect what these customs are and what they signify by themselves, outside 
of their daily application—there are no timeless, abstract laws, only the right thing to be 
done, the proper way to honor the gods.  
By the time of Plato, this poetic culture was already at odds with the mindset that 
emerged with the spread of alphabetic writing, with the experience that the text as a self-
standing object afforded the reader. The written text enabled the reader to “dispense with 
most of that emotional identification by which alone the acoustic record was sure of 
recall.”8 The ability to return to a statement, evaluate it, and compare it with others 
depends, for Havelock, on writing only. In fact, the Socratic method of dialectics, he 
holds, is already a result of this experience. When Socrates demands of his interlocutors 
to repeat, explain, and rephrase their statements, he is effectively interrupting the 
identification of the speaker with the spoken and isolating specific issues for careful 
examination.9 Dialectics “was a weapon for arousing the consciousness from its dream 
language and stimulating it to think abstractly,”10 yet this capacity had been already 
enabled by the written text—even if Socrates, famously, never wrote a word.  
                                                
7 Idem, 198. 
8 Idem, 208. 
9 In fact, we will argue below, Socrates is exploiting the possibility for iteration that already belongs in 
speech, a possibility that is characteristic of writing but not in the sense that Havelock understands it here. 
10 Idem, 209. 
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All the essential elements of Platonism—the distinction between the sensible and 
the intelligible, the one and the many, being and becoming—can thus be explained as a 
result of the possibility of stopping the mimetic flow of the poetic performance to 
examine it outside of its sensorial and temporal constraints.11 Plato’s fundamental aim in 
the face of these changes, as presented in the Republic, is to secure theoretically the force 
of a thinking, self-identical subject and the affirmation of an abstract, timeless object of 
knowledge against the poetic experience that still dominates his sociocultural milieu, 
emphasizing the separation between the listener and the poem. In Havelock’s words, 
Plato demands of Athenians that,  
They should examine this [poetic] experience and rearrange it, that they should 
think about what they say, instead of just saying it. And they should separate 
themselves from it instead of identifying with it; they themselves should become 
the “subject” who stands apart from the “object” and reconsiders it and analyses it 
and evaluates it, instead of just “imitating” it.12  
The strategy consists in presenting the poetic experience as a confused and contradictory 
form of knowledge (he calls it doxa) that cannot reach the type of knowledge, the 
episteme, that the new mindset requires. Plato points out a type of cognitive dissonance 
between the operations of the mind as he now understands it, and the way mimesis 
engages with them, finding those of mimesis to be limited, misguided, and dangerous. 
But this means that the definition of mimesis as presented in the Republic, the 
recollection and analysis of the Homeric poetic experience, is made possible by the 
appearance and spread of writing, and it is advanced in order to establish Platonism, 
philosophy as such, as its counterpart, as its vanquisher. The philosophical episteme is 
precisely what mimesis can never offer. What mimesis does offer, the rich, complex and 
contradictory experience of human action, aisthesis, and becoming, is what threatens 
philosophy from all flanks.  
Without exaggerating this polarization, it is already clear that the account of 
archaic mimesis that we find in the Republic is constituted by philosophy as its other, it is 
                                                
11 Idem, 218. 
12 Idem, 47. 
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the outside of philosophy, it is what philosophy is not (sophistry is another other of this 
other of philosophy, the charges against both are very similar). Each formulation in the 
text is already outside the experience of orality as Havelock wants to describe it (he will 
say the same about the written Homer we possess), and thus it is only constituted by 
philosophy, it derives from it. 
Placed in opposition to philosophy, mimesis might be said to belong to it. There is 
therefore nothing original about archaic mimesis. We should be suspect, then, of Plato’s 
account as a document, as a historical record, as what it can tell us about the “original” 
experience of archaic mimesis and mousikē. But, paradoxically, this makes philosophy 
itself be constituted by the exclusion of what is established as mimetic by mousikē. 
Philosophy appears by differentiating itself from mousikē, by creating the scaffold of 
what will allow it to distinguish itself from it. Thus, mousikē, and hence mimesis, are 
already in philosophy, they are part of it as its outside—that is to say, they are the origin 
of philosophy, its motivation. Mimesis, being outside of philosophy, is constituted by the 
philosophy of which it is the origin without belonging to it.13 It is rather unarchaic and 
anarchic: unoriginal. 
We can easily see how this interpretation attracted the attention of deconstruction. 
To understand this paradox, we will have to distinguish, further on, between a general 
mimesis that, without being itself original, originates the restricted mimesis that we find 
in Plato. This points us to the general structure of what I call, after Lacoue-Labarthe, a 
mimetology, a philosophical elaboration of mimesis that attempts to set down and define 
its limits and boundaries. Paradoxically, however, a mimetology is grounded in an 
experience that already does not belong to it but everywhere affects it. Mimesis gives 
mimetology this possibility from without, with the effect that “the more it resembles, the 
more it differs.” This mimetology introduces a historical aspect; it marks a break, a 
                                                
13 This analysis, and what follows, is based on Derrida’s reading of Saussure in the first part of Of 
Grammatology, where the system of writing is defined as exterior and yet constitutive of the system of 
language that pretends to exclude it. The formulation towards which we are approaching is that “writing 
[and mimesis are] at the same time more exterior to speech, not being its “image” or its “symbol,” and 
more interior to speech, which is already in itself a writing.” Derrida Of Grammatology, 46. See also 
Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Stanford, (CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
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distinction between what used to be and what now is and should be. In defining itself as 
present, it defines the past from the perspective of its present and rewrites the past as its 
past, a past with which it wants nothing to do. Thus, for instance, the infamous 
“expulsion of the poets” does not only function as a regulation for an ideal city, for a 
utopia, but also, or moreover, it has the effect of banishing mimesis retroactively from its 
own history—we say moreover because this banishment was in fact more effective than 
the one “prescribed” for the future, to which Aristotle was already quick in replying.  
Mimesis, then, is outside of philosophy, and yet somehow inside it. The abyssal 
logic of this formulation will be made clearer by returning to the problem of writing, as 
writing is also at the origin of philosophy, according to Havelock. Does this mean that 
mousikē and writing are in the same position with respect to philosophy? Certainly, 
insofar as they both constitute it from the outside and are in turn constituted 
philosophically as its exclusion. This does not mean that mimesis and writing are 
equivalent in any simple sense. For, as is well known, Plato is in what we could call a 
complicated relationship with writing, an ambivalence that led him to formulate attacks 
in the seventh letter and the Phaedrus.14 Havelock, in fact, devotes very little discussion 
to these texts and to the problem in general of accounting for Plato’s self-awareness of 
the definitive role of writing for his philosophy. Plato’s “preference for oral methods was 
not only conservative but illogical, since the Platonic episteme which was to supplant 
doxa was being nursed to birth by the literate revolution.”15 Coming close to begging the 
question, Havelock here makes clear that he denies Plato any self-awareness of the 
effects of writing upon these transformations, yet by this move his theory falls into a 
simple technological determinism, exaggerating his claim about the influence of writing 
in problematic ways, starting with the very formulation of writing as a “technology,” as a 
                                                
14 On writing and the Phaedrus, see Derrida, Dissemination. See also Jasper Neel, Plato, Derrida, and 
Writing. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988). 
15 Idem, 56. In The Muse Learns to Write, he refers to Aristotle’s choice of the word theoria, contemplation, 
as a “subconscious” choice to signal a passage from the acoustic to the visual, and subsequently refers to 
the Phaedrus as Plato’s attempt to “give the oral message priority over the written, though with ambiguous 
result.” Havelock 1986, 111. 
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technē that is implicitly opposed to phusis insofar as he does not elaborate the point 
further.16 
Writing is therefore also outside of the philosophy that it produces and, 
conversely, philosophy has its origin in the writing that, like mousikē, it excludes. 
Writing and the mimesis of mousikē, however, are not in this case anything alike. Yet the 
problem is, precisely, that in its Platonic formulation, and to an extent that shall be 
decided later in Havelock, writing was conceived as a form of mimesis. Here, I suggest 
that an elaboration of Plato’s conception of writing (as suggested by Derrida) will show 
him operating with an awareness of a certain notion of writing that, however, is 
determined by mimesis in ways that exceed his attempts to delimit both writing and 
mousikē. 
In Havelock’s argument, it will be recalled, the importance of the affective, 
mimetic experience of mousikē was the possibility for externalizing and storing the mores 
of the tribe, for memorization. It should not come as a surprise to recall that Plato’s attack 
on writing in the Phaedrus relied precisely in questioning its effects upon memory. In the 
myth told by Socrates, the god Theuth presents Thamus—King of the Egyptians—with 
the gift of writing, which he says “will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their 
memory; I have discovered a potion (pharmakon) for memory and for wisdom.”17 The 
king, however, disagrees with Theuth’s description and rejects the gift. His response is 
well known: 
O most expert Theuth, one man can give birth to the elements of an art, but only 
another can judge how they can benefit or harm those who will use them. And 
now, since you are the father of writing, your affection for it has made you 
                                                
16 Cf. Halverson “Havelock on Orality and Literacy,” 163. This, however, is not more problematic than to 
charge Plato with full self-consciousness of his relation to writing such that he could “use the most 
powerful system available to humanity, the system of writing, to steal the most powerful voice of Western 
civilization, the voice of Socrates, and then he tries to negate the system itself, leaving himself with both 
the voice of authority and absolute control a system that after him will be corrupted, unable to regain a 
position of authority, unable to begin the search for truth.” Neel 1988, 6. 
17 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. by A. Nehamas and P. Woodroof, in Plato, Complete Works. (Ed. John M. Cooper 
and Hutchinson D. S. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009), 274e. All subsequent citations from Plato, except from 
the Republic, are from this edition and are cited with inline Stephanus numbers. 
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describe its effects as the opposite of what they really are. In fact, it will introduce 
forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it: they will not practice using their 
memory because they will put their trust in writing, which is external and depends 
on signs that belong to others, instead of trying to remember from the inside, 
completely on their own. You have not discovered a potion (pharmakon) for 
remembering (mnēmē), but for reminding (hupomnēseōs); you provide your 
students with the appearance (doxan) of wisdom, not with its reality (alētheian). 
Your invention will enable them to hear many things without being properly 
taught, and they will imagine that they have come to know much while for the 
most part they will know nothing. And they will be difficult to get along with, 
since they will merely appear to be wise instead of really being so (275e – 276b). 
The effects of writing, he shows, are precisely the opposite of what Theuth claims, and 
what results from writing is not remembering (mnēmē), but reminding (hupomnēseōs), it 
provides students with the appearance (doxan) of wisdom, not with its reality (alētheian). 
The passage identifies memory (mnēmē) and truth (alētheia), on the one hand, and 
reminding (hupomnēseōs) with appearance (doxa), on the other. Memory is interior, it is 
autonomous and present to itself without any mediation, and it alone is true. Writing is 
exterior, it is dependent on signs (graphēs), and is deceitful—these by now familiar 
oppositions form a system with all the structural oppositions of Platonism.  
As Derrida has shown, these oppositions attempt to dominate an ambiguity in the 
Greek word pharmakos that in fact gives the possibility for the entire schema, allowing 
Thamus to reveal writing to be precisely the opposite of what Theuth intended.18 In 
“Plato’s Pharmacy,” Derrida traces the diverse meanings of the pharmakos, its multiple 
usages in Plato and terms that are closely related, to expose the impossibility for the 
closure of any system based on oppositions, specifically language and writing. Left 
untranslated, pharmakos might mean both remedy and medicine as well as drug and 
poison as, presumably, decided by the context. But for Derrida this means that, caught in 
a chain of significations, its contextual meaning escapes control by the author, not just 
                                                
18 Derrida Dissemination, 103. 
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because of ambiguity but also because of an activation of the play of referentiality that 
annihilates the system of differences that constitutes textuality.19 The task for the reader, 
in the face of these ambiguities, is to produce an interpretation which, instead of pinning 
down the unambiguous meaning that the author might have intended, or of aiming to 
locate it in some transcendental signified outside the text, lets the play of the text run its 
course to bring forth—and collapse—its general structure.20  
In this passage, moreover, there is more at stake with this ambiguity: it allows 
Thamus to invert Theuth’s statements in a wordplay that accentuates the exteriority, 
artificiality and harmfulness of the pharmakon, characteristics that Plato aims to assign to 
writing as well. Initially presented as a gift, the pharmakon is a remedy for memory, an 
enhancer, a supplement that will make up for its natural deficiencies, yet it turns out to be 
the very opposite of this, it becomes a drug that introduces forgetfulness and makes the 
soul dependent on the exteriority of signs. This is the inversion that Plato would have 
intended, yet the ambiguity imposes another consequence: no matter how exterior the 
pharmakon might turn out to be, it still has the possibility of infecting and poisoning the 
interior soul. Plato ends up being forced to affirm both senses at the same time: “Thus, 
even though writing is external to (internal) memory, even though hypomnesia is not in 
itself memory, it affects memory and hypnotizes it in its very inside.”21 Writing is 
exterior yet it has the power of affecting the interior, it is a “dangerous supplement,” 
arriving to infect the natural closure of the system that pretends to do without it. 
This reading renders Havelock’s account more complicated. Besides maintaining 
the relation between memory and writing, Havelock’s theory parallels the myth in the 
Phaedrus, showing writing to be aligned with exteriority and artificiality, as well as 
                                                
19 Derrida notes that, with certain modifications, “pharmakon” plays a similar role as does “supplement” in 
his reading of Rousseau in Of Grammatology (as well as, we may note, other “hinge” concepts such as 
“hymen,” “specter,” etc.). The supplement is something that is external and secondary but which artificially 
completes what would otherwise be natural thus corrupting and violating it. This makes the supplement a 
constitutive part of what is supplemented, presence being therefore always already infiltrated by alterity, in 
a structure that Derrida takes to be the rule of textuality in general, which Rousseau inscribes in his own 
text. 
20 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 158. 
21 Derrida, Dissemination, 110. 
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reaffirming its effects on the interior.22 Consequently, he is also forced to uphold both the 
exteriority of writing, its status as a technology, as a supplementary element that comes 
from nowhere and is somehow capable of transforming everything down to the core, in 
fact of producing a “soul” that resembles writing, predicated on separation and exteriority 
more than it ever resembled itself: writing, in Havelock’s account, not only poisons the 
soul but makes it be like writing itself. But now, in Havelock’s tally, truth resides on the 
side of writing and exteriority, of objectivity, not on the full self-presence of interiority. 
We must not rush into drawing the conclusion that with this inversion Havelock already 
effectuates the necessary inversion of Platonism by showing it to be essentially correct 
about the power of writing, with only a matter of orientation making the difference. One 
could say that Havelock here gives the truth to Plato’s system, it shows it for what it’s 
worth in the way it shows the truth even when doing the opposite. This, however, does 
not amount to the transvaluation of truth, it is simply an inversion that keeps everything 
in its place: interior speech and exterior writing, memory as immediacy and writing as 
mediation: truth simply changes sides to mark a break, a transformation that authorizes 
the narrative as history. What is needed is to show truth as value, and to expose the way 
Platonic mimetology already conceives of truth as value, the production of which is the 
matter of economimesis. 
Here, we still need to return to the relation between writing and mimesis as it 
operates in the Platonic text, for it will show the common ground between Havelock and 
Plato. Besides maintaining the relation between memory and writing, Havelock’s theory 
parallels the myth in the Phaedrus, showing writing to be aligned with exteriority and 
artificiality, as well as reaffirming its effects on the interior. Havelock writes under the 
shadow of Platonic mimetology, outlining a transformation that is in fact programmed by 
the same mimesis it is attempting to define. In all of this, mousikē has seemed to be in the 
periphery, in fact, as we saw, it is the periphery, the outside, the motivation and hence the 
                                                
22 It is, in fact, a sophistic strategy from the beginning, as Derrida shows, elaborated by Gorgias, Alcidamas 
and Isocrates (presumably the motivation behind the entire dialogue). The sophists placed writing lower 
than logos, but not because the latter was a pharmakon but because the logos was a more potent one, a 
persuasive enchantment, magical indeed. Plato, in Derrida’s lectures, imitates and takes over the strategy of 
the sophist (itself a sophist strategy, in Plato’s condemnation) to invert it, “the dialectician [simulates] him 
whom he denounces as a simulator, as the simulacrum-man.” Idem, 112. 
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origin of everything that does not include it. But, paradoxically, as we encounter it, it is 
constituted by the same philosophy that its exclusion originated. 
Writing in Plato’s text is conceived as mimetic in various senses. In Thamus’s 
account it is mimetic in the sense that it is deceitful, writing shows the appearance of a 
truth residing elsewhere. Writing provides the students “with the appearance (doxan) of 
wisdom, not with its reality (alētheian).” This “imitative” deceptiveness is also 
contagious, it infects the soul and makes it itself deceitful: “they will be difficult to get 
along with, since they will merely appear to be wise instead of really being so.” Further 
on, Socrates confirms what we already expected, that writing is an imitation of the logos 
in the soul, which, as living, is alone legitimate and true. In opposition to the living logos, 
a lifeless image that looks alive but cannot answer back “it continues to signify just that 
very same thing forever” (275d). It is thus a repetition, a pure repetition, always the same 
thing, like a pictorial image, lifeless and irresponsive. The relation between painting and 
writing is mimetic. “They have faithfulness as their model,” writes Derrida, “the 
resemblance between painting and writing is precisely resemblance itself: both operations 
must aim above all at resembling. They are both apprehended as mimetic techniques, art 
being first determined as mimesis.” 
SOCRATES: Now tell me, can we discern another kind of discourse (logon), a 
legitimate brother of this one? Can we say how it comes about, and how it is by 
nature better and more capable? PHAEDRUS: Which one is that? How do you 
think it comes about? SOCRATES: It is a discourse (logon) that is written down, 
with knowledge, (epistēmes graphetai) in the soul (psuchē) of the listener; it can 
defend itself, and it knows for whom it should speak and for whom it should 
remain silent. PHAEDRUS: You mean the living, breathing discourse 
(logon…zōnta kai empsuchon) of the man who knows, of which the written one 
can be fairly called an image (eidolon) (276a). 
This means, however, that archaic mimesis as presented by Plato is conditioned by a 
specific conception of writing, one that assumes it to be the image of speech, a secondary 
substitute for what is first and foremost, originally, in the soul—that is, it conceives of 
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writing as already mimetic. The transformation at the “origin” of mimesis is the result of 
the mediation of writing, but only if we understand writing to be the kind of mediation 
that interrupts the presence to itself of idealized thought, as “the mediation of mediation 
and as a fall into the exteriority of meaning”23  
How to read, then, Havelock’s account of Platonic mimesis with or after his 
1960s contemporary Derrida? After acknowledging that the “event” of the invention of 
writing cannot be taken to be a pure origin but rather as the regulated re-inscription of 
inscription itself? And what happens to the narrative of affective communication and 
philosophic reflexivity when the event that separates them only makes them fall back into 
each other? Finally—and this is the most important strategy to be adopted here—, what 
happens when one takes contagion into account and asks about the role of mousikē in the 
deferrals that separate and re-join these various modes of mimesis? 
 
We read it, Plato’s account of the mimesis of mousikē, not as if there was something 
originary in mimesis before the Platonic intervention, not as if this pre-Platonic mimesis 
was original, true, the truth of mimesis, or the proper mode of accessing truth in mimesis, 
of which Platonic mimesis was a false postulation made in the name of truth. Not as if the 
“poetic state of mind” was true, the true origin, true mimesis. For this origin is postulated 
in retrospect, assumed as originary to explain and justify as history the very logic that it 
aims to historicize, through that very logic. This is to say, but not only, that Havelock’s 
account is logocentric—he cannot avoid it. More importantly, it means that by 
interrogating archaic mimesis as a myth—a convenient myth, just like the myth told by 
Socrates in Rep. 5 that would allocate the classes in the ideal State according to the 
metals they emerged from—we get a glimpse of the groundless logic that (un)grounds all 
operations of grounding, of the origin of the idea of origin, of the paradigm of 
paradigmaticity. The abandonment of “archaic” mimesis in Plato is explained as a 
cultural transformation produced by the invention of writing. We must then give an 
account of this transformation that does not assume writing to be new while at the same 
                                                
23 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 13. 
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time showing how a particular notion of writing, a logocentric writing, appears and 
motivates these transformations. That mousike is at the origin of this myth should be no 
surprise—its modern form is familiar since Rousseau and Herder. To inquire into this 
paradigmatic origin, into this origin of paradigmaticity, is thus to ask about the possibility 
of understanding anything about the origin of music from within the frame of a 
logocentric history. It is also, moreover, to ask about the value of this myth, about the 
logic of its value, about the economy built around this value and the means of producing, 
preserving, and monopolizing this value. 
PLATO AND THE PARADIGM 
Most readers of the problem of mimesis in the Republic focus on poetry, tragedy, and 
painting, even while acknowledging the importance, complexity and semantic breadth of 
ancient Greek mousikē.24 Philological inquiry into the development of the word is often 
undertaken as an attempt to account for the polysemy—or rather, dissemination—of the 
meanings of mimesis in the Platonic text, and especially to explain the relation between 
books 2, 3 and 10, of the Republic, as well as to understand the nature, reasons, and 
extent of Plato’s so-called “banishment of the poets” from the ideal State.25 The strategies 
adopted towards this aim are as varied as can be imagined, and most often rely in making 
historical or conceptual distinctions about the meanings of mimesis that join or divide the 
discussions of technē, mousikē and poiesis. Thus, for Stephen Halliwell, one of the most 
rigorous figures in the discussion, Plato never offers anything like a “doctrine” of 
                                                
24 The classic work on music in Plato is Evanghélos Moutsopoulos, La musique dans l’œuvre de Platon; 
See also Edward Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1964). For a more recent account, see Francesco Pelosi, Plato on Music, Soul and Body, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). The relation between mimesis and music has been recently addressed 
in Séline Gülgönen “La Mimesis Musicale Dans Les Dialogues Platoniciens.” Phoenix 68.1/2 (2014): 97–
111. 
25 The discontinuity between the opening and closing books of the Republic is a traditional theme of 
Platonic criticism, and any reconstruction involves a position between those who argue about continuity, 
and those who argue about for discontinuity; for a concise account, see Jera Marušič, “Poets and Mimesis 
in the Republic” in Plato and the Poets, (Pierre Destrée and Fritz-Georg Hermann, eds. Leiden and Boston; 
Brill, 2011). The one elaborated here draws on, but departs in crucial points to be noted below, from 
Halliwell, Mimesis, For a reassessment of the so-called banishment, see Stephen Halliwell, “Antidotes and 
Incantations: Is There a Cure for Poetry in Plato’s Republic?” in Plato and the Poets. 
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mimesis and all his pronunciations on the matter are to be taken as conditional, 
progressive elaborations on a concern which, above all, invite—and have effectively 
produced—further engagement by subsequent readers.26 For Halliwell, any single 
statement on the matter has to be contextualized, contrasted with other similar 
pronouncements that attest a concern with both the ethical and ontological gravitas of the 
problem of mimesis.27 Plato’s true legacy in this matter, in short, can be taken as a 
general demand not to take mimesis lightly. Risking to get ahead of myself, I would 
venture that this oversight is itself a consequence of the very terms in which our ideas of 
poetry and music have been programmed by the discussions from the Republic, from an 
especially Romantic perspective. Thus, to restore the place of music in the dialogue 
involves working against—without ignoring—centuries of discussions centered around 
the problematic ideas of “art” and “aesthetics,” a critical balancing act that is almost 
impossible to perform successfully, as Halliwell’s work itself shows.  
If mimesis is primarily a concern with paradigms and copies, with the conditions 
and ontological status of what is made after something else, and of what it means that 
something is like something else, then it is crucial to understand what the paradigm is that 
is being used to understand what mimesis is in general, what it is like. It is Plato’s key 
strategy, the astounding artistic and philosophical feat of the Republic, to define mimesis 
mimetically, to exploit the resources of paradigmaticity to expose the difficulties of 
thinking mimesis in general.28 
The logic of the paradigm inverts or interrupts the traditional logic that moves 
from particulars to arrive to universals (induction) or from universals to particulars 
(deduction). Instead, the paradigm moves form particular to particular. For Agamben, it is 
not deductive knowledge but analogical, where each particular element might be taken up 
as a representative of the whole. What is more, the logic of the paradigm has a double 
ontology, or rather a topology, of inclusive exclusion: the paradigm belongs to the group 
                                                
26 Halliwell, Mimesis, 38. 
27 Idem. 
28 I draw on the classic work on paradigmaticity in Plato, Victor Goldschmidt, Le Paradigme dans la 
dialectique Platonicienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947) as well as Giorgio Agamben, The 
Signature of All Things: On Method, (New York, NY: Zone Books, 2009). 
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and is separate from it at once—as exemplar. So, says Agamben, it is never possible to 
separate its exemplarity from its singularity. Similarly, insofar as the opposition between 
universals and particulars is neutralized, it suspends any dialectical attempt at sublation 
or subsumption of one by the other. The tension that remains, given this duplicity, is 
further complicated when this operation is said to be mimetic, as simultaneous singularity 
and exemplarity of the paradigm is further posited as a model—when it might have been 
just as well the copy. What mimetology does, in the end, is deciding upon this duplicity, 
fixing it and determining one element over the other. From a multitude of singulars, one 
is posited as being a model in addition to being a paradigm. This does not destroy either 
its singularity or exemplarity, but redistributes the relation that it has to the other 
elements in the paradigmatic group, which are thus defined as copies.  
In fact, there is a mimetic strategy involved in Plato’s approach to mimesis itself. 
Like other words in Plato’s vocabulary, mimesis has a diverse range of pre-philosophical 
meanings that progressively take on a technical signification in the course of the 
dialogues. As with other concepts, Plato discusses mimesis using models, paradigms, to 
think what mimesis itself is. My first thesis here is that Plato's mimetology is a folding 
upon itself of mimesis, explaining mimesis with respect to a paradigm that models it, 
through things that are said to be mimetic. In books 2 and 3 of the Republic, where 
Socrates and his interlocutors are concerned with evaluating and censoring the types of 
myths to be used in the education of the guardians and the (mimetic) modes of telling 
these myths, the paradigm used to understand mimesis is mousikē, which defines mimesis 
as an affective contagion that works on the body and soul of listeners and performers. In 
book 10, when the question of mimesis returns, the paradigm is painting and the 
productions of craftsmen, whose representations barely approximate the models they 
attempt to reproduce, while mousikē is not discussed anymore. Consequently, we get a 
very different concept of what mimesis is in book 10. This is not to say that there are 
two—or more—essential types of mimesis; rather—and this will be my second thesis—
different paradigms produce different ideas of what mimesis is—different mimetologies. 
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This amounts to saying that the copy precedes and produces the model, and not the other 
way around. 
This “paradigm shift”—from mousikē to the productions of demiourgs and 
painters—is accompanied, or perhaps based on, the movement from a “restricted” 
account of mimesis to a “general” one, which, in the Republic is determinant of any 
successive understanding of mimesis and the mimetology that aims to explain it while 
reducing it. Even when asking about general mimesis, the discussion is carried out only 
in terms of a restricted mimesis, which then passes as general. This movement is 
mentioned explicitly in the text: when the problem of mimesis returns in book 10, 
Socrates asks: “Could you tell me what imitation in general (mimesis holos) is? For I 
myself scarcely comprehend what it wants to be” (595c.).29  
A crucial question to be asked about this passage and the answers that follow it, in 
my view, is why, and with what consequences, is mimesis “in general” approached 
through another form of mimetic production, which is restricted? And if the paradigm 
defines the idea, then there is a sort of contagion between paradigms and ideas: visual 
mimesis—a restricted mimesis—becomes mimesis “in general,” which in turn defines the 
performative mimesis it is supposed to replace, the former determining the latter as its 
opposite. As visual mimesis is presented as containing the logic of mimesis “in general,” 
we lose account both of the initial performative mimesis of mousikē and of the general 
mimesis that (un)grounds both types. General mimesis, as opposed both to restricted 
mimesis and to mimesis “in general,” names the economy of this contagious conceptual 
determination, which we encounter in Plato in the form of a mimetology that opposes 
being and appearance. 
This is the logic that we need to understand: a restricted form of mimesis is 
replaced by another restricted form to elucidate what the general form of mimesis is. Yet 
the strategy continues to be that of using a restricted form as paradigm for the general 
form. The explanation involves the logic it is trying to explain, a folding upon itself of 
                                                
29 Halliwell translates holos as “as a whole” or “in general”. Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, 133f. 
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mimesis, explaining mimesis with respect to a paradigm, that entirely opens its definition 
and exposes its excessive groundlessness.  
What makes a visual paradigm better for defining what mimesis (and hence 
paradigmaticity) is? Why is it “more general,” or what makes the definition “general” 
when the paradigm is changed? What happens with this originary re-inscription of the 
visual into the logic of the paradigm? What consequences does this hold for mimesis, 
music and painting? Is it not the case that to us the reason why visual paradigms seem 
more appropriate to think mimesis is precisely that Plato himself made the displacement, 
paradigmatically defining the history of mimesis from this point on, around a visual 
paradigm? 
The move, as Lacoue-Labarthe describes it, is a placing en abyme of the 
theoretical itself.30 The first move, he says, consists in asking not “who is the mimetician” 
(as is done in the Sophist, to surprising results), but rather a purely theoretical question: 
“what is mimesis, in general.” Asking this “theoretical” question means defining mimesis 
“according to the old habits,” in terms of what is seen and what is not seen, of what 
appears and of what does not appear, in short, within the visible realm, within the realm 
of theory.31 Once this is done—which is in fact just the preparation of the turn (the pre-
turn)—once one restricts “general” mimesis to the theoretical, that is, the visual, the rest 
follows easily: The real turn, for Lacoue-Labarthe, consists precisely in redoubling the 
operation, placing the theoretical en abyme. Socrates’ suggestion is fantastic (and highly 
ironic): one can fabricate ideas. 
“It’s not hard,” I said. “You could fabricate them quickly in many ways and most 
quickly, of course, if you are willing to take a mirror and carry it around 
everywhere; quickly you will make the sun and the things in the heaven; quickly 
the earth; and quickly, yourself and the other animals and implements and plants 
and everything else that was just mentioned” (596d).  
                                                
30 Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 92. Halliwell, on his part, says that “the mirror analogy stands for the 
threat, not the final assertion, of a reductive conception of visual mimesis.”. The Aesthetics of Mimesis, 139. 
31 Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 91. 
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As Lacoue-Labarthe says, this is not just any mirror, it is a false mirror or a two-way 
mirror. What the mirror shows, first and foremost, is not what it reflects (the ideas it 
creates) but what the mimetician is presumed to do. The mimetician has become perfectly 
visible. That is, his operation, his “work,” has been revealed to be as working in and with 
the visible. It is indeed a magical trick by Socrates the sorcerer. The mirror, moreover, is 
an apotropaic object: just as it turns the medusa into stone, it immobilizes the mimetician, 
turns him into an image of himself (or the inverse, perhaps, animating him, turning him 
into a puppet. In any case, it is a turn or trick (they are same in French) of conjuring and 
illusionism: theorization, Lacoue-Labarthe says, is a thaumaturgy, but one in which the 
illusionist himself is the victim. If the mimetician is said to be an illusionist himself, this 
mirror is “an anti-thaumaturgic thaumaturgy (a mise-en-abyme that neutralizes the 
mirror) destined to contain the thaumaturge.”32 The trope of the mirror consists in 
revealing that mimesis rests in simply turning a mirror around, a play of mirrors, and 
therefore nothing. 
This latter would consist in doing everything without doing anything, in 
pretending to know how to do everything when one does not work and is content 
to imitate or ‘double’ (or, in the language of the theater, stellvertretung) the one 
who does something by fraudulently substituting oneself for him and by using, in 
order ‘to produce the illusion,’ a material that lends itself to this in advance (or 
that others have already prepared in advance) and that one need only divert from 
its own proper use, or use generally and improperly. In the face of the 
Unheimliche, the improper-mastery becomes possible only by taking it still 
further, by outdoing it with the Unheimliche. This is what speculation is.33 
                                                
32 Idem., 94. Lacoue-Labarthe’s reading of this passage occurs during his questioning of Heidegger’s 
ontotypology in the 1936 lectures on Nieztsche, where Heidegger turns to the Republic to demonstrate how 
Nietzsche failed to accomplish the overturning of Platonism. Lacoue-Labarthe, on his part, questions 
whether Heidegger was able to overcome Plato’s mimetology and did not reaffirm it instead. Although I 
cannot reconstruct his demonstration here, Lacoue-Labarthe shows that one crucial omission in both Plato 
and Heidegger’s reading is precisely the problem of work—which Heidegger reinscribes as pro-duction, 
her-stellen, as his way of “dealing with Marx”) as if “it was a question to prevent worker from being heard 
within “demiurge”; that is to say, as we will see in a moment, a problematic of work within the question of 
poiesis and mimesis.” Idem., 83. 
33 Idem., 94. 
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But there is another turn that concerns us. What happens to the definition of music, or 
mousikē, when it is used to define mimesis and is defined by mimesis in turn? That Plato 
does not take up the relation of mousikē and mimesis “in general” at the end of the 
Republic is a telling symptom of the pervasiveness of the abyssal logic of mimesis. 
Should we assume that everything that is said about mimesis in book 10 applies 
retrospectively to book 3? In it the case, as it often is with concepts in the Republic and 
other dialogues, we would be tempted to reread the opening with respect to what has been 
accomplished in the end. We could read back the ontological arguments about mimesis 
into the legislation that organizes the disposition of mousikē in the polis and that disposes 
of poets, modes and rhythms. Why is this task left for the reader? Are the consequences 
of this rereading necessary and univocal? 
This is the logic, rather the magic, of contagion that un-grounds mimesis: 
whatever is used as paradigm to define mimesis ends up itself being defined mimetically. 
Plato’s strategy consists in out-doing mimesis by assigning to mimesis the means of 
specularization (“the trick of the mirror”), by reducing mimesis to a “theoretical” practice 
that operates on the visible. From here on, mimesis is defined as re-presentation, 
reproduction, imitation, and so on. There is no escape from this. But this epistemic 
epidemic continues: since there is no origin, no original definition, either of mousikē or 
mimesis, then the (restricted) visual paradigm that defines mimesis “in general” folds 
back to define mousikē as well. We lose any account of the “original” meaning of 
mousikē, we cease to be able to talk about mousikē without defining it with respect to this 
mimesis “in general” which is visual.  
There are broader consequences, since with the Republic we are not talking 
simply about mousikē—or painting or poetry—as artistic forms that correspond to a 
specific sensorial field (for lack of a better word for aisthesis). Rather, we attend to a re-
definition of the sensorium in general, to what it means for something to be sensible, as 
opposed to the intelligible, and with respect to differences between sensorial fields, 
between the visible and the audible etc. Mimesis is involved in the description and 
prescription of our modes of hearing and seeing, seeing and touching, touching and 
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hearing, the hierarchy and relations between them, as much as it uses our aesthetic 
experience of them (in music or painting) to define mimesis itself. 
“LEAVE US THAT MODE” 
What is mimesis, then, as defined according to the paradigm of mousikē? The first 
explicit mention of both terms occurs simultaneously, in book 2, in the transition from 
“the city of sows” towards “the city of luxuriousness.” This feverish city will be “gorged 
with a bulky mass of things, which are not in cities because of necessity—all the hunters 
and imitators (mimetai), many concerned with figures and colors, many with music 
(mousikē)” (373b). Mousikē reappears shortly after (376e), introducing the long 
discussion about the education of the guardians. These must be properly reared so as to 
be “philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong,” (376c) and presumably the best means to 
accomplish this is the traditional paideia: mousikē for the soul, firstly, and gymnastics for 
the body. In stating the primacy of mousikē, Socrates also expresses a crucial aspect of 
mimesis as the capacity of something—not yet a person but always already a person—to 
become like its model.  
It is a question of beginnings, and mousikē must be first: “Don’t you know that 
the beginning is the most important part of every work and that this is especially so with 
anything young and tender? For at that stage it is most plastic, and each thing assimilates 
itself to the model (enduetai tupos) whose stamp anyone wishes to give to it” (377b). 
This point is repeated in similar forms throughout books 2 and 3. Without actually 
mentioning it, onto-typology—a hylemorphic mimetology according to which a 
shapeless, feminized matter is imprinted by an ideal form, a type—is here in full, 
including the idea of the mind, but also the body, as being imprinted by a model, a type 
(tupos).34 The relation between mimesis and habits is explicitly mentioned in a similar 
passage in book 3: “Or haven’t you observed that imitations (mimeseis), if they are 
practiced continually from youth onwards, become established as habits (ethē) and 
nature, in body and sounds and in thought?” (395d). 
                                                
34 Lacoue-Labarthe develops this description of onto-typology in his reading of Heidegger in 
“Typography.” 
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This passage, which appears in the course of the discussion of the types of 
discourse, lexis, appropriate for poetry (mimetic, diegetic, and mixed), considers mimesis 
as a performance, as an enactment made by the poet, which has effects on the constitution 
of the body of the listeners and his own. Notably, it is not restricted to young children 
anymore, it is considered as having effects from “youth onwards,” that is, on anyone who 
engages in mimetic performances, most crucially the guardians and well-educated men. 
More importantly, the passage combines three apparently different aspects of 
mimesis: (i) The process of plastic formation in education; (ii) The difference between 
diegetic or direct narration and mimetic narration or lexis; (iii) The effects that 
performing mimetic poetry has on the actors and listeners, of “becoming others,” that is, 
like the models they imitate. In this third sense, especially, there is no distinction between 
actors and listeners with regards to mimetic effects. In all cases, mimesis is defined as a 
potentially unbound contagious performance, an affective communication that not only 
persuades but that also shapes and transforms the listener’s soul and body according to a 
model. In close connection here are the magicians and enchanters, even Socrates himself 
according to the Symposium, a better musician than the satyr Marsyas—whose 
instruments will be soon shunned from the ideal State—and a magician, a pharmakeus. 
(Recall that book 2 opens by Socrates complaining that Thrasymachus had been 
enchanted too soon).35 
While stated here as a prohibition, this definition of mimesis grants it powerful 
capacities. It determines the plasticity of the human body and soul to be boundless, to be 
able to take on the character, the imprint, of diverse types of people, and even of “horses 
neighing, bulls roaring, the crashing of the sea, thunder,” and so on (396b). By defining 
the limits of mimetic performance, Plato hints at a dangerous, multifarious mimesis in 
need of control. Crucial to this control is the axiom about the division of labor in the ideal 
State, which is directed at imitators and sophists as well and which organizes a whole 
                                                
35 On the relation between music and magic in Plato, see Moutsopoulos, La musique, 13-17. This 
taxonomy, of course, is not exhaustive. It can be compared, however, to the one advanced by Else as 
presented in chapter 1, above.  
 
   80
political economy, a political economimesis. In any case, mimesis passes from being 
simply a problem of education or epistemology to being a problem of political economy 
in the widest sense. 
After discussing the parts of mousikē that concern “speeches and tales” (logos te 
kai muthos, 398b7), Socrates and Glaucon set out to do the same for “song and melody” 
(odes kai melon, 398c1-2). Unlike the previous discussion, the legislation of the 
“musical” aspects of mousikē is taken up under a veil of ignorance. Socrates initially 
assumes that “everyone could by now discover what we have to say about how [song and 
melody] must be if we’re going to remain in accord (sumphonesein) with what has 
already been said.” But we shouldn’t be misled to think that this presumes that the 
association of musical modes and types of behavior was common sense in ancient 
Greece. Laughing out loud, Glaucon replies that he shouldn’t be included amongst 
“everyone”: “At least I’m not at present capable of suggesting what sort of things we 
must say. However, I’ve a suspicion” (398c). As it turns out, Glaucon, unlike Socrates, is 
trained in music, and so it will depend on him to legislate what modes and rhythms are to 
be accepted in the city.  
Mousikē, as presumably everyone in Athens knew, “is composed of three 
things—speech (logos), harmonic mode, and rhythm.” For Socrates, sung speech doesn’t 
differ from speech that isn’t sung, insofar as it must conform to the same models (tupoi) 
as had been discussed before. Harmonic mode and rhythm come to supplement logos, 
conforming to the same regulations, thus adding nothing, if not the suspicion that the 
previous regulation is not complete. If sung speech is the same as unsung speech, and if 
mousikē in any case is always sung to musical accompaniment, then there should be no 
need for further regulation: it is the content of the tales, the nature of the models and the 
correctness of the imitation, which presumably distinguishes between good and bad 
mimesis. Why then should harmony and rhythm be regulated separately, yet still 
following what is said for logos?  
This introduces further difficulties. When regulating the content of speeches, 
where it was the legislator’s role to know the models to which poetry should conform, 
Socrates had no trouble quoting passages from the poets and censoring what was 
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inappropriate for the education of the guardians. In the discussion on song and melody, 
however, Socrates declares himself ignorant of music and must delegate to Glaucon: 
(399a) I don’t know the modes. Just leave us that mode which would 
appropriately imitate the sounds and accents of a man who is courageous in 
warlike deeds and every violent work… (399b) And again, leave another mode 
for a man who performs a peaceful deed, one that is not violent (biaio) but 
voluntary (ekousia), either persuading someone of something or making a 
request….(399c) These two modes—a violent one and a voluntary one (tautas 
duo harmonias, biaion, ekousion), which will produce the finest imitation of the 
sounds of unfortunate and fortunate, moderate and courageous men—leave 
these.36  
Socrates’s musical ignorance points to a crucial aspect of musical mimesis. As a 
theoretician, as having something to contemplate, something with a visible aspect and an 
eidos, he is perfectly happy to follow the dialogue wherever it takes him. With mousikē, 
he posits his ignorance from the start instead of reaching it as an aporia. Concerning 
speech there was never any doubt as to the content of tales. The media of speech and 
bodily performance offer no distortion, no ambiguity. Insofar as the model is the correct 
one, its mimetic counterpart will be equally good or bad—speech places no mediation 
between model and copy. Thus, the only regulation to be made is according to good and 
bad models. In this case, imitation adds nothing, and its value depends entirely on the 
nature of the model. Rhythm and harmony, on the other hand, are multifarious and 
ambiguous. There is a multitude of modes and rhythms, and a multitude of instruments, 
which are themselves “panharmonic” and “many-stringed.”37 Out of this multitude, only 
                                                
36 Translation modified. 
37 See the introduction to Part I of this dissertation. See also Richard Martin, “‘The Pipes are brawling’: 
Conceptualizing Musical Performance in Athens.” In The Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, 
Conflict, Collaboration, (ed. Carol Dougherty and Leslie Kurke, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 153-81; Peter Wilson, “The Aulos in Athens” in Performance and Culture in Athenian Democracy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Wilson, “Athenian Strings; Homeric Strings in Hellenistic 
Athens” in Wilson and Murray, eds. Music and the Muses: The Culture of “Mousikē” in the Classical 
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those corresponding to the two ideal temperaments for the guardians, a violent one and a 
moderate one, are to be preserved in the city. The founders don’t innovate in preferring 
the music and instruments of Apollo over those of Marsyas (399e). But how to choose 
them is not as easy. First, the modes are discussed as being something, e.g “the wailing 
modes,” (tines oun threnodeis harmoniai, 399d1). Then, Socrates—who doesn’t know 
them—asks Glaucon “what modes are soft and suitable for symposia,” and so on (398e9). 
Only later he asks about a mode “which would appropriately imitate the sounds and 
accents of a man who is courageous.” We see, then, in the course of the legislation itself, 
the ambiguity of musical mimesis and the challenges it poses: modes are, or are 
appropriate for, or lastly imitate, different types of life and activity, but it is not so clear 
how this happens. 
When turning to rhythms, Glaucon also ends up declaring himself incapable of 
seeing the correspondence between these and the types of life to which they presumably 
correspond. “But, by Zeus, I can’t say,” says Glaucon, “There are three forms out of 
which the feet are woven, just as there are four sounds from which all the modes are 
compounded—this I’ve observed and could tell. But as to which sort are imitations of 
which sort of life (opoiou biou), I can’t say” (400a). Socrates then defers to Damon, who 
is cited as the authority on musical knowledge: “Let these things be turned over to 
Damon. To separate them out (dielesthai) is no theme for a short argument” (400c).38 
Here we find a general condition for the legislation of mousikē: the poets are 
ignorant of types, only the founders know them. Earlier, Adeimantus asked about the 
models [tupoi] for tales about the gods that would be allowed, and Socrates replied that, 
“we are not poets right now but founders of a city. It’s appropriate for founders to know 
the models according to which the poets must tell their tales. If what the poets produce 
goes counter to these models, founders must not give way; however, they must not 
themselves make up tales” (379a).  
                                                                                                                                            
Athenian City. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Eric Csapo, “The Politics of the 
New Music” in idem. 
38 On the historical as well as the Platonic figure of Damon see Robert Wallace, “Damon of Oa: A Music 
Theorist Ostracized?” in Murray and Wilson, eds.; Tosca Lynch, “A Sophist ‘in disguise’: a reconstruction 
of Damon of Oa and his role in Plato’s dialogues”, Études platoniciennes, 10, 2013. Web. Access Oct 29, 
2015. 
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If mimesis in speech is transparent, the copy being no obstacle to understand the 
nature of the model, musical mimesis is the opposite, but in a baffling way. Musical 
modes and rhythms correspond to modes of life, but this correspondence is entirely 
opaque. This depends, on the one hand, on the “indistinction” between subject and object 
as Havelock presented it. Further, as Séline Gülgönen argues, modes and rhythms are 
inseparable from the things they are presumed to be copies of. Gülgönen joins scholars 
like Anne Wersinger in arguing that Greek experience tends not to differentiate between 
the sense and the sensible that is used to perceive it, such that, for example, the term akoè 
means both the audible, the organ of hearing, and that which is heard. 
In the Cratylus, Laws and book 3 of the Republic, the use of genitives and 
adjectives (as in “the wailing modes” threnodeis harmoniai, Rep. 3.398e1; or “these two 
modes—a violent one and a voluntary one” tautas duo harmonias, biaion, ekousion, Rep. 
3.399c1) to account for the relation between modes, rhythms, and their models, indicate 
that models and rhythms confuse themselves with the affections (etats d’âme) that are 
presumed to be their models. Not, crucially, because there is any resemblance or 
similarity between affections and their musical forms, but because modes and rhythms 
are themselves affections.39 Beyond any distinction between essence and appearance, 
then, mimesis is defined as a potentially unbound contagious performance, an affective 
communication that not only persuades but that also shapes and transforms the listener’s 
soul and body. And it has the strongest effects on listeners, especially when they are 
young—when their souls and bodies are supple—but also later on. 
If we still hold that they are “copies,” these are of a strange kind: they entirely 
duplicate and replace the model. The copy is no copy, for it does not clearly express its 
subordinate relation to the model, and hence escapes the regulation that had been made 
for logos. The interlocutors assume that modes imitate characters, types of life, but upon 
examination they find them to be indistinguishable; these modes imitate so well that they 
cease to imitate at all. If Socrates and the others were to approach the matter 
                                                
39 Séline Gülgönen, “La Mimesis Musicale Dans Les Dialogues Platoniciens.” Phoenix 68.1/2 (2014): 106. 
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“dialectically,” they would have to decide whether the relation between modes and types 
of life is conventional or by nature. But what shows the relation between them, the 
signatura, as the Latin tradition will call them, is hidden—we don’t know the modes. 
This is the aporia that they do not reach, but presuppose. In either case (natural or 
conventiona), the modes cannot be sorted out, their divisions cannot be made evident 
through diairesis—they are irrational, neither conventional nor natural, and they can only 
be verified after their effects on listeners and performers make it evident. Instead, they 
are simply classed according to grace and gracelessness (euschemosyne kai 
aschemosyne), a general categorization that groups them according to their shape, their 
schema (what in German is called Gestalt), or what they appear to be, and not truly 
according to their model, their type. 
If the relation between modes and sorts of life isn’t clear, and if the effects of 
these are so dangerous for whoever engages in them, they should be a matter of serious 
concern, but Socrates does not want to hear of it. He resorts to a legislation based on an 
empirical and dogmatic classification, taken entirely from Damon, and to this previous 
regulation Socrates entrusts the rearing of guardians, who as children would learn to 
recognize in this way “what isn’t a fine product of craft or what isn’t a fine product of 
nature” (401e). Likewise, “when reasonable speech comes, the man who’s reared in this 
way would take most delight in it, recognizing it on account of its being akin” (402a). 
This affective familiarity with grace and gracelessness before the advent of logos is “the 
most sovereign rearing,” which repeats the idea of ethical education as a stamping of the 
soul mentioned before, “because rhythm and harmony most of all insinuate themselves 
into the inmost part of the soul and most vigorously lay hold of it in bringing grace with 
them; and they make a man graceful if he is correctly reared, if not, the opposite” 
(401e).40 I will return to this passage later for, it seems to me, this opinion on music gets 
modified through the dialogue, especially after the division of the soul, the definition of 
philosophy, and, most importantly, by the discussion of mimesis in book 10. 
                                                
40 For music and education in Plato, see Moutsopoulos, la musique dans l’œuvre de Platon, 175 and ff; 
Moutsopoulos, “Beauté et moralite musicales: une initiative damonienne, un idéal athenien” and Anne 
Gabrièle Wersinger, “‘Socrate, fais de la musique!’ le destin de la paideia entre musique et philosophie” in 
Mousikè et Aretè, Malhomme and Wersinger, (eds). 
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In fact, the issue of mousikē almost disappears as a concern in the dialogue after Glaucon, 
in book 7, recalls that music is the “antistrophe” of gymnastics, concerned with the 
education of the guardians “through habits, transmitting by harmony a certain 
harmoniousness, not knowledge, and by rhythm a certain rhythmicalness” (522a; 
emphasis mine). There is nothing in mousikē that orients itself towards what is, as 
philosophy must do. Unless, that is, we consider only harmony—and not the whole of 
mousikē—as the “antistrophe” of the revised approach to astronomy that make up the 
third and fourth parts of the curriculum presented towards the end of book 7. Both are 
concerned with the logos behind the apparent motion of objects and “the movement of 
harmony” (enarmonion phoran, 530d). As part of the education of the ruling guardians, 
music will be approached only insofar as it is useful, as long as it rises towards problems, 
“to the consideration of which numbers are concordant and which not, and why in each 
case.” (530c). 
This would be a good moment to turn to the famous opening of the Phaedo, 
where Socrates calls philosophy the highest kind of music (megistes mousikēs, Phaedo, 
61a). However, I want to remain within the text of the Republic to consider the role of 
music in the course of the dialogue. After the passage on the curriculum of the guardians 
in book 7, lack of good musical education is mentioned only three times, always in 
connection to the different forms of corruption of the cities. Finally, mousikē appears 
only once in the important discussion of poetry and mimesis in book 10, a passage to 
which I will come back later. Thus, I note a progressive distancing from mousikē in the 
discussions of mimesis and poetry, which appear initially to be thoroughly intermingled 
in book 3. If commentators are still puzzled by exactly what kinds of poetry are banished 
from the ideal State and how to interpret Plato’s intentions and arguments, despite the 
rivers of ink that have flowed on the matter, the case of mousikē is even more dismal. 
However, I argue, restoring some centrality to mousikē may serve to further illuminate 
and rethink the diversity of meanings of mimesis in Plato and to readdress the multiple 
traditions of mimetic thought that have Plato’s text as their keystone. 
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The passages I have mentioned all portray musical mimesis as an affective 
communication that occurs without any mediation. Performers and listeners are all 
similarly affected, outside or before logos. Rhythms and harmonies correspond to forms 
of life so precisely that it is hard to tell them apart. They are copies that entirely duplicate 
and replace the model. And all of these have the strongest effects on listeners, especially 
when young but also later on. These define habits and dispositions, in a thoroughly erotic 
way: “musical matters should end in love matters that concern the fair” (403c.) 
THE PHARMAKON OF THE PHILOSOPHER 
When the issue is taken up again in the opening of book 10, we hear Plato’s war cry—or 
rather the conspirator’s whisper, whose conception of “the most sovereign rearing” has 
changed, “now that the soul’s forms (psuches eide) have each been separated out”: 
Between us—and you all won’t denounce me to the tragic poets and all the other 
imitators—all such things seem to maim the thought of those who hear them and 
do not as a remedy (pharmakon) have the knowledge of how things really are 
(595b). 
 What is this remedy, this antidote, that has the capacity to fend off mimetic contagion? It 
is a pharmakon that nevertheless requires the banishment of the poets, thus an ineffectual 
drug, or one that is in the end not distributed to everyone equally. The pharmakon, in 
fact, had been announced as early as book 2, where it described the use of lies as “a 
preventive, like a drug, for so-called friends when from madness or some folly they 
attempt to do something bad” (382c. cf. 389b). We are justified in suspecting such a 
pharmakon, especially in the face of the second passage, where it accompanies the first 
mention of mimesis in the dialogue. “Now what I was just talking about would most 
correctly be called truly a lie—the ignorance in the soul of a man who has been lied to. 
For the lie in speeches is a kind of mimesis of the affection in the soul, a phantom of it 
that comes into being, and not quite an unadulterated lie.” (382b) Here Socrates is 
defending the idea that the gods never lie since “none of the foolish or the mad is a friend 
of the gods” (382e). There is nothing more hated by both gods and men than to hold lies 
in the soul. The pharmakon, the lie in speeches, therefore, is here something that makes 
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lies agreeable in certain situations, it qualifies mimesis, interrupts it, so that lies cease to 
be hateful, without them ceasing to be lies. It is significant, additionally, that mimesis is 
here introduced along with falsehood and phantasms, even before it begins to be 
thematized as such. 
This pharmakon, we are now justified to suggest, is not unlike that in the 
Phaedrus (cf. p. 60ff, above). It is both a medicine and a poison, a helpful remedy that 
turns out to be harmful, but in what way? In a similar way—precisely in imitation—of 
writing, which is here always considered as a mimesis of speech: a drug to counter 
another drug, a pharmakon for the pharmakon of mimesis. Already in book 2, speech was 
presented as an imprint, a kind of writing in the soul. 
Mediation replacing immediacy, reflexivity instead of repetition, sober analysis 
over affective identification: this is a demand for a different type of mimesis than the one 
discussed in book 3, but it requires a change of paradigm, one which introduces 
mediation by emphasizing the difference between models and copies, the paradigm of 
images, paintings and mirrors.  
The pharmakon against mimesis, then, is knowledge of how things really are. But 
what are things as they really are? What follows in the dialogue (at 596a, the same place 
as the “trick of the mirror”) is the famous clinic scene, the model of mimesis according to 
the three types of bedframes (klinai).41 Socrates introduces the discussion of mimesis as a 
question over “mimesis in general.” This makes us presume that the discussion in book 3 
was a type of restricted mimesis. Yet, as we have seen, book 10 doesn’t discuss “mimesis 
in general” but rather another type of restricted mimesis that then passes as general and 
overdetermines the restricted mimesis of book 3. 
The use of a visual paradigm to discuss mimesis, the “turn or trick of the mirror,” 
is thus a crucial strategy to bind the multifarious mimesis of book 3. Analyzing this 
                                                
41 Halliwell, on his part, warns about the rhetorical tone of the exposition, the satirical tone of the passage, 
especially in the choice of tables and bedframes (instead of beauty and justice, for example) and the irony 
with which the mirror is presented, which should call for “constant alertness in its readers to the presence of 
‘subtexts.’ Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, 134. This, in Halliwell’s interpretation, points to a retain 
reticence in Plato (characterized by Halliwell as a “romantic puritan”) to entirely reject “art.”  
   88
mimesis “in general” which is not more general, nor is it general mimesis, Socrates 
makes the crucial distinction between three kinds of producers who preside over three 
forms of bedframes: first is god, the producer of a bedframe that simply is and of which 
there is just one. Second, the one produced by a craftsman, which is multiple and is made 
according to the one made by the god; and third, the one produced by a painter. The 
painter’s bedframe, they agree, is third-removed from the couch that “truly” is: it is made 
in imitation of the craftsman’s bedframe. It is necessarily partial and limited, static and 
useless. 
 
Let us now consider what this scene looks like according to the logic of paradigmaticity. 
Before bringing in the mirror, but already within the “theoretical” method of questioning, 
their habit, Socrates says:  
we are, presumably, accustomed to set down some one particular form 
(eidos…hekaston) of the particular “manys” (hekasta ta polla) to which we apply 
the same name. Or don’t you understand? 
 “I do.” Then let’s now set down any of the “manys’ you please; for example, 
if you with, there are surely many bedframes and tables.”“Of course.” 
 But as for ideas (ideai) for these furnishings, there are presumably two, one 
of bedframe, one of table.” (596a-b; translation modified). 
 The strategy is not simply to say that there is one eternal form or idea that serves as a 
model for all the material things in the world. Various commentators, including 
Halliwell, warn about taking this model as an exposition of Platonic metaphysics as a 
whole. What is paradigmatic in the scene, the place where the paradigm or the logic of 
the paradigm appears, is precisely in showing that the relation between the one and the 
multiple is one of paradigmaticity. Socrates does not say that we have to look at all the 
particular bedframes to see what they have in common to arrive at the idea; neither does 
he say that we can know what the many bedframes look like by simply contemplating the 
“idea of bedframe.” But also, he does not say that the “one” is the paradigm of the 
“multiple.” The one and the multiple are juxtaposed and then compared with respect to 
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what their “being” is. More precisely, what their eidos, their aspect, is: how, or in what 
way they appear and how the one and the multiple relate to each other.  
Further, the question turns out to be to how they are produced since, after all, 
mimesis is a form of production, of poiesis. The clinical scene is not a paradigm of 
epistemology or metaphysics but one of production and economy—of economimesis: 
“Aren’t we also accustomed to say that it is in looking to the idea (idean) of each 
implement (skeuē) that one craftsman (demiourgos) makes (poiei) the bedframes and 
another the chairs we use, and similarly for other things? For presumably none of the 
craftsmen fabricates (demiourgei) the idea itself. How could he?” (596b). The question, 
then, is how are these implements made, and by whom. The “craftsman” here is not 
simply a poietes or a technités, but a demiourgos: someone who works for the people, the 
demos, by making implements, day-to-day artifacts. He makes things that, as Heidegger 
points out, are “not simply present-at-hand (Vorhanden), but are at our disposal to use 
(Zuhanden).”42 What the carpenter makes is not an object of theoretical contemplation but 
one which is used by the demos.  
And further, the demiourg makes the implements “looking to the idea.” This is 
where the traditional readings of this passage, which both Halliwell and Heidegger resist 
(although for different reasons) supposes that things in the world are “copies” of pure 
ideas that exist as such. Rather, as Heidegger interprets the passage, at this point it is not 
a matter of copying, of fashioning-after (Nachahmen) but of pro-ducing (Her-stellen): 
“Making and manufacturing therefore mean to bring the outward appearance [eidos] to 
show itself in something else, namely, in what is manufactured, to “pro-duce” the 
outward appearance, not in the sense of manufacturing it but of letting it radiantly 
appear.”43  
As complex as it might seem, Heidegger’s idiosyncratic translation of eidos as 
outward appearance, meant to emphasize that it is not a matter of ideal/material, also 
helps us see how mediation is at stake here. The difference between the bedframe that 
                                                
42 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979), 174. 
43 Idem., 176. 
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“is” and the one that the demiourg makes is not of model and copy but of withdrawal and 
appearance. The demiourg brings out the bedframe from unconcealment, makes it ready-
to-hand, zuhanden, because he knows how the being of the bedframe “is.” This 
knowledge of how a thing is, gathered through its use and manufacture, is what 
distinguishes each type of demiourg: the carpenter makes tables, the shoemaker shoes, 
and so on.  
When Socrates, in the ironic turn remarked above introduces the mirror, by 
supposing that there is someone who can produce the eidos that the demiourg cannot, the 
point is to show that the imitator does not have the same familiarity with the things he 
produces. “It is all a matter of observing tini tropōi poiei, in what way he produces.”44 
This tropoi is a way or a manner: “how one is turned, in what direction he turns, in what 
he maintains himself, to what he applies himself, where he turns to and remains tied, and 
with what intention he does so.”45 
 We have already seen how this goes on with the “trick or turn of the mirror.” The 
difference is not that the demiourg makes real objects and the imitator or mimetes only 
simulacra. Manufacturing and placing a mirror are forms of poiesis in the sense that both 
are modes of pro-ducing an outward appearance, but in each case the tropos differs: the 
demiourg pro-duces a house that shows itself in stone and wood, while the other shows 
the house in a mirror. The difference of tropos is what we would call a difference of 
media. So, there are three forms of products, or three ways, three tropos in which the 
eidos of the bed appears: by itself; in wood; and in a mirror or a painting. The first are 
called the ones that truly “are” because they show themselves without mediation, in self-
showing: eidos as idea. These, as Socrates says, are made by the god and appear by 
nature, phusei, that is, as self-producing. The second are produced by the demiourg, and 
the latter are made by the mimetes.  
Heidegger insists in showing that all three are “real.” The difference between the 
first and the others is that the latter are “a dim thing compared to the truth” (597a). Only 
in the bedframe that is self-producing does the eidos of the bed shows itself as true, as 
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45 Idem. 
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aletheia, while the other two appear through the mediation of something else and reduce 
its eidos. Finally, the difference between the demiourg and the mimetes, in Heidegger’s 
interpretation, is not that the mimetes copies what the demiourg produces. Both are 
modes of pro-ducing, of bringing forth the eidos of the same thing. Rather on the one 
hand, what the mimetes produces is not for the demos, he does not participate in the 
public uses of things and in communal life. Compared to the one made by the demiourg, 
the table that he produces is useless. On the other hand, the painting darkens the eidos 
even more, since it only shows one aspect of it, one perspective: “What he pro-duces is 
consequently but one aspect, one way in which the table appears. If he depicts the table 
from the front, he cannot paint the rear of it. He produces the table always in only one 
view or phantasma (598b). 
Reading this passage with Heidegger’s interpretation has been useful for 
sidestepping the problems of more traditional readings that insist on models and copies, 
as well as showing the importance of mediation in the passage. With Lacoue-Labarthe, on 
the other hand, we have seen that Heidegger still preserves and repeats the trick of the 
mirror, he falls in “the mimetic trap” while attempting “to outdo Plato.”46 
Lastly, Lacoue-Labarthe signals the way that Heidegger and Plato slowly 
assimilate work to poiesis, moving mimesis out of its economical context towards an 
“aesthetic” one. In addition to determining mimesis as visual and conditioned by a 
mediation that obscures the eidos, Plato also determines it as a matter of property. This is 
one of Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida’s most important reformulations of mimesis, namely 
of reinscribing it as an economical problem. 
Thus, one can also read this passage as a theory of labor.47 There are better and 
worse types of labor. These do not so so much follow the distinction between mental and 
manual labor but between the types of products they create, according to their usefulness 
                                                
46 Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 89. 
47 Besides the texts I employ here, there do not seem to be many works that approach Plato form this 
perspective. To my knowledge, the most incisive ones are Rancière, Jacques. The Philosopher and His 
Poor. Translated by Andrew Parker. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004, and Disagreement: politics 
and philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).  
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and the “transparency” by which they display their eidos. Since after all the passage is 
most often read in terms of models and copies, in fact as the paradigmatic definition of 
what a model and a copy is, especially in the texts that I will examine later on in this 
dissertation, we can examine this theory of labor in these terms, keeping in mind 
Heidegger’s reading so as not to assume that model and copy are ontological 
determinations. Rather, I argue that we can see how in this passage the “use-value” of 
these objects (fashioned by the demiourg for the demos to use) can also be thought of in 
terms of “reproducibility-value” and their capacity to pose as originals. This capacity, in 
Heidegger’s terms, would correspond to the degree of darkening that occurs in their 
production. The further removed such production is from the pure, self-showing, the less 
reproducibility or originality it will have. Thus, god’s labor is highest because he creates 
the eidos that shows itself.  
The demiourg produces objects which still have the capacity to be determined as 
models, since after all they do not obscure the eidos nor reduce it to a single perspective. 
Thus, while it is not necessary that the artist considers the works of the demiourg as 
model, nothing prevents him from doing it. Further, the originality of the demiourg’s 
productions is a non-issue: no one would object to them being “less original” unless they 
were explicitly copying another one, (and hence producing in a different way). The 
demiourg is then second best.  
Painters and poets fit nicely in the third category, since the entire system is built 
to show precisely how useless and unoriginal are their products. They possess no 
reproducibility value since they are “third-removed,” and no one, presumably, would 
think of using them as models.  
 With the affective labor of the musicians, the issue is more problematic. Affects 
have no paradigm, emotions are always completely original and completely derivate. 
They belong to everyone and no one and are dispersed easily; they can only be regulated 
by a metaphysics of the soul, by dividing the soul into parts and assigning emotions to the 
part that needs to be controlled. To this paradigm of the soul corresponds a paradigm for 
music given in the Timaeus and a notion of harmony that organizes its economy. 
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It is this affective haunting that prompts the triple-copy model and the 
mimetology that ensues from it. After the value of affective mimesis has been analyzed, a 
new value, a whole new theory of value, an economy, must take place. The scheme of 
mimetology and the criticism it levers upon poets and sophists guarantees a monopoly 
upon the regulation of the paradigms accepted as legitimate in the State. More precisely, 
it determines the whole economy and regulates the modes of production of those listening 
bodies and, finally, of the very paradigms that come to be inscribed in bodies. It produces 
the paradigm of their production and the paradigms produced. This is a thoroughly 
idealist, or rather speculative operation, the paradigm of speculation itself: reason gives 
itself its own rules and principles, and takes everything that is not itself to be a copy or 
derived from itself, or at best something like itself. Because of this, reason must posit the 
existence of a pure medium, of the very notion of immediacy, whose model it takes 
paradoxically from affective mimesis. 
It now becomes clear why mousikē and the painters are banished from the State: 
in book 3, as we have seen, Plato constantly warns about the risk that they pose by 
threatening the division of labor that the triple model seeks to justify. In book 2, the 
initial State becomes “luxurious” precisely with the entrance of the poets and mousikē, an 
entire army of imitators, painters, sculptors, poets, rhapsodes, actors, dancers, theater 
agents, make-up artists, and so on (373ff). Along with this comes money, the market, 
prostitution, violence, and so on. As Lacoue-Labarthe writes, 
From the very moment that money intervenes, there is a generalized 
depropriation, the risk of a polytechnics or of an uncontrollable polyvalence, the 
exacerbation of desire, the appetite for possession, the triggering of rivalry and 
hatred. In fact, almost “Capital”; and the entire political orthopedics has finally no 
other object than to reduce (economically) this senseless expense of the proper 
that comes along with the “general economy,” that is, the mimetic economy.48 
                                                
48 Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 124. 
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“General economy,” as Bataille presents it in the Accursed Share, aims to show that the 
traditional sense of economy, where the aim is to maximize profit, is restricted: It 
presumes to be closed on itself and rejects any expenditure, any useless production. 
Similarly, in texts such as “Economimesis” and “From Restricted to General Economy” 
Derrida has shown that speculative philosophy, exemplified in Kant, works upon the 
same principle. Lacoue-Labarthe’s reading of the political orthopedics of the Republic 
follows this line as well.49 
Restricted mimesis thus corresponds to restricted economy and to speculative 
philosophies that aim to maximize profits, to regulate excess and control the 
multifariousness of mimesis. Here, then, we see the relation of general mimesis to 
restricted mimesis: the trick of the mirror aims to show that what seems to be a 
productive activity is in fact a useless expenditure. However, in order to accomplish this 
the philosopher must have recourse to mimesis itself, to the logic of paradigmaticity, to 
show that what holds for one, a mirror, holds for mimesis in general. 
Now, we have seen that the first type of pro-duction, self-showing, has almost an 
infinite reproducibility value. Socrates makes the point in book 10 of showing how it 
would be impossible that there were two of these entities, since immediately one of the 
two would appear to be secondary: “Because” I said, “If he should make only two, again 
one would come to light the form of which they in turn would both possess, and that, and 
not the two, would be the couch that is” (597c). Now, although this is not mentioned by 
Socrates, the philosopher imitates god in this exact respect, but his place is never 
determined in the hierarchy: as Lacoue-Labarthe shows, he is holding the mirror to 
protect himself. In the eighteenth-century, aestheticians would often talk of the work of 
genius as being an imitation of natura naturans, not natura naturata.50 In the Republic 
the philosopher king has exactly this role. Not only he invents the myths that are suitable 
for the the education of the guardians (which would be a product with some use or 
reproducibility value) but he in fact creates the paradigm of the State itself: that is, in the 
                                                
49 Derrida, Jacques. “Economimesis.” Diacritics 11, no. 2 (July 1981): 3–25; “From Restricted to General 
Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve” in Writing and Difference. London: Routledge, 2001. 
 
50 Derrida, “Economimesis,” 9; Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 255ff.  
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end, what the entire work is about. It consists in creating a global—but restricted—
economy in which the creation of paradigms—and its fundamental means of production, 
mimesis—is completely monopolized by the philosopher. Later on—even starting with 
Aristotle—this productive power of mimesis would be recognized and seized by artists: 
they would call it imitatio. 
 
To summarize, some “originals” have infinite reproducibility value, which is never 
exhausted no matter how many copies are made. These, the first kind, tend to appear as 
abstract, general, or universal things: sonata form, courageousness, the circle, the piano. 
Likewise, they do not claim dependence no other things as copies of them, but appear as 
models of themselves.  
Other things claim such dependence to an original, accruing from the value of the 
original itself, and preserving some reproducibility value. This is the second kind. A 
Steinway is not an abstract piano but a particular one, and yet there are potentially infinite 
Steinway pianos. Yet, their reproducibility value is more limited: it does not permit for 
something else to claim them as their model—whatever attempts to do it is a 
“counterfeit” or a “fake.” This is the third type, which not only partakes of the limited 
reproducibility value of the second type, but also has a minimum reproducibility value: 
no one makes copies of copies.  
Mimesis produces these three types of objects (or more specifically, the difference 
between them): some are abstract originals, others are particular originals, or legitimate 
copies of these originals, and others are counterfeits. Each mimetology has a specific way 
of distributing reproducibility value among the different types of objects and, more 
importantly, between the different social classes that produce these objects. For Plato, for 
example, the first two types are good, while the third one is problematic—and it so 
happens that all artistic creations fall in the last category. For the mimetologies that 
developed during the Renaissance, on the other hand, an artist was required to show what 
its original model was in particular terms, either a previous artist with great 
reproducibility value, or “nature” which most often was of the first kind. 
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As presented in the Republic, mimesis appears split between that which corrupts the soul 
immediately and that which shows how things really are, namely copies, things that are 
but not entirely, since they are separated from what really is. A model of mimesis based 
on immediacy is replaced by another that emphasizes mediation, which presumes to be 
mimesis in general, but which shows itself depending on—because opposed to—the 
earlier mode which is now silently dismissed. General mimesis, like the pharmakon, is 
never entirely in sight: distributed into good and bad, harmful and productive, musical 
and visual, mimesis both poisons and heals—it is, and is not.  
In my reading, this ambivalence works through and produces the opposition 
between immediacy and mediation which the analysis of mousikē helped establish but 
that book 10 erases. The “banishment of the poets” of book 10 is not as scandalous as the 
undetermined state in which the whole of mousikē is left as presented in book 3, and even 
less than the political effects of this banishment. If the text distributes mousikē and 
painting according to the opposition of immediacy and mediation, this is only in order to 
preserve the affective, ethical and political powers of mousikē while maintaining control 
of its multifarious productions. It is preserved, most crucially, in the “noble lies” told to 
the citizens of Kallipolis to maintain the social order and keep citizens in their “natural” 
place.  
Such is the effect of mimetology: a political economy that passes as ontology, 
inaugurating a long history of readings and interpretations in a field too hastily called 
“aesthetics” and which overwrites the specific context of this transformation at the origin. 
The values, qualities, and characteristics we normally associate with the “arts” of music, 
painting, sculpture, and poetry, are programmed, with long lasting effects, in this 
moment. 
AFFECTIVE INSCRIPTION AND ITERATION 
When Havelock described writing as producing the distinction between the knower and 
the known that pitted mousikē and philosophy against each other, we said, he was 
following the program of the debasement of writing inaugurated by Plato’s text itself. 
But, at the same time, he allows us to see a multitude of means by which the Greeks were 
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thoroughly familiar with writing before the letter. Havelock was, in a way, advancing a 
similar thesis as Derrida, his 1960s contemporary. In the first part of Of Grammatology, 
Derrida distinguishes between writing “in a restricted sense,” which is spatially and 
geographically—Eurocentrically—located, and a more general writing which comprises, 
in addition to the traditional writing, “all that gives rise to an inscription in general, 
whether it is literal or not and even if what it distributes in space is alien to the order of 
the voice: cinematography, choreography, of course, but also pictorial, musical, 
sculptural ‘writing … All this to describe not only the system of notation secondarily 
connected with these activities but the essence and the content of these activities 
themselves.”51 In fact, Derrida says, one might even speak of military or political writing.  
With this sense of writing as general inscription, an archi-writing defined as the 
quasi-transcendental condition of possibility for permanence and spatialization as such, 
we may easily invert the thesis of orality and literacy: the multitude of practices 
performative enactments of mousikē, is already a general assemblage of inscription. The 
contents of mousikē are not simply “memorized” by the performer and then repeated. 
Rather, a heterogenous collation of material means, dances, temples, figures, instruments, 
modes, metrical feet, and so on, serves to preserve and transmit, in short to re-compose, 
the customs, mores, and laws of the community, its ethos and nomoi.52  
What allows for the permanence of these mores and laws across such a 
heterogeneous medium is what Derrida calls iteration, namely the possibility for any 
mark to be removed from its context and still necessarily preserve the possibility to be 
read and deciphered as a mark of any sorts.53 Understood as iteration, the repetition that 
takes place in mousikē does not consist so much in the ritualized movements and 
practices that are bound to specific times and places, as it does in the fact that this 
                                                
51 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 9. 
52 On the “ethos theory,” see Warren Anderson, Ethos and Education in Greek Music: The Evidence of 
Poetry and Philosophy, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1966); Wallace, “Damon of Oa,” and 
Peter Wilson, “Athenian Strings” in Murray and Wilson, eds., 259, 292. 
53 Derrida discusses the notion of iteration in “Signature Event Context,” published in Writing and 
Difference, a close reading of J.L Austin’s theory of the performative, and further elaborated it in Limited 
Inc. and other places. Derrida, Jacques. Limited Inc. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988. 
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repeatability is in fact possible, given that no place and time are ever identical. What the 
performative accomplishes, understood as iteration, is not so much to produce a 
transformation in the world, but to demonstrate that language and all marks have a certain 
permanence that exceeds their immediate location and time (their context), without this 
excess constituting any sort of ideality.  
Rather, what we call repetition is precisely the necessary transformation of these 
presumably context-bound units into marks that have the possibility of being everywhere 
“iterated,” presented as the same and different at the same time, altered in its repetition. 
For Derrida, what is crucial about this is that marks do not retain any intentionality or 
“original” semantic meaning, they can be break with every given context and “engender 
infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion.”54 When the performative 
assemblage of mousikē exploits this necessary possibility, on the other hand, what is at 
stake is not the dissemination they engender but rather that these units, exemplary the 
musical modes, cease to be strictly bound to a musical context and attain a reproducibility 
that links their simultaneous identity and alterity across media and across time.  
 
An account mousikē as archi-writing can, in fact, be read directly in book 3 of the 
Republic, in a passage that we already examined. The first site of inscription is the body: 
“Or haven’t you observed that imitations (mimeseis), if they are practiced continually 
from youth onwards, become established (kathisthantai) as habits (ethe) and nature 
(phusis), in body (soma) and sounds (phonas) and in thought (dianoian)?” (395c). In this 
passage, Plato neatly summarizes the roles of mimesis and repetition in making the body 
a site of affective inscriptions for habits and mores. Mimesis performs a double task: on 
the one hand, it ensures the identity of what makes the imprint and what is imprinted in 
the body—this is covered under the sustantive “mimeseis.” On the other hand, it affirms 
repetition as a mode of producing the identity between the two. 
The task of the legislators in the Republic is not only to make sure its citizens are 
good and virtuous, but to preserve the state apparatus, the means of reproduction of the 
                                                
54 Derrida, “Signature Event Context”, 320. 
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conditions of production. This occurs, I argue, through the famous “ancient quarrel 
between philosophy and poetry” (Rep. 607b5-6).55 Much ink has flowed upon this 
quarrel, which is arguably longer after Plato mentioned than it was before him, but here 
we can suggest seeing it by placing the body as an inscribable medium—as the object of 
an onto-typology—at the center of Plato’s “quarrel” with mousikē. The body must be 
shown to be plastic and susceptible to the imprint of the legislator, hence the emphasis on 
education both in music and gymnastics. Likewise, the mimetic mechanism of its 
inscription, mousikē also must be preserved, wrested away from its current holders, the 
poets and the sophists. The difference between immediacy and mediation, which 
produces (alphabetical) writing as secondary, serves to accomplish this displacement just 
as much as the indictment to poets and sophists that they “do not know what they say.” 
The bulk of book 3 is concerned with a “purging” of the words, harmonies, and 
rhythms which have turned the “city of sows” into a “city of luxuriousness.” The passage 
offers several complications. As we have seen, the fact that mousikē was composed of 
logos, harmonic mode, and rhythm entailed that two different legislations had to be 
undertaken. One for logos, which worked undisturbed insofar as it was possible to 
distinguish between true models—the gods—and the things the poets said about them as 
true or false appearances. But in the case of modes and rhythms, which correspond to 
modes of life to an extent that they confuse themselves with them, the regulation not only 
has to be repeated, but reaches an aporetic point, expressed by Glaucon: “as to which sort 
[of rhythms] are imitations of which sort of life, I can’t say” (400a). 
Picking up in our discussion of economimesis, it now becomes more evident that 
the problem with modes and rhythms is not simply that these fail to conform to a model-
copy system, but rather that they introduce a sort of multifariousness and ambiguity that 
threatens what I called the “theory of labor” that upholds the entire system. Matters of 
ontology—and this is a general thesis that will accompany in the next chapters—depend 
on matters of economimesis.  
                                                
55 For a broad overview of the issues see the essays in Pierre Destrée and Fritz-Gregor Herrmann, Plato and 
the poets (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2011). 
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What Socrates finds most problematic in this confusion is that the practices of the 
poets and musicians are panharmonic and many-stringed, that they do not keep to their 
own job but instead they aim to “imitate” everything, “a polytechnics of uncontrollable 
polyvalence” in Lacoue-Labarthe’s words, that turns the city of sows into a luxurious 
city. There is no room for “‘double man among us, nor a manifold one, since each man 
does one thing’. ‘No, he doesn’t harmonize’” (397e). 
Out of this multitude, only those corresponding to the two ideal temperaments for 
the guardians, a violent one and a moderate one, are to be preserved in the city. The 
founders don’t innovate in preferring the music and instruments of Apollo over those of 
Marsyas (399e). But how to choose them is not as easy. First, the modes are discussed as 
being something, e.g “the wailing modes,” (tines oun threnodeis harmoniai, 399d). Then, 
Socrates—who doesn’t know them—asks Glaucon “what modes are soft and suitable for 
symposia,” and so on (398e). Only later he asks about a mode “which would 
appropriately imitate the sounds and accents of a man who is courageous.” We see, then, 
in the course of the legislation itself, the ambiguity of musical mimesis and the 
challenges it poses: modes are, or are appropriate for, or lastly imitate, different types of 
life and activity, but how this is so, is not clear. 
This ignorance—to employ a hermeneutical commonplace—is strategically 
ironic. Its main purpose is concealing the way in which an identity between musical 
modes and modes of life, already established as part of Greek culture, is adopted and 
integrated into the ideal State. It is not by coincidence that the harmonic modes are 
named with geographical names: Dorian, Ionian, Lydian. It matters little to know which 
mode corresponds to which ethos—it can be left to Glaucon and even to Damon (in 
absentia) to decide—insofar as their identity is announced and taken up as subject of 
legislation. This is the second type of inscription, of what Derrida calls writing avant la 
lettre (very literally “before the letter”), advanced by Plato. A harmonic mode is not 
simply a collection of pitches. It is, in addition or concomitantly, a set of regulations 
about the employment of these pitches, their hierarchy and tendencies, the instruments 
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that may or may not employ it, and in the Damonian theory appropriated by Plato, the 
codification of social customs.56  
These modes are everywhere inscribed: in the instruments but also in the 
mathematical proportions by which they come to be conceptualized; that one of them is 
“material” and the other one is “ideal” does not negate that they are different means of 
inscription—it is only the difference between them that creates this “metaphysical” 
distinction. Before Aristoxenus and the latter tradition, there was no fully “abstract” 
conceptualization of independent pitches and their mathematical relations.57 The modes 
existed nowhere outside of their inscriptions, and in them they are already “identical” 
with the customs they are supposed to correspond to. Their codification, undertaken years 
later, would complicate this identification and produce further problems for the tradition 
of mimesis in music, which will be explored in Parts II and III of this dissertation.  
Crucially, then, the text invokes and affirms a series of identifications: the Lydian 
and “tight” Lydian are wailing; the Ionian and some Lydian are soft—presumably for 
being “slack,” i.e. not tight in the lyre. The Dorian and the Phrygian are the ones that 
“would appropriately imitate the sounds and accents of a man who is in courageous in 
warlike deeds… etc.” Thus, harmonic modes, codify, preserve, and transmit the ethē of 
the community that employs them, using mimesis in a diversity of senses: some are said 
to “imitate the sounds,” or to “be” soft since they are produced by lax strings, others 
simply for conventional associations which in the end correspond to their geographical 
origins. The main mimetic operation, however, is to produce an ideal entity, “a harmonic 
mode,” out of empirical practices, stabilize the ambiguity it entails—make it natural—
and legislate its usage. When, in what was later taken up as the “ethos theory” of musical 
modes, a certain mode was said to move a listener towards one disposition or another, the 
                                                
56 This is attested further, for example, in Aristotle’s Politics. In this account we see the inseparability of 
instruments, genres, and mode. When attempting to compose a dithyramb, which “is by general consent 
held to be a Phrygian thing,” on the dorian mode, Philoxenus was forced to abandon the attempt since “the 
nature of the genre forced him back into the proper mode, the Phrygian” (Pol. 1342a32–b12). What links 
them is their foreign provenance, which further delineates the conflict between the national and the foreign 
prompted by the New Music. cf. Csapo 2004, 232–35; and Steiner 2013, 197. 
57 For the role of Aristoxenus in this context see Andrew Barker “Aristoxène et les critères du jugement 
musical” in Malhomme and Wersinger, eds. Mousikè et Aretè, 68. 
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means of production of this ideality was concealed by affirming the mode to be first and 
to “cause” affections in their listener. The structure was inverted, the copy produced the 
paradigm.  
Inscription is always a form of power, which does not mean that it is a violent 
irruption but simply the expression of and means for the exercise of power. It is not 
because there is writing that there is violence; rather, inscription always bears the trace of 
the powers that be, while these powers are in rigor nothing without the inscription that 
they effectuate. Inscription less writes the decrees of power than inscribes the will of 
power itself. Inscribed with this power, the violence of music appears then through its 
regulations and rationalizations. 
The third element advanced by Plato is the theory of the soul, presented as a 
theory of forms of musical inscription in the Timaeus and the Laws, in addition to the 
Republic. Here, and not in the regulation of modes, we find the importance of 
mathematics as ensuring stability and identity over the multifariousness of musical 
experience.58 The soul is presented as the ultimate site for inscription. As with the other 
inversions by which the secondary takes the place of the primary—the paradigm taking 
the place of the copy—the soul comes to be the model for all other types of inscription, 
taking the place of the body. In the Republic, the things said to be imitated come to be 
more and more “abstract,” and “ideal”: Grace and gracelessness, harmony and lack of it: 
these are affectively communicated to the body of the infant, of the being without logos 
so that, “when reasonable speech (logos) comes, the man who’s reared in this way would 
take most delight in it, recognizing it on account of its being akin” (402a.). This affective 
familiarity with grace and gracelessness before the advent of logos is “the most sovereign 
rearing,” which repeats the idea of ethical education as a stamping of the soul mentioned 
before, “because rhythm and harmony most of all insinuate themselves into the inmost 
part of the soul and most vigorously lay hold of it in bringing grace with them; and they 
make a man graceful if he is correctly reared, if not, the opposite” (401e).  
                                                
58 Anne Gabrièle Wersinger, Platon et La Dysharmonie: Recherches Sur La Forme Musicale. (Paris: J. 
Vrin, 2001). 
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Most importantly, the soul and the city are identified. The city is just if each part 
performs their own function with respect to affections and habits that correspond to the 
forms [eidoi] of sobriety, courage and wisdom, (435b); therefore “we shall thus expect 
the individual also to have these same forms in his soul, and by reason of identical 
affections of these with those in the city to receive properly the same appellations” 
(435c). Thus the analysis of the parts of the soul into the appetitive, the spirited and the 
rational corresponds to the three classes found in the State, “the moneymakers, the 
helpers, the counsellors” (441c). Music—and gymnastics—ensure that the rational rules 
over the irrational, “to render them concordant, intensifying and fostering the one with 
fair words and teachings and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by 
harmony and rhythm” (442a). We find a musical definition of justice, to attain “self-
mastery and beautiful order within himself, and ... [harmonize] these three principles, the 
notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the mean, and 
all others there may be between them, and [bound] all three together and [make] of 
himself a unit, one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison…” (433e).59 
Plato thus draws the modes of inscription of ethē from the body, through the soul, 
and into the city. All of these come to be regulated by the transcendent paradigm of 
mathematical order called the “world-soul” in the Timaeus, famously—and obscurely—
organized according to the musical proportions associated with the Pythagoreans.60 The 
“perfection” of these musical harmonies and the correspondences they preserve counter 
the multiple displacements operated in the social field. The ethē must become regulated, 
they must become or turn into law, nomoi. For this reason, the guardians are to be trained 
to be watchful of transformations or changes in the musical order,  
                                                
59 Csapo also emphasizes the musical origin of the negative adjectives used to criticize political regimes, 
namely polueidos and poikilos. Csapo, “The Politics of the New Music,” 239. 
60 For the relation between music and the Timaeus, see Sergio Zedda, “How to Build a World Soul: A 
Practical Guide” and Andrew Barker “Timaeus on music and the liver” in Wright, M. R. (ed.) Reason and 
Necessity: Essays on Plato’s Timaeus, (Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales, 2000) and Wersinger, 
Platon et La Dysharmonie. See also Gretchen Reydams-Schils, “Myth and Poetry in the Timaeus” in 
Destrée and Hermann, (eds.) Plato and the Poets, 358. 
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“they must beware of change to a strange form of music, taking it to be a danger 
to the whole. For never are the modes of music (mousikēs tropon) moved 
(kinountai) without the greatest political laws (politikon nomon) being moved, as 
Damon says, and I am persuaded.” 
“Include me too,” said Adeimantus, “among those who are persuaded.”
So it’s surely here in music, as it seems,” I said, “that the guardians must build the 
guardhouse.”
“At least, he said, “this kind of lawlessness (paronomia) easily creeps in 
unawares. 
“Yes,” I said, “since it’s considered to be a kind of play (paideian) and to do no 
harm.”
“It doesn’t do any, either,” he said, “except that, establishing itself bit by bit, it 
flows gently beneath the surface into the dispositions (ethē) and practices, and 
from there it emerges bigger in men’s contracts with one another; and it’s from 
these contracts, Socrates, that it attacks laws (nomon) and regimes with much 
insolence until it finally subverts everything private and public (424c). 
The fascinating wordplay in this passage affirms an association that is repeated in the 
Laws: The modes—tropoi, turnings, idiomatic instrumental gestures—are not moved or 
changed without affecting the political laws. Songs become laws. The pun is made 
clearer in Adeimantus’s response: paranomia, lawlessness, emphasizes the double 
meaning of nomos as song and law. In the Laws, the Athenian calls this a paradox: “our 
songs have turned into ‘nomes’ (apparently the ancients gave some such name to tunes on 
the lyre—perhaps they had some inkling of what we’re saying, thanks to the intuition of 
someone who saw a vision either in his sleep or while awake) (Laws, 799e; cf. 722d, 
775b).”61 This is the most permanent mode of inscription. Songs composed in specific 
                                                
61 For a philological analysis of the relation between nomos as musical form and law, see Barker, Greek 
Musical Writings, 249. Csapo documents other references and explanations for this recurrent pun (in 
pseudo Aristotle, Aelian, Pseudo Plutarch, Plutarch, and the Sudas). Csapo, “The Politics of the New 
Music,” 239. He frames his discussion in terms of an opposition between “Old Oligarchs” and “New 
Democrats.” Whether the explanation is repetition as mnemonics, the “immutability” of musical laws and 
social laws, or derivation, the general notion of inscription is the same and is not limited to Plato. The most 
recurrent of these in the seventeenth century, or at least the most exemplary, is perhaps Pseudo-Aristotle, 
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modes inscribe and incorporate the ethē they come to be associated with; by their 
repetition and mobilization they become laws. They preserve and inscribe the nature and 
social conditions of the community. 
 
In summary, then, the mimetology of mousikē is a performative assemblage of 
inscription. Performative here means that, as Havelock shows, this type of mimesis is 
primarily enacted by the musician-poet, who does not simply tell or act a story but re-
composes it and makes the audience participate of it as well. Now, mousikē does not only 
involve the musicians and audience, but also the myths that are told, the instruments, the 
harmonic modes and rhythms, the stage, the places, the times of the performance, and so 
on. It articulates a widely distributed, heterogeneous multiplicity of elements where none 
have priority over the others: it is an assemblage. It is performative also because in 
repeating such an enactment it does not only articulate the assemblage as a “show” but 
also has real effects upon the world, it accomplishes something. What it accomplishes is 
the inscription of the laws and customs of the community that participates of the 
performance. Through performances of mousikē, or more precisely through the iteration 
of its mores, the community becomes what it is and distinguishes itself from those that 
are not like itself, those that do not use the same musical instruments or modes, that tell 
different myths and honor different gods, and so on. What this comes down to is 
distinguishing between Athenians and barbarians, or natives and foreigners or, in the 
most basic terms, self and other. By regulating what types of mousikē are allowed in the 
State, these distinctions between what is proper and improper to Athenians becomes 
naturalized as law. This is why Plato would say that changing the modes of music 
entailed changing the laws of the community. This is what is commonly known as the 
“ethos theory.” 
                                                                                                                                            
Problems XIX.28: “Why are the nomoi that people sing called by that name? Is it because before they 
learned writing they sang their laws, so as not to forget them, as is the custom even now among the 
Agathyrsi? And they therefore gave to the first of their later songs the same name that they gave to their 
first songs.” Barker, Greek Musical Writings, 198. 
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But this is where it is important to distinguish the different mimetologies that are 
at stake. Under a traditional mimetology, which distributes things between originals and 
copies—mimesis as imitation—one would tend to imagine that such a performance 
consists of seeing actors behave in a particular way, play different types of music, 
specific modes and rhythms, that are presumed to correspond or resemble love, anger, 
happiness, sadness, and so on. The “contagious” aspect of the performances would be the 
emotional response in the audience, so that one repeats or imitates the emotions that the 
musical performance is supposed to communicate. In fact, this mimetology is very much 
present in popular accounts of the meaning of music that understand music as an 
expression of emotions.  
But as we know well, it is not very clear how a particular type of music or musical 
element, say a major triad, resembles or imitates happiness. Or, when it becomes a matter 
of national character—still an issue of ethos—what distinguishes for example Italian 
from French or German musics in terms that are not just conventional. Or, on the other 
hand, how is it that the formalist approach that presumes that music has no meaning 
outside itself, that it is pure sound, seems to have been replaced by theories of vibration 
and affect in which music does not represent but immediately makes us feel or react in 
particular ways. In other words, if today we can say that some kind of music is 
aggressive, or sensual, or “so German,” or anything else, this is because of a certain 
convention has become established to an extent that it seems to be natural. What is 
mimetic about such a relation is not that music resembles or imitates an emotion, but that 
something that is just conventional now appears as natural.  
The passage from the conventional to the natural is what I call inscription, and 
what accomplishes this inscription is the performance of mousikē that involves such a 
heterogeneous assemblage. As we can see, inscription is not so much related to writing in 
the sense of musical notation or alphabetical writing, but a more general sense: scales, 
rhythms, sounds, and the movement of bodies in space are all forms of inscription. In the 
performance of mousikē, the entire assemblage serves both as a means and medium of 
inscription. What gets inscribed are modes of behavior and forms of regulation, ethē and 
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nomoi, which are iterated, externalized, and preserved across the assemblage as a 
collective memory. 
It is difficult to say what Plato’s role—as an author—was in the re-codification of 
mousikē and mimesis that I have presented. We can only deal with its consequences. In 
what follows, I will elaborate on the notion of a performative assemblage of inscription 
as it would have been taken up by Italian humanists in the musical and intellectual 
revolution that would lead to the imitation without a model of ancient Greek mousikē.
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Part II 
Second Origins 
 
To read what was never written 
Theses on the Philosophy of History 
Walter Benjamin
 
As examined in Part I of this dissertation, mimesis is unoriginal. It threatens origin and 
makes every origin derivate while conversely making it possible to claim an origin for 
what is always already derivate. The risk, as always, is to end up building castles in the 
air: to attempt to ground without grounds. Take that exemplary moment at the origin of 
modern music, the declaration made by Claudio and Giulio Cesare Monteverdi as a 
defense against the conservative whip of the dialogue penned, in 1600, by the now 
infamous disciple of Zarlino, Giovanni Maria Artusi.1 In this and subsequent works, as is 
well known, Artusi attacked the harmonic transgressions, musical allusions to improvised 
counterpoint and ornamented singing, and the adoption of rhythms derived from dance 
that began to characterize the style of madrigalists like De Rore, Marenzio, Gesualdo, and 
Luzzaschi. Since the musical examples under attack were taken from Monteverdi’s as of 
then unpublished madrigals, the composer eventually responded to Artusi’s attack with a 
well-known letter, addressed to the “Studiosi Lettori,” and a subsequent line-by-line gloss 
on that letter written by his brother Giulio Cesare, in which they declared the style under 
attack to be based on a different aesthetics than the one upheld by Artusi. The new music, 
they came to argue, privileged the expressive power of the text over the abstract 
                                                
1 Giovanni Maria Artusi, L' Artusi, ouero Delle imperfettioni della moderna musica ragionamenti dui 
(Venice: Giacomo Vincenti, 1600; Facsimile reprint Bologna: A. Forni, 2000; Digital edition in Andreas 
Giger, Saggi musicali italiani, Bloomington, IN: CHMTL. 
http://www.chmtl.indiana.edu/smi/seicento/ARTIMP_TEXT.html. Partial translation in Oliver Strunk, ed. 
Source Readings in Music History (New York: Norton, 1998), 393-404. For a reconsideration of Artusi as a 
theorist see Chadwick Jenkins, “Giovanni Maria Artusi and the Ethics of Musical Science”, Acta 
musicologica, 81 (2009), 75–97 and Claude Palisca, “The Revision of Counterpoint and the Embellished 
Style,” in Studies in the History of Italian Music and Music Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 3-29. 
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harmonic rules of traditional counterpoint.2 But moreover, as I show here, what the 
Monteverdi brothers finally called a “Second Practice” depended throughout on a 
disagreement upon origin, upon the authority of arche, its power of regulating musical 
and social experience, and on the means of securing and deploying this authority. At 
stake in the controversy was primarily the question of sovereignty and law. Its outcome 
was a transformation of the relation between music and law—musical as well as social 
laws: nomoi—to call them by their common Greek name. This transformation depended 
on the redrawing of the political economy of mimesis in musical practices that regulated 
the rationality of hearing, the nature of dissonance, the relation between music and text—
and the place of subjectivity in both. Furthermore, it reorganized the relation of musical 
practice to the compositions and theories sanctioned by tradition, and the place of music 
as a representational dispositive in the social space of the court. All of this depended 
upon a transformation of the sense of imitatio or imitatione and its regulation. The 
controversy, in sum, effectively reinscribed mimesis onto the nomos of economy (oikos-
nomos), producing a new and modern economimesis.3 
An account of the economimetic transformations involved in the emergence of 
opera is crucial to understand the status of mimesis in the seventeenth-century in its other 
main formulation, the passage from similarity to representation. According to the 
groundbreaking Foucauldian model introduced by Tomlinson in the early 1990s, there is 
a significant transformation around 1600, that can be summarized as the passage from an 
episteme based on “similarities” to one based on “representation,” or more precisely, as 
                                                
2 Claudio’s letter was published in the Fifth Book of Madrigals (1605). Giulio Cesare’s Dichiaratione was 
attached to a compilation of Claudio’s Scherzi Musicali published by Ricciardo Amadino in 1607. Giulio 
Cesare Monteverdi, “Dichiaratione della Lettera stampata nel Quinto libro de suoi madrigali,” in Claudio 
Monteverdi, Scherzi Musicali a Tre Voci, raccoldi da Giulio Cesare Monteverde suo fratello (Venice: 
Ricciardo Amadino, 1607); Both pieces are transcribed in Claudio Monteverdi, Lettere, Dediche, E 
Prefazioni, ed. Domenico De’ Paoli (Roma: De Santis, 1973) and translated in Strunk, Source Readings, 
405-412. For Monteverdi’s careful avoidance of any reference to “new music” in the controversy, see Tim 
Carter, “Cerberus Barks in Vain: Poetic Asides in the Artusi–Monteverdi Controversy,” in JAMS, Vol. 29, 
No. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 461-476. 
3 I borrow the term from Derrida, who employs it in his reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, elaborating 
it as a concept that accounts for the political economy of mimesis—the assignation of what can be imitated, 
under which conditions, and towards what means, with an aim to control the productive power of mimesis 
(see Part I of this dissertation). 
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the end of the discursive formations that affirmed the notion of hidden interconnections 
(similarities) between things and which gave song (in addition to hermeneutics and 
semiotics) the capacity to uncover and manipulate these similarities. Mimesis, in this 
world of sameness, is for Gary Tomlinson limited to this magical function—uncovering 
and manipulating similarities—which constitutes the archeological ground of 
signification in Renaissance madrigal. In Metaphysical Song, moreover, Tomlinson 
emphasizes the “invisible,” “transsensual,” “immaterial,” in short, “metaphysical” nature 
of these correspondences.4  
In his gloss of Teodato Osio’s L’armonia del nudo parlare con ragione di numeri 
pitagorici (Milan, 1637), Tomlinson writes that this form of mimesis, translated as 
“imitation,” brings us into contact with the supersensible, operative force behind such 
surface likenesses. While representation stands at one remove from the harmony that 
resonates through the cosmos, imitation, instead, taps that harmony and puts it to 
emotional use…it is the reflection in this human harmony of higher concordances that 
allows song to attain ethical and emotional powers.5 
In a similar way, in his original catabasis into the archaeological substratum of madrigal 
in Music and Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others, Tomlinson 
presented Osio as offering a “simplified,” “disenchanted” version of Ficino, one which 
aimed to reconcile natural magic with the rising Aristotelianism of the academics and 
especially of the association of poetry with painting upon the rediscovery of the Poetics. 
Osio, Tomlinson showed, conflated Ficino’s furor poetico, with an interpretation of 
imitatione according to which the essential feature of imitation was “the expression of 
costumi.”6  
While this interpretation may be far from Ficino, it is much closer to Plato’s text 
(not to mention Aristotle’s) and its late sixteenth-century deployment, from Zarlino to 
Artusi, as the following chapters will elaborate. Yet there is another important element 
                                                
4 Gary Tomlinson, Metaphysical Song: An Essay on Opera (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1999). 
5 Tomlinson, Metaphysical Song, 16. 
6 Gary Tomlinson, Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 226. 
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that goes unmentioned in Tomlinson’s reading of Osio which is important in this context. 
Osio’s distinction between imitatione and rappresentatione, in the passage quoted by 
Tomlinson, in fact concerns their “specific difference” which in scholastic philosophy is 
understood to depend on matter—form being the universal, generic element. Thus, as 
Osio writes, “the specific difference between the poet and the painter will not be verse 
itself [that is, the form], but rather verse as what [the medium, or matter] introduces 
imitation with its musical proportion.”7 This passage is a reference to the problematic 
opening of the Poetics, in which Aristotle distinguishes the types (eidoi, or species, as 
opposed to genus, genre) of poetry, according to “three ways, by using for the 
representation (1) different media (en heterois mimesthai; literally, doing mimesis in 
other things), (2) different objects (to hetera; other things) or (3) a manner (tropon) that is 
different and not the same (to heteros kai me ton auton; or otherwise).”8 Aristotle, 
however, goes on to discuss only (2) and (3), setting aside the question of media, as John 
Guillory notes, “for two millennia.”9 It seems that Osio, pace Tomlinson (and Guillory), 
is here making a point about media, and not so much about the object of representation: 
the painter imitates surfaces because his medium only permits imitating, or more 
precisely, representing, the exterior of its objects; the poet and musician imitate the 
internal qualities—the costumi—of their objects because sound is able to penetrate into 
the soul of the listener. Or as Osio writes in the passage just before the one quoted by 
Tomlinson,  
                                                
7 Tomlinson, Music in Renaissance Magic, 227; translation modified. “Di maniera, che la differenza 
specifica dal poeta al pittore non sarà il verso dà sè, mà più tosto come introducente l’imitatione co’l suo 
numero Musico; perche del pittore, & del mascherato è ufficio di con lo rappresentare i segni, & le figure 
dar à vedere con li segni, & le figure stesse, quale fosse nell’esterno quel soggetto rappresentato: & del 
poeta con l’espressione de’costumi dare ad intendere qual’essere dovea nell’interno. Onde quella 
differenza, la quale occorre dalla rappresentatione alla imitatione sarà quella medesima, la quale dal pittore 
farà dissimiliante il poeta.” 
8 Aristotle, Aristotle, Poetics I with the Tractatus Coislinianus, a Hypothetical Reconstruction of Poetics Ii, 
the Fragments of the on Poets, trans. Richard Janko (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987),1447a16-18. As the 
translator notes, there are no abstract nouns corresponding to our words for media, object, and manner; an 
absence that is also evident in Osio’s text, and for which Tomlinson adequately—but silently—supplies the 
crucial word: medium. 
9 Clifford Siskin and William Warner, eds., This Is Enlightenment (Chicago; London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2010), 56. 
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Thus it is familiar to the poet that Music, due to the variation of its part-
movement, can rouse the affects and perturbations of the human soul. He [the 
poet], imitating with nothing else but [music] itself, will be able to better 
represent the mores convenient to the people introduced in his poems. For the 
modulation of the verse for that person—furious or lascivious, fearful or cruel—
ephemeral by nature, will succeed not only in expressing those perturbations, but 
also to penetrate the souls of the those who are listening, and by accident rouse in 
them the same affects and passions.10 
Music, as a medium, is more adequate for imitating the affects and the movements of the 
soul (gl’affeti, & perturbationi dell’animo dell’huomo) due to the variation of its part-
movement (mercè la variatione delle modulationi).11 The distinction depends not in a 
difference in object, “of what” is imitated, but in medium, “in what.” The object may be 
more or less appropriate, but it is the medium that provides the specific difference. The 
problem of mimesis has been troubled, since Plato, by the question of object: what are the 
are appropriate and inappropriate models for imitation, and how can they be known? Or 
as the Aristotelean neoclassicists would ask, what is the “nature” that art is supposed to 
imitate? Should its object be a beautiful, idealized nature, or nature such as it is? With 
music, as we have seen, the problem grows much larger, as the “objects” of musical 
imitation are not by any means clear. In this passage by Osio we encounter yet another 
opposition that complicates the question, that between imitation and expression, which 
has a history of its own. Thus, an account of mimetological transformations concerned 
with a question of object will remain limited and trapped within the same Aristotelean 
mimetology. 
                                                
10 “Perche dunque della Musica, mercè la variatione delle modulationi sue è proprio di suegliare gl’affeti, & 
perturbationi dell’animo dell’huomo, è famigliarissima del poeta. Il quale imitando, non quindi con altro, 
che con la medesima potrà meglio nelle persone introdotte ne’ suoi poemi rappresentare i costumi à quelle 
convenienti; perche la modulatione del verso di quella persona od irata, o lasciva, o paurosa, o crudele per 
sua natura conface volissima riuscirà non solamente per esprimere quelle perturbationi, mà per penetrare 
altresì ne gl’animi de gl’ascoltanti, & per aventura gli stessi affetti, & le stesse passioni destare in quelli.” 
Teodato Osio, L’armonia del nudo parlare, con ragione di numeri pitagorici, discoperta da teodato osio 
(Milan: Carlo Ferrandi, 1637), 178. 
11 For the translation of modulationi as “part-movement” see Denis Arnold and Nigel Fortune, The New 
Monteverdi Companion (London: Faber and Faber, 1985), 140-142. 
Second Origins 
 
113 
Moreover, Tomlinson’s schema not only operates on such an assumption that 
there is a transformation in object for musical mimesis—which changes its nature as a 
whole—but further makes of this change first into an aesthetic transformation (in 
Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance) and later into an archaeological one (in 
Music and Renaissance Magic). Both accounts presume a specific medium which is 
transformed by a change of object from the “supersensible” of natural magic to the 
“objects” of the disenchanted world as presented in the poetry of Marino.  
If this passage in Osio serves as evidence of the persistence of the Renaissance 
episteme in 1637, I am more inclined to read it as the reappearance, the return, of the 
question of media and materiality for the problem of mimesis. If the problems of media 
and materiality already appear in an “all-but forgotten Milanese magus,” they will 
become central for the self-styled cosmopolitan star Athanasius Kircher (examined in the 
epilogue, below). For now, the important point to be stated is that the change in object (or 
a passage from imitation to expression) may not be as fundamental for the history of 
mimesis as the problem of media and mediation as we find it here. Further, it bears 
emphasizing that the role of the “supersensible” is by no means as clear as Tomlinson 
presents it, at least not in this passage of Osio—where it is clear that he refers to the 
costumi as taken from Aristotle’s reading of Plato and transmitted by Aristides 
Quintilianus and into Zarlino, as I show below. 
The object, as seen above, is rather a matter of economimesis: what is chosen as 
an object—a model, an original—for mimesis is not so much a question of archaeological 
transformations but of very material decisions, bearing upon the value and profit of the 
originals. If there is a passage in object (from Ficino’s interest in the signatura rerum to 
Osio’s costumi) this is not only limited to the discursive formations available to each, but 
more directly by the specific conditions under which these discursive formations were 
tested for their effectivity. In fact, as Foucault states, the question bears not on the change 
of content nor a change of theoretical form, 
It is a question of what governs statements, and the way in which they govern 
each other so as to constitute a set of propositions which are scientifically 
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acceptable…In short, there is a problem of the regime, the politics of the scientific 
statement. At this level it’s not so much a matter of knowing what external power 
imposes itself on science, as of what effects of power circulate among scientific 
statements, what constitutes, as it were, their internal regime of power, and how 
and why at certain moments that regime undergoes a global modification.12 
Thus, it is not enough to describe the archaeological difference between late Renaissance 
and Baroque monody as a change of object, even if this change illuminates a certain 
difference between imitation and representation. Not only that. For the history we trace 
here, and especially for Foucault, it is misleading to do so. Knowledge does not exist in a 
void, neither as the private exchange of readers and commentators of philosophical works 
concerned only with the truth of their syllogisms, nor in the underground substratum 
which in Tomlinson’s account changes in a somewhat autonomous fashion. Knowledge, 
at all times, is traversed by power; not so much as the manipulation of a certain body of 
knowledge by a specific source of power, or located in particular laws, but rather in an 
internal, constitutive fashion: a “regime of power.” Foucault refers to this relation 
between knowledge, power, and the social body as a productive network, operating not in 
terms of pressure and repression, but rather as a circulation across bodies and things, an 
economy in which power “traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms 
knowledge, produces discourse.”13 
It is in this productive economy of power—a general economy—in which I locate 
the economimetic transformations of seventeenth-century musical production: before 
being the subject of literary criticism, or the techniques and prescriptions for the 
composition of works—before being an aesthetics or a poetics, before being a matter of 
regulation, of law—mimesis is a productive force, it establishes relations between 
subjects, bodies and things, realms and machines, constituting them now as originals now 
as copies and distributing them along a continuum of value and power in which pleasure, 
or more generally affect, makes these connections perceivable as effects upon the body. 
                                                
12 Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 59. 
13 Idem., 61. 
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Mimesis constitutes and exceeds the restricted domains of aesthetics and poetics which 
employ propositions, schemas, and regulations grounded on its productions, but it 
exceeds them just as soon it constitutes them. There is, thus, not so much a history of 
mimesis but rather the historically determined results of the transformations, 
displacements, and reorganizations of knowledge formations that are produced by the 
work of mimesis. And the context of these transformations, the stages of its 
metamorphoses, continues to expand. 
 116 
CHAPTER 3 
NOVEMBER 16, 1598, A FANTASTIC MUSICAL SERATA: LISTENING TO THE 
MONTEVERDI-ARTUSI CONTROVERSY  
Artusi’s first dialogue, divided in two parts, is set in Ferrara, November 1598, during the 
visit of Margaret of Austria for her wedding to Phillip III of Spain. The “First Discourse” 
[Ragionamento primo] relates the the conversation between an Austrian musical amateur 
named Signor Luca and the Bolognese erudite Signor Vario after a visit of the royal 
entourage to hear the famous Concerto of the nuns from the Convent of San Vito, which 
took place on the 15th (“Era quasi giunto il fine dell' Anno 1598… Ma la Domenica 
mattina, che fu il giorno quintodecimo, giorno memorabile;” fol. 1r). In the “Second 
Discourse,” which takes place on the 17th (“Spontava l' alba del giorno decimo settimo.” 
fol. 39r), Luca tells Vario of the music he heard the previous night at a concert at the 
house of the Ferrarese Nobleman Antonio Goretti, in company of Luzzasco Luzzaschi 
and Hippolito Fiorini.1  
                                                
1 There seems to be no register of these events other than the account given by Artusi, yet what is told in the 
dialogue has been presumed to be true as a historical document. For a historically informed reading of the 
events, including the context of Margaret’s presence in Ferrara and Artusi’s attendance to the convent of 
San Vito, see Tim Carter “‘E in rileggendo poi le proprie note’: Monteverdi responds to Artusi?” 
Renaissance Studies (Vol. 26 No. 1, 2012). Carter, moreover, deduces that Monteverdi was not present 
given that he was in Mantua at the time, for a performance of Guarini’s Il Pastor Fido in November 22. 
Tim Carter, “Artusi, Monteverdi, and the Poetics of Modern Music” in Musical Humanism and Its Legacy: 
Essays in Honor of Claude V. Palisca, Nancy Kovaleff Baker, and Barbara Russano Hanning, eds. 
(Stuyvesant NY: Pendragon Press, 1992), 172, n 2; Iain Fenlon, Music and Patronage in Sixteenth-Century 
Mantua, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), i. 149-61. The historical evidence for 
these claims is, in my view, problematically limited to Artusi’s own telling of the events (it is indeed 
surprising that scholars like Anthony Newcomb, Paolo Fabbri, or Carter have not found any other record of 
the event at Goretti’s). One hypothesis, presented by Tomlinson, relates this musical serata to the 1598 
Mantuan performance of the Il Pastor fido, suggesting that this performance inspired Monteverdi to 
compose the madrigals that set the Guarini play. Gary Tomlinson, Monteverdi and the End of the 
Renaissance, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 107. The Mantuan performance would have 
in turn raised interest in Ferrara for Guarini settings, thus drawing attention to Monteverdi’s pieces, so that, 
“indeed, one such presentation in neighboring Ferrara may be memorialized in Artusi’s description of the 
concert where Luca heard Monteverdi’s Pastor fido madrigals.” Tomlinson, Monteverdi, 118 (emphasis 
mine). In these readings, moreover, Artusi is cursorily identified with Vario, an assumption that readers 
familiar with the genre of the dialogue should be ready to distrust. The setting of the dialogue, the wedding 
between Margaret and Philip, is important enough, since it displaces the event from a purely aesthetic 
situation to an eminently political one, even if the boundaries of this “political context” are hard to define. 
For what, in fact, places the conservative priest Artusi in a private performance of avant-garde music? 
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Luca complains that, insofar as the new madrigals violated the good rules [le 
buone Regole] and introduced “new rules, new modes, and new turns of phrase, these 
[compositions] were harsh and little pleasing to the ear.”2 Luca offers the music to Vario 
for examination, presented as nine “passaggi,” nine exemplars—exemplars that rise to 
the level of the exemplary, of the paradigmatic—taken from Claudio Monteverdi’s 
“Cruda Amarilli, che col nome ancora,” “Anima mia, perdona,” “Che se tu se’ il cor 
mio,” and “O Mirtillo, Mirtillo anima mia.”3 
 The exemplars, only a single bar in each case and, crucially, without their accompanying 
text, are identified with numbers and laid out in a sequence without interruptions, placed 
in the course of the dialogue—a veritable mashup of Monteverdian dissonance that 
Signor Luca transcribed “for [his] amusement” [per mio diporto] (Figure 1).  
                                                                                                                                            
Approximating Artusi to the Goretti house seems, moreover, a counter-evidence, in the light of the political 
and religious tensions between the conservative church and the secular courts remarked by Tim Carter and 
Seth Coluzzi, in which musical modernism in Ferrara seems to stand in for Mantuan secularism during the 
papal occupation, such that “the whole affair at Goretti’s home has the air of a show of resistance by the 
Ferrarese and Mantuan courts against the Vatican’s control.” Seth J. Coluzzi “‘Se Vedesti Qui Dentro’: 
Monteverdi’s ‘O Mirtillo, Mirtillo Anima Mia’ And Artusi’s Offence" Music and Letters, (94: 1, 2013), 28-
30; Carter “‘E in rileggendo,’” 142. An especially daring interpretation of the dialogue suggests that “[i]t 
seems possible, given the surviving evidence, [that is, L’Artusi and the fourth and fifth madrigal books, 
DVV] that all the pieces heard at Goretti’s house were by Monteverdi, and that all were from Il Pastor 
Fido, which may have provided an element of thematic continuity for the evening.” In this hyperrealistic 
account, which is interpreted as a precursor to the later integration of the Accademia degli Intrepidi in 1600, 
other “unnamed intellectuals” that also attended the concert are “represented in Artusi's dialogue by his 
interlocutor, ‘Luca.’” Massimo Ossi, “Monteverdi, Marenzio, and Battista Guarini’s ‘Cruda Amarilli,’” 
Music & Letters, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Aug., 2008), 334 and passim. Some attempts have been made to correlate 
an account that places—rather circumstantially—Luzzaschi, Fiorini, and Queen Margaret together in a 
performance by two members of the concerto delle done on November 15, 1598, that is, the day the court is 
said to have visited the convent in L’Artusi. See Coluzzi, “‘Se Vedesti Qui Dentro,’” 30. n. 59; Suzanne 
Cusick, “Gendering Modern Music: Thoughts on the Monteverdi-Artusi Controversy”, JAMS (46:1, 1993), 
10 n. 19; Anthony Newcomb, The Madrigal at Ferrara, 1579-1597 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), i, 184. 
2 Strunk, Source Readings, 394. 
3 See the authoritative essay by Claude Palisca which places the attacks in the broader context of late 
sixteenth-century madrigalism, “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy” in The New Monteverdi Companion. 
eds. Denis Arnold and Nigel Fortune (London: Faber and Faber, 1985). For a relation of sources and a close 
analysis of the attacks, see Paolo Fabbri, Monteverdi (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 34. 
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The unpublished madrigals circulated presumably in manuscript form and 
travelled widely, reaching Ferrara at a time when Monteverdi was still relatively 
unknown, even before he had been appointed at the Gonzaga court in Mantua.4 They 
would be later published in the fourth (1603) and fifth (1605) books of madrigals—the 
latter of which also included the first public response of Monteverdi to Artusi’s attacks.5 
                                                
4 Palisca, “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy,” 128. Monteverdi’s music reached Ferrara as early as 1594, 
sent there by Valeriano Cattaneo to Duchess Margherita Gonzaga, sister of Vincenzo and wife of Alfonso II 
d’Este. Fabbri, Monteverdi, 32. Monteverdi, in fact, had not published any new music since the third book 
of madrigals of 1592, besides four canzonettas included in an anthology published by Antonio Morsolino, Il 
primo libro delle canzonette a tre voci (Venice, Ricciardo Amadino, 1594). The third book of madrigals 
would be reprinted in 1594 and 1600. Fabbri, Monteverdi, 29. 
5 Palisca, “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy,” 129. 
 
 
Figure 1: Artusi, L’Artusi, ff. 39v-40r. CHTML. 
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The interlocutors meet “in a room sufficiently remote and conveniently free from 
disturbing sounds.”6 Luca introduces the music as “certain new madrigals” [certi 
Madrigali nuovi] that he heard at the musical serata. Luca, however, does not give the 
name of the author [ma tacciuto il nome dell' Auttore]. The consequences of this 
concealment, along with the removal of the text, cannot be underestimated. Giulio 
Cesare, of course, would later point out that everything depended on the omission of the 
words.7 Devoid of text, the music is reduced to a series of intervallic relations to be 
analyzed into consonances and dissonances—which are of two entirely different natures, 
as Vario will later state—whose treatment by the composer is then evaluated against the 
canonic rules of the musical tradition.8  
As objects of study, these exemplars represent all of the “imperfections” of the 
new music, but to do so they must become simple and timeless harmonic relations. They 
must give up everything that is particular in them to stand in for the universal, abandon 
their novelty to become timeless. Devoid of author, the music shows itself for what it is: 
“Pure, anonymous counterpoint, abstract webs of musical lines” in the words of Claude 
Palisca.9 Absolute music avant la lettre, without author and without words—without 
recognized origin or authority, orphans incapable of defending themselves, as Socrates 
says of the written logos.10 As we read in the preface to the reader of L’Artusi, 
                                                
6 “In una Camera assai remota, et da’ strepiti lontana, per la loro maggior comodità.” L’Artusi, fol. 39. 
Strunk, Source Readings, 494. 
7 “But if, in the ‘passages’ noted as false, he had shown the words that went with them, then the world 
would have known without fail where his judgment had gone astray, and he would not have said that they 
were chimeras and castles in the air from their entire disregard of the rules of the First Practice.” G.C. 
Monteverdi, “Dichiaratione” Strunk, 407. I return to this passage below. 
8 L’Artusi, 42v. “Vario: I do not deny that dissonances are employed as nonessentials in compositions, but I 
say none the less that, being by nature contrary to consonance, they can by no means agree in the same way 
and should not be employed in the same way.” Strunk, Source Readings, 400. 
9 Claude Palisca, Music and Ideas in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 2006), 162. 
10 “When it has once been written down, every discourse roams about everywhere, reaching 
indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no business with it, and it doesn’t 
know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not. And when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, it 
always needs its father’s support; alone, it can neither defend itself nor come to its own support.” Plato, 
Phaedrus, trans. by A. Nehamas and P. Woodroof, in Plato, Complete Works. (Ed. John M. Cooper and 
Hutchinson D. S. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009), 275e. 
On writing in the Phaedrus, see Derrida, Dissemination. See also Jasper Neel, Plato, Derrida, and Writing. 
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Nevertheless, if you and everyone who is dedicated this Art will be pleased to 
read carefully these few pages, and that far from every passion will be willing to 
consider my words in the way I pronounce them, and take hold of the truth: be 
aware that I have argued universally, without mentioning anyone in particular.11  
Making the author anonymous, then, is a strategy to universalize the attacks. 
Monteverdi’s response, identifying himself as the target of the attacks, aims to counter 
this strategy by localizing—historicizing—the universalist claims of the priest, to mark 
the specific differences that make this music what it is: to appear as author, father, and 
defender of the new music. As if signing the music once was not enough, the operation is 
repeated two years later: Giulio Cesare’s signature remarks Claudio’s re-claiming of the 
music.12 Especially since the previous response to Artusi, issued under the pseudonym of 
                                                                                                                                            
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988). Artusi alludes to this passage, without quoting it, as 
part of his sarcastic reply to the anonymous L’Ottuso Accademico in the second part of L’Artusi, published 
in 1603: “Ne di questo si deve alcuno meravigliare, perche accade per il più, che quando alcun libro esce 
fuori delle stampe, et che come peregrino se ne va per il mondo, capita alle mani d’huomini talamente de 
pensieri varii, et dalla intentione de Scrittori lontani, che necessariamente viene in diversi modi ricevuto, et 
visto.” Giovanni Maria Artusi, L’Artusi Delle imperfettione della moderna musica, Parte Seconda, (Venice, 
Giacomo Vincenti: 1603; Facsimile reprint in Artusi, L’Artusi Bologna: A. Forni, 2000), 1. 
11 L’Artusi, IVv; Emphasis mine. “Tuttavia se voi, et tutti quelli che attendono à questi Arte, vi contentarete 
di leggere attentamente queste poche di carte, et che lontani da ogni passione vorrete considerare le mie 
parole per quel verso, che io le dico, et appigliarvi al vero; restando serviti ch’io habbi ragionato in 
universale, senza nominare alcuno in particolare.”  
Why did Artusi (on top of his continued bout with theorist Ercole Bottrigari) choose Monteverdi, the 
youngest of the composers under attack, is a problem that has attracted some musicological attention. Tim 
Carter suggests Artusi might have perceived him as a “relatively easy target” in comparison with 
Fontanelli, Gesualdo, Luzzaschi, or de Wert. Carter, “Artusi, Monteverdi,” 173. The controversy produced 
by Guarini’s Il Pastor Fido which provides the text to both madrigals might also be an issue. Cf. Carter “E 
in rileggendo,” 149 and Cusick, “Gendering Modern Music,” 18-19. Seth Coluzzi expands on these points 
by showing that “O Mirtillo” in fact holds to scrutiny, while displacing reasons for Artusi’s attack on the 
perception of Monteverdi as “ignorant,” his allegiance to the Gonzagas—and thus his unstable political 
position in the eyes of the clergy—where “Monteverdi would have stood directly in the middle of this 
political and ideological conflict between the secular courts of northern Italy, with their extravagant and 
‘modern’ tastes, and the conservative-minded Pope Clement VIII” (28). He advances this possibility by 
elaborating on Cusick’s reading of the gendered dimension of the controversy to suggest that on top of the 
political controversy, Artusi felt threatened by the extreme sensuality of the new music and its performance 
practice. I return to this argument below. Seth J. Coluzzi, ‘Se Vedesti Qui Dentro’: Monteverdi’s ‘O 
Mirtillo, Mirtillo Anima Mia’ And Artusi’s Offence,” Music and Letters, (94: 1, 2013) 1-37. 
12 Although Artusi refers by name to two of the pieces in the Seconda Parte dell’Artusi (1603), the identity 
of the pieces and their author was only acknowledged in print five years later, with the famous Lettera by 
Claudio Monteverdi in the 1605 fifth book of madrigals. In the Discorso secondo musicale (Venice: 
Giacomo Vincenti, 1608) published under the pseudonym of Antonio Braccino da Todi and directed 
explicitly to Monteverdi, Artusi complains that he addressed letters “full of warmth and civility” 
[amorevolezza et civilità] and that, instead of responding in the same way, Monteverdi chose to reply with 
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L’Ottuso Accademico, whose identity is still a mystery, ended up being incorporated into 
the second part of the dialogue.13 I will come back to L’Ottuso and the response of the 
Monteverdi brothers below, but first we need to situate the aesthetic and philosophical 
stakes of Artusi’s criticisms beyond strictly musical issues. 
HARMONIC CASTLES IN THE AIR 
Luca judged the madrigals as little pleasing to the ear [al udito poco piacevoli], consisting 
“of deformations of the nature and propriety of true harmony,” [deformi dalla natura, et 
proprietà dell' Harmonia propria] violating the good rules which were “in part founded 
upon experience, the mother of all things, in part observed in nature, and in part proved 
by demonstration.”14 The indicted passages, Luca holds, go against “what is good and 
beautiful in the harmonic institutions.” The “harmonic institutions” are of course those of 
Zarlino, who stands in the text for that assemblage Artusi presents as founded in part 
upon experience, nature, and demonstration, handed over by tradition, and affirmed by 
                                                                                                                                            
anonymous letters and through a third person (presumably l’Ottuso but also possibly Giulio Cesare). Artusi, 
Discorso secondo, 6. The rhetoric effect of the anonymisation of Monteverdi is all the more evident if one 
takes into account the end of L’Artusi, in which Vario presents Luca with a motet by Costanzo Porta 
(copied in the book in its entirety), extolling its invertible counterpoint which permits the piece to be sung 
as two, three, four, and five parts. For Palisca, Artusi withheld the identity of the composer and expressed 
his opinions through the fictitious characters Vario and Luca to avoid making a personal argument against 
Monteverdi. Palisca, “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy”, 128-9. Tim Carter analyzes the complicated 
etiquette of courtly debates, noting that it was Monteverdi who first broke protocol by mentioning Artusi by 
name in the Lettera, and that Artusi’s complaints in the Discorso secondo evidence the priest’s lack of 
understanding of such conventions. Finally, Carter analyzes the indirect ways by which Monteverdi chose 
to respond to Artusi in the fourth book, before the publication of the letter, since, as Carter writes, accepting 
a challenge amounts to legitimizing it. Carter, “E in rileggendo,” 146. 
13 With respect to L’Ottuso and the question authorship, it bears remarking that the first usage of the 
expression “seconda pratica” occurs in the letter by l’Ottuso to Artusi transcribed in the Seconda parte 
dell’Artusi, fol. 16. cf. Palisca, The Artusi Monteverdi-Controversy,” 143). Giulio Cesare and Claudio 
would claim that “questa voce [seconda prattica] essere sicuramente sua,” referencing only Artusi’s latter 
mention of the term “questa seconda Pratica, che si può dire con ogni verità, che sia la feccia della prima.” 
(fol. 33). If, as it seems, the term was “already current in oral, if not written discussions” (Palisca, 143) then 
it becomes clear that questions of authorship and inscription are entwined in the controversy from the 
beginning. Palisca considers and rejects the possibility that L’Ottuso might be either of the Monteverdi 
brothers, Ercole Bottrigari, Antonio Goretti, or a composer from Ferrara or Mantua. He leaves open the 
possibility, advanced by John Harper, that L’Ottuso is Artusi, who “concealed his own name in the similar 
sounding ‘Ottuso’ as an inganno.” Palisca, “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy,” 136-7 n.17; See also 
Carter “E in rileggendo,” 141 n. 11 and Fabbri, Monteverdi, 42. 
14 “[S]i trasgrediscono le buone Regole, parte fondate nella esperienza Madre di tutte le cose: parte 
speculate dalla Natura; et parte dalla demostratione demostrate.” L’Artusi, fol. 39v. 
   122
the practice of great composers and which guarantees the mutual intelligibility of artistic 
practice.15 In the tradition that Artusi defends, music is a science that develops rationally 
through the investigation of generations of theorists in their aim to explain, illustrate, and 
codify what are ultimately immutable natural laws. For Artusi, Zarlino constitutes the 
pinnacle of this development, and nothing else can be added to it.16 These natural laws, 
however, must constantly be manifested in practice, in the production of musical 
compositions which express these laws and their immutability.17 Music, as a science and 
as practice, constantly strives towards achieving its perfection, as Zarlino finally stated in 
the Sopplimenti musicali of 1588.18 
There is, however, a further dimension to this metaphysics of scientific perfection, 
which comes out clearly in Artusi’s text. As true conservatives, the interlocutors in the 
dialogue see nothing wrong with things being “new” as such, as long as what is “new” 
sticks to the old rules. The real threat in these “novelties,” for them, is rather the 
corruption of the institutions whose order and borders [ordine e termine]—however 
founded upon nature, experience, and reason—are everywhere susceptible of being 
penetrated “by confusion and imperfection of no little consequence,” by barbaric 
irruptions which use the same rules to excuse themselves, their licenses and 
licentiousness, confounding themselves with what is pure. Capable of making the pure 
indistinguishable from the barbaric, they deserve blame, not praise. 
                                                
15 “Do you not know that all the arts and sciences have been brought under rules by scholars of the past and 
that the first elements, rules, and precepts on which they are founded have been handed down to us in order 
that, so long as there is no deviation from them, one person shall be able to understand what another says or 
does?” Strunk Source Readings, 400. For a reading of Artusi’s position in the tradition of Zarlino which 
locates musical science within a philosophical and “ethical” tradition, see Jenkins, “Giovanni Maria Artusi 
and the Ethics of Musical Science,” 77-91. 
16 Massimo Ossi, Divining the oracle: Monteverdi's seconda prattica (Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press: 2003), 36. For a more general account of the development of the Renaissance notion of musical 
perfection starting from Netherlandish polyphony and its transference to Italy, see Leo Schrade, 
Monteverdi, Creator of Modern Music (New York: Norton, 1950), 11-48. Especially significant in 
Schrade’s classic account is the parallels he suggests between Zarlino and art historian Giorgio Vasari, and 
the role of Vincenzo Galilei in the realignments of ancient and modern music and practice, where antiquity 
is presented as “something apart, not a period in history, one among others, but the measure of all things 
artistic, the expression of the very essence of beauty in art.” Schrade, Monteverdi, 36. 
17 Jenkins, “Giovanni Maria Artusi and the Ethics of Musical Science,” 77. 
18 Idem, 85. 
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Luca’s anxiety about the purity and reasoned order of the harmonic institutions is 
truly symptomatic: what are these institutions, what is their ground and reason, if their 
authority can easily be threatened by a few bars of musical novelties? The possibility, 
announced by Luca, that the “beautiful” style may become indistinguishable from the 
“barbaric”—a possibility that is actualized as soon as it is announced—puts into question 
the self-evidence, the authority of “laws” that are otherwise presumed timeless and 
natural.19 To understand how this is possible, and the historical consequences of this 
formulation (consequences for history, consequences that imply history, that enact 
history), we need to take Artusi’s attack to Monteverdi beyond any limited sense of 
“aesthetics” as a matter of style or taste. We can begin to approach it as the putting to test 
of two competing acoustemologies,20 a matter of defining grounds, of affirming the 
possibility of establishing a reasoned correspondence between what is sounding and what 
is understood and judged by the listener—and by extension, the very nature of what 
sounds, which is under the regulation of the composer.21 
                                                
19 The relation and problems between music theory and nature as its ground is explored at depth in 
Suzannah Clark and Alexander Rehding (eds.) Music Theory and Natural Order from the Renaissance to 
the Early Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). As the editors write in the 
introduction to the volume, “insofar as natural order reflects the position of the human in society, as 
Raymond Williams indicated, nature’s seemingly objective command is in the first place our projection 
onto it.” According to the theory of mimesis elaborated here, moreover, this reflection is not only a 
projection of the human in nature, but the very constitution of nature through the postulation of laws and 
the creation of works that claim to imitate it. 
20 Acoustemology, as Stephen Feld defines it, joins acoustics with epistemology as a way of knowing the 
world through sound. Stephen Feld, “Acoustemology” in Keywords in Sound (Durham; London: Duke 
University Press, 2015), 12; See also Ana María Ochoa Gautier, Aurality: Listening and Knowledge in 
Nineteenth-Century Colombia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014); Feld, (Jazz cosmopolitanism in 
Accra: Five musical years in Ghana (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012); Samuels, D. W., L. 
Meintjes, A. M. Ochoa and T. Porcello “Soundscapes: Toward a sounded anthropology.” Annual Review of 
Anthropology (39, 2005), 329–345. Feld, “Waterfalls of song: An acoustemology of place resounding in 
Bosavi, Papua New Guinea.” In S. Feld and K. H. Basso (eds.), Senses of place (Santa Fe, NM: School of 
American Research Press, 1996), Feld, S. (1996), 91. 
21 For Ossi, the controversy is a “symptom of an incipient process of experimentation” that was 
transforming aesthetic concerns “from the rational basis for aesthetic judgment to the proper relationship 
between invention and imitation.” Ossi, 36. In my reading, however, what Ossi locates as the motivation 
for the symptom is however equally symptomatic of more important transformations, namely an 
epistemological and social transformation—modernity—and more specifically the crisis of princely 
sovereignty that defines the European seventeenth century, which extends to the register of what 
scholarship still wants to preserve as the autonomous realm of the “aesthetic.” The need, then, is to 
understand the “aesthetic” and the “political” as competing claims upon a shared sensorium, without 
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In the dialogue, Luca shows that the sovereignty of musical institutions must not 
only be upheld by the production of works that express the “immutable laws” that define 
it, but also with the extermination of what exists outside the laws. Their existence poses a 
complicated topological problem: whereas the laws serve to protect the borders of “the 
beautiful,” these borders must be without an outside, for as soon as what is outside is 
recognized, it is incorporated into the inside, the two made indistinguishable. The task for 
the theorist is not only to demonstrate that canonical compositions follow or express 
these laws, but moreover to denounce those compositions that do not follow the laws, 
even if they seem to do so. It should be possible, Vario assumes, to show that the new 
music is lacks all rational grounding, even if it might resemble it. Not only is the new 
music offensive to the ear, it also threatens the institutions that are presumed to be well 
grounded: the purified style will become indistinguishable from the barbaric, and in so 
doing the musical institutions will be found to be as ungrounded as the compositions that 
threaten them. That this possibility is stated, that Luca identifies—in aiming to defend 
it—the scandal that grounds music theory, namely that the institutions that protects it may 
as well be chimeras, susceptible of being penetrated by barbarians who use the same 
rules, “in conformity with the style,” to bring decadence into purity. The disagreement, 
thus, is not a matter of conservatism against experimentalism, as it has often been styled 
to be, but about the very possibility of affirming and preserving the rationality of music 
as science. 
Vario: Signor Luca, you bring me new things which astonish me not a little. It 
pleases me, at my age, to see a new method of composing, though it would please 
                                                                                                                                            
assuming one or the other to be derivate of the other. This critical reading can be expanded based on the 
gendered dimension of the controversy, as examined in Cusick, “Gendering Modern Music” as well as 
Susan McClary, “Constructions of Gender in Monteverdi’s Dramatic Music” Cambridge Opera Journal, 
Vol. 1, No. 3 (Nov., 1989), pp. 203-223. See also Coluzzi, “‘Se Vedesti Qui Dentro,’” 1-37. Returning to 
Susan McClary’s suggestion to critically examine the original social purposes of the new politics of 
“representation” in early-modern cultural productions, the readings I present here are prompted by the need 
of developing modes of critical analysis that lay bare the mechanisms of the new politics of representation. 
Doing so, however, involves a departure from the New Historicism that characterizes these works which is, 
ultimately, still motivated by a hermeneutic need and a concern for the “musical object” and authorial 
intention behind them. See Tomlinson, Music and Renaissance Magic, 230ff and passim. For the 
relationship between politics and aesthetics as a shared sensorial distribution, see Jacques Rancière, 
Aesthetics and Its Discontents (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009) and The Politics of Aesthetics: The 
Distribution of the Sensible (New York, NY: Continuum, 2004). 
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me much more if I saw that these passages were founded upon some reason which 
could satisfy the intellect. But as castles in the air, chimeras founded upon sand, 
these novelties do not please me; they deserve blame, not praise. Let us see the 
passages, however. 
 Luca: Indeed, in the light of what little experience I have in this art, these 
things do not seem to me to entitle their authors or inventors to build a four-story 
mansion (as the saying goes), seeing that they are contrary to what is good and 
beautiful in the harmonic institutions. They are harsh to the ear, rather offending 
than delighting it, and to the good rules left by those who have established the 
order and the bounds of this science they bring confusion and imperfection of no 
little consequence. Instead of enriching, augmenting, and ennobling harmony by 
various means, as so many noble spirits have done, they bring it to such estate that 
the beautiful and purified style is indistinguishable from the barbaric. And all the 
while they continue to excuse these things by various arguments in conformity 
with the style.22 
The image of a castle built in the air follows a fairly traditional distinction between a 
sensuous appearance and a rational grounding, but there is much more at stake. The 
analysis is rather motivated by the immunological need to reground the rationality of the 
institutions, by showing that the new music is ungrounded and undocumented, without 
law or right.23 That one of these is called “beautiful” and the other “barbaric,” of course, 
shows that what is at stake is a continuity between what has been attained and established 
as “proper” of Italian humanism—even if this means overlooking the inheritances of the 
Netherlandish style—and thus timeless, from what exceeds its self-established 
delimitations. This logic, it bears reminding, is by no means proper of sixteenth-century 
                                                
22 Strunk, Source Readings, 394-5; emphasis mine. 
23 In his influential analysis of Western politics as defined by an immunitary paradigm that organizes 
society according to what belongs to it and what is foreign, Roberto Esposito points out how the immune 
system is often conceived of as a military device, “defending and attacking everything not recognized as 
belonging to it” so that its “biological function is extended to a general view of reality dominated by a need 
for violent defense in the face of anything judged to be foreign.” Roberto Esposito, Immunitas: the 
protection and negation of life (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), 11. 
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Humanists: it already characterizes the Greeks after which they sought to model 
themselves—that is, it belongs to the Italians insofar as it does not belong to them, 
insofar as it belongs to the model they claim for themselves—and which they produce by 
“imitating.” This operation, determining the boundaries and limits of the “proper” goes 
hand in hand with the negation of the historicity of musical practice, with the 
rationalist—and now empiricist—affirmation of the identity between the musical practice 
of certain “models” and a “musical nature” that is expressed by laws that must be 
timeless. By invoking these laws to attack the new music, Artusi effectively naturalizes 
Zarlino’s musical science, he removes it from the course of history and presents it as a 
given, with all the empiricist experiments serving to reaffirm their certainty. Yet, by 
appealing to the rules to defend the institutions against “novelties,” Artusi also outlines 
their closure, making them once again a historical formation. Coming on the heels of 
Vincenzo Galilei’s philological research on all things Greek, the moment we are 
examining is effectively the irruption of history in the field of music theory. In fact, 
Zarlino had already undertaken a reorganization of the field of musical knowledge in the 
Sopplementi of 1588 as an attempt to deal with his critics (Galilei’s, in particular) and the 
evident transformation of music in his time by distinguishing between art as science and 
practice: his concern—as Monteverdi would also affirm—had only been with the practice 
of the moderns. There is, in fact, a difference between truth and method, inevitably 
mediated by history. Thus, “Zarlino’s compromise, such as it is, gives a hint of a turn 
toward manipulative knowledge that already and inexorably had been initiated.”24  
 
History, it can be argued, never ceases irrupting within the fields of the arts and sciences. 
The particular form of this irruption towards the end of the sixteenth century would be 
definitive in one respect: it would be the irruption of modernity itself, the disenchantment 
of the world as perceivable in first music theory with Galilei, as Daniel Chua argues.25 
The conflict, then, was between two oppossed claims to origin and law, to arche: the 
                                                
24 Jairo Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects: The Construction of Musical Thought in 
Zarlino, Descartes, Rameau, and Weber (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 37-41. 
25 Chua, Daniel K., “Vincenzo Galilei, modernity, and the division of nature,” in Clark and Rehding (eds.), 
Music Theory and Natural Order, 17-29. 
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natural and rational grounding of Zarlino’s science, on the one hand, against the 
historically inflected musical revolution triggered by the Florentine Camerata on the 
other. If, as we have been arguing, this revolution was not “merely aesthetic” but 
inseparable and consequent with the crisis of the humanist project that aimed to fashion 
itself after the model of a Greek ideal, then it is no overstatement to say that 
Monteverdi’s response to the attacks would have been programmed by these opposing 
claims. 
The characteristically modern nature of L’Artusi, its appeals to experience, to 
musical practice, to an immediate now that becomes absolute, can be glimpsed from the 
beginning of the dialogue. Vario’s first attack consists in holding that “the high is a part 
of the low,” taking issue with the famous unprepared seventh and ninth between the 
bassus and cantus in bar 13 of Monteverdi’s “Cruda Amarilli.” Vario explains how, as 
proven experimentally by the monochord, intervals are produced by dividing a string into 
smaller sections, so that a low sound effectively produces “higher” sounds. More 
complex intervals are conceived as being contained in the simpler ones, and only those 
that are derivable through harmonic division, namely thirds, fourths, fifths, and octaves 
can be called “rational” and be used structurally. All the others, the sevenths and ninths in 
the first example, insofar as they cannot be derived harmonically, are alien. The 
experimental demonstration replaces or reinscribes the opposition, in nature or as nature, 
between consonance and dissonance. It affirms, as a matter of experience, what the 
tradition of harmonicists have discovered rationally, and restates an opposition between 
“reason” and “the senses” as old as the rules themselves.26 The authority of harmonic 
derivation authorizes sounds over and above the ear’s judgment. The simplest sound is 
the beginning and origin, principle and reason, the arche that structures the entire 
composition as a system and determines what belongs in the composition and what does 
not belong, what is pure and what is barbarian. 
                                                
26 For an analysis of the theoretical traditions involved in this opposition of reason and sense in the 
controversy, see Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 36ff. 
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A synesthetic metaphor without precedent explains this acoustemology while 
gathering all the terms under which we have analyzed the historical and philosophical 
stakes at the opening of the dialogue. The composition is said to be a majestic, closed 
system [Sistema massimo], a hierarchy, in which the fundamental judges all the parts—
each individual interval—as an eye [un’ occhio] that sends forth diverse visual rays 
[diuersi raggi visiui], to observe—to judge (but not to listen)—that all proportions are in 
rule, that they belong to the composition, that they are not extraneous, foreign, barbarian. 
This panoptic system is so powerful and regulated that the fragments, taken out from 
their sources, still exhibit their lawfulness—or lack of it—under the gaze of the sovereign 
eye. Harmonic proportion or correspondence is the sole guarantee for the solidity of the 
architectonic construction that is a madrigal:  
And, for the first argument against them, I tell you that the high is a part of the 
low and is born from the low [l’acuto è parte del grave, e nasce dal grave] and, 
being a part of it, must continue to be related to it, as to its beginning or as the 
cloud to the spring from which it is derived. That this is true, the experiment of 
the monochord will show you. For if two strings of equal length and thickness are 
stretched over one and the same equal space and tuned perfectly in unison (which 
is regarded by the musician as a single sound, just as two surfaces which are 
throughout in contact with each other are regarded by Vitello as a single surface), 
and if you cut off a part from one of these or bring out a high sound from it by 
placing a bridge under it, I say that beyond doubt the high will be a part of the 
low. And if you would know that a part produces the high sound, strike the whole 
and then the part which is high with respect to the whole, and it will necessarily 
be related to the low, as the part to the whole or as to its beginning. At the lowest 
note of the complete system, or of any composition, [Sistema massimo; o 
d’alcuna Cantilena] there may be represented an eye, sending forth various visual 
rays and regarding all the parts, [viene dipinto, un’occhio, dal quale uscendo 
diversi raggi visuisi, và mirando à tutte le parti] observing in what proportion they 
correspond to their beginning and foundation. How then will the first, second, 
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fourth, fifth, and other measures stand, if the higher part has no correspondence or 
harmonic proportion to the lower?27 
Speaking on behalf of the composers he is attacking, Luca explains that the A in the 
cantus (of “Cruda Amarilli”)—which forms an unprepared ninth with the G in the 
bassus—may be understood as resulting from an upper neighbor to a G that is left out to 
create a little more harshness, while the F is a passing note ensuing from the same 
presumed G. These alterations, Luca argues, are the product of “accented singing,” the 
written record—the inscription—of an improvisational practice.28 These alterations, 
which Luca later admits to find “not unpleasing” are, in Vario’s account, an attempt to 
confound the ear by presenting it with sounds that do not have a real existence. Thus, by 
employing the “same” rules of counterpoint, the offending dissonances can presumably 
be justified—that is, until the ear, and not the all-seeing eye, comes into the scene: for the 
empiricist Vario there is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses, and no 
appeal can ever be made to entities like those that would later be called sous-entendre 
sounds. 
Vario: Good! I follow you perfectly, and answer that the sense of hearing does 
not perceive what it does not hear and, not perceiving it, cannot present it to the 
intellect, there being nothing in the intellect that has not first been perceived by 
the senses. How absurd it is to say that the tenor sustains a note in one register 
while the soprano, immediately afterward in a higher register, produces the effect 
the tenor should have produced! Especially after the rest, how much more evident 
it is to the ear that the soprano sings a sixteenth and then a fourteenth! 
                                                
27 L’Artusi, 40v. Strunk, Source Readings, 396. Translation modified after Cusick, “Gendering Modern 
Music,” 10; emphasis mine. As will be clear below, the analysis presented here follows closely some of the 
reading strategies and results of Cusick’s ground-breaking essay, while aiming to press her point further: 
insofar as the difference between “rhetoric” and “substance” is itself gendered (Cusick, 5), an analysis of 
the gendered nature of the argument is still important not just for our understanding of the period, the work, 
or the composer’s “intentions,” but also of the large-scale ideological structures that condition the very 
terms of the discussion and place it well beyond the presumably restricted realm of the aesthetic. 
28 Palisca, “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy,” 130. 
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A PHANTASTIC SERATA?29 
One could begin to suspect, in the context of what is heard (and not heard) against what is 
understood, what is available to the senses and what is not, of the authenticity of the 
musical serata at the house of Antonio Goretti, for which no other record exists (see note 
1, above). Neither of the Monteverdi brothers makes any reference to the event nor to 
how Artusi got hold of the unpublished music. In the dialogue, Luca says that they “were 
sung and repeated” [Fuorono Cantati una, et due volte], and he presents it to Vario: “[in] 
order that you may see the whole question and give me your judgment, here are the 
passages, scattered here and there through the above-mentioned madrigals, which I wrote 
out yesterday evening for my amusement.” […eccovi li Passaggi che sparsamente, sono 
sparsi per entro alli sudetti Madrigali; li quali distesi per mio diporto hiersera sopra 
questa carta.]30 How Artusi got hold of the music is an open question, quite interesting 
from a historical perspective, and even more important from the philosophical 
perspective pursued here. At stake is the status of the musical object and the notions of 
listening defended by each camp, issues which lie at the crux of the controversy and 
                                                
29 My spelling of “phantastic” aims to evoke the psychoanalytical theory of the “phantasy” as a 
protective/productive formation for the subject, operating not so much as wish-fulfillment but as “the 
support of desire” through which “the subject situates himself as determined by the phantasy.” Jacques 
Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, (New 
York: Norton, 1978), 184-6 and passim. In this respect, addressing the serata as phantasy aims not to cast 
doubt about the veracity of Artusi’s telling of the events, nor to offer an analysis of his psychology as 
subject. Rather, it makes the event readable as constituted in a broad field which also constitutes Artusi as 
subject and writer, thus broadening the perspective from where the controversy can be critically addressed. 
The phantastic scene locates that which the subject position occupied by Artusi lacks and everywhere 
desires, namely the self-coincidence of presence to itself and authority, self-sovereignty. It is, once again, 
not a psychological lack of Artusi as subject, but that which defines him as subject in its lacking. 
30 L’Artusi, 39v. Strunk Source Readings, 394. Palisca assumes that Artusi knew the pieces from manuscript 
copies, without making reference to the fiction of the musical serata, which he takes as part of the theorist’s 
attempt to “soften the blow” of his criticisms of Monteverdi. Palisca, “The Artusi-Monteverdi 
Controversy,” 128. Ossi goes as far as suggesting that the criticisms in the dialogue in fact reproduce the 
discussions that ensued after the performance of the madrigals, with Vario standing in for Artusi, and Luca 
for other unnamed interlocutors. Ossi, “Monteverdi, Guarini, and Marenzio’s Cruda Amarilli,” 334. One 
problem with this interpretation is that Luca is the one who transcribed the music and issues the first 
concerns about their errors, yet he also voices some defenses of the passages—rhetorically presented to 
allow for Vario’s sharpest attacks. Once again, even if Artusi is no master of the Platonic literary form (and 
its paradoxical mimetology), as readers we should have learned by now to approach the dialogic genre as a 
means for the contestation of the historiographical presuppositions of accuracy, psychological 
representation and not as a straightforward means of communication, of a writing that faithfully reproduces 
the author’s intention. From this perspective, the problems addressed in this chapter demonstrate what a 
rigorous criticism of mimesis contributes to the practice of historiography in general. 
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which mark a historical transformation. In the dialogue, Luca, a musical amateur, hears 
the madrigals performed twice and writes them down afterwards. The verb is 
‘distendere,’ (from the Latin extendere, meaning ‘to spread out,’ ‘to place upon,’ to 
‘expand’ or ‘dilate,’ or even ‘to relax.’31 In the seventeenth century, moreover, it could 
mean “to elaborate,” “to explicate thoughts by means of writing”—not, however, in the 
sense of ‘copying’ or ‘transcribing’ (that is, from another manuscript source). It implies 
not only a re-presentation or making the music into an object, placing an idea upon a 
surface and in front of someone (obicere), but moreover a spatialization, an inscription 
that first and foremost inscribes its distance from its origin. The suggestion, then, is that 
Luca identified, analyzed, memorized and later transcribed all of Monteverdi’s “faults” 
that he heard and judged over the course of two performances during a social event. 
The mode of listening imagined here highlights the relation between hearing and 
reasoning that forms the aesthetics, or better, the metaphysics, through which Vario 
criticizes the exemplars. For Vario, perception is deceptive and is helpless without the aid 
of reason. “Sense without reason, and reason without sense, cannot render an accurate 
judgment of any object that involves learning. They can only do so when they are joined 
together.”32 The new musicians, however, disregard reason and the rules it upholds, 
aiming to satisfy only the senses.33 Luca’s perfect hearing demonstrates—necessarily 
needs to demonstrate—that the ear of the theorist is a rational ear—a sovereign eye—that 
understands in addition to, or instead or, taking delight on sound. He needs to prove that 
any transgression of the rational rules of harmony is already comprehended within a 
purely rational listening, such that he can understand it immediately.34 As we will see, 
however, this necessity leads him into an untenable position which exposes the 
metaphysics of the system he invokes and its limits. Not that its metaphysics is in any 
                                                
31 “Distendere”, Vocabolario degli accademici della Crusca, First Edition (1612), 293; 
http://www.lessicografia.it/ Accessed 14 December, 2015. 
32 L’Artusi, 12. The translation is from Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 44. For an analysis of the relationship 
between reason and sense in the controversy, see Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 36-57. 
33 L’Artusi, 42. 
34 Carter, on a different context, uses the hypothesis of Monteverdi’s “aural memory” to account for a 
misreading of the Rinuccini’s “Zefiro torna, e di soavi accenti” in the Scherzi musicali setting (1607). 
Carter, “Two Monteverdi Problems, and Why They Still Matter,” JAMS, (19:3, 2002), 422, n. 9. 
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way concealed: citing Ptolemy, Vario divides the “Harmonic faculty” [facoltà 
Harmonica] into two types of judgment, hearing and reason:  
The sense judges those things that pertain to matter; reason applies itself to form. 
From this one gathers that since matter is given perfection through form, so 
judgment makes it possible that the apprehension of any object is made perfect by 
reason… What the sense knows in a confused fashion from unstable matter, 
reason judges in the abstract, divorced from matter.35  
We have thus the metaphysical underpinning of the type of listening that corresponds to 
Artusi’s tradition: an Aristotelean hylomorphism which considers matter to be the 
passive, irrational and unstable component in all substances which receives from form its 
principle and its telos: its ‘for the sake of which.’”36 The division of the senses 
corresponds to a similar division in the musical object itself. Specifying what the “corpo 
sonoro” is, Vario sketches the division of sound into form and matter, citing Aristotle’s 
Physics:  
The musician calls sounding body that thing from which it is possible to have and 
obtain a sound apt for harmony. By this fundamental, we can say with Aristotle in 
the second book of the Physics: Ipse proportiones sunt forme, aut cause formales 
intervallorum, et consonantiarum. The proportions are the forms, i.e. the formal 
cause of the intervals and consonance. Thus every interval has its form, and those 
forms are different from each other, just like every interval is different in size 
from each other.37 
                                                
35 L’Artusi, 44. Translation in Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 45. 
36 Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 45. Incorporating the previous discussions on the role of tradition and the 
purposes of science in Zarlino, Ossi specifies that “‘form,’ in this context, is the aggregate of the principles 
derived by theorists from the natural laws that determine the basic materials of composition (pitches, 
intervals, etc.) together with the examples gathered from the works of past masters who, through 
experimentation, have perfected the art of music.” As explained below, this interpretation fails to identify 
the crucial recourse to Aristotelean hylomorphism and its consequences, especially within the theoretical 
tradition of Zarlino. For such an analysis of hylomorphism in Zarlino, see Jairo Moreno, Musical 
Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 37-41. 
37 “Chiama il Musico corpo sonoro, quella cosa, dalla quale si possi havere, et cavare suono atto 
all’Harmonia. Stando questo fondamento potiamo dire con Aristotile nel secondo della Fisica. Ipse 
proportiones sunt forme, aut cause formales intervallorum, et consonantiarum. Le proportioni sono le 
forme, overo cause formali de gl’intervalli, et delle Consonantie; ciascuno intervallo adunque ha la sua 
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The proportions are the form, or the formal cause of intervals and consonances, and each 
interval possesses its own form which differentiates it from others. As Chadwick Jenkins 
rightly points out, Artusi understands the consequences of this hylomorphic metaphysics 
of listening to be ethical, insofar as preference for the sensual aspect of sound—its 
irrational “matter” over the ideal aspect of intervals, its “form”—means abandoning the 
rational and scientific nature of music and the possibility it offers of reaching truth as the 
telos of the intellect.38 The necessity for a hylomorphic model is already posed by 
Zarlino, where it functions as the rational legitimation for music, it suffuses music with 
the “authority” of Nature and marks it with “the imprimatur of reason.”39 The new music, 
in Jenkins formulation, is rather “anti-music,” the aberrant product of the new musician’s 
vanity which threatens not only musical and scientific but also moral institutions by 
producing sounds that refuse to communicate rationally: as Vario says, the institutions 
ensure that “by not deviating from the principles and good rules one can understand what 
another says or does.”40 
Such an emphasis on communication pervades Artusi’s theory of music, which 
places vocal music as the natural form of music, making all other forms derivate as 
imitations of it.41 Artusi’s “science of music,” presented in his L’Arte del contraponto 
(Venice: Giacomo Vincenti, 1598), divides music into three kinds: 1) Music that moves 
the sense alone; 2) Music that moves both the sense and the intellect; 3) Music that 
moves the intellect alone. The type of music that “moves the senses alone” is called 
irrational insofar as it lacks any semantic content, it produces sound but not voice, which 
has sense in addition to mere sound. As is well known, the difference between sound and 
voice goes back through Zarlino to Aristotle’s division in the Politics between phonē and 
                                                                                                                                            
forma, et sono differenti l’una all’altra; si come gl’intervalli sono differenti di grandezza al’uno dal l’altro.” 
L’Artusi, 44v. 
38 Jenkins, “Artusi and the Ethics of Musical Science,” 91. 
39 Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 45. 
40 L’Artusi, 41v. cf. Jenkins, “Artusi and the Ethics of Musical Science,” 91. 
41 Jenkins, “Artusi and the Ethics of Musical Science,” 92. 
   134
logos, a distinction advanced to justify the notion of man as a political animal.42 The third 
type, which “moves the intellect alone,” stands in for the traditional musica mundana and 
musica humana which it conflates. Of the three types of music, then, only one is “true 
music,” the one that moves both sense and intellect. This, however, under the condition 
that only the intellect might preserve the right and power to judge it.43 
It is the “communicative nature” of this second type of music, which moves both 
the senses and the intellect at the expense of the sensual, what Artusi’s phantasy of 
perfect listening aims to secure: the capacity to understand and preserve the “form” of 
sounds and to protect the listener from their corruptible, sensuous, and deceptive—in 
sum, feminine—“matter.”44 By having Luca attend the musical serata and easily identify 
                                                
42 “For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech 
[logos]. The mere voice [phonē], it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the 
other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful 
and pleasant and to indicate those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the 
advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of 
man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong 
and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state.” 
Aristotle, “Politics,” in Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1944), 1253a10; Digital edition in Perseus 
Digital Library. 1253a. For a criticism of the philosophical and political problems associated with the 
distinction between voice and speech as presented in this passage, see Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: 
Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Giorgio Agamben, 
Homo Sacer (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); and Mladen Dolar, A Voice and Nothing 
More, 2006. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). 
43 This ostensibly simple division is as rich as it is problematic, and more attention could be devoted to it. 
Of particular interest to our purposes is the claim that, as paraphrased by Jenkins, the first type “derives 
from the sounds of animals such as nightingales and blackbirds; it is irrational in that it owes its existence 
to irrational animals.” The theory that music’s origins are to be found in the imitation of birdsong go as far 
back as a fragment in Democritus, which states that “We have become pupils in the most important things: 
of the spider for spinning and mending, of the swallow for building, and of the songsters, swan and 
nightingale, for singing, by way of imitation.” DK 154. Lucretius echoes Democritus in De Rerum Natura, 
which Zarlino cites in his discussion of technics in the first book of the Sopplementi, 13. The Discorso 
Secondo Musicale (Giacomo Vincenti, 1608; rep. Forni 2000), Artusi’s last work involved in the 
controversy, issued under the pseudonym of Antonio Braccino da Todi in response to Monteverdi’s 
Dichiaratione, opens with the argument that “la voce humana fra quelle de tutti gl’animali, ottiene il primo 
luoco, et l’huomo solo propriamente potiamo dire che parli et Canti; è tutti gl’animali si dicono nell’esser 
su cantare, non che propriamente sia il vero che cantino, ma per una certa analogia, et similitudine.” 
Discorso Secondo, 3. 
44 Cusick correctly identifies the opposition between form and matter as gendered (in the tables of gendered 
oppositions, pp. 4 and 8), yet devotes to it little attention in her essay. In the passage in the Seconda Parte 
dell’Artusi where “Cruda Amarilli” is compared to a “monstrous birth,” which Cusick makes reference to 
(7), Artusi quotes Aristotle’s History of Animals, to hold that “more consideration must be given to form 
than to matter.” (Seconda Parte, 21). By pointing out the centrality of this hylomorphic metaphysics, this 
reading hones into a crucial issue in Cusick’s reading of the controversy. The problem is not only that 
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and write down the music without even mentioning the manuscripts he in fact possessed, 
Artusi simultaneously aims to secure the phantasy of the sovereignty and incorruptibility 
of the musical institutions he seeks to defend as well as the sovereignty of the listening, 
rational subject that grounds these institutions.  
This omission of the written, or better, its repression, fits squarely with the 
logocentric metaphysics he upholds and with the aversion to mediation he evidences 
elsewhere in the dialogue. For example, citing Aristotle in the “Ragionamento primo,” 
Vario distinguishes the objects capable of being perceived by the senses between those 
that can be perceived immediately, as in touch, and those that require mediation—air, in 
the case of hearing. Without mediation, the sense would judge accurately its object, but 
there always happens to be something that impedes truth, either in the sense, the sensible, 
or in the medium itself, such that the true cannot be immediately judged entirely. 
                                                                                                                                            
music was gendered rhetorically—however seriously we take rhetorics as a means for the construction of 
gender—but that in fact we can read such rhetorics as one side of a pervasive metaphysics that permeates 
even the attempts to transform such rhetoric, as shown below in the response of the Monteverdi brothers. 
For a classic account of the unavoidably gendered nature of hylomorphism, see Luce Irigaray, Speculum of 
the Other Woman (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985). Developing a point from Charles S. 
Brauner’s response to Cusick (JAMS, 47: 3, 1994), where Artusi might reveal a fear not of the feminine as 
such but of sexuality, Coluzzi’s reading of “O Mirtillo”, a tour de force of Schenkerian, new historicist, and 
hermeneutic analysis of the controversy, emphasizes Artusi’s reactions to the sensuality of performance, 
concluding that “more than the music itself, it may very well have been his precarious subjection to (and 
participation in) the open display of erotic-like passion and arousal, staged by adversaries of the papal 
regime from the Este and Gonzaga courts, that provoked Artusi to target Monteverdi, and not another 
moderno, as the figure of modern music.” Coluzzi, “‘Se Vedesti Qui Dentro,’” 37. However, this very rich 
analysis, to my mind, ends up missing the point of the gendered reading began by Cusick et al. by 
excessively psychologizing Artusi’s response (as well as diverting the much-needed feminist critique of the 
values and discourses of Western European culture that their work continues to make possible). 
Specifically, Coluzzi’s reading reduces the possibilities that an analysis of the controversy opens for a 
thoroughly critical reassessment of the values and power relations preserved in the several institutions 
engaged in the conflict by reducing everything to the reaction of a victimized priest by music that 
“threatened his own moral fortitude,” (30) “who must now separate himself from the ‘sfacciata meretrice’ 
through public chastisement, backed by reason and tradition, as a means of self-purification.” Coluzzi “‘Se 
Vedesti Qui Dentro,’” 37. If, in the terms I have been suggesting here, the Goretti event is Artusi’s 
phantasy, this is not meant in a psychologizing sense of this type, but rather as a larger symptom of the 
crisis of subjectivity and institutionality of his time. From this perspective, the attacks to Monteverdi can be 
read beyond limited issues of authorship and psychological intentionality, even if the serata turns out to 
have been a real event—hence my insistence on considering what is philosophically at stake in the account. 
The undecidability of the historical event produced by the dialogue becomes a powerful motivation for 
historical analysis alongside the positivity of historical data. 
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Of the perceivable objects, some are mediated, others are immediate; I call 
mediated those which cannot be heard without the means of another thing, such as 
sound, which cannot be heard without the means of air in which the sound is 
made (or as Artusi named them at the end of the Arte del Contraponto, 
‘convenient conditions’). I call immediate perceivable object that which is 
understood by the senses without the intervention of another means, such as 
tangible things which the sense of touch receives without any mediation. Now, if 
objects that are mediated were to reach the senses under the appropriate 
circumstances (i.e. that the aire was pure, that the sense was not impeded by any 
obstructions that could keeping from doing its job, that the object was appropriate 
to the sense), then you would almost believe that what [Francesco] Salines says 
could be absolutely true [namely that if one has an acute sense one can judge 
accurately its objects]. Yet there always occurs something that impedes truth [il 
vero], either on the side of the sense, or the sensible, or the means, in such a way 
that it cannot itself judge the true entirely. 
The phantasy by which touch becomes the highest, the truest and infallible of the senses 
is by no means proper to Artusi. It marks an entire metaphysical tradition from Plato to 
Merleau-Ponty that Jacques Derrida has called “humanualism.”45 By mobilizing touch as 
the paradigm of infallible perception, Artusi seeks to ground the possibility of true 
sensible knowledge, of the coincidence and intuitive plenitude—of direct immediacy—
that he denies for other senses. But this leads him into a contradiction, as he conceives of 
reason, which judges form, under the phantasmic model of an infallible sense. In a typical 
move, the presumed primacy of reason is reinscribed by modeling it on the opposite it 
seeks to replace: the copy, here as well, produces the paradigm.46  
                                                
45 Namely the tradition that defines humanism and what is proper to the human as animal rationale with 
respect to the hand, to touch and its exemplary capacity to know immediately, without the intervention of 
anything else, an ultrasense yielding a pure knowledge that distinguishes the human from everything else: 
“Human beings touch more and touch better. The hand is properly human; touching is properly human: it is 
the same proposition.” Jacques Derrida, On Touching, Jean-Luc Nancy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2005), 152. 
46 The exemplary example of this operation is the modeling of memory as a writing in the soul, which takes 
writing (presumably a mediate copy of immediate speech) as a model for what is supposed to be primary. 
Second Origins—A Fantastic Musical Serata 
 
137 
This phantasy completes—or exceeds—that of Luca’s perfect listening capacities: 
they both aim to ground and localize sensorial experience as immediate and self-present. 
To put the question in its simplest and most paradoxical terms: If Luca (only) heard the 
madrigals performed twice, how could he judge the improper, ungrounded, and inexistent 
sounds so accurately, that is, as if he possessed immediate access to them? Is not their 
irrationality as quickly available to the ear as it is to the intellect that grasps them in the 
instant of their fleeting existence? Or, on the other hand, if the harmonic transgressions so 
radically escape rational justification as well as judgment by the all-too-fallible ear, what 
then is so threatening about them in their instantaneous disappearance? The paradox 
relies on the opposition between the instantaneous and the permanent, the fleeting 
improvisations of “accented singing” and the eternal, immutable laws of the “harmonic 
institutions.” Their instantaneity, then, is perhaps what is more threatening: Artusi’s 
anxiety may not be not so much a fear against the masculinity of the institutions being 
penetrated by a feminized and barbarian sensual music. Rather, as the symptomatic 
erasure of the written shows, Artusi perhaps knows that the “Second practice,” as it will 
have been called in 1603, has already—always already—penetrated and inscribed—as 
practice, as a practice of inscription—the institutions he seeks to defend.  
At stake in Artusi’s attack on the new music is then not only a question of style or 
aesthetics but rather the affirmation and verification of the metaphysics of sovereignty—
the humanism in a strong sense—that is concomitant with the harmonic institutions he 
defends. What the phantasy of the musical event at Goretti’s and Luca’s capacity to 
memorize and transcribe the music accomplish, in addition to the omission of the words 
and the author, is to cover over the mediations necessary to ground Artusi’s attack. 
Monteverdi’s madrigals effectively circulated as written manuscripts and in this consisted 
                                                                                                                                            
See Jacques Derrida, Dissemination. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981). See also Part I of this 
dissertation, chs. 2 and 3. One further example of Artusi’s logocentrism is found in the preface to the 
Seconda parte dell’Artusi where, in addition to the already cited reference to the wandering letter of the 
Phaedrus, (see n. 13 above) he references the Seventh Letter, writing that “Di chi è che Platone Regola, e 
norma de gl’huomini sapienti imitando Pitagora disse, che non voleva publicamente dire di suo cosa 
alcuna, accioche gli pensieri suoi, non fossero soggietti al giudicio d’ogn’uno, et restassero senza difensore, 
et protettore; conoscendo sino à quei tempi quanta fosse la malignità dell’animo humano, che più tosto, 
talvolta si dovrebbe dire inhumano.” Seconda parte dell’Artusi, 3. 
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their true danger: they did not threat the musical institutions as fleeting musical events 
that could be misperceived and misjudged by casual listeners: they were inscriptions with 
their own autonomy, subject only to their own laws and prone to fall in the hands of 
anyone, as in the Socratic paradigm of the wandering letter that Artusi alludes to in the 
Seconda parte dell’Artusi (see note 13 and 50 above).47  
The paradox, then, is that Artusi’s phantasy reveals rather than obscures the 
mediations he seeks to hide: Luca’s perfect pitch imitates the writing it seeks to debase. 
Recall, finally, the setting of the dialogue (so important in Platonic dialogues): the 
interlocutors meet the day after the performance—after the fact, then, separated by the 
inexorability of time—to discuss the music “in una Camera assai remota, et da’ strepiti 
lontana, per la loro maggior comodità.”48 To say it once more, the possibility that Luca in 
fact transcribed them from memory is not at stake, but rather the rhetorical strategy by 
which Artusi intended to obscure the real threat of the new music.  
The judgments advanced by Luca and Vario constitute the signature of Artusi’s 
listening of Monteverdi, a signature that constitutes the music as repeatable and citable, 
necessarily extracting it from its context and from its addressee.49 What is more, Artusi’s 
inscription makes not only music repeatable but also constitutes listening itself as 
repeatable. This moment exemplifies musical analysis as a signed listening, as the 
communication and transmission of an experience that is presumed intimate and unique, 
that possesses a type of duration and permanence outside of the phenomenological instant 
of listening. Yet this permanence is necessarily separated from that moment of 
coincidence between the hearer and the heard: from the moment Artusi signs his 
                                                
47 Further proof that Artusi was in possession of the manuscript madrigals beyond the Goretti event is that 
he refers to them again, naming both “Cruda Amarilli” and “Era l’anima mea”—the first bars of the latter 
are even reproduced in the text—in the reply to L’Ottuso included in the Seconda parte dell’Artusi (pp. 6 
and 11), an exchange he claims occurred in 1599. Recall, also, that when “O Mirtillo” is discussed in 
L’Artusi, Luca says that he “heard a madrigal not many days ago which began on a note [corda] of the 
twelfth mode with B flat; then, if I remember it well, it was changed through B natural and became the first 
mode; and it seems to me that the words of the madrigal were ‘O Mirtillo’ by Guarini, taken from Il pastor 
fido.” L’Artusi, 48v. Trans. Carter in Fabbri, 36. 
48 L’Artusi, fol. 39. 
49 On the notion of “signing a listening,” see Peter Szendy, Listen: A History of Our Ears (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008) and Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1988). 
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listening—thus constituting it as such—it ceases to belong to him: the moments of 
production and alienation coincide, threatening the authority and sovereignty of the 
listener in the very moment of its constitution as listener.  
It was precisely by taking advantage of the iterability of the musical—the 
possibility of any inscription of being repeated and cited meaningfully outside of its 
context, a citation that threatens and transforms the “original” meaning of the event—that 
Artusi was able to isolate and present these exemplary exemplars as evidence of the 
current musical decadence of the composers in Ferrara, demonstrating, moreover, that he 
was as aware as Monteverdi was of “the power of print to establish, market, and preserve 
his works, and therefore, in some sense, himself.”50 Perhaps he was even more aware than 
the composer, at least in two counts: firstly, besides mastering possibilities of citation, 
circulation, and the play of pseudonyms, he seems to have perceived that the “power of 
print” by no means depends on the printed or on what is printable, but on the iterability of 
what comes to be inscribed in whatever form—including listening itself. Secondly, he 
mistrusts that power as a means to “preserve” anything, much less to “preserve himself”: 
insofar as a text depends on its being readable in the absence of its specific addressee and 
sender, a mark always inscribes their future absence, their death.51 Iterability is rather the 
dispersion, the dissemination, of authorship. Print less constitutes an author than de-
constitute her, exposing her to the outside, to all its possible appropriations and 
misreadings—as Artusi, channeling Plato, complains (see notes 13 and 50, above). Not 
that this mistrust would have preserved Artusi, who nevertheless went on writing as those 
he attacked began to defend themselves, so that the mistrust is evidenced more clearly in 
the constant attempt to overcome it through the very means—writing—that brings it 
about. 
                                                
50 Carter, “Musical Sources” The Cambridge Companion to Monteverdi, 20. 
51 Derrida, “Signature, Event, Context,” in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 
1985), 316. 
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DOUBLES, MASKS, AND GHOSTS (SHADOW BOXING) 
Before we examine the responses from the Monteverdi brothers, let us examine the 
various shadings in Artusi’s signature and its shadows. Two characters in the dialogues 
are entrusted with the task of defending the new music: the musical amateur Luca in 
L’Artusi, and the anonymous intellectual L’Ottuso for the Seconda Parte dell’Artusi. 
Luca speaks with familiarity of the arguments, motivations, and reasons behind the errors 
he himself brings under Vario’s consideration. His defenses, however timid, are revealing 
of the thinking of the time.52 The amateur speaks of “accented singing”—that is, 
extemporized ornaments such as appoggiaturas, rapid coloratura, and avoided notes—
which he finds attractive.53 In another passage, he alludes to contrapunto a mente (the 
practice, described by Tinctoris, of improvising counterpoint for a cantus firmus in which 
all voices are in accord with the tenor while not necessarily with each other) suggesting 
that some of the passages under examination seem to imitate the effects of this 
improvised practice.54 Besides these references to contemporary musical practice, 
however, Luca’s excuses do little to aid Monteverdi’s case, and end up prompting even 
more severe attacks by Vario.  
A more significant defense came from L’Ottuso Accademico, presumably a well-
known musician from Ferrara or Mantua who wrote in private to the priest even before 
                                                
52 Palisca “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy,” 130. 
53 These are closely analyzed Fabbri, who remarks that “is significant that the ‘moderns,’ in their search for 
expressiveness, should have availed themselves of techniques specifically associated with vocal 
performance (this also applies to Luzzaschi) as regularly used by singers as extemporized ornamentation of 
a given melodic line to underline a word, a conceit or an interjection.” Fabbri, Monteverdi, 37. Besides 
highlighting the centrality of the voice in the discussion, this passage is interesting for the desire, expressed 
by Luca, for a “universal sign” (un segno universale) by which composers could indicate to performers that 
such ornaments were to be realized. The problem, for Luca, is not that there is no way to accurately write 
and prescribe these effects, but rather that there are many ways, which thus lead to confused realizations. 
Vario’s retort effectively associates these improvisational practices with the “corruption of the senses” and 
the entire metaphysical apparatus under examination here. L’Artusi, 41v-42r. 
54 That is, as in the case with accented singing (see above), Luca describes Monteverdi’s music as capable 
of recording—inscribing—improvisation. Palisca quotes Tinctoris’s description of contrapunto a mente as 
well as Adriano Banchieri’s fascination with the effects produced by that practice, which prompted him to 
make up “a set of ten instructions for counterfeiting such counterpoints in writing. The trick, he shows, is to 
write each of the parts against the bass independently of the others.” Palisca “The Artusi-Monteverdi 
Controversy,” 133; Fabbri, 37-40. In this respect, the Banchieri text is an important document of the history 
of musical inscription in the seventeenth century. Adriano Banchieri, Cartella musicale nel canto figurato, 
fermo et contrapunto… novamente inquesta terza impresione ridotta dall’antica alla moderna pratica 
(Venice, 1614), 230. 
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L’Artusi was published in 1600.55 If Luca and Vario are the doubles of Artusi, the 
anonymous Ottuso mirrors and distorts him like the audible mask of his name distorts the 
priest’s. The identity of L’Ottuso’s ghost thus haunts the controversy, his letters inscribed 
in fragmented form within Artusi’s publications, issuing defenses which only buttress the 
attacks of the priest—who will not cease to scream at the shadow—and motivate more 
and more text, to the point of setting the terms for the eventual participation of the 
Monteverdi brothers in the controversy. He provides the fetishistic face to the material 
forces of the printing industry which effectively fueled the controversy.56 It is from this 
deliciously mimetic character that some of the most important turns of the controversy 
issued: first, as noted above (note 15), he is the first to use the expression “seconda 
pratica” in print (in his second letter, which Artusi reproduced the in Seconda parte 
dell’Artusi, 16)—even if, as the Monteverdi brothers claimed later, it belonged to the 
composer alone and it “may not be appropriated by anyone else.”57 Not only does he coin 
the banner but also voices what will have been its ideology, arguing that the new 
harmonic rules obeyed to entirely new purposes: 
                                                
55 In the Seconda parte, Artusi reports that the first anonymous letter under the pseudonym of L’Ottuso was 
given to him in Ferrara in 1599. The pun on Artusi’s name has only been alluded to in the scholarship 
around the controversy by Susan McClary, for whom “our Wagnerian hero of 1600 actually punned on his 
Hanslickian opponent’s name, twisting it to Ottuso —‘the obtuse one.’” Susan McClary, Modal 
Subjectivities: Self-Fashioning in the Italian Madrigal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). 
This assumes that L’Ottuso is either Claudio or Giulio Cesare, possibilities that Palisca already dismissed 
(as for the reasons of Palisca’s dismissals, however, these are limited in that they are advanced in terms of 
divergences of style, as if style was itself coextensive and identical with its author, especially when in the 
context of a veiled public polemic like this one). Palisca also notes that the self-derogatory form of the 
pseudonym matches others at the time, and notes also the existence of two academies named “degli Ottusi.” 
Palisca “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy,” 137. See note 15, above, especially—in this context—the 
suggestion by Harper that Ottuso hides Artusi’s name under a similar sounding inganno. For an analysis of 
the musicological and historiographical issues at stake see, in addition of Palisca, Ossi, Divining the 
Oracle, 39-57. 
56 I am referring to the suggestion by Tim Carter that behind the entire controversy might have been the 
economic interests of the two rival Venetian printers, Giacomo Vincenti (who issued all of Artusi’s books) 
and Ricciardo Amadino (who published Bottrigari’s Il Desiderio 1594—one of the earliest motivations for 
the controversy—, all the incriminating music, prefaces, and letters by Monteverdi, as well as music by 
other seconda pratica composers. In fact, as Carter writes, “The reticence of the chief duelists, and the use 
of (real or imaginary) seconds, gives a curious impression of shadow boxing; the only names that 
constantly recur are those of the printers emblazoned on the title pages of these various treatises and music 
prints.” Carter, “The Poetics of Modern Music,” 177. 
57 In the Letter of 1605. I examine this text below. Strunk, Sources, 410. 
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This being a new song [modulatione], it finds with its novelty new concenti, and 
new affetti, and without leaving reason in any way, it nevertheless departs in a 
certain way from some of the ancient traditions of some excellent musicians.58 
L’Ottuso, whoever he was, set the terms for the musical aesthetics of the coming years by 
making an identification that, to judge by Artusi’s resistance, was entirely unheard of in 
1599. As the analyses of Palisca and Ossi show, by proposing that novelty in concenti 
had as its consequence novelty in affetti, and that the search for both was the purpose of 
the new music, L’Ottuso wholly redefined the meaning of affetti as it had been used in 
the sixteenth century. From this moment on, we are in the terrain of the modern “theory 
of the affections.” This is effectively a redistribution, the identification and regulation of 
a certain relation between a sonorous event (“concenti,” which for L’Ottuso means, in 
Palisca’s translation “consensus” or more loosely, “harmonic combination”) and a certain 
transformation in the listener—that ranges from the physiological to the psychological 
and the moral—called an affetto. In fact, this redistribution involves posing a new notion 
of the “listener” as subject—subiectum, the underlying and self-identical substance of 
transient affections—and not the judge, the “all-seeing eye” that verifies that the rules of 
counterpoint are followed correctly. Sound, in this model, is not a substance (composed 
of matter and form), but a force, a means by which an effect can—and must—be 
produced. This relation, which comes to be interpreted as that of cause and effect 
(concenti produce affetti) is by no means straightforward, and in the critical reading we 
are attempting here it should be seen more as a result, a product, than a departure point.  
Diverse forms of mimesis produce these distributions. The distance between 
Artusi and L’Ottuso is not that between a conservative and a progressive but rather that 
created by the transformations that changing notions of mimesis produce in all the terms 
involved in the relation. This is the period, in fact, the moment, when a transition that is 
now taken as commonplace and straightforwardly descriptive occurred, the passage from 
a presumed injunction in Renaissance music to express the affections, affectus exprimere, 
                                                
58 Essendo questa modulatione nova, per ritrovare con la novità sua novi concenti, et novi affetti, ne 
discontandosi in niuna parte dalla ragione, se bene s’allontana in un certo modo dalle antiche traditioni 
d’alcuni eccellenti Musici. Seconda parte dell’Artusi, 6. Translation in Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 39. 
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to arouse them, to “move the affections,” affectus movere.59 We take it for granted that 
music “moves” or “affects” us, and we equate “affection” with our contemporary 
emotions, entirely used to as we are to the results of a long history of which Ottuso’s 
letter is only one—however crucial—chapter. 
                                                
59 Dietrich Bartel, Musica Poetica: Musical-Rhetorical Figures in German Baroque Music (Lincoln and 
London: U. of Nebraska Press, 1997), 32. For a survey of authors writing on the relation between music 
and the affections see Palisca, Music and Ideas, 179-202; for the continuation of this tradition into 1650, 
analyzed from the perspective of affect theory, see chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SIGNOR &C: AUTHORSHIP, INSCRIPTION, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
SECONDA PRATTICA 
 
IMITATIO, EMULATIO, AND NEW AFETTI  
This is also the history of the return and further repression of mimesis in the history of 
music theory, a history that is inseparable from the history of humanism in a weak 
sense—the revival of ancient philosophy, literature, and arts—and in a strong sense—the 
determination of the humanitas of man with regard to an already established 
metaphysical interpretation of nature, history, world, and of beings as a whole.1 In both 
senses, mimesis is the unthought ground by which this humanism is made possible. The 
fascination of Italian “humanists” with the accounts of the power of music over human 
feelings and its capacity to shape moral character—mainly those in Plato’s Republic and 
Aristotle’s Politics—is mimetic: it identifies them as models for something that is or is 
not reproduced in their own time. The erection of the ancient Greek and Roman worlds as 
moral, political, and artistic paradigms to which the Renaissance humanists looked up to, 
produced a rigorous and long lasting notion of mimesis—translated as imitatio and more 
specifically as aemulatio—a “poetics” in which the purpose of art was to attain the 
greatness of that unique moment of artistic perfection, as in the models advanced by 
Vasari and Zarlino.2 As educational practice, Ciceronian emulatio was conceived as the 
                                                
1 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism’” in Pathmarks, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
245. 
2 Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (New York: New American Library, 1960), 
145; Schrade, Monteverdi, 34. See note 18 above. The mimetic dimension of the self-fashioning of Italian 
humanism is also, in Terry Pinkard’s reading, the running thread of Hegel’s analysis of early modern 
Europe—in the “Bildung” chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit—where it is trough culture (Bildung) 
that the individual acquires actuality (Wirklichkeit) through the sublation (Aufhebung) of its “natural self.” 
This process is mimetic in two ways: first, it involves the positing of the Roman world as a model to be 
imitated, and specifically the conceptualization of Bildung as a self-fashiong determined by “types.” As 
Pinkard writes, “to remain in the state of one’s ‘natural self’ was to be ‘base’; to become an aristocrat was 
therefore to alienate oneself into becoming that type of person who is ‘truly’ noble.” Terry P. Pinkard, 
Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), 151. 
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imitation of authors who had already demonstrated their mastery, as well the attempt to 
further surpass them.3 Artusi references this very tradition in several places, for example 
when writing that innovation should not trump imitation, “massime di quelli, che sono 
eccellenti cosi dice Quintiliano nel Libro Decimo.”4 In the case of music, however, the 
fascination with ancient perfection—in the absence of anything that could be recognized 
as “music”—was mostly focused on understanding and accounting for what appeared as 
the almost miraculous power of music, in combination with the attempt to unearth and 
decipher the few scattered, fragmented, and contradictory ancient writings on music they 
could find.5 
Besides the mimesis of aemulatio, however, the fascination with the effects of 
music, especially in Plato’s model, puts mimesis in a central place, where it remained out 
of sight for centuries. As this dissertation argues, the account of mimesis and mousikē in 
book 3 of the Republic is all but straightforward.6 Palisca has noted how Ficino’s 
                                                                                                                                            
This analysis of the “tornness” (Zerrissenheit) of European modernity is carried to its last—comically 
mimetic—consequences in Rameau’s Nephew, addressed in Part IV of this dissertation. See also John 
Hamilton, Music, Madness, and the Unworking of Language, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2008), 107-120. 
3 Thus Artusi writes that Josquin, Clemens non Papa, Willaert and De Rore are themselves models of 
imitation, “Non sono questi imitati da tanti, e tanti? Non s’attende adunque alla imitatione in questa 
facoltà? Alcuni imitano il Palestina [sic], altri Cipriano, altri il Porta, altri il Gabrielli.” Seconda Parte 
dell’Artusi, 42. For Zarlino, in turn, the composer must “emulate nature—and with it all that nature stands 
alongside in the unbroken continuum of all things (history, scientia, etc.)—which fuels the engagement of 
the Institutioni with musica prattica.” Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 44. As is 
well known, Zarlino’s non plus ultra model for imitation is Willaert, he elevates the composer to the level 
of paradigm, such that the purpose of music theory, as a whole, can be understood as a mimetic mechanism 
for the production of such paradigms, of exemplary models worthy of imitation, and of the codification of 
the means of imitating these models. For imitatio and aemulatio in literature and poetry during the 
Renaissance see Luiz Costa Lima, Control of the Imaginary: Reason and Imagination in Modern Times 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis: 
Culture, Art, Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 62-88; G. W. Pigman III, “Versions 
of Imitation in the Renaissance,” Renaissance Quarterly (33:1, 1980), 1-32. 
4 Seconda parte dell’Artusi, 42. 
5 Palisca, Music and Ideas, 3-12. 
6 The relation between music and mimesis in ancient Greek thought up to Plato is explored at depth in Part 
I of this dissertation. The classic work on music in Plato is Evanghélos Moutsopoulos, la musique dans 
l’œuvre de Platon; See also Edward Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1964). For a more recent account, see Francesco Pelosi, Plato on Music, Soul and Body, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). The relation between mimesis and music has been 
recently addressed in Séline Gülgönen “La Mimesis Musicale Dans Les Dialogues Platoniciens.” Phoenix 
68.1/2 (2014): 97–111; for mimesis in Plato in general, see Gebauer and Wulf, Mimesis, 31-52 and Stephen 
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translation of Plato and the lack of technical texts on music misled sixteenth-century 
readers—from Zarlino to Caccini and Monteverdi—into assuming that melos, harmonía 
and logos stood simply for melody, harmony, and text in the modern sense, thus leading 
them to affirm the primacy of the word over music.7  
This, however, is not the only problem with the reception of the Platonic account 
of the nature of music, specifically in the politico-philosophical context of the Republic. 
In my reading, the passage is determinately obscure, as it relies on a performance of 
Socratic ignorance that affirms the powerful capacities of music only to deny any further 
logical knowledge of them. In doing so, he establishes a specific relation between music 
and law, mousikē and nomos, which is precisely what is at stake in L’Ottuso’s 
intervention. It bears clarifying that, although sixteenth-century readers did not read in 
the same way as we do today, a text like the Republic produces problems of interpretation 
that go beyond the issues of translation remarked by Palisca. Sure enough, they are 
problems of translation, in which the distance that separates readers gives the text a 
certain kind of agency that exceeds the intentions of authors involved in their translation 
and reading. Thus, as argued in Part 1 of this dissertation, it is only by attending to this 
history, to its historiography, explicit or under erasure, that we can know anything about 
mimesis. Lacking any self-identity and any originality, lacking any origin, any arche, and 
therefore any telos, mimesis is not outside the history that attempts to bind it and write it 
down. That is why we must engage mimesis as a historical matter, through its historicity. 
The strategy is not quite straightforward but it results from the “nature” of its object: 
mimesis is unoriginal, anarchic. It appears and disappears from our sources. It even sets 
the rules for its own disappearance. 
As we saw in chapter 2 when examining the famous passage in book 3 of the 
Republic—which Monteverdi will later quote in his Lettera—music, for Plato, or more 
precisely melos “is composed of three things: speech [logos—translated as oratione by 
                                                                                                                                            
Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2009. 
7 Palisca, Music and Ideas, 5; Palisca, “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy”, 154-155. 
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Ficino], harmonic mode [harmonía, harmonia], and rhythm [ruthmos, rhythmo].”8 Yet, as 
I pointed out—and this is the crux of the matter—there seems to be an asymmetry 
between the regulation of logos and the regulations of harmonic mode and rhythm: if the 
myths are appropriate there would be no need for further regulation, but in continuing to 
discuss the “musical” modes independently, Socrates and his interlocutors point to a 
mimetic ambiguity in the musical elements: musical elements are supposed to imitate, 
correspond, or incite mimetic behavior in its listeners, but it is entirely unclear how this is 
so. 
As we saw, at stake was the regulation of a multiplicity and multifariousness for 
which the aulos was the paradigm. The status of the aulos as irrational, opposed to all 
logos, “many-headed,” and even barbarian, is summed up in Socrates’s remark as they go 
about purging the city from everything excessive and immoderate: “We certainly aren’t 
doing anything new in preferring Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his” (399c). 
In its place, we found a codification of ethos that operated as an inscription upon 
the soul, the body and the community: all three had a similar structure that came to be 
regulated by a mathematical paradigm, the transcendent order of the Timaeus, which had 
to be preserved in the community. The guardians had the task of avoiding alterations—
changes, tropes—in music since they would also transform the laws: “they must beware 
of change to a strange form of music, taking it to be a danger to the whole. For never are 
the ways of music (mousikēs tropon) moved (kinountai) without the greatest political 
laws (politikon nomon) being moved, as Damon says, and I am persuaded.” (424c). In 
other words, it is by making musical songs as mimesis of ethē, thus as repetitions of 
them, that they become laws, preserving and inscribing the nature and social conditions 
of the community. 
 
                                                
8 Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato. (New York: Basic Books, 1968). 398c. Henceforth I will cite this 
translation using inline Stephanus pagination. For the translation of these terms by Ficino and their 
consequences for sixteenth-century humanist music theory (with their “scant comprehension of Greek 
music”) see Palisca, Music and Ideas, 3-4 and 154-155. I return to Monteverdi’s interpretation of this 
passage below. 
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When these texts are taken up in the context of a mimetic humanism in the Renaissance, 
the multiple layers and complex modes of operation produce real problems of translation. 
Especially in the tradition that sought to revive neo-Platonicism as a form of natural 
science, as magic. Ficino’s translation of Plato and his commentary on the Timaeus 
would have been cited by all the parties involved in the controversy, infusing the 
discussion with a cosmological metaphysics in which the powers of music were of central 
importance.9 This tradition would produce a “philosophy” or even a “metaphysics” of 
music out of what in Plato was in fact the philosophical regulation of the place and 
functions of the members of the State and the articulation of the mechanisms for its 
production and preservation—either as an actual political project or as a dissertation on 
the nature of man and the role of philosophy. 
Furthermore, mimesis—which in Plato is multifarious, all-pervasive, and ever in 
need of control—would disappear in the Renaissance under what has been called a 
continuous fulcrum of similarities.10 In Foucault’s well-known reading of the 
Renaissance, mimesis forms a homogeneous ground of similarities and correspondences 
that are discovered through hermeneutics and manipulated by magic. As Jairo Moreno 
has shown, the Foucauldian description of this episteme neatly accounts for Zarlino’s 
system. The taxonomy of correspondences (convenientia, aemulatio, analogia, and 
sympatia) explains Zarlino’s retelling of the doctrine of musica mundana and uniquely 
clarifies that which allows Zarlino to theorize and justify the expansion of the 
Pythagorean consonances to account for thirds and sixths in contemporary musical 
practice by advancing the notion of the numero Senario.11 
The binding power of correspondences also accounts for Zarlino’s elaboration of 
the affective power of music as presented in chapters 4-9 of the Istitutioni, one of the 
most important attempts to face the troubling absence of the miraculous effects of music 
                                                
9 On Ficino’s philosophy of music, see Jacomien Prins, Echoes of an Invisible World: Marsilio Ficino and 
Francesco Patrizi on Cosmic Order and Music Theory (Leiden: Brill, 2015) and Gary Tomlinson, Music in 
Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
10 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2002). 
11 Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 30-38. 
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during the Renaissance.12 The rhetoric of this engagement is also paradigmatic: at stake is 
the question of why modern music cannot reproduce the same effects as ancient music 
did.13 Zarlino’s discussion of ancient Greek music is significant in many respects. 
Emphasizing the point that ancient music differs in multiple ways from that of the 
ancients, he gives a vivid account of the performative practice of ancient Greek music 
that is not far from some of Eric Havelock’s descriptions of mousikē.14 It can also be 
described, as is done in chapter 2 with respect to Havelock’s account, as a general 
acoustic assemblage of inscription.15 In Zarlino’s account, ancient Greek music, or 
mousikē, is too a rhythmically-organized physiological, affective, linguistic, and sonorous 
performance aiming to preserve and transmit, in short to compose, the customs, mores, 
and laws of the community, its ethos and nomoi.16 
                                                
12 In part II of the Istitutioni, Zarlino in fact paraphrases the pseudo-Aristotelean Problema XIX.28 quoted 
in chapter 2, (above) which explains that the musical form was called nomos because before people 
“learned writing they sang their laws” Andrew Barker, Greek Musical Writings, vol. 1. The Musician and 
his Art (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 198 (see note 52). Zarlino: “Et cosi 
con tai numeri, percussioni, modi, et concenti; et con la voce humana, esprimevano materie convenevoli et 
buoni costumi. Nominarono poi tali determinationi Leggi: imperoche altro non è Legge nella Musica, che 
un modo di cantare, il qual contiene in se un determinato concento et un determinato Rithmo, et metro. Et 
fuorono cosi chiamate: perchioche non era lecito ad alcuno di mutare, overo innovare in esse alcuna cosa, si 
nelle harmonie, come etiandio ne i Rithmi, et Metri; ancora che siano alcuni, che dicano, che si ciamavano 
Leggi: imperoche avanti che si scivessero le Leggi civili, si cantavano tal Leggi in versi al suono della Lira, 
o Cettera, accioche i popoli più facilmente ritenessero nella memoria quello, che dovessero osservare.” 
Gioseffo Zarlino, Istitutioni harmoniche, (Venice: 1558; repr. New York, Broude, 1965), 66. Zarlino’s 
reference for this passage is pseudo-Plutarch’s De Musica, which he paraphrases at length. De Musica was 
translated by Carlo Valgulio in 1497, who believed it was by Plutarch. Palisca, Music and Ideas, 6. The 
actual author and date of De Musica are unknown, see Barker, Greek Musical Writings, 205. 
13 A question that would be repeated by Girolamo Mei, Vincenzo Galilei, Giulio Caccini, and even by 
Athanasius Kircher, whose account is closely modeled on Zarlino’s. See chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
14 Eric A. Havelock Preface to Plato (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1963). See chapters 1 and 2 of this 
dissertation. 
15 On the notion of “acoustic assemblages” see Gautier, Aurality, 22. For various approaches within 
classical studies to the notion of mousikē, see Murray and Wilson, eds.; Mousikè et Aretè: La Musique et 
L’éthique, de L’antiquité à L’âge Moderne: Actes Du Colloque International Tenu En Sorbonne Les 15-17 
Décembre 2003, (Florence Malhomme and Anne Gabrièle Wersinger (eds.) Paris: J. Vrin, 2007). 
16 For an adaptation of the concept of “musicking” to a broader sense of practices that includes that of 
mousikē, Gary Tomlinson, A Million Years of Music: The Emergence of Human Modernity. (New York: 
Zone Books, 2015). On the “ethos theory,” see Warren Anderson, Ethos and Education in Greek Music: the 
Evidence of Poetry and Philosophy, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1966); Wallace, “Damon 
of Oa,” and Peter Wilson, “Athenian Strings” in Murray and Wilson, eds., 259, 292. 
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Zarlino’s physiological account of the dynamics of musical affection also relies 
on the Ficinian account and thus traces accurately the pleats within the Renaissance 
episteme. As Ossi explains, emotions depend on the variations on temperature (hot or 
cold) and humidity (wet or dry) in the corporeal and organic sensorial appetite. These 
elements may be changed through specific harmonies to which they correspond, “as a 
result of the similarity between these passions and certain Harmonies.”17 The Phrygian 
excites anger (characterized by heat and wetness), the Mixolydian produces sadness, 
while the Dorian mediates between the two.  
When analyzing how, specifically, the miraculous effects of ancient music can be 
obtained, as Ossi shows, Zarlino sets up a fourfold set of requirements. These are the 
three elements that compose melodia, that is, harmony (of sounds or the voice), rhythm 
(numero or metro), and text (“oratione, overo il parlare”), plus a “sogetto ben disposto,” 
a well-disposed subject capable of receiving the affections.18 Zarlino presents them in 
additive form: no one will be moved by a simple harmony that does not express anything; 
the listener will find pleasure in the proportions, but he won’t be moved unless he is pre-
disposed to happiness or sadness. But if rhythm is added to harmony, it suddenly gains 
great strength and moves the soul (“subito piglia gran forza, et muove l’animo”), as it 
happens with dance.19 Words come next: 
Adding then to these two things the text [la Oratione, cioe il Parlare], which 
expresses mores by means of narration of some story or fiction, it is impossible to 
express how great is the force of these three things combined.20 
Words then add something entirely lacking in harmony and rhythm. The structure is the 
same as the passage in Plato’s Republic quoted above where harmonia and rhutmos add 
nothing to logos that can be determined as content, but only a multifarious multiplicity 
                                                
17 Zarlino, Istitutioni, 70. Translation in Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 52. 
18 Artusi makes reference to this passage, especially to a “soggietto secondo ch’egli è disposto à ricevere 
cotali passione.” Seconda Parte dell’Artusi, 31. In the same passage, he argues that the similar has effects 
on the similar, the natural upon the natural, so that artificial harmonies cannot have natural effects. 
19 Giulio Cesare Monteverdi, on his part, quotes this passage in the Dichiaratione. Monteverdi, Lettere, 
dediche e prefazioni, 401. 
20 “Aggiungendo poi a queste due cose la Oratione, cioe il Parlare, il quale esprima costumi col mezo della 
narratione di alcuna historia o favola; è impossibile di poter dire quanta sia la forza di queste tre cose 
aggiunte insieme” Zarlino, Istitutioni, 71. 
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and heterogeneity that must be regulated. They constitute a mimetic supplement that, 
while adding nothing, complicates everything. Zarlino’s inversion ([harmony+rhythm] + 
text, instead of text + [harmony+rhythm]) changes nothing yet underscores the 
problematic supplementarity of the whole structure: wherever you begin there is an 
imbalance between what is added and what is essential, yet the addition of the inessential 
is always somehow necessary. The reference to “costumi,” ethos, makes everything 
clearer: it conceives of the narrative (“alcuna historia o favole”) as the medium (“col 
mezzo”) for adding the supplement that is truly essential, the inscription of ethos. As 
Zarlino writes, in fact, it is impossible express how great is the force of these three things 
combined. 
At this point, it is clear, we are not dealing with “affect” in any emotional sense. It 
is, rather, everywhere political—and Zarlino makes no attempt to hide this fact.21 The 
example of Alexander the Great, moved to war through music by Timotheus (a classic 
example, also quoted by Galilei and Kircher, recounted in the Sudas), introduced to 
consider the necessity of the sogetto ben disposto (here—and only here—Zarlino calls 
him the listener, “l’Uditore”) drives the point home: to be moved to laugher or weeping is 
never at stake. To be moved is to be moved to action, political action.  
As Moreno writes, this is the only appearance of the listener in Zarlino. The 
Institutioni is otherwise lacking, insofar as “there is no conception of a ‘listener’ as a 
discrete cognitive locus separate from objects of perception.”22 Moreno locates in this 
fleeting listener the anchoring point of the ideological nature of Zarlino’s Institutioni: 
under the criteria of objectivity and rationality it invests a particular musical practice with 
                                                
21 Not, that is, as the biological or psychic states that are commonly understood as emotions. I elaborate on 
the difference between affect and emotion and its consequences for seventeenth-century musical thought in 
the following chapter. Ossi further refers to the Sopplimenti musicali (Venice, 1583; repr. Gregg Press, 
1966) where Zarlino defines the ancient “Affettioni ò Costumi” as ethos and divides them, presumably 
following Aristides Quintilianus, into sustalktikon, hesuchastikon, and hexukastikon. These presumably 
correspond to Quintilianus’s systaltic, hesykastic, and diastaltic but Zarlino corrupts the terms. See Barbara 
Russano Hanning, “Monteverdi’s Three Genera” in Musical Humanism and its Legacy, Nancy Kovaleff 
Baker, and Barbara Russano Hanning, eds., 154ff. esp. 164 n. 41. Ossi rightly remarks that these ēthē 
correspond to Ciceronian rhetoric and further remarks that “they are not the passions themselves” but rather 
“the means by which human emotions may be ‘directed and known.’” Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 53. 
22 Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 45. 
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mythical values of immanence and universality aiming to sociopolitically legitimate 
Venetian musical practice, embodied in Willaert: at the same time Ciceronian model and 
redemptive figure.23  
The theorist, moreover, occupies a complex subject position: he is not a purely 
rational subject nor a subject of affections, he is the “anchoring point” of a sociopolitical 
structure. This is the same position that Artusi’s Luca occupies, and which motivates the 
phantasy of the musical serata: the theorist is under the political injunction to defend the 
musical institutions because these effectuate a suture between the mythical “ever” and the 
immediate “now,” which seamlessly infuses the present with the past and projects its 
survival into the future as well.24  
Well-established notions of imitatio and aemulatio are taken up with renewed 
strength at the historical juncture of the Italian Renaissance because they work towards 
accomplishing this goal. The injunction that the artist must imitate the ancient models is 
directed towards the production of the figure of the composer worthy of imitation—in 
line with the Ciceronian educational model remarked above—and this production has an 
entirely patriarchal structure.25 By claiming to be imitating a certain author, artists 
inscribe themselves as this author’s descendants (the beneficiaries, in Moreno’s reading 
of Zarlino): they participate in a filiation that serves to preserve value and authority in an 
unmediated, pure transmission from male to male (or even to female, who nevertheless 
must claim a male model). Erasmus’s image of imitatio as a birth from one’s head, like 
                                                
23 Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 44. See also Martha Feldman, City Culture and 
the Madrigal at Venice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). As the following chapter argues, 
this aspect of Zarlino’s theory will be the locus of a significant reinterpretation by Kircher, which 
effectively marks the onset of a modern conception of the listener in a different but complementary way 
than the one produced by Descartes, as shown by Moreno. 
24 Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 44. 
25 As Gebauer and Wulf remark following Luiz Costa Lima, however, is that imitatio is not to be taken 
simply as “a call for similarity to a model…[Rather] What is being required of those who exercise power 
over symbols is a formal commitment. The demand is made in the name of antiquity and truth, in the 
interest, not of the exercise of power to the advantage of individuals, but of supporting the social order and 
the universality of knowledge-bearing institutions.” Gebauer and Wulf, Mimesis, 87. 
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Juno being born from Jupiter, is only one of the most well-known images of the 
patriarchal logic of Renaissance imitatio.26 
This is the most widespread form of the mimetic production of originals during 
the Renaissance: not so much aimed at producing veridical copies, mimesis is concerned 
with determining who, and under what conditions, is a model of imitation—and what 
counts as a successful imitation, or alternatively, what are the consequences of a 
wrongful imitation. Such a model possesses an infinite reproducibility value, the 
guarantee that all the copies made thereof will be valuable of it as copies, whereas 
compositions that do not follow a model, or which seek to improve upon them in ways 
not considered viable—in short, “novelties”—appear as useless. This derivation ensures 
that they belong in the institutions, that they are rational. Furthermore, this value also 
takes a moral form expressed as the respect owed to the ancients, and so on. Thus, when 
L’Ottuso writes to Artusi that invention is better than imitation, Artusi replies that,  
As to the observation of the mores (i.e. the so-called ‘rules’ [or ‘laws’]), and those 
first principles that are taught in music as hypotheses [per suppositi], he himself 
[L’Ottuso] agrees when I say they were in good custody, when he demonstrates 
those mores that he adopted against nature. The judicious reader will draw the 
conclusions, being true that every artist strives to imitate nature, (although what is 
good about this I do not want to say for now). The despise for the things of the 
Ancients (as he calls them) about the imitation of things, demonstrates how 
confused is his judgement in believing to be more advanced. And he tells the truth 
without any contradiction left in his confusion, in the ugliness of the style, in the 
bad grace of the voice leading.27 
                                                
26 Pigman, “Versions of Imitation in the Renaissance,” 9. The “origin” of this logic, as shown above, is 
precisely Plato, which thus authorizes—makes possible, and effective—above all the defense of the 
Monteverdi brothers. 
27 “Quanto alla osservatione delle tradittioni, che cosi si compiace di nominare le regole, e quei primi 
principii, che s’insegnano per suppositi nella Musica; quanto dico essi ne siano stati buoni custodi egli 
istesso lo confessa, quando dimostra quelle tradittioni da lui adoprate contra la natura; tiri adunque il 
giudicioso Lettore la consequenza, essendo vero che ogni Artifice si sforza d’imitare la natura; ma quello 
che ci sia di buono voglio tacerlo per hora. Il disprezzo poi che fa delle cose de gli Antichi cosi da lui detti 
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Crucial to the functioning of the Renaissance episteme—and preserved effectively in 
imitatio as the only form of mimesis clearly visible and audible in the musical surface—is 
that there is nothing “new,” only things to be discovered as always already having been 
there (thus Zarlino’s Willaert as the suture of past, present, and future). In Foucault’s 
words, it is by means of the interplay of sympathy and antipathy—these fundamental yet 
restricted forms of mimesis—that “the world remains identical; resemblances continue to 
be what they are, and to resemble one another. The same remains the same, riveted onto 
itself.”28 A saying quoted at the beginning of the Seconda parte dell’Artusi captures this: 
“Chi lascia la via vecchia per la nova, spesso ingannato si ritrova.”29 More pointedly, 
however, Artusi lays out the role of imitatio in preserving the identity of the same when 
he writes that, even if L’Ottuso references Aristotle’s “Ars imitatur naturam,” 
Because he says that in this way you do not have to conform to the imitation of 
the Ancients, as if they did not make artificial counterpoints, and to many who 
have given light to all the rest of us and who are worthy of being imitated. [Think 
of] Josquin, Iouan Motton, [Jacob] Clemens non Papa, Adriano [Willaert], and 
Cipriano [de Rore], who were the fathers of the modern way of composing. And 
what kind of artificial counterpoints made by the Moderns was not already found 
and invented by the aforementioned?30 
The seamless thread produced by similarities, antipathies, and analogies hides the 
productive force mimesis. By assuming that the correspondences are everywhere present 
                                                                                                                                            
intorno alla imitatione delle cose loro, dimostra quanto il giudicio suo confuso sia, che si pensa d’avanzarli; 
et dice il vero, che senza alcuna contradittione, gli avanza nella confusione; nella brutezza dello stile; nella 
mala gratia delle modulationi delle parti.” Seconda Parte dell’Artusi, 41. 
28 Foucault, The Order of Things, 25. 
29 Seconda Parte dell’Artusi, 4. This could be translated as: that who leaves the old way for the new, would 
find himself fooled all the same. 
30 “perche dice, che in questa facoltà non si ha da attendere alla imitatione de gl’Antichi, quasi che non 
habbino osservato di fare de Contraponti artificiosi, et tanti, che hanno dato lume à noi altri tutti, et sono 
degni d’essere imitati. Quel Iosquino, Giovanni Mautone, Clemens non Papa, Adriano, et Cipriano, che 
sono stati li padri del modo di componere moderno: et qual sorte de contraponti artificiosi si ritrovano da 
Moderni fatti, che dalli sodetti non si astato primari trovato, e inventato?” Seconda Parte dell’Artusi, 42. It 
is true that this is not one of Artusi’s strongest arguments: by saying that all “contraponti artificiosi” of the 
Moderns have been found and invented by his canon of composers, isn’t he entirely contradicting himself? 
He goes on to say, moreover, that imitation is everywhere: or are not all of these composers constantly 
imitated? Does not one speak of a madrigal made “alla Ciprianesca,” or “alla Palestrinesca”? 
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and only in need of interpretation, mimesis is rendered powerless–or better, inactive. A 
continuous structure, without time or history, is held together by macro and microcosmic 
correspondences and expressed again and again through musical compositions that pin 
down this order upon the figures, the models, of those composers sanctioned by tradition.  
And yet, two non-coincidental absences mark—and threaten—the seamless thread 
of the Renaissance episteme: the subject and mimesis. Each of these points to each 
other’s absence, each of them de-sists underneath it.31 The affective (or rather, affected) 
listener, the subject of the new mimetic effects, appears as the crucial suture in the 
otherwise continuous “fulcrum of similarities”—the missing spot that joins knowledge 
and power—and her all-but fleeting absence in Zarlino shows its frail place, her absence 
masked by the prominence of the models. In fact, we could conceive of the entire 
structure as a means to hide its scandalous absence if this did not imply projecting a latter 
formation into an episteme defined precisely by this absence. But this is precisely why it 
is important to consider it as a lack—and to locate it through figures of absences like 
L’Ottuso, which begin to demarcate the fault-lines of these formations.32 
When L’Ottuso writes to Artusi that the purpose of the new music is to find “new 
concenti and new affetti,” he makes the whole Zarlinian structure collapse with a single 
blow. Artusi’s responses to L’Ottuso everywhere evidence this epistemic dissonance. In 
his response to the first letter, for example, he concedes that the “modulatione” might be 
                                                
31 By “desistance”, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida aim to show the way in which the subject is 
“(de)constituted,” that is, neither constituted for and by himself as an autonomous subject nor entirely the 
product of an an Other, the imaginary, or a social context. As Derrida writes, “Should one then say that 
subjectivity consists in such a desistance? No, that’s just the point—what is involved here is the 
impossibility of consisting, a singular impossibility: something entirely different from a lack of consistency. 
Something more in the way of a “(de)constitution.” Jacques Derrida, “Introduction: Desistance” in Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 
1989), 5. A subject that de-sists is one that exists by being de-constituted, and mimesis, which is not one, 
which is not identical to itself nor to anything else, seems to be involved in this paradoxical operation, 
which Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe read as a “rhythmo-typy”, a repercussion, resonance, echo, 
reverberation, by which the subject is “deconstituted…A rhythm collects us and divides us in the 
prescription of a character [tupos, but also ethos, DVV.].” I seek here to elaborate on the notion of 
desistance beyond this rigorously philosophical understanding of “rhythm.” See Lacoue-Labarthe, 
Typography, 31 and passim. 
32 For the place of subjectivity in the context of imitatio, see Gebauer and Wulf, 85-88; Luis Costa Lima, 
“On Mimesis and the Control of the Imaginary,” Culture, Theory and Critique (54:2, 2013) 145-165. 
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new since the compositions are new, which doesn’t mean, however, that they make new 
“concenti,” as concenti must always produce “an infinite sweetness in the ear,” that is, 
they must be consonant—the difference between consonance and dissonance being “by 
nature.”33 In Palisca’s paraphrase: “Indeed, no new concenti are possible, because the 
number of consonances is limited. So no new affections can be expressed by them.”34 The 
“hermeneutic” reason for this disagreement is that Artusi conceives of the musical 
science of Zarlino as an ars perfecta, having attained a state beyond improvement. 
L’Ottuso, however, writes that new concenti produce a new “affetto, that is to say a 
desire” for new concenti. In Ossi’s reading, this constitutes an emancipation of desire as 
“an independent agent capable of operating in the pursuit of sensual pleasure, the very 
antithesis of reason.”35 The “archeological” reason, on the other hand, might be that the 
Renaissance episteme must necessarily disavow the possibility of anything new being 
introduced in the already seamless weave—the text—of similarities in which concenti 
and affetti are already intertwined through the correspondences that mark and locate them 
(anger as hot and wet and produced by the Phrygian mode, etc.). If this thread is broken 
by L’Ottuso it is not so much by the emancipation of “desire” but by the identification, 
through desire, of the subject that lacks, that de-sists, beneath the unbroken fulcrum. 
When Artusi realizes this absence he acts out, invoking the ghosts of Zarlino and 
Willaert—masks upon masks—which might still preserve the cosmos and save him from 
madness. 
 If L’Ottuso—keep in mind: an anonymous person, a faceless persona, another 
mask—points to the lack of true anchoring in the Zarlinian cosmos by invoking a desiring 
                                                
33 Attacking the seventh at the opening of “Era L’Anima Mia,” Artusi writes: “ma non fa già, che se 
gl’estremi suoni sono dissonanti, per questo habbino da consonare, et dilettare; perche quella cosa, che per 
natura sua è tale; sempre sarà tale; et se la consonanza sarà soave, sarà sempre per natura soave, ne in modo 
alcuno potrà V.S fare che non sia tale. Si come la dissonanza essendo dissonante, no potrà V.S. fare di 
modo, che sia consonante, essendo per natura sua dissonante.” Seconda parte dell’Artusi, 8. A further 
argument, which Artusi presents in a passage that simulates the month elapsed between his response to 
L’Ottuso and the latter’s second letter, argues—using Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Physics—that since not 
only consonances and dissonances are different but they are contrary, and that it is impossible for contraries 
to coexist, then it follows that they do not produce any new concenti, leaving the ear in utter confusion. 
Seconda Parte dell’Artusi, 12. 
34 Palisca, “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy,” 140. 
35 Idem. 
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listener and a composer capable of creating novelty, he must also rebind the mimetic 
forces that the fulcrum of correspondences kept in place. It is Artusi, in his reply to the 
first letter, who challenges L’Ottuso to point out the new role imitation will have in a 
cosmos that knows no novelty. This brings to the fore the issue of mimesis in the 
controversy, which escalates quickly:  
That Signor &c. [Monteverdi] wants to distance himself somehow from the 
ancient traditions of some excellent musicians, I don't know who are these that 
you call the excellent Ancient masters; and which are those traditions, how and in 
which part he distances from those, and for what reason, he should say, so that we 
will see in detail how little esteem should be had for these novelties, that without 
any authority from the old masters, and without demonstration are introduced, 
damaging and ruining the good and beauty of the Music. Which sculptor, which 
painter, which poet, orator is that who does not try to imitate as much as he can 
the Ancient masters, who are excellent? Except for Signor &c.36  
L’Ottuso replies with a pithy claim that is typical of the statements demarcating the 
Ancients from the Moderns in accounts of the Querelle des anciens et des modernes in 
seventeenth-century France:37 
In these madrigals, Signor &c. has made a particular effort in this direction, since 
in Music novelty is more valued than the other, especially since in this field there 
is no need to follow the Ancients, there being ample opportunity for progress 
through invention and this new modulation [part-movement].38 
                                                
36 “Che il Signor &c. [that is, Monteverdi] s’allontani in un certo modo da le antiche traditioni d’alcuni 
eccellenti Musici, non sò quali siano questi che lei chiama eccellenti Musici antichi; et quali siano queste 
tradittioni, come, et in quali cose egli s’allontani, et per qual ragione egli cosi s’allontani, dicalo V.S che à 
parte per parte vedremo in quanta poca stima si debba havere queste novità, che senza autorità de vecchi, e 
senza la demostratione sonno introdotte, guastando, e rovinando il buono, e’l bello della Musica. Ma qual 
Scultore, qual Pittore, qual Poeta, Oratore è quello che non cerca di imitare più che puote gl’antichi, che 
sono stati eccellenti? eccetto il Signor &c.” Seconda Parte dell’Artusi, 11. Emphasis mine. 
37 Cf. Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1995), ch. 9. 
38 “In questi suoi Madrigali esso Signor, &c. si ha fatta particolare professione, come che nella Musica 
questa sii di gran lunga più lodata di quella, oltra che in questa facoltà non s’ha d’attendere alla imitatione 
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But earlier on, and only in passing, L’Ottuso makes the identification that will be crucial 
for the seconda pratica—which he thus baptizes: the new modulatione are full of new 
affetto,“to imitate with them the nature of the verse, and to justly represent the true 
intention of the poet” [che sarà adunque questa se non nova modulatione piena di nuovo 
affetto, per imitare con essi la natura del verso, et giustamente rappresentare il senso 
vero del Poeta…].39 Music does not necessarily need to tend to imitation, but rather 
towards innovation, which is accomplished by the new “modulatione”—and thus the new 
“concenti” and “affetti” that Artusi everywhere denies, and which imitate the nature of 
the verse.  
Here then is the crucial realignment of music, mimesis, and affect, formulated in a 
unique form by L’Ottuso: music will no more be limited to expressing the already 
existing similarities and antipathies that make up the ordered macro and microcosmic 
universe; it will no more be “magical” or “miraculous” in the way the Ficinian 
tradition—extending past L’Ottuso until Kircher—wanted it. The “ideological” nature of 
these formations is already in the surface of the deeper archaeological formations: Zarlino 
himself made them visible and audible. At the center of L’Ottuso’s challenge is the 
relationship between art, truth, and nature—the truth of nature—that the harmonic 
institutions could not express anymore: in a world saturated by significance, music has 
the possibility of discovering what is true beneath the smooth surface of the 
(Foucauldian) same. The limits of the overlapping of hermeneutics and semiotics that 
guarantees knowledge in the Renaissance episteme are the limits of alterity. Still 
defending his claim that new modulations produce new affetti, L’Ottuso offers a diversity 
of definitions of “affetto” as passion, love, or desire.40 However, 
it is not necessary that this music should perform the miracle of reviving the dead; 
it will well produce affect, that is, the desire with the novelty of its modulation to 
hear frequently such kinds of harmony, more apt to move our soul with its novelty 
                                                                                                                                            
de gl’Antichi, essendovi massime campo con la inventione, et con questa nuova modulatione d’avanzarli.” 
Seconda Parte dell’Artusi, 19. Translation modified after Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 40. 
39 Seconda Parte dell’Artusi, 14. 
40 L’Ottuso defines the various senses of affetto as a passion of the soul (citing Guarini: “affetti tuoi son fatti 
miei”); desire (Petrarca: “Hai spento ambidue gl’affetti miei”); love (Dante: “per abbracciarmi con si 
grand’affetto”). Seconda parte dell’Artusi, 17. 
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in this new practice than in the past one, as that which more effectively strikes the 
sense.41 
What is important about all these diverse “affetti” as conceived by L’Ottuso and the 
crucial difference they have with respect to Artusi's and Zarlino’s interpretation, is that 
these—the affetti, as well as the modulatione and concenti that produce them—are new or 
point towards the new. They do not belong in the cosmos of the same. What is denied is 
the association between the same and the true. From this perspective, in order for 
something to be true it must be different—it must be new.42 For this, L’Ottuso brings the 
productivity of mimesis back from its deep slumber, by associating it with alterity, with 
the “new.” The innovations of the new music have the only purpose of disclosing what is 
“true” in the poem, [il vero senso del poeta] by imitating the “nature of the verse” [la 
natura del verso].  
Mimesis does not imitate what already exists. It uses innovation to expose nature 
by imitating something that was not there before. Where the Renaissance magus finds a 
similarity, where a madrigalism uses conventional associations of words and sounds, 
Monteverdi produces an as-yet unheard of combination of sounds that, being new, is 
more true to nature. Even if by using such innovations they seem to go against nature—
that is, against the philosophical and theoretical definition of what nature—essence, more 
                                                
41 “Non è però necessario, che questa Musica facci il miracolo di suscitar morti; cagionerà bene affetto, cioè 
desiderio con la novità della sua modulatione d’udir bene spesso simil sorte di concento, più atto à mover 
l’animo nostro con la novità sua in questa nova practica, che nella passata come quella che con più efficacia 
ferisce il senso.” Seconda parte dell’Artusi, 17; translation after Carter in Fabbri, Monteverdi, 45. 
42 José Antonio Maravall describes a series of changes from a moderate interest on the new in Renaissance 
Spain, followed by a phase of distrust motivated by monarchical absolutism’s attempt to preserve its social 
order among broader transformations, towards its glorification during the seventeenth century, such that the 
baroque came to affirm a taste for the new as a “natural, innate inclination that pulls the human towards the 
new,” yet he identifies this naturalization of taste precisely as an ideological strategy from the same 
monarchic absolutism to displace and stall attempts of sociopolitical transformation, as a strategy to 
capturing the will. “The appearance of a daring novelty that enveloped the creation on the outside 
concealed a doctrine —here the word ideology would not be out of hand —that was inflexibly anti-
innovation, conservative. A force reconstitutive of traditional interests was smuggled in by means of the 
novelty that one was attracted to for enjoyment. Antonio José Maravall, Culture of the Baroque Analysis of 
a Historical Structure (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 224ff. Maravall is right on 
the mark in identifying the political aesthetics of taste in the baroque, although his conception of power 
remains too centralized—as if power emanated top down and effectively pervaded the entirety of the social 
body. These problems are taken up in chapter 7. 
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precisely—might be. To challenge such notion of nature, in this context, is nothing less 
than a political intervention, in a strong sense: it expresses the possibility of a different 
order, a different nature, than the one sanctioned by the institutions.43 
The stakes become clearer in the way L’Ottuso’s reply exasperates the priest 
beyond proper measure, who deploys here one of the starkest gendered similes in the 
controversy (not noted in Cusick’s groundbreaking paper—it occurs just after the 
description of “Cruda Amarilli” as a “monstrous birth,” thus bringing home the 
homophobic bent of the metaphor).44 Artusi twists L’Ottuso’s words, who writes that the 
composers of the “seconda pratica” commonly follow a sharpened note by a descending 
interval and a flattened note by a rising one, even if this movement is “against their 
nature” [et così per moti contrarii alla natura sua].45 Artusi retorts—reinscribing in that 
context the epithet for the new composers which L’Ottuso used in the passage: 
Do you think, Signor Ottuso, that this opinion (or rule) of yours can be compared 
to the many talented men, Greeks and Romans, who left so many other writings 
and rules? It is indeed true that in this new second practice of yours, those who (to 
use your own words) act against nature and confound the matters and the rules of 
our forebears, these reputed as the better and as more elevated talents, and in this 
way you believe that both you and they are to become immortal, and you are 
greatly deceived. All artists seek to imitate nature, and however many 
philosophers there are and have been, they neither think of nor philosophize about 
anything other than the operations done by her. And do you offer praise to and 
consider more fully those who act against nature?46 
                                                
43 See note 22, above. I deal more closely with the politics of nature and the role of mimesis in its 
interpretation and production in chapter 8 of this dissertation. 
44 Suzanne G Cusick, “Gendering Modern Music: Thoughts on the Monteverdi-Artusi Controversy,” JAMS 
46, no. 1 (1993): 1–25. 
45 Seconda Parte dell’Artusi, 16. See Palisca, “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy,” 143. 
46 Seconda Parte dell’Artusi, 22. Emphasis mine. Signor Ottuso, che questa vostra opinione, ò Regola si 
confronti con tanti e tanti valent`huomini, Greci, e Latini, che ce n’hanno lasciati tanti scriti, e Regole? E 
ben vero che in questa vostra seconda pratica nova, quelli che (per usare le vostre parole fanno contra la 
natura; et confondono le cose, e le Regole de nostri passati, questi reputate per i migliori, e per ingegni più 
elevati, et con questo mezzo vi credete che s’habbino, et voi, ed essi ad imortalare, et molto v’ingannate. 
Cercano tutti gl’Artefici di imitare la natura, et quanti Filosofi sono, et sono stati, in altro non pensano, ne 
filosofano se non intorno alle operationi da lei fate; et voi, quelli, che contra la natura operano, 
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“SECOND” WITH RESPECT TO ITS USE, “FIRST” WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 
Being enlisted in this escalation of philosophical and political disagreements, Monteverdi 
could not avoid taking a position—which to an extent consisted in taking a distance from 
this specific conflict. The role of innovation in aesthetically calling into question the 
natural order is not the main point in the defense of the Monteverdi brothers. To examine 
their response at the level of the acoustemological challenges examined above, I will 
focus on the Dichiarazione as their main pronouncement by using a particular reading 
strategy, which takes advantage of a significant structural “motive” in the controversy, 
namely the way the pair Giulio Cesare–Claudio mirrors the previous dialogic duets of 
Luca–Vario and Artusi–L’Ottuso. Less for simplicity than for emphasis, then, I refer to 
them here collectively as Signor &c., the name Artusi uses to refer to the composer in the 
Seconda parte dell’Artusi. This strategy, inspired by Derrida’s response to John Searle in 
Limited Inc., is further motivated by the appearance of the Dichiarazione on the printed 
page (in the Scherzi of 1608), where Claudio’s letter is printed in large fonts with callings 
to footnotes in which Giulio Cesare glosses the “intention” of his brother.47 This allows 
us, moreover, to distance the arguments—and my readings thereof—from problems of 
authorial intentionality. Not without playful irony, this strategy invites considering their 
texts at the same level as the others, that is, as personae, as masks. The &c. thus signals a 
collective, an authorial multiplicity, while the Signor locates the origin of this authoriality 
within a squarely patriarchal schema. 
Instead of engaging with the technical aspects of Artusi’s attacks or with the issue 
of mimesis as it emerged in the exchange with L’Ottuso, Signor &c. attack the very 
grounds of the argument—or rather, they make explicit that the controversy is about 
grounds, about origins and archai. They denounce instead the violence, the lack of 
                                                                                                                                            
maggiormente lodate, et osservate?”; translation after Carter in Fabbri, Monteverdi, 44. The brackets 
opened at “per usare” are nowhere closed in the printed text. Renaissance jurists like Paolo Zacchia (1584-
1659) and Amato Lusitano (1511-68), the latter Chair of Medicine in Ferrara, wrote against anal intercourse 
and sodomy, calling it a sin “contra natura,” against nature. See George Rousseau, “Policing the Anus,” in 
The Sciences of Homosexuality in Early Modern Europe, Kenneth Borris George Rousseau, eds. (London: 
Routledge, 2013), 86. 
47 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988). 
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civility and the lacerations effected by Artusi upon the composer’s pieces. The 
paradigms, the exemplary examples presented by Artusi—fragmented as they are in the 
dialogue—are deprived of their harmony, their rhythm, but above all they are deprived of 
the words. Recall, as Signor &c. will do later, that pure harmony, without rhythm or 
words, is incapable of having any effect whatsoever. What Artusi exposes are not 
chimeras nor castles in the air but corpses, “bodies without soul,” very minute details that 
amount to nothing musical if the words, the most important part of music, are left out. 
These details, called “passages” by Artusi, which are seen so lacerated [che si 
vegono così lacerati] by him in his Second Discourse, are part of my brother’s 
madrigal “Cruda Amarilli,” and their harmony is part of the melody of which this 
is composed; for this reason, he has called them details and not “passages.” But in 
this case, Artusi takes certain details, or, as he calls them, “passages,” from my 
brother’s madrigal “Cruda Amarilli,” paying no attention to the words [nulla 
curandose dell’oratione], but neglecting them as though they had nothing to do 
with the music, later showing the said “passages” deprived of their words 
[oratione], of all their harmony [armonia], and of their rhythm [Rithmo]. But if, in 
the “passages” noted as false, he had shown the words that went with them, then 
the world would have known without fail where his judgment had gone astray, 
and he would not have said that they were chimeras and castles in the air 
[chimere, e castelli in aria] from their entire disregard of the rules of the First 
Practice. But it would truly have been a beautiful demonstration if he had also 
done the same with Cipriano's madrigals … and, to conclude, with others whose 
harmony obeys their words exactly and which would indeed be left bodies without 
soul [corpi senz’anima] if they were left without this most important and principal 
part of music, his opponent implying, by passing judgment on these “passages” 
without the words, that all excellence and beauty consist in the exact observance 
of the aforesaid rules of the First Practice, which makes the harmony mistress of 
the words.48 
                                                
48 Strunk, Source Readings, 406-407; Monteverdi, Lettere, Dediche, e Prefazioni, 395-396. 
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The defense of Signor &c. consists in resisting the metaphysics of Artusi’s rational 
institutions, their grounding. It does not cease to be political nor metaphysical, however, 
still bearing upon the logos and arche of music. As shown above, in Artusi’s paradigms 
the reason, the logos—or more specifically the “form”—is in the rational proportions 
(logoi) that regulate the entire composition and each individual interval. The intellect 
judges a composition according to one ground, one reason, one arche. If each sound fails 
to express its status and harmonic derivation from its origin—its relation as part to the 
whole—the edifice collapses, catastrophe ensues. For Signor &c., logos is soul, the living 
speech of the music without which nothing is left, not even music itself. By being 
deprived of their words, the passages are also deprived of all their harmony, and of their 
rhythm: corpses standing in for the abstract and empty laws of the harmonic institutions. 
Yet, even when avoiding the appeal to the “new,” Signor &c. are explicit in their 
rejection of these institutions, of the authority and regulation that they presume to have, 
which only lack of civility and violence can make evident. For them, a theory is already 
this act of self-instituting violence: to their collapsing monuments they prefer the living 
practice of madrigalists like De Rore. 
Make no mistake: a party whose official line in which the words should be the 
mistress (padrona) of the harmony and not the servant (serva) is by no means an anarchic 
one. As Cusick shows, the padrona-serva metaphor was motivated by Artusi himself, 
who writes that “Nascono dall’Harmonia, dal numero dal Rithmo che sono servi 
dell’Oratione.”49 The important consequence of these remarks is that, in responding to 
Artusi’s gendered metaphor in the same terms, Signor &c. are accomplices—and not 
rivals—of Artusi in the preservation of a patriarchal institution, “Artusi's focus on the 
troubled masculinity of composers and listeners is reified in the brothers Monteverdi’s 
responses: thus both modern music and its practitioners remain open to the association 
with effeminacy.” This in turn suggests that we have to consider Artusi (with all his 
                                                
49 Cusick, “Gendering Modern Music,” 2; Seconda Parte dell’Artusi, 31; Artusi refers to the serva before as 
well, in his gloss of the Republic through Zarlino, writing that “di modo che si vede, che non può la sua 
modulatione operare questi due effetti. Ella ben si può dire serva all’uno, et all’altro; all concento, et alla 
melodia; ma non per questo si può dire, che da lei nascano.” Seconda Parte dell’Artusi, 23. 
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pseudonyms and personae) as part of Signor &c., so that their readings and misreadings 
become impersonal, textual—not particular “flaws of character” or something “of their 
time,” but as forming a structural and effective part of a patriarchal order which regularly 
employs a diversity of mimetic strategies for its self-preservation and self-reproduction.  
The dispute, as I have been showing, is about origins, but more precisely, as I 
now argue in greater detail, a matter of patriarchal filiation: one of the requirements of 
destroying the mechanism of aemulatio by which authority was preserved within the 
cosmos of the same is to make a claim on the new order, to secure their place as 
beneficiaries of the new. This is the effect of the signatures in Claudio’s Letter and Giulio 
Cesare’s Declaration they mark their authority over the “Second Practice.” Giulio Cesare 
writes that  
My brother has made known to the world that this expression is assuredly his in 
order that it may be known and concluded that when his adversary said, in the 
second book of the Artusi: ‘This Second Practice, which may in all truth be said 
to be the dregs of the First,’ he spoke as he did to speak evil of my brother’s 
works. This was in the year 1603, when my brother had first decided to begin 
writing his defense of himself against his opponent and when the expression 
‘Second Practice’ had barely passed his lips, a sure indication that his adversary 
was desirous of defaming in the same vein my brother’s words and his music as 
well, although they were still in manuscript. And for what reason? Let him say it 
who knows; let him see it who can find it on the map! But why does the adversary 
show so much astonishment in that discourse of his, saying further: ‘You show 
yourself as jealous of that expression as though you feared that someone would 
rob you of it,’ as though he meant to say, in his language: ‘You should not fear 
such a theft, for you are not worth imitating, let alone robbing’?50 
Signor &c., that is, identified at once the two modes under which Artusi deployed 
mimesis, “in his language,” in this conflict upon origins: the repetition and inscription—
the iteration—of the expression “seconda prattica,” and the erection—or denial thereof—
                                                
50 Strunk, Source Readings, 406; Monteverdi, Lettere, Dediche, et Prefazioni, 401-2. See note 14, above. 
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of models “worthy of imitation.” If L’Ottuso and Artusi first put the expression in print, 
these documents re-mark it as an illegitimate appropriation, for it is Signor &c.’s original 
expression, and “it may not be appropriated by anyone else” [questa voce seconda 
prattica tall’hora non fosse occupata da altri]. As for the statement, cited by Signor &c., 
that the Seconda prattica is “the dregs of the first,” it is not found in the Seconda parte 
dell’Artusi, a text addressed to L’Ottuso and still aiming to conceal the identity of the 
composer. It appeared perhaps in the now lost Discorso musicale of Antonio Braccino Da 
Todi—which has “always been assumed to be Artusi.”51  
In the most important claim to origins of the entire dispute, they admit that it can 
be called a “Second Practice” with respect to its adoption, but that with respect to its 
origin it should be called first.52 This declaration spells out the logic of modernity for 
centuries to come remarking and repeating the irruption of history in Zarlino. It is the 
logic of a rupture, of an event that splits history in two, that draws out a limit that 
validates the musical practice while, as Jacques Rancière would argue, absolutizing 
dissensus (pre-emptying the disagreement voiced by L’Ottuso) by placing its terms 
outside of history.53 The rupture, in this case, is retroactive: to wit, the second practice is 
first, and the event of rupture marks not the beginning of something new but the end of 
what took the place of the true origin. And what guarantees this primacy, this origin? The 
text of Plato, the locus classicus for the identity and authority, the patriarchy, of logos 
and arche, the founding moment and monument of the reasoned grounding of all 
institutions and filiations to come in the West.54 Or rather, we might better say that the 
guarantee of primacy is given in the relation that this moment in history developed to 
Plato’s text, a relation that I argue is fundamentally mimetic, in the sense of the term 
developed above. 
                                                
51 Palisca, “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy,” 153; Carter “The Poetics of Modern Music,” 175. 
52 “Chiamaralla seconda prattica in quanto al modo di adoperarla, che in rispetto al origine si potrebbe dir 
prima.” 
53 Jacques Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009), 131. The question 
of the “modernity” of this position and its excessive mimetic structure is explored further in the following 
chapter. 
54 The consequences of this patriarchal heritage are exposed by Derrida in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Irigaray, 
Speculum of the Other Woman and Lacoue-Labarthe, “The Echo of the Subject” in Typography. 
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Sure enough, the central passage from book 3 of the Republic quoted by Signor 
&c. in Ficino’s translation—where melody is said to be composed of harmony, rhythm, 
and words—was standard fare in the humanistic discussions of the previous century and 
served to establish Plato’s authority on the question of the effects of music—they contain, 
in nuce, almost the whole of Plato’s “theory” of music. In fact, the same passage is 
quoted in the Seconda parte dell’Artusi together with the passage in book 7 of Zarlino’s 
Institutioni (examined above), with the crucial difference that when glossing the meaning 
of “Oratione,” Artusi simply refers to “la lunghezza, e brevità della parola [che] 
s’appartiene al metro, overo alla Oratione.” Gone is, then, any reference to ethos or 
costumi, as in Zarlino, or to “la natura del verso” or “il vero senso del poeta,” as L’Ottuso 
claimed.55 According to Signor &c., Plato held instead that, 
“The song is composed of three things: the words, the harmony, and the rhythm”; 
and, a little further on: “And so of the apt and the unapt, if the rhythm and the 
harmony follow the words, and not the words these.” Then, to give greater force 
to the words, he continues: “Do not the manner of the diction and the words 
follow and conform to the disposition of the soul?” and then: “Indeed, all the rest 
follows and conforms to the diction.”56 
Unsurprisingly for any reader familiar with the Republic, this is a simplification of 
Plato’s text, to say the least. A convenient one, however, which was able to capitalize on 
the work of the humanists, indeed to turn Artusi’s argument on its head, and mobilize 
Plato’s authority for the defense of “new” music—the Republic, of all things, that 
paradigmatic text of aesthetic conservatism! This paradox, however, did not seem to 
trouble any of the parties involved in the dispute, nor has it caught the attention of music 
historians, captivated by the very expressive dissonances in the new madrigals of Claudio 
                                                
55 Carter notes how much depends on how one defines “l’oratione,” whether simply as “words,” or as 
Palisca and Silke Leopold suggest, as “verbal delivery,” the latter noting that ‘oratio,’ and ‘logos,’ can mean 
“on the one hand the words as such, and, on the other, the delivery of the words.” The problem—the 
distance of Monteverdi’s Latin from Plato’s Greek and our attempts to understand them is more complex, 
yet it is still one of translation, which began with this Artusi. Carter, “Two Monteverdi Problems, and Why 
They Still Matter,” 420 n. 5. 
56 Strunk, Source Readings, 407. These passages are taken from Rep. 3.398c-d and 400d. Monteverdi also 
quotes Gorgias 449d and Ficino’s Compendium in Timaeus. 
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and by the rhetorical dexterity through which Signor &c.’s misreading of Plato’s text 
effected a veritable musical revolution with consequences that are still audible today. 
More paradoxical still is that Signor &c. deployed everything crucial in Plato’s 
discussion of music without mentioning mimesis or imitatio. 
As argued above, mimesis permeates the entire argument of music in the 
Republic, both in Plato’s text and its reception in the Renaissance. In fact, explicit 
mention of imitatio is everywhere in the passages that Signor &c. elide in the quotation 
yet is only alluded to in the specific passages they do cite. Mimesis is effectively avoided, 
textually repressed, in the Dichiaratione. Everything, however, rides on this absence. Its 
necessity was already evident for Ficino who, in the sentence just before the one quoted 
by Signor &c., translates homoioumenon, “likening itself,” with the same word he uses to 
translate mimesis, imitatio. Here is the full passage (400d) in Ficino’s Latin and a modern 
translation: 
Atqui congruum quidem pulcram orationem sequitur, et tanquam simile imitatur 
incongruum verò contrariam. Quin etiam consonum ipsum, et dissonum eodem 
modo; quando quidem rhythmus et harmonia, ut paulò antè dictum fuit, orationem 
sequuntur, non ipsa oratio rhythmum et harmoniam sequitur. 
 
Further, rhythm and lack of it follow the style, the one likening itself 
[homoioumenon] to a fine style, the other to its opposite; and it’s the same with 
harmony and lack of it, provided, that is, rhythm and harmonic mode follow 
speech, as we were just saying, and not speech them. 
This passage, we might say, formulates an identification that belongs exclusively in the 
neoplatonic world of Ficino; as a translation, it is an interpretation, a form of closing off 
the play of the text (similar to the decision by which pharmakon is translated now as 
medicine, now as poison; see chapter 2). By translating homoioumenon into imitatur, by 
making imitatio also translate the process of “becoming similar to,” instead of “making 
something in the image of something”—as the orthodox reading of the Republic would 
insist—Ficino makes mimesis liken itself (homoioi) to becoming similar (homoioo), that 
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is, becoming another (i.e. becoming similar to something else which implies that it is not 
itself): precisely the meaning Plato aimed to disrupt by coining the mimetology based on 
models and copies which reduce alterity to sameness. Ficino, we might say, uncovers the 
truth underneath the separation Plato aimed to preserve.57 
This, in turn, prompts Antonio Braccino da Todi—Artusi’s presumed pseudonym 
(masks upon masks)—to reject and ridicule Signor &c.’s metaphor of oratione as 
padrona and harmonia as serva.58 This might appear as mere verbal nit-picking, but the 
consequences are formidable, for in this modern misreading of Plato—produced, as 
argued above, not by a single author but by the impersonal authorial function of Signor 
&c.—that we find the “origin” of the aesthetics of modern music.59  
Mimesis, as we said, is everywhere in the Platonic text. Crucially, however, it is 
not where Ficino and Signor &c. put it: in Plato, words imitate the ethos—Zarlino’s 
costumi—of others, that is, ideally courageous warriors and compassionate men (398d). 
By means of these imitations, the speaker comes to partake of the ethos that is being 
imitated by becoming that which is imitated—hence the educative function of music in 
the ideal State. This means that words act as a medium for such identification, a medium 
that assimilates the model to the copy: the ethos to the performer. Musical mimesis, in 
                                                
57 The relation between homoioo and mimesis offered here is tentative, as it requires a more systematic 
examination of their relation in the Republic and the Platonic corpus, which moreover needs to be 
compared to the uses and functions of methexis, especially with the philosophical meaning this word attains 
in the Sophist and its elaborations in Hellenistic neoplatonism. Stephen Halliwell, The Aesthetics of 
Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 155ff. 
who sees homoiomata (likeness) as interchangeable with mimemata in Aristotle, although he does not say 
the same (or the contrary) in the case of Plato; although the musical context for their identification, Politics 
1340a12-39 makes it possible to assimilate them (at least for hellenic and neoplatonist writers). 
58 The metaphor first appeared in print in the Seconda Parte dell’Artusi. See note 102 above. On this 
passage, Palisca writes that “Artusi quite rightly, if unduly harshly, scolded Giulio Cesare for distorting 
Plato’s meaning” “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy,” 155. 
59 Monteverdi’s writing strategies, despite their famous “laconism,” exhibit an interesting productivity that 
depends on misreadings like this one. Another important example is the “slip of the pen” in the preface to 
the Madrigale Guerreri” analyzed by Massimo Ossi, where Monteverdi quotes from the Republic yet 
assigns it to a non-existing Rhetorica, which Ossi takes to be Aristotle’s. This leads him to an interesting 
analysis of the preface according to the structure of its third book, providing an illuminating elaboration on 
the rather stark preface. The suggestion, however, that this is a “typical Freudian slip,” seems to me less 
happy. It is with an aim to avoid this kind of psychologism that I deploy the reading strategy of authorial 
functions to understand the operations of the misreading of Plato in the Dichiarazione. Ossi, Divining the 
Oracle, 192ff. 
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Plato, is an imitation “of the same by the same.”60 The passage, it must be recalled, is 
concerned with a regulation of what is possible through mimesis (even if this involves 
assigning capacities to mimesis that will later be denied in the text). Thus, all the poetry 
of Homer and Hesiod is examined to ensure the correct ethos is given as model. More 
important than the regulation of models, however, is multiplicity in imitation. Plato 
condemns those who can imitate everything as well as diversity and multiplicity of 
rhythms and styles: a man who does many things “doesn’t harmonize with our regime 
because there is no double man among us, nor a manifold one, since each man does one 
thing” (397e). This disharmony, moreover, is associated with madness, with a lack of 
self-control. From this determination follows the reasoning that “the rhythm and the 
harmony follow the words:” compositions must be made with unity of style, rhythm, and 
harmonic mode, all three operating together (in “symphony” sum-phonos, 398c) towards 
the enactment of a single, determined ethos. Since, recall, Socrates and Glaucon state 
ironically that they “do not know” which modes and rhythms correspond to which ethos, 
they assume that regulating words will be sufficient, “provided, that is, rhythm and 
harmonic mode follow speech, as we were just saying, and not speech them.” Words are 
not the models (nor “mistresses”), they are just the component of melody that most 
clearly exhibits the ethos that is to be performed. This is precisely what Braccino writes: 
to follow is not to be a servant. In this text—the last “official” document of the 
controversy—61we encounter the final substitution. Braccino identifies “to follow” with 
“to imitate,” an association Signor &c. never make explicit in the Dichiarazione. 
The declarer means for that sequuntur and sequitur that harmony and rhythm are 
both servants; and that the oration is the ruling master, and the former are the 
ruled ones. And yet when the talented Tiburtio Massaino imitated the works of the 
Excellent Cipriano [de Rore], can we say that he is servant of Cipriano? One 
                                                
60 Gülgönen, “La mimesis musicale,” 99, 101. 
61 Carter, “The Poetics of Modern Music,” 175; Palisca, “The Artusi-Monteverdi Controversy,” 153. 
Carter’s most recent contributions to the scholarship on the controversy have focused on finding the 
indirect ways by which Monteverdi responded to Artusi during the controversy and beyond, see Carter, “‘E 
in rileggendo poi le proprie note’” and “Cerberus Barks in Vain.” 
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Melopeo follows the style of Adriano [Willaert], another Palestrina's, another 
Porta's, others Gabrielli's. What else can you say, except they are imitating the 
works of Gabrielli, Palestrina, Porta, Adriano?62 
Further on, abandoning Plato, Braccino writes that it is necessary that the composer 
[Melopeo] “conosca la proprietà, la natura della consonanza, della dissonanza, et 
dell’armonia, acciò possi imitare più che puote la oratione conforme all’intento suo.”63 
We have here a trace of the textual genealogy of the principle that music must imitate the 
words.64 It happened more explicitly in the texts of Artusi than on the pronouncements of 
Signor &c., and even then it obeyed to much larger transformations of mimesis at the end 
of the sixteenth century. Yet what remained the same underneath all of these 
transformations was the alignment of artistic practice with the preservation of an 
authorial power—a patriarchal filiation—grounded on the identification and 
appropriation of an origin. Thus, more important than locating this moment as the 
“origin” of the composer’s aesthetic ideals after 1608 is to note what, in this misreading, 
is left out—or repressed.  
                                                
62 “Intende il dichiaratore per quel sequuntur, et sequitur. chel’ Armonia, e’l Rhithmo siano l’uno il servo, 
et l’altro la serva; et che la oratione sia la patrona Comandante, et esse le Comandate. Et però quando il 
valente Tiburtio Massaino sia imitato l’opere dell’Eccellente Cipriano si puo per questo dire che egli sia 
servo di Cipriano? Il tale Melopeo seguita lo stile di Adriano, quell’altro del Palestina [sic], un’altro del 
Porta, altri del Gabrielli; che altro vuol dire, se non che imitano le opere del Gabrielle, del Palestina [sic], 
del Porta, di Adriano?” Discorso secondo musicale, 8. This makes the Discorso secondo not only the 
culmination of the controversy but a definitive turning point in the history of mimesis; it cannot be thus 
dismissed as a “reiteration” of the previous arguments (cf. Fabbri, 51). One could consider it, in fact, the 
affirmation and further definition of the actual terms at stake in the controversy, if one is willing to consider 
reiteration in its constitutive sense, its role of constituting that which it re-iterated by signaling—by 
repeating it—what is iterable in any given utterance. In the context of Artusi’s homophobia, it bears noting 
that Tiburtio Massaino served in Salzburg under Archbishop Wolf Dietrich von Raitenau until he was 
forced to leave in 1591 after a criminal conviction for homosexuality. David Bryant. “Massaino, Tiburzio.” 
Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press, accessed December 13, 2015. 
63 Discorso secondo musicale, 8. Branccino, overstating his point, here goes so far as contradicting Zarlino, 
writing that the harmony and rhythm possess “forza” and “vigore” by their own, not depending on the 
“oratione,” “è ben vero che con questa accompagnate, la fortificano, le danno maggior forza di quello che 
per se stessa have.” 
64 This account, of course, must be crossed with the genealogy that goes from Girolamo Mei, through 
Galilei, to Caccini. The influence of the Florentine Camerata upon Monteverdi’s aesthetics is 
circumstantial. This separation allows us to trace it materially, instead of aiming for a presumed yet 
unaccountable continuity between them. As Carter calls them, they stand “in the wings of this shadow-
play,” Carter, “The Poetics of Modern Music,” 177; See also Palisca, “The Artusi-Monteverdi 
Controversy,” 153 and Palisca, “Vincenzo Galilei's Counterpoint Treatise: A Code for the ‘Seconda 
Pratica’,” JAMS (9:2, 1956). 
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As was clear to Zarlino, what the words bring to harmony and rhythm, the cause 
of as-yet unheard effects, is the costumi, the ethos. Also still clear, as we saw with 
Jenkins, was the political and moral meaning of these “effects”—especially in L’Artusi. 
The slow, almost unperceived transformation of musical mimesis we attend to here does 
not depend only in stating that “music must imitate the words” but rather that, in so 
doing, words become a kind of “model” they were not before. They attain a specific 
autonomy, they lose the capacity to confuse themselves with the ethos that they 
transmitted, becoming instead models of that ethos: they become “Platonic ideas” in the 
modern sense, not in the sense of Plato.  
This has consequences for the music that aims to imitate such words: It becomes 
also autonomous, proffering only “a representation of speech.”65 We can describe this 
earlier sense as “a magical speech,” where music and speech are almost “amalgamated,” 
having a certain consonantia because of their participation in the harmonic order of 
things, minimally separated but unified by similitude, which reveal the hidden 
connections of things.66 By doing so, the artificiality—that is, the arbitrary signification—
of musical devices such as the ostinato in The Lament of the Nymph becomes clear, as do 
the reasons by which Monteverdi, in attempting to set poetry by a poet like Marino—who 
“embodied an epistemology of representation in which language was separated from the 
world”—constantly fell short of his genius as composer. 
THREE TIMES MAD 
We encounter, in this way, the picture of a melancholic Monteverdi, who never ceased to 
think about Plato and mimesis, hoping until his death to write his treatise on the Second 
Practice—another absent text. As he wrote to Giovani Battista Doni in 1633 
I keep telling myself that it will not be unacceptable to the world, for I found out 
in practice that when I was about to compose ‘the Lament of Arianna’—finding 
                                                
65 Tomlinson, Music and Renaissance Magic, 242. 
66 Idem., 241. This problem of a passage from a world of mimesis as participation to one of representation 
forms Tomlinson’s interpretive schema, based on Osio’s L’armonia del nudo parlare, for the passage from 
the late Renaissance into the Baroque discussed in the introduction to this Part; the problem will return 
below. 
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no book that could show me the natural way of imitation [la via naturale alla 
imitatione], not even one that would explain how I ought to have been an imitator 
[che dovessi essere imitatore], other than Plato, in one of his shafts of wisdom, 
but so hidden that I could hardly discern from afar with my feeble sight what little 
he showed me)—I found out (let me tell you) what hard work I had to do in order 
to achieve the little I did do in the way of imitation.67 
Monteverdi, we are told, uniquely achieved “a realization of the rhetorical and assonant 
music inherent in the text, of the varied expressive devices through which Rinuccini 
projects Ariadne’s changing passions…[O]nly in the lament of Ariadne is the passionate 
music of Rinuccini’s verse ideally and unremittingly given real musical voice.”68 And, we 
are finally told—this, of course, before the archaeological mode of analysis was available 
but with roughly the same results—, “if Monteverdi never again achieved such a precise 
musical realization of the expressive means of his text, some of the blame may be placed 
on his poets.”69 Without taking into account the many metamorphoses of mimesis during 
this period when attempting to understand the difference between these whole 
incompatible epistemic worlds, we are still somehow limited to “the aesthetic” in the 
most traditional sense, of a concern to understand what archeology always tried to empty 
out, the idea of “genius” and “the interrogation of individual subjectivities.”70  
The reason for this might be, as Tomlinson writes, because “from all our efforts at 
hermeneutic and archeological interpretation there emerges, as a function of our 
knowledge, an irreducible difference—an unresolvable alienation separating us from, for 
example, Renaissance magic.”71 A further reason might be that, as Derrida remarks on 
Foucault’s project to write a “history of madness” where madness speaks “in the first 
person,” any attempt to write a “history” of madness will either be a reasoned history or 
be condemned to “follow the madman down the road of his exile.”72 Thus, 
                                                
67 The Letters of Claudio Monteverdi, 421; 
68 Tomlinson, “Monteverdi’s ‘Via Naturale Alla Immitatione,’” JAMS (34: 1, 1981), 96. 
69 Idem., 97. 
70 Tomlinson, Music and Renaissance Magic, 241. 
71 Idem., 247. 
72 Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness” in Margins of Philosophy, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), 36. 
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a history, that is, an archaeology against reason doubtless cannot be written, for, 
despite all appearances to the contrary, the concept of history has always been a 
rational one. It is the meaning of ‘history’ or archia that should have been 
questioned first, perhaps. A writing that exceeds, by questioning them, the values 
of “origin,” “reason,” and “history” could not be contained within the 
metaphysical closure of an archaeology.73 
Monteverdi the composer knew this first hand, as shown by his abandoned project for 
writing music—another rational enterprise with high stakes on archai—that imitated 
madness. Struggling with mimesis, Monteverdi aimed, and failed, at writing music that 
brings mimesis to the extreme of its own formulation. As he wrote to Striggio in 1627, he 
aimed in his portrayal of madness in La Finta Pazza to imitate “the single word rather 
than the sense of the phrase.”74 Monteverdi’s formulation in that letter, that “the person 
who takes the principal part, which should arouse both humor and compassion, must be a 
woman who can lay aside every sort of imitation except that which is dictated by the 
word that she is saying” is a formulation avant la lettre of Diderot’s Paradox of the 
Actor.  
It demonstrates, as the latter does, that madness, mimesis, and self-representation 
are bound in an inescapable tension: musical expression, the investment in mimesis that 
from this moment on defines the most important understanding of mimesis in musical 
thought, is threatened from within by madness. This connection had been noted expressly 
by Plato, whose distrust of the manifold, as we saw, was linked with madness. Not until 
Diderot will this issue reappear. In Diderot we will find again how “doctrines of mimesis 
are unworked, exposed to the difficult tensions between semblance and deviation, 
difference and repetition, propriety and impropriety.”75 In this moment, the mimetic 
                                                
73 Idem. 
74 Monteverdi, Lettere, ed. de' Paoli, p. 244; translation in Tomlinson, “Monteverdi’s ‘Via Naturale Alla 
Immitatione,’” 102. See also Tomlinson, “Twice Bitten, Thrice Shy: Monteverdi's ‘finta’ ‘Finta pazza’” 
JAMS (36:2, 1982) 303-311. 
75 John Hamilton, Music, Madness, and the Unworking of Language (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2008), 55. 
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regime that begins with Monteverdi, where “sound absorbed into discourse, ready and 
able to represent or express,” will be destroyed by Rameau’s Nephew by exceeding its 
own capacities. 
Another way of understanding the meaning of the transformation in the history of 
mimesis gathered in the injunction to “imitare la oratione” is by focusing on the political 
sense of ethos that is effectively severed off in the exchanges examined above. If this 
disappearance might not be appreciated in the specifically “aesthetic” level, this may be 
because the “aesthetic,” as it arises here, is concerned essentially with covering the means 
by which the disappearance was effected.76 Which does not mean that the power by 
which music inscribes ethos ceases to exist. It happens, we might say, as it does in Plato: 
the laws, nomoi, are preserved, inscribed, by repetition. The moderns, however, displace 
the place of inscription of this bionomics: no more upon bodies but upon the aesthetic 
itself. Art becomes that which makes the law.  
By elevating L’Arianna to the level of model, of paradigm of musical mimesis, 
Monteverdi instituted one such law. L’Orfeo and the Combattimento, moreover, can be 
seen as the places by which this institution of nomoi is inscribed within a more restricted 
mimesis, again as a bionomic—of the latter composition, Suzanne Cusick writes that it 
might be the most important site to address the problematic politics of ethnicity and 
gender representation with which we engage today, suggesting that to address it is 
                                                
76 A similar argument is advanced by Tom Huhn, who locates this transformation in eighteenth-century 
philosophy, which created an aesthetics “in imitation” of mimesis, that is, that the aesthetic production of 
the eighteenth century, in its ever more divergent ways, continued to be underpinned by a notion of 
mimesis. Rather than a replacement, an emancipation or a decline, one can argue that the eighteenth 
century accomplished a crucial transformation in relation to the metaphysical determination of being as 
representedness, namely that of naturalizing representation by erasing mimesis as a regulated device for the 
making and judging of artistic objects, only to incorporate it into a production of sensory experience, of 
aisthesis itself. As Heidegger writes, “the artwork becomes an object of experience and consequently is 
considered to be an expression of human life.” Heidegger, Martin, Off the Beaten Track. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002. 57. Important works which readdress the place of mimesis in the eighteenth 
century in aesthetics in general are Huhn, Tom. Imitation and Society: the Persistence of Mimesis in the 
Aesthetics of Burke, Hogarth, and Kant. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004 
and Derrida, Jacques. “Economimesis.” Diacritics (11.2, 1981), 3-25. 
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necessary to consider music not as a signifying medium in an “episteme of 
representation” but rather a force77.  
I offer the ideas in this chapter as a supplement: Mimesis may be such a force, in 
this case, constantly producing alterity as both representation and inscription. The 
Combattimmento, in Cusick’s reading, and L’Orfeo—by which the Gonzaga dynasty 
inscribes its divine filiation, as suggested by Jean Pierre Ponnelle’s groundbreaking 1975 
production for the Zurich Opera—to which we now turn, are exemplars of this force. 
Monteverdi’s silence upon their political effects while simultaneously making “purely” 
aesthetic statements, is symptomatic of their importance.78 
 
                                                
77 Suzanne Cusick, “Monteverdi studies and ‘new’ musicologies” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Monteverdi John Whenham, Richard Wistreich eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2007), 259. 
78 On the Combattimento, see Ossi, Divining the Oracle, 211ff, and Cusick, “Indarno Chiedo,” in Word, 
Image, and Song. Vol. 2, Rebecca Cypess, Nathan Link, and Beth Lise Glixon (Rochester: University of 
Rochester Press, 2013). 
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Part III  
Orpheus’ Modern Turn: Sovereignty, Allegory, Performance  
 
ὀνομακλυτὸν Ὄρφην 
“Orpheus, of famous name;” 
first extant mention of Orpheus (6th C. BCE) 
Ibycus, fr. 10 (Diels) 
 
SERENISSIMO SIGNORE MIO SIGNORE [FRANCESCO GONZAGA] 
ET PATRONE COLENDISSIMO 
 
La favola d’Orfeo che già nell’Academia de gl’Invaghiti sotto gl’auspitii di V.A. fù sopra 
angusta scena musicalmente rappresentata, dovendo ora comparire nel gran Teatro 
dell’universo a à far mostra di sè a tutti gl’huomini, non è ragione che si lasci vedere con 
altro nome signata, che con quello dell’Altezza V. glorioso, e felice. A lei dunque 
humilmente la consacro, affinch’ella che à guisa di benigna stella le fu propitia nel suo 
nascimento, con I Serenissimi raggi della gratia sua, si degni di favorir il progresso della 
sua vita, la quale posso sperare, mercè dell’Altezza Vostra chè sia per esser durabile al 
pari dell’humana generatione. Supplico V. Altezza à gradir questo segno della divotione 
mia, con quell’animo grande che, è proprio di lei, e che lega gl’animi di chiunque hà 
ventura di trattar seco, E qui inchinandomi con sommessa riverenza all’Altezza V. prego 
il Signore che d’ogni suo desiderio la faccia contenta. In Mantova li 22, d’Agosto. 1609. 
     Di V. Altezza Serenissima, 
      Humilissimo, et obligatissimo servitore, 
         Claudio Monteverdi1 
                                                
1 Claudio Monteverdi, L’Orfeo Favola in Musica Da Claudio Monteverdi Rappresentata in Mantova 
l’Anno 1607. & Novamente Data in Luce (Venice: Ricciardo Amadino, 1609), f. 1.; Preface transcribed in 
Claudio Monteverdi, Lettere, Dediche, E Prefazioni, ed. Domenico De’ Paoli (Roma: De Santis, 1973), 
408–9. Emphasis mine. “The fable of Orpheus, which has already been represented in music under the 
auspices of Your Highness on a small stage at the Accademia degli Invaghiti, now having to appear in the 
great theater of the universe to wshow itself to all men, there is no reason that it should allow itself to be 
ssociated with any other name than that of Your Glorious and Fortunate Highness. To you therefore I 
humbly consecrate it, so that you, who as a benign star were propitious at its birth, with the most serene 
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Speaking of origins, what about that paradigmatic phrase—Theatrum mundi, the theater 
or the spectacle of the universe—that Monteverdi employed in the preface to the 1609 
score of Orfeo?2  
What can we make of this gesture, this second birth—staged under the “rays” 
(raggi) of the “benign star” (benigna stella) of Francesco Gonzaga—that made Orfeo 
pass from a famously narrow stage, the sopra angusta Scena in the Mantuan Ducal 
Palace, to the “great Theater of the Universe” (gran Teatro dell’universo)3 from which, 
however, it would just as soon disappear until 1904?4 
                                                                                                                                            
rays of your grace, will deign to favor the progress of its life. I beg your Highness finds this sign of my 
devotion agreeable, with the great spirit that is proper of his, and and which he transmits to all who have 
the fortune to treat with him. And bowing in submissive reverence to Your Highness I beg the Lord that he 
finds worthy of all your desires.” translation modified after Mauro Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera: 
Monteverdi’s Staging of the Self (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012), 282 n. 28. 
2 In Part II I introduced the figure of Signor &c. to refer to Claudio and Giulio Cesare Monteverdi as a 
collective authorial function facing the various authors, pseudonyms, and anonymous figures of the texts 
involved in the Artusi-Monteverdi controversy. With this strategy, I sought to distance my arguments from 
claims pertaining to intentionality and authorship for texts that are already densely interwoven. In this 
section, I will refer only to “L’Orfeo,” without aiming to identify or distinguish between Claudio 
Monteverdi and Alessandro Striggio as authors, thus bypassing fraught arguments about the literary merit 
of the libretto or the possibility, recently advanced by Barbara Russano Hanning, that the author of the 
Apollonian ending might be Ottavio Rinuccini; see Barbara Russano Hanning, “The Ending of L’Orfeo: 
Father, Son, and Rinuccini,” Journal of Seventeenth-Century Music 9, no. 1 (2003). When referring to the 
characters from the operas, I refer to their Italian names (thus Orfeo, Euridice, Plutone), and use English 
names when referring to the mythical figures (Orpheus, Pluto).  
3 The history of the Theatrum mundi metaphor has been explored at length, famously by Ernst Curtius in 
European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages; (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1953). and more 
recently in the context of baroque literature in Frank J. Warnke, Versions of Baroque: European Literature 
in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). Warnke argues after Curtius that 
there was a surge in “world as theatre metaphors” after 1595, with the reprints of John of Salisbury’s 
Polycraticus which contains the famous motto of the Globe Theater, “totus mundus agit histrionem,” but 
especially “because the metaphor expresses with great cogency the concern with the illusory quality of 
experience which runs obsessively through the literature of the first two-thirds of the seventeenth century” 
Ibid. According to Warnke, it acquires its most refined poetic elaborations in the works of Shakespeare and 
Calderón (especially Hamlet and La Vida es Sueño). See Lynda G Christian, “Theatrum Mundi: The 
History of an Idea” (Garland, 1987) and; Matthew Potolsky, Mimesis (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006). In 
the Italian context, the metaphor is familiar from Mirandola’s Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486), which 
contain the keystones for what Stephen Greenblatt calls the Renaissance self-fashioning. Stephen 
Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980). Of particular interest for this dissertation is James M Saslow, The Medici Wedding of 1589: 
Florentine Festival as Theatrum Mundi (New Haven, CT: Yale University press, 1996), which employs the 
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The four chapters that follow are an extended exercise in examining the creation 
of paradigms in early modern Italy and in the multiple ways in which mimesis is effective 
in early opera as what I described as a performative assemblage of inscription (see 
chapters 3 and 4). This is an essay—un ensayo, an attempt—to look and listen to Orfeo 
from the perspective offered by Monteverdi in the dedication preface, through a trope—
the Theatrum mundi—that almost stands in for the whole aesthetics of the baroque: not 
only as the politico-theological framework in which men’s fate is scripted by God (or 
Fortune) and its sensorial overhauling in Counter-Reformation sensualist catechism,5 nor 
as the “performance of nobility” by which courtly spectacle became an effective means 
of political control,6 but also as that change of perspective, or turn to perspective—the 
introduction of mathematized perspective (in geometry and painting)7 and the turn it 
                                                                                                                                            
metaphor as key to offer a general interpretation of the 1589 intermedi. Based on Saslow’s work, one could 
suggest that, for early seventeenth-century readers, the expression could specifically suggest Florence—
Jacopo Soldani would refer to the city as a “theater of the world” as late as 1716.S Berner, “Florentine 
Political Thought in the Late Cinquecento,” Il Pensiero Politico 3, no. 2 (January 1, 1970): 186. 
4 On the status of the 1609 score and the interpretation of prologues as paratexts—as “liminal thresholds 
working as crucial sites of intersubjective exchange between subject and reader”—which authorize the 
work and its subsequent performances, see Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 21ff and further; Gérard 
Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation (Cambridge; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997) and; Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). On 
the various extant editions and copies of the score of L’Orfeo and its editorial problems, see Tim Carter, 
“Some Notes on the First Edition of Monteverdi’s ‘Orfeo’ (1609),” Music & Letters 91, no. 4 (2010): 498–
512. Carter notes that the metaphor is a clumsy rhetorical flourish with a potentially negative effect, as 
Monteverdi does not realize that “drawing attention to the limitations of the first performance scarcely 
paints his patron in a flattering light” p. 509; Carter also suggests an interesting possibility, from the 
perspective of material book studies, that “angusta” may be a typographical error for “augusta,” a 
hypothesis that the famous 1607 letter by Carlo Magni (which dates the first performance of L’Orfeo and 
says all the performers will “speak musically” [parleranno musicalmente]) falsifies, as it utilized the same 
adjective to describe the size of the room, “…caso che l’angustia del luogo non mi escluda.”Angelo Solerti, 
Gli albori del melodramma, vol. 1 (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1969), 69; see also Calcagno, From Madrigal to 
Opera, 20; Susan Helen Parisi, “Ducal Patronage of Music in Mantua, 1587-1627: An Archival Study” 
(University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1989), 189 n.81. In lieu of adducing simple causal reasons 
like this one, we can suggest that the rhetorical flourish is overdetermined, and in this lies its analytical 
interest. It may be clumsy, or a typo, and also motivated by opposition of the pervasive trope it aims to 
mobilize—the Theatrum mundi—as well as by the other trope that accompanies—the birth (and this sense 
should not be underestimated). In all cases, it mobilizes diverse, incompatible, and simultaneous causes 
none of which entirely accounts for it, yet it uniquely programs the conditions under it was produced, as 
well as illuminating how we approach it now, as this section elaborates. 
5 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994), 45ff; Antonio José Maravall, Culture of the Baroque Analysis of a 
Historical Structure (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986). 
6 Saslow, The Medici Wedding of 1589; Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 17–20. 
7 Erwin Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form (Cambridge, MA: Zone Books, 1991). 
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entailed towards representation, towards an image of the world which saw the world as 
an image8—that served to expand and implement the mechanical and sensorial dimension 
of the new place of man elaborated in what we know today as “Renaissance humanism,” 
programming modernity as a turn away from the obscurity of myth towards the light of 
reason, towards Enlightenment.9 
The chapters that comprise this section focus on elaborating the figure of the 
paradigmatic turn in the Orpheus myth—a longtime figure of poetic imitatio—
specifically as developed in L’Orfeo, from historical, political, and aesthetic perspectives. 
In chapter 5, I locate L’Orfeo within the agonistic relation between Florence and Mantua, 
where the two dynasties aimed to appropriate the Orpheus myth as a means to self-
display. The reading of L’Orfeo as an allegorical representation of the Gonzaga 
patriarchal lineage is suggested in Jean-Pierre Ponnelle’s 1976 production of L’Orfeo, 
and further analyzed by Mauro Calcagno. 10 Elaborating on Calcagno’s reading of 
L’Orfeo as a performance of nobility which includes not only the musical performance of 
1607 but also the printed scores and other materials produced after the production, I 
introduce the idea of performance as actualization and operativity, but especially as in-
completion: namely that the same conditions that allow for allegorical identifications to 
be suggested through performance are at the same time the conditions for the 
impossibility of such identifications to remain fixed but also, and perhaps more 
fundamentally, in constant need to be reenacted in order to, precisely, affirm noble power 
and legitimize its sovereignty. This point is elaborated through a close-reading of the 
opening of Ponnelle’s production, and further in an excursus focused on the role of 
allegory and opera in Walter Benjamin’s The Origin of German Tragic Drama. 
L’Orfeo is recurrently presented as the paradigmatic opera, both due to its theme 
of musical effectivity and its historical position, yet it cannot nevertheless be taken as a 
                                                
8 Martin Heidegger, “’The Age of the World Picture (1938),’ in Off the Beaten Track, ed. Julian Young and 
Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
9 Adorno, Theodor W, and Max Horkheimer. Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002. 
10 Jean-Pierre Ponnelle and Nikolaus Harnoncourt, Monteverdi: Orfeo (Munich: Unitel Films, 1978); 
Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera. 
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pure origin. As we know, it draws most immediately from Rinuccini and Peri’s 
L’Euridice (1600), from the madrigal tradition (as Calcagno and others demonstrate), and 
further from the allegorical intermedi developed by the Medici in Florence during the 
sixteenth century and adopted by Duke Vincenzo Gonzaga at the end of the century. 
Chapter 6 thus looks back at L’Euridice, aiming to situate what I argue are the most 
important elements that make both L’Orfeo and L’Euridice modern versions of the 
Orpheus myth, namely the absence of musical power as magical effectivity, and its 
displacement onto questions of sovereignty and law. I situate this displacement through a 
close reading of the underworld scene in L’Euridice, which introduces two significant 
departures from ancient and modern versions of the myth: first, in Peri’s stile 
rappresentativo magical song is not only unrepresentable but also ineffective. Second, 
Orfeo’s paradigmatic lament/plea to Plutone is doubled by Caronte and Proserpina, who 
adapt and transform elements from Ovid’s telling creating a choral appeal that centers on 
the sovereign. This figure of the sovereign corresponds to Benjamin’s analysis of the 
politic-theological figure of the sovereign in the German Trauerspiel, based on Carl 
Schmitt, but it is not exhausted by it. I elaborate on this choral dimension by turning to 
Machiavelli’s political and theatrical writings (The Prince and La Clizia), suggesting not 
only that the entire scene in L’Euridice recalls some of Machiavelli’s writings on 
sovereignty, but that seeing it from that perspective opens it to suggestive interpretations 
of its political function, namely that the collective address to the sovereign from the 
position of the subordinates can be understood as mode of opening a space for the people. 
If chapter 5 argues that every performance is an in-completion of the work, chapter 6 
argues that such an in-completion can be understood in a political sense as an opening 
towards the future, as opening such a political space, a space for a people that is 
unrepresentable. 
In chapter 7 I focus on a structural condition by which a turn produces a dorsal 
invisibility, as remarked by David Wills in Dorsality: Thinking Back Through 
Technology and Politics, which defines the place of music as dorsal, unseen and even as 
transcendent. The spectacularization of the world, I argue, is also a spectralization, the 
production of a haunting remainder that makes every new turn into a crisis. Thus, the 
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performative and material turns in contemporary musicology necessarily produce the idea 
of music as transcendent, as I show through a reading of Carolyn Abbate’s 2004 essay, 
“Music: Drastic or Gnostic?” This structure, I argue further, is constitutive also the 
modern turn towards vision described by Martin Jay in Downcast Eyes: The Denigration 
of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought and especially by Christine Buci-
Glucksmann in The Madness of Vision: On Baroque Aesthetics. The baroque, moreover, 
intensifies the simultaneous spectralization and spectacularization of the world by posing 
multiple perspectives, which music traverses through what baroque theorists called the 
affections, a collective, impersonal disposition which music regulates. I focus on a 
particular type of affect, allegrezza or gioia, which characterizes early modern festa, as 
the mimetic means by which early modern spectacle, from intermedi to opera, uses 
spectacle, music and allegory to inscribe the ethos of the community. 
The two preceding chapters can be seen as a preparation for my reading of Act 4 
of L’Orfeo, specifically the moment of Orfeo’s backward turn and subsequent loss of 
Euridice, which serves as the unifying trope of Part III. I focus on the seldom noted noise 
(strepito) that makes Orfeo turn towards Euridice. Absent from other tellings of the myth 
except for Virgil’s—where three thunders are heard after Orfeo turns—this noise 
complicates traditional readings about Orfeo’s motive for turning. Added to the absence 
of magical song—as argued in chapter 6—this noise makes L’Orfeo a paradigmatic 
baroque moment, a turning point or a crisis, at the origin of modernity. I first elaborate on 
this sense of crisis and modernity and music’s role in it through Theodor Adorno’s and 
Mladen Dolar’s comments on L’Orfeo (in Sound Figures and Opera’s Second Death, 
respectively). The ineluctable eventality and opaque materiality of the noise constitutes 
an interpretive impasse that declares the turn to be without meaning, and thus invites us 
to consider the turn in all its material and performative dimensions. 
 
I ask several questions which I consider to be at the center of critical approaches to 
L’Orfeo, given its paradigmatic place in the history of opera. These are questions that will 
help understand how L’Orfeo becomes such a paradigm, how it is produced, and how 
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paradigms in general are produced. Central to my method is avoiding to place 
Monteverdi or any other as an author, and instead examining the figures—authorial, 
rhetorical, historical, that frame questions like these: how can we reconcile the mythical 
aspects of Orpheus with the literary tropes that actualize it in early seventeenth-century 
opera, while preserving the specificity of opera’s modes of figuration and the 
technologies that mediate it? In other words, how is it that the birth of opera, and modern 
music, are presented—re-presented (musicalmente rappresentata)—on the stage of a 
trope that is as old as the world, the Theatrum Mundi, while also being articulated as a 
turn (a re-turn) towards ancient music and myth (or the return of ancient drama to the 
modern stage)? What is the structure and the significance of this turning point (a birth 
which is also a passage into the underworld—a katabasis—into the past as the realm of 
the dead, a shamanic initiation for Orpheus) for modern music?11 
For L’Orfeo is such a turning point, staged precisely as a turn in Orpheus’s 
unavoidable and irresistible movement, a tropos which becomes a trope.12 The early 
status of Orfeo in the history of opera makes it also irresistible to locate and to interpret—
                                                
11 Not to speak of its medieval interpretations as a precursor of Christ, as educator, civilizing agent, and so 
on. For a survey of the various figures of Orpheus in history, from antiquity to late modernity, Walter A 
Strauss, Descent and Return; the Orphic Theme in Modern Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1971); John Warden, Orpheus: The Metamorphosis of a Myth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1985); A. M Babbi, ed., Le metamorfosi di Orfeo: convegno internazionale, Verona, 28-30 maggio 1998 : 
atti (Verona: Fiorini, 1999). As the titles of these works attest, and as Strauss elaborates, metamorphosis is 
the uniting trait in the Orpheus myth—in fact, of any myth, as Eduardo Viveiros de Castro emphasizes 
(after Levi-Strauss): “Mythic discourse registers the movement by which the present state of things is 
actualized from a virtual, precosmological condition that is perfectly transparent—a chaosmos where the 
corporeal and spiritual dimensions of beings do not yet conceal each other… mythic metamorphosis is an 
event, a change on the spot… Myth is not history because metamorphosis is not a process, was not yet a 
process and will never be a process. Metamorphosis is both anterior and external to the process of 
process—it is a figure (figuration) of becoming.” Eduardo Batalha Viveiros de Castro and Peter Skafish, 
Cannibal Metaphysics: For a Post-Structural Anthropology, 2014. In other words, Orpheus can be taken as 
an exemplary myth, as “myth thinking about myth,” in the words of Elizabeth Sewell Strauss, Descent and 
Return; the Orphic Theme in Modern Literature, 2; On katabasis and Orpheus as shaman, see Robert 
MacGahey, The Orphic Moment: Shaman to Poet-Thinker in Plato, Nietzsche and Mallarmé (Albany: State 
Univ. of New York Press, 1994). 
12 As Heather Love notes, the word trope indicates a “a word turning away from its literal meaning.” She 
thus takes the turn as a figure for figuration, and specifically for a modernist melancholia which seeks to 
move forward by producing a series of nonmoden others that are left behind, to which it is nevertheless 
tragically bound. Her book is “an image repertory of modernist melancholia” figured as a backwards turn, 
to which the readings in this chapter can contribute. Through this repertory, we could also then speak of the 
trope of treating the turn as the trope of modernity. Heather Love, Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics 
of Queer History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 5. 
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to allegorize a myth that historically has invited allegorical interpretations in the West for 
more than two millennia, perhaps more than any other myth in its repository13—as a point 
of origin, as a paradigm of opera in toto. The myth gives itself easily to interpretation, to 
the selection of particular elements within the narrative that are then presented as 
exemplary of opera as a whole. It seems obvious why Orpheus is given this prominent 
role, in mostly every author who signals the recurrence of early baroque operas based on 
that particular myth, so obvious that the explanation most often misses or overstates the 
crucial point. Orpheus is taken to represent the magical and incantatory power of music 
over its listeners that Italia humanists sought to restore in their attempt to fashion 
themselves after the ancient Greeks.14 What would then be more suitable to create and 
reproduce the fabled effects of their than by choosing Orpheus as their model?15 
                                                
13 I have referred, among others, to the rich essays collected in Warden, Orpheus. 
14 And it is large question, indeed, why it is a pastoral myth in its Ovidian form and not the “true” heroic 
tragedies of Sophocles, Aeschylus, Euripides, or Seneca. As Lorenzo Bianconi remarks, “it is as though the 
foundation of the new musical and theatrical genre—based on a musical language that was capable of 
representing and moving the affections (a regeneration, so to speak, of the ‘pathopoietic’ properties of 
music) was destined (my emphasis) to take place less under the banner of the tragic catharsis of heroic and 
sacrificial mythology (the horror of which is sufficient to silence both music and text) than on the fertile—
indeed, enchanted—terrain of a mythology of metamorphoses and origins.” Lorenzo Bianconi, Music in the 
Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987). This contradiction seems to 
have struck the young Nietzsche as well, who dismisses the stile rappresentativo in section 19 of The Birth 
of Tragedy as the product of “unmusical” and “theoretical man,” who “Because he does not sense the 
Dionysian depth of music, he changes his musical taste into an appreciation of the understandable word-
and-rhetoric of the passions in the stile rappresentativo, and into the voluptuousness of the arts of song. 
Because he is unable to behold a vision, he forces the machinist and the decorative artist into his service. 
Because he cannot comprehend the true nature of the artist, he conjures up the “artistic primitive man” to 
suit his taste, that is, the man who sings and recites verses under the influence of passion. Friedrich 
Wilhelm Nietzsche, Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, NY: Random House, 
2000), 116. 
15 The phrase that “all opera is Orpheus” has become a commonplace in critical assessments of the 
philosophical aspect of opera and its origins in a (often Romantic or romanticized) teleological narrative 
that tends to overemphasize certain aspects of opera as determining of the whole genre: vocal virtuosity, the 
expressive power of monody and the stile rappresentativo, etc. But several other questions can be asked by 
taking its centrality as a starting point. This paradigm is, of course, being challenged from several positions, 
for example by recovering and re-staging works from the so-called “dark ages” of opera, i.e. the period 
between Monteverdi’s death and Gluckian reform, and especially by producing new historicist close 
readings of primary sources, documents, and performances to expose the variety, complexity, and 
irreducibility of musical practices to a single paradigm, especially by highlighting issues of gender, identity 
and difference. See, for example, Bruno Forment, (Dis)embodying Myths in Ancien Régime Opera: 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2012); Rebecca Cypess, Beth Lise 
Glixon, and Nathan Link, Word, Image, and Song, vol. 1, 2013. One may argue, however, that with such a 
reexamination its status as paradigmatic opera is not threatened or relativized but only reinforced by 
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This interpretation is not without its mimetic complications: to recall the theory of 
mimetic paradigmaticity presented in Part I, there is a certain contagion in this process of 
paradigmatic determination: the singular stands in for the totality, it is both a part of the 
whole and outside of the whole, without any mediation other than the work of mimesis by 
which both become identified. The particular mirrors the totality, which it anticipates in 
congealed form—a “proleptic vision.”16 L’Orfeo certainly has this quality. It is commonly 
presented as a rare case, a truly mythical being: born—like Athena—fully grown from 
the genius of the composer17 (or so it seems, since we lack any sketches or 
correspondence that gives light on the composer’s labor); a hybrid with no offspring (for 
the difference with the works of its contemporaries and the composer’s own later works 
is radical); and yet majestically appropriate to stand in for the birth of opera as a whole.18 
Or so it appears in Joseph Kerman’s Opera as Drama: 
                                                                                                                                            
examining the context of which it is taken to be paradigmatic. This chapter complements these approaches 
with a critical assessment of the notion of paradigmaticity at stake in the “paradigmatic opera” for the 
period these works aim to complicate. 
A slightly different argument for the use of Apollo and Orpheus is suggested by Pirrota and emphasized by 
Calcagno, namely that “the choice of mythological characters known for their musical prowess—Apollo 
and Orpheus—undoubtedly served a legitimizing purpose, justifying music as an art that could fully hold 
the stage for an entire performance, fulfilling Aristotelean requirements of verisimilitude.” Calcagno, From 
Madrigal to Opera, 15. 
One could also question the centrality of Orpheus by noting the also prominent place of Apollo in the 
symbolic universe of the Medici, which precedes, and engenders, the role of Orpheus, as Barbara Russano 
Hanning does in her reading of the first first opera, Dafne, by Rinuccini, Corsi, and Peri. Barbara Russano 
Hanning, “Glorious Apollo: Poetic and Political Themes in the First Opera,” Renaissance Quarterly 32, no. 
4 (Winter 1979): 485–513. In this line, or lineage, one may also question the place—or absence—of 
Eurydice as paradigm and symbol. Kelley Harness, “Le Tre Euridici: Characterization and Allegory in the 
Euridici of Peri and Caccini,” Journal of Seventeenth-Century Music 9, no. 1 (2003), http://sscm-
jscm.org/jscm/v9/no1/harness.html. 
16 Echoes here of Attali’s “prophetic music” are not mere coincidence. Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political 
Economy of Music (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1985). 
17 Thus Leo Schrade: “But the Orfeo was in every respect a unique work, so far above anything that had 
been produced in the early days of opera that the genius of Monteverdi, “Musico ver del Paradiso,” must 
have been apparent even to those who had previously shown reluctance to honor him. The Mantuans 
welcomed the Orfeo with great excitement, since they knew, as Carlo Magni recorded, that they were 
privileged to witness a unique event…The unity between drama and music, which Ferrari observed is, 
indeed, the great historic distinction of the Orfeo. At the dawn of operatic history, the music drama was 
created by Monteverdi alone, without any real precursor.” Leo Schrade, Monteverdi, Creator of Modern 
Music (New York: Norton, 1950), 226. 
18 Elements for this fable of pure origin are also to be found in the mythical figure of Orpheus, every since 
Ibycus named him “Famous Orpheus” (fr. 10, Diels; David A Campbell, Greek Lyric: In Four Volumes., 
vol. 3, Stesichorus, Ibycus, Simonides, and others (Cambridge, Masachusetts: Harvard UP, 2001), 269.) as 
well as Pseudo-Plutarch, for whom Orpheus “appears not to have copied anybody, [Ὀρφεὺς οὐδένα 
φαίνεται µεµιµηµένος] since he had no predecessors except the poets who composed songs sung to the 
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The lasting myths contain in them the lasting problems of man. The myth of 
Orpheus, furthermore, deals with man specifically as artist, and one is drawn 
inevitably to see in it, mirrored with a kind of proleptic vision, the peculiar 
problems of the opera composer…[For] Orpheus, the lyric singer, the crisis of life 
becomes the crisis of his lyric art: art must now move into action, on to the tragic 
stage of life. It is a sublime attempt. Can its symbolic boldness have escaped the 
musicians of 1600, seeking new power in the stronger forms of drama? Orpheus’ 
new triumph is to fashion the lament that harrows hell out of his own great, 
sorrowing emotion…It is the problem of emotion and its control, the summoning 
of feeling to an intensity and communicability and form which the action of life 
heeds and death provisionally respects. But as man he cannot shape his emotions 
to Pluto’s shrewd decree; face to face with the situation, he looks back, and fails. 
Life and art are not necessarily one.19 
For Kerman, then, Orpheus stands in for his (and T. S. Eliot’s) theory of drama, the 
rigorously mimetologic definition of artistic creation as the organic shaping of materials 
and feelings towards a unified aim which seeks to give “some perception of an order in 
life, by imposing an order upon it.”20 Orpheus is presented as (modernist) artist, and a 
failed one, incapable of controlling himself—for this is the moral of the story as given by 
Apollo, the neoplatonic interpretation according to which Eurydice’s beauty is but a 
means to kindle the “blind amor” of true philosophical eros, one directed towards eternal 
things and not tied to earthly appearances.21 This scheme—already an interpretation of an 
interpretation—gives Kerman the key to approach the score as bearing the traces of the 
                                                                                                                                            
aulos, and Orpheus’ work is not like theirs in any respect” Pseudo-Plutarch, De Musica, sect. 5. Andrew 
Barker, Greek Musical Writings, vol. Vol. 1 The Musician and his Art (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), [p. 210. 
19Joseph Kerman, Opera as Drama (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 27–28 emphasis mine. 
20 Eliot, quoted by Kerman in ibid., 8. 
21 The gendered dimensions of this interpretive schema—the (male) composer working upon a 
passive/unruly (hence feminine) material—should be kept in mind, especially in the context of the previous 
chapter. For a different reading of this neoplatonic motive in the opera, with a criticism of this logic, see 
Klaus Theweleit, “Monteverdi’s L’Orfeo: The Technology of Reconstruction,” in Opera Through Other 
Eyes, ed. David J Levin (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 164. 
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compositional process (in the absence of sketches) in which the (Prometheic and not 
simply inspired) genius meets the raw libretto (of a poet whom all critics are happy to 
dismiss as mediocre), struggling to accomplish an organic, ideal unity, with fallible 
humanity accounting for the score’s flaws. 
And yet, we may ask, what is the necessity of this turn, what makes it fateful or 
tragic, and to whom does it belong? Even if we remain within the interpretation of 
Orpheus as lyric poet, the turn is not univocal. By turning, by losing Eurydice—it is also 
suggested (after Rilke)—Orpheus becomes who he is: Orpheus’s disobedience transforms 
fate into vocation.22 Also since the place and the moment of the transgression are not 
clear: there is a certain inevitability for transgressing the law that forbids him to turn. It is 
necessary to repeat the transgression of the law, “for he already violated it with his first 
steps toward the shades.”23 For, as Guthrie established, Eurydice is a late addition to the 
Orpheus myth: in the most ancient sources, Orpheus is at home in the underworld; later 
on, Eurydice enters the story and, significantly, Orpheus succeeds in rescuing her (as in 
Peri and Rinuccini’s Euridice). The injunction not to look back, Guthrie suggests, signals 
“an element of tabu” which nevertheless only becomes prominent in Alexandrian 
versions, and more famously in Virgil’s and Ovid’s tellings—the earliest sources for 
Striggio’s libretto.24 
Further, if for Kerman L’Orfeo is an allegory of the work of the (male) composer 
struggling to control himself and his (passive/resistant/feminine) material, we can 
imagine another interpretive turn and see this struggle in its historicity, in fact as an 
allegory of historical work as such. Beyond the autonomous realm of the aesthetic, 
L’Orfeo takes place on a world stage, or a stage between worlds, in a liminal space 
                                                
22 Robert Romanyshyn, “‘Anyway, Why Did It Have to Be the Death of the Poet?’: The Orphic Roots of 
Jung’s Psychology.” Spring: A Journal of Archetype and Culture, no. 71: Orpheus (2004): 67ff. This 
interpretation is echoed by Klaus Theweleit and further by Slavoj Žižek, “The Ridiculous Excess of 
Mercy,” Lacanian Ink, no. 41/42 (Spring 2013), www.lacan.com. 
23 Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, 1982 References to modern readings of the myth can be 
endlessly multiplied; they will appear below as needed. 
24 William K. C Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion: A Study of the Orph. Movement. (London: Methuen, 
1952), 31; On Striggio’s sources, see F. W. Sternfeld, “The Orpheus Myth and the Libretto of Orfeo,” in 
Claudio Monteverdi, Orfeo, ed. John Whenham (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1986). 
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between the underworld and the mortal world, or similarliy in the private, narrow scene 
of the Gonzaga palace and the public stage which it never reached.25 Thus, L’Orfeo stages 
the demand that humanism placed in opera, that of fulfilling a historical, political, and 
artistic task by looking back, by seeking to save the ancient past from forgetfulness and 
setting it to work in the present—an ancient past which stands in for modernity’s fantasy 
of a lost origin.26 Seeking to revive in opera the fabled effects of a now silent ancient 
music (but for what ends?), the humanists wished to have been born under the sign of 
Janus—capable of seeing equally towards the past and the future—yet their fate was to 
repeat Orpheus’ destiny, to keep turning back, to keep losing what they sought to 
retrieve, to reinscribe it as trope in its iteration. 
In so doing, the humanists programed opera with a certain historicity 
characterized by a mimetic structure which is embodied by Orpheus’ turn: opera has no 
origin, it was not born—in Florence or Mantua or Venice—but it was always a return, a 
turning gaze seeking a model, the paradoxical creation of the new through a turn towards 
the already lost past.27 A turn that was supposed to authorize it, to endow it with a lineage 
that would support and guarantee its value—by providing an interpretive scheme, a 
methodology, a repository of meaning, and authority: an “origin” for what was otherwise 
                                                
25 On the private/public aspect of the Theatrum mundi metaphor in L’Orfeo, see Calcagno, From Madrigal 
to Opera, 21. The difference between the private and the public, Calcagno argues, is more of degree than in 
kind, and also determines various aspects of the opera, most significantly the need for two different 
endings. p. 22; I return to this interpretation below.) 
26 Among the well-known figures involved in this enterprise, Jacopo Peri seems to have had an awareness 
of the problematic task they faced, as he noted, in his foreword to the 1601 edition of Euridice, that even if 
he was inspired by the theories of the Camerata, his attempt at reviving the power of ancient music was not 
an attempt to recreate “the manner of singing used in the fables of the Greeks and the Romans,” but rather a 
kind of singing that could be adapted to modern Italian.Translation in Oliver Strunk, ed., Source Readings 
in Music History (New York: Norton, 1998), 375. 
27 The question of “when” and “where” is of crucial importance, as Lorenzo Bianconi shows, for the 
historiography of opera. There are only two alternatives, Bianconi writes suggests that either opera began in 
Florence in 1600, or in Venice in 1637; either opera is a courtly event, produced by humanist intellectuals, 
aimed at demonstrating the magnificence of the sovereign for a private audience that embellish a particular 
festive event, or it is a massive spectacular public performance, repeatable and ephemeral, and aimed at 
producing amazement in the bourgeoisie by through distraction and exaltation of civil life. In Florence, 
opera turned to the Greeks, in Venice it turned away from them and towards the public; the Metastasian 
reform would be yet another attempt at turning back, and so on. Bianconi, Music in the Seventeenth 
Century. 
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an “original,” unprecedented creation—a similar economic strategy as the one that 
organized the dispute between Artusi and Signor &c. This, to recall the terms of the 
previous chapter and to situate it in its Renaissance terms, is the function and mechanism 
of imitatio. Within a patriarchal structure, it allows for artists to inscribe themselves as 
descendants and beneficiaries of a composer-model, or in this case, of a myth that acts as 
a repository of meaning and authority.28 To make a copy, in the context of Renaissance 
imitatio, is to accrue from the value of the original that is thus produced. Thus, we can 
still ask, who or what turns or responds in this turn and its repetitions? What are the 
consequences of this originary event of modern aesthetics, especially when staged as a 
turn, or a re-turn? 
For this return undoes opera’s originality, it reinscribes as permanent what it 
sought as novelty, and at the same time defines the “new” of modernity as a turn that 
necessarily loses its object. Similarly, the trope of Orpheus’s turn stages this logic: the 
turn is at once origin and repetition, the origin of a repetition of the past, a turn towards 
the past and a return of the past. The movement we examine here is a turn towards the 
past that simultaneously creates and loses the ghost it seeks—either by recognizing it as a 
ghost and fleeing from it, or by failing to see it as a ghost and grasping an empty void. In 
a psychoanalytical language, both seem to be fatal misrecognitions and the unconscious 
acting out of a drive to autonomy that defines the modern; Orpheus, we’d have to say, 
“intentionally” loses Eurydice in an attempt to be thoroughly autonomous—him and his 
lyre. This spectral structure is suggested by Klaus Theweleit’s reading of Act 5 of 
L’Orfeo as an anticipation of recording technology, whereby Orpheus himself “creates 
this recording medium [in his “conversation” with Echo] and he creates it out of his dead 
lover, Eurydice,” which Žižek further reads as a Orpheus’s perverse act, willingly turning 
towards her in order to lose her and reach sublimation as an artist.29 
                                                
28 Recall also Erasmus’ allegory of Juno’s birth, born fully grown out of the head of Jupiter, which we 
likened above to the seemingly sudden appearance of L’Orfeo. 
29 Theweleit, “Monteverdi’s L’Orfeo,” 169; Žižek, “The Ridiculous Excess of Mercy.” I return to Žižek’s 
reading at the end of chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PERFORMANCE AND ALLEGORY AT THE TURN OF MODERNITY 
If L’Orfeo could be said to stand in for the birth of opera and modern music, this does not 
mean it appeared out of nowhere. The musical experimentations of Peri, Caccini, and 
Monteverdi are not unprecedented or inaugural events but rather, as we know through the 
work of Nino Pirrotta and Elena Povoledo, the result of adaptations and modifications of 
earlier poetic, musical, and theatrical court practices and rituals.1 They constitute a 
reorientation, an inflection that could be located as an attempt to stop the blind, disorderly 
drift of courtly spectacle, to turn it towards the past so that it could advance towards the 
future. 
The dimensions of the Orpheus myth as original, as repository of particular 
meaning and value, can be measured by the centuries-long quarrel between courts to 
secure the “rights” over the actualization of the myth, a dispute that was part of a political 
strategy of alliances based on festivals and dynastic weddings in a complex economy of 
exchange and expenditure.2 The turn occurs in the midst of an already densely structured 
field where, as Mauro Calcagno and James Saslow argue, the nobility patronized artists 
and organized spectacles—including operas—in which mythology was used to relate the 
“stage of the world” to “the world on stage.”3 That myth and spectacle operated together 
in articulating these two stages is evidence enough to hold that the distinctions between 
the aesthetic, the political, and the mythological were not given. Rather, their 
                                                
1 Music and Theatre from Poliziano to Monteverdi (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1982). The point is remarked by Bianconi, who speaks of the “sheer enormity” of the operatic “invention” 
while emphasizing that its emergence is “deeply rooted in historical and social events: conditioned as it is 
by the various prevailing economic and political situations, opera has been and continues to be exploited as 
not an insignificant tool of ideological persuasion and mobilization, a public demonstration of sovereign 
power, a means of collective entertainment, a vehicle for the community celebration of civic events.” 
Bianconi, Music in the Seventeenth Century, 161. 
2 Mauro Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera; Saslow, The Medici Wedding of 1589; Peter Burke, The 
Historical Anthropology of Early Modern Italy: Essays on Perception and Communication (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987); Sara Mamone and Francesco Venturi, Firenze e Parigi: due capitali 
dello spettacolo per una regina, Maria de’ Medici (Cinisello Balsamo (Milano): Silvana, 1988); Sara 
Mamone, Dèi, semidei, uomini: lo spettacolo a Firenze tra neoplatonismo e realtà borghese (XV-XVII 
secolo) (Roma: Bulzoni, 2003). 
3 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 17. 
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coarticulation suggests that such distinctions are produced through a widely distributed 
network of mimetic practices. Thus, as Calcagno argues “the Mantuan artworks based on 
the story of Orpheus were a public act blending mythology and art in order to symbolize 
the rank of the sponsoring dynasty through self-representation.”4 
And we should not, within this struggle for symbolic authority, lose sight of the 
agonistic relation between Florence and Mantua (as well as the Este in Ferrara): it is no 
mere coincidence the Gonzaga chose the same myth as the Medici for their courtly 
celebrations.5 From Ficino’s self-identification with Orpheus, through Poliziano’s 
presence at Lorenzo de’ Medici’s court and further Agnolo Bronzino’s portrait of Cosimo 
de Medici as Orpheus (c. 1537-1539; Philadelphia Museum of Art), ending with the 
Rinuccini-Caccini-Peri collaboration in Euridice for the 1600 Florentine intermezzi, the 
Medici could have been taken as the rightful inheritors of Orpheus’s powers and divine 
lineage. The Gonzaga, for their part, boasted Mantegna’s 1474 frescoes in the Camera 
degli Sposi which features four different depictions of Orfeo, as well as the portrait of 
Poliziano, which “may have reminded the Mantuans that his Orfeo was produced in 
Mantua in for the first time upon the return of Cardinal Francesco in 1472.”6 In addition, 
various references are made to the myth in the Loggia of the Muses at the Gonzaga 
Palazzo del Tè located at the entrance of Mantua. Built in the 1520s, the Loggia was 
decorated by Giulio Romano with two episodes from Virgil’s telling of the Orpheus 
myth; the motive returns elsewhere in the Loggia in an iconographic ensemble of an 
Allegory of the Mantuan Arts, and again in a smaller chamber dedicated to Ovid, which 
displays Orpheus and Eurydice before Pluto and Proserpina.7 
 In the case of Orfeo, Calcagno notes, the competition determines all the aspects 
of the work, making the score less a prescriptive text than a performative function, aimed 
                                                
4 Ibid., 23. 
5 On the practices of sovereign representation in Florence during this period, see Nina Treadwell, Music 
and Wonder at the Medici Court: The 1589 Interludes for La Pellegrina (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2008).; Saslow, The Medici Wedding of 1589; and Burke, The Historical Anthropology of Early 
Modern Italy. On Mantua, see Parisi, “Ducal Patronage of Music in Mantua, 1587-1627”; and Iain Fenlon, 
Music and Patronage in Sixteenth-Century Mantua (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
6 Schrade, Monteverdi, Creator of Modern Music, 225. 
7 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 23. 
Orpheus’s Modern Turn—Performance and Allegory 
 
191 
to symbolize the rank and function of the patrons.8 In fact, it is precisely the agonistic 
mix between competition and collaboration that defines aemulatio, where imitatio is not 
only aimed at accruing value but at outdoing the adversary’s—or the model’s—earlier 
accomplishments. Aemulatio transforms the economimetic structure of imitatio into a 
zero-sum game, where the inexhaustible value of the original is transferred over to the 
copy, which then becomes a new original under the monopoly of the aemulans. 
 
The first part of this chapter examines the strategies involved in this agonistic stage and 
elaborates on the important suggestion by Calcagno and Saslow, that there is a relation 
between performance, myth, and sovereignty. In order to elucidate this relation, I bring 
Calcagno’s discussion of performance closer to the theoretical framework of this 
dissertation through an examination of Judith Butler’s theory of performativity. If 
Calcagno’s suggestion is to question the difference between text and performance such 
that performances can be incorporated into the musicological archive, I show how 
treating a performance as text also implies that performance is open to the type of play 
and undecidability that characterizes all texts, and which I call the in-completion of 
performance. The result of this will be a notion of performance that can productively 
expand Calcagno’s analysis in order to relocate or reinscribe performance less as a locus 
of historicist hermeneutical meaning, and more as an always already open site of 
contestation whereby history becomes interpretation. 
Here, I return to a claim advanced in chapter 4, that Monteverdi’s “second 
practice” is a question of patriarchal filiation, which employs and transforms available 
notions of mimesis—of a particular Platonic heritage—to redistribute the relation 
between music and the social world. The dispute transformed the humanist understanding 
of the relation between music and ethos, producing an “aesthetic” sphere in which words 
                                                
8 Ibid., 26 Calcagno borrows the expression “conspicuous consumption” from Peter Burke’s influential 
essay. I return to Burke’s essay in chapter 6, but here it may be noted that “consumption” still implies 
something closer to capitalist accumulation. “Expenditure,” in Bataille’s sense (to whom Burke refers in 
passing), could also be useful. In this dissertation it can be more easily understood as an economimetic 
production of paradigms. Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, trans. 
Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1988). 
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and music are linked by separating them as models and copies, whose relation is verified 
by their effects upon an affective (and affected) listener.9 This sphere has a certain 
autonomy, in that words understood as models are severed from their semantic functions 
outside of the affective closed loop joining words to music and listener. Yet, as we saw, 
this autonomy masks the political function of inscribing the laws of the community upon 
the social body by means of (i) a performative assemblage of music, words, stage 
machinery and props, dances, buildings—which incorporates the gods into courtly life 
through intermezzi, banquets, poems, and so on—and (ii) an economic reorganization and 
reappropriation of mythical repositories of symbolic value (the passage from imitatio to 
aemulatio). This makes Renaissance self-fashioning (sensu Greenblatt) into a spectacular 
Baroque self-performance of sovereignty on stage, which will remain dominant until the 
French Revolution.10 
The second part consists of a reading of Jean-Pierre Ponnelle’s opera-film 
Monteverdi: Orfeo, with the Monteverdi-Ensemble des Opernhauses Zürich, conducted 
by Nicolaus Harnoncourt and released in 1978 by Unitel Films, Munich.11 In this “epoch-
making production,” the singers playing Apollo and Orfeo double as Duke Vincenzo 
Gonzaga and Prince Francesco. The production stages the mediation between the world 
and the myth through an analogy that relates Apollo and Vincenzo as the father, and 
Orfeo and Francesco as the son, thus establishing a divine lineage for the Gonzaga 
dynasty that can be taken to legitimize the sovereignty of the Mantuan rulers in a time of 
social, economical, and political upheaval.12 The identification is suggested not only by 
the doubled role of Duke Vincenzo/Apollo, but effected through a series of allegorical 
                                                
9 The scare quotes around “aesthetic” should warn the reader against understanding such a sphere simply in 
the modern sense of artistic autonomy. 
10 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980); see also Maravall, Culture of the Baroque. 
11 See Nigel Fortune, “The Rediscovery of Orfeo,” in Claudio Monteverdi, Orfeo, ed. John Wenham 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); On the opera-films of Ponelle, see Marcia J. 
Citron, “Subjectivity in the Opera-Films of Jean-Pierre Ponnelle,” in When Opera Meets Film, Cambridge 
Studies in Opera (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 97–135. 
12 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 24. Here, I write “Orpheus” and “Eurydice” (and so on) when 
discussing the mythical characters, and “Orfeo” and “Euridice” when referring to Monteverdi and 
Striggio’s characters. On the end of the Renaissance as a period of change, see Burke, The Historical 
Anthropology of Early Modern Italy; and Peter Burke, The Italian Renaissance: Culture and Society in Italy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
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devices, which I analyze through a reading of Walter Benjamin’s notion of allegory in his 
1923 Origin of German Tragic Drama. From this reading I advance a way to relate 
performance and allegory through the notions of spectacle and affect, which illuminate 
the specifically modern form of performance that appears with early opera. 
PERFORMANCE AND THE IN-COMPLETION OF OPERA 
The Ponnelle production of L’Orfeo is an early example of an approach to Early Modern 
courtly productions which considers them less as artistic works having purely aesthetic or 
dramatic motivations, and more as means for social groups to represent and affirm 
themselves as within symbolic networks.13 According to this approach, early operas, in 
the patronage system of Early Modern Italy, symbolized nobility’s social rank by means 
of events that can be critically understood as performances (both the musical 
performances and their printed paratexts), as Calcagno argues after Claudio Annibaldi 
and Richard Schechner. Such performances, Calcagno states, “were aimed at displaying 
the innate moral superiority of nobility, a superiority signified by elevated musical style 
and sheer magnificence in the productions, and that justified nobility’s social and 
political power.”14 This moral superiority is linked to the values of the north Italian 
nobility that were conveyed through operatic plots, especially those that focused on the 
patriarchal lineage of Apollo and Orpheus, making opera “a true princely spectacle.” 
L’Orfeo is not only, or not so much, an example of courtly entertainment but rather, as 
Calcagno argues, a type of ritual (performed during Carnival, in a specific place, and for 
a specific audience, with a specific function). Considered within a neoplatonic 
interpretation of the myth, where Orpheus attains wisdom by losing Euridice, the 
performance of the opera within the agonistic courtly context of Florence and Mantua can 
be seen as “a rite of passage,” where allegorical interpretation would have suggested the 
identification between the Prince and Orfeo, and thus symbolizing a transformation in the 
Prince himself, 
                                                
13 Another productive approach to opera as social performance is offered in Martha Feldman, Opera and 
Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); I consider Feldman’s work in chapter 6. 
14 Ibid., 16. 
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In the case of Orfeo, symbolic value was conveyed through the enactment of the 
“rite of passage” undergone by the protagonist of the opera, in a mise-en-scène of 
Prince Francesco’s process of increased self-knowledge, showing the acquisition 
of virtues considered natural to nobility. The elite academic members present at 
the premiere mirrored themselves in this process. The score, as the material 
reiteration of the values embodied in performance, transferred this process into 
the public domain.15 
This approach to L’Orfeo casts the work in an entirely new light, and allows us to ask 
crucial questions about the way music, as a performative assemblage, is involved in the 
production of paradigms, or in this case, a certain type of value. Calcagno suggests that 
the inherent value of the nobility is first displayed in the performances, and then 
conveyed as symbolic value through the scores and other paratexts. One could ask, 
however, whether displaying and symbolizing nobility are political acts with real 
effectivity—especially in the turbulent political world of the late sixteenth century—or, 
in other words, whether symbolic value exists and is effective in a political, and not 
aesthetic, sphere. One way to understand their effectivity is to question their status as 
symbols, limited to communicating and transmitting (without altering) the values of the 
nobility. However, as we have seen, there is no such transparent transmission: a repetition 
is always an alteration. Thus, if it has been established that the performances are not 
simply an entertainment but are entwined with issues of political representation and 
sovereignty, questioning the mimetic structure of these productions, emphasizing their 
productive aspect as performative assemblages, might put them in a new perspective. As 
in other forms of mimetic production examined here, we can suggest that what appears as 
a symbol for the value of the nobility is already the production of such value 
 We can already see how this happens in Calcagno’s analysis. ‘Value,’ in these 
two passages, is first synonymous with ‘virtue,’ namely the “innate moral superiority” of 
the nobility that needs to be displayed and signified. And yet, these ethical valences are 
also conveyed, embodied, and transferred through these significations. That is, ‘value’ 
                                                
15 Ibid., 19. 
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here also has an economic mode of circulation, one that includes the mirroring of the elite 
academic members in the performance. Thus the innate, we might say original, moral 
value—the inherent goodness—of the nobility passes into its cultural products by being 
signified through the production’s elevation and magnificence, through conspicuous 
consumption. It is as if the passage of virtue into an economic mode of existence had 
itself been motivated by the historical circumstances of northern Italy, specifically the 
way the Medici used their power and influence as bankers to gain political control of 
territories and to rise above other aristocratic families, such as the Gonzaga. 
In fact, the Medici first developed the strategy of “performing nobility” during 
Cosimo I’s rule, but especially during Ferdinando’s time, that is, after 1588. Ferdinando, 
known for his frugality and financial efficiency, largely expanded on the resources, 
technologies, and creative forces within the principate, and made it his central purpose to 
present the Medici to the world “as commanding actors on the international stage.”16 This 
was especially necessary given the difficulty of legitimizing Medici rule according to 
political theories of sovereignty. In late cinquecento Florence, sovereignty was defended 
more on terms of ancient lineage than on monarchical titles of honor.17 Giovanni Battista 
Strozzi, commissioned in 1603 to write an encomium of the Medici family to be 
distributed around Europe, faced the problem of accounting for the family’s origins in 
“strictly” historical terms. As Samuel Berner shows, his solution was to insist on 
Florence as the greatest imitation of Rome, and the role of the Medici family in 
maintaining its magnificence—a device which allowed him to gloss over the uncertainty 
of the family’s origins as well as their exile during the Republican period.18 The official 
descriptions of the 1589 intermedi, written by Bastiano de’ Rossi, relied on the same 
device: 
Leaving aside the machines and the other Roman splendors, and the spectacle 
which—with many animals from all over the world—Pompeo launched in Rome 
                                                
16 Saslow, The Medici Wedding of 1589, 10; Treadwell, Music and Wonder at the Medici Court, 14. 
17 Berner, “Florentine Political Thought in the Late Cinquecento,” 170. 
18 Idem., 171. 
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(by the way, they say that more than five hunderd lions were killed); and from 
these distinguishing what was public, since the private were other things, and 
getting to our argument, we can say that: among the European provinces, that of 
Tuscany (and particularly the city of Florence) has always forcefully and publicly 
tried to imitate the aforementioned venerable antiquities, in terms of theatre 
buildings and amphitheaters that were built there.19 
Rossi goes on to describe the buildings and spectacles created by Cosimo il vecchio 
(1389-1464), supreme model of magnificenza and virtù and moves through all 
generations, in which each patriarch imitated and surpassed their accomplishments, up to 
Cosimo I de’ Medici, “il primo Granduca di Toscana, notabile esemplo, nell’età nostra, di 
tal virtù,” and his sons Francesco and Ferdinando, each more “enamoured” (innamorato) 
and “infatuated” (invaghito) with the patriarch’s virtù. Ferdinando’s wedding feste, then, 
was his attempt to show, with his works, how much he loved such virtù (“E volendo pur 
tuttavia con l’opere mostrare, quanto e’ sia amator di questa virtù…”).20   
By 1600, Duke Vincenzo had entered the competition and could only do so in 
their terms, replacing his costly military endeavors with—even more costly—displays of 
magnificenza.21 By engaging in the practices of aemulatio with the new kind of ruling 
class of Florentine bankers, the values of the Gonzagas became similar to those of the 
Medici. We would have to say, then, that in the context of northern Italy’s Early Modern 
opera, symbolic value depends on display and circulation and not accumulation. This 
explains why the innate moral superiority of the nobility needs to pass into its cultural 
                                                
19 “Ma lasciando da parte le macchine, e l’altre romane magnificenze, e lo spettacolo, che con tanto numero 
di fere, condotte da diverse parti del mondo, fecce rappresentare in Roma Pompeo, che fra l’altre dicono, 
che vi furono uccisi più di cinquecento Lioni; e da queste faccendo ragione, quali fossero le pubbliche, 
poichè le privati erna tali, e venendo al nostro proponimento; diremo che, tra l’altre provincie dell’Europa, 
quella della Toscana, e in quella particolarmente la città di Firenze, come per le reliquie de’ teatri, e 
anfiteatri, che fabbricati furono in essa, tuttavia possiamo vedere, ha sempre cosi in pubblico, come in 
privato, con tute le forze sue, cercato d’imitare le dette venerabili antichità.” Bastiano de’Rossi, 
Descrizione dellapparato e degl’ intermedi. Fatti per la commedia rappresentata in Firenze. Nelle nozze de’ 
serenissimi Don Ferdinando Medici, e Madama Cristina de Loreno, gran duchi di Toscana. (Firenze: A. 
Padouani, 1589); transcribed in Treadwell, Music and Wonder at the Medici Court, 178. 
20 Coining the title of Great Duke for Cosimo I, in 1569, was itself a transformation of sovereignty towards 
a more monarchical theory of sovereignty, closer to that of divine right. Berner, “Florentine Political 
Thought in the Late Cinquecento,” 186. 
21 Parisi, “Ducal Patronage of Music in Mantua, 1587-1627.” 
Orpheus’s Modern Turn—Performance and Allegory 
 
197 
productions, why it needs to be performed. By the end of the Renaissance, moral value 
has no value if it does not circulate, if it does not behave like economical value. The 
nobility discovers that its decreasing value cannot be accumulated like capital: it needs to 
put its value in circulation through the cultural products from which the members of the 
Academies that produced them can benefit by mirroring themselves in them.22 
Readings of these early modern performances as offered by Calcagno and Saslow 
force us to question the modes of circulation and representation of this double value 
(moral and economical). They suggest also, if we push the logic further, that 
performances produce the values that they put in circulation. It is not so much that the 
inherent moral value of the nobility is signified by the performances, as if they were 
signifiers of an essential core. Rather, as mimetic performances, they partake of the 
production of values that characterize the nobility, especially as the moral values of the 
nobility turn into the economical values of the rising bourgeoisie. 
The economimetic structure of the production of values through performance can 
be seen more clearly by turning to Judith Butler’s theory of performativity as presented in 
her influential “Imitation and Gender Insubordination.”23 For Butler, there is no essential, 
interior identity to be put on display, for example by calling oneself “gay” or “lesbian,” 
(or, as in this case, “noble”) that is externalized by “coming out of the closet” or by 
producing cultural products to signify such an identity. Rather, being “out” is only a 
deferral that depends on being “in,” that produces the closet as a promise of disclosure 
that, says Butler, by definition can never come. This deferral, the non-presence of identity 
as essence, is “a site for the production of values.”24 
The values that are produced from this deferral include “male,” “female,” “gay” 
and so on, which are the result of play and repetition: Not the repetition of the “being” of 
                                                
22 As David Graeber shows, there is still much do do in anthropological theory to show how is it that 
economy and morals share the term “value,” and how to understand the difference, or rather the identity, 
between the two. My modest claim is that mimesis, which strictly belongs to none of this spheres, is in 
charge of relating them one another. David Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False 
Coin of Our Own Dreams (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
23 Judith Butler, “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” in Inside/Out, ed. Diana Fuss (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1991), 13–32. 
24 Ibid., 16. 
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these values (i.e. not the symbolic presentation of the noble in its productions) but rather 
the repetition in which a subject plays a being lesbian or noble. Repetition without a 
model, which constitutes “the way in which that ‘being’ gets established, instituted, 
circulated, and confirmed.”25 
More precisely, and to turn to Butler’s inversion of the notions of gender and 
performance, which employs just the Derridean logic this dissertation elaborates upon, 
gender is paradigmatically mimetic, it is a kind of imitation that has no original but that, 
in fact “produces the very notion of the original as an effect and consequence of the 
imitation itself.”26 The imitation, Butler argues, is a performance—a kind of drag—that 
produces the “reality” of heterosexual identity by setting itself up “as the origin and the 
ground of all imitations.”27 Thus, what is politically subversive in the Derridean inversion 
of mimesis is that is shows how, whereas heterosexuality aims to performatively 
constitute itself as an original, as a normative and natural mode of being, “the parodic or 
imitative effect of gay identities works neither to copy nor to emulate heterosexuality, but 
rather, to expose heterosexuality as an incessant and panicked imitation of its own 
naturalized idealization.”28 
In our context this inversion illuminates the strange identification of economical 
and moral value that circulates as Early Modern nobility. With the rise the bourgeoisie, it 
is not enough be a noble to maintain one’s place and political control. As Machiavelli had 
made explicit, even in times of peace the main concern of the ruler should be maintaining 
his power, as much through force as through cunning, specifically by carefully 
controlling the way the Prince appears to others, his virtù: “[f]or everyone is capable of 
seeing you, but few can touch you. Everyone can see what you appear to be, whereas few 
have direct experience of what you really are; and those few will not dare to challenge the 
popular view, sustained as it is by the majesty of the ruler’s position.”29 Under this 
                                                
25 Ibid., 17. 
26 Ibid., 19, emphasis in the original. 
27 Ibid. emphasis in the original. 
28 Ibid., 18. 
29 Niccolò Machiavelli, Machiavelli: The Prince. Edited by Quentin Skinner. Translated by Russell Price. 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 63. My reading of Machiavelli, developed 
further in chapter 6 is influenced by Louis Althusser, Machiavelli and Us (London; New York: Verso, 
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mimetic regime of political spectacularity, where the centaur-like Prince is made by 
imitating previous rulers, mythical heroes, and even beasts, the act of ruling is a warlike 
performance.30 Every affect and affection has to be measured and balanced towards 
creating the prince as an image of power to which others will submit. And although 
Machiavelli only mentions feasts and spectacles in passing as a means to gain reputation, 
and whereas the Medici did not quite receive his advice—quite the opposite, during his 
lifetime—we cannot doubt that he was a sharp analyst of his own culture—what Burke 
would call an “insider.” The virtù of the Prince that constitutes his power as Prince 
depends on the same value that makes him part of the nobility, and follows its logic. This 
value needs to be put in display and circulation, through extensive and lavish 
performances, since, strictly speaking, such values do not exist until they are constituted 
through the performances that presume to represent them. The performance and the self-
representation of nobility is precisely the production of nobility as value. And this value, 
as in Butler’s account, is first of all a heterosexual, patriarchal value, more precisely, of 
the ideal of innate value as the result of inherited transmission, and of the sovereign as 
divine descendant: hence the importance of employing the myths of Apollo and Orpheus 
as the models for their performances. In other words, Early Modern performance 
                                                                                                                                            
1999). For a reading of Machiavelli in relation to Monteverdi’s operas, see John Bokina. “Deity, Beast, and 
Tyrant: Images of the Prince in the Operas of Monteverdi.” International Political Science Review / Revue 
Internationale de Science Politique 12, no. 1 (1991): 48–66 and Wendy Heller, “Tacitus Incognito: Opera 
as History in ‘L’incoronazione Di Poppea.’” JAMS 52, no. 1 (1999): 39–96. 
30 “Since a ruler, then, must know how to act like a beast, he should imitate both the fox and the lion, for 
the lion is liable to be trapped, whereas the fox cannot ward off wolves. One needs, then, to be a fox to 
recognize traps, and a lion to frighten away wolves. Those who rely merely upon a lion’s strength do not 
understand matters...and those best able to imitate the fox have succeeded best. But foxiness should be well 
concealed: one must be a great feigner and dissembler” Idem., 61. This is a political mimetology—a 
zooanthropomimetopolitics: the sovereign must imitate (and hence is, or becomes) the beast. What he 
imitates in the fox, moreover is cunning: the ability to pretend, the power of simulacrum, is taken from his 
imitation of the fox: “[t]he prince must be a fox not only in order to be cunning like the fox, but in order to 
pretend to be what he is not and not be what he is.” Derrida, Jacques. The Beast and the Sovereign. 
Translated by Geoffrey Bennington. Vol. 1. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 91. This 
zooanthropomimetopolitcs would have a long, if surprising life. Berner describes a funerary oration for 
Cosimo I (d. 1574) written by Bernardo Davanzati, where a central conceit is that, since “one must try to 
imitate nature as much as possible, [then] the acquisition of the Principato is more perfect when it comes 
about most naturally,” namely, as it happens in the animal kingdom, where the strongest becomes the ruler. 
Berner, “Florentine Political Thought in the Late Cinquecento,” 185. 
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inscribes a certain ethos, a type of nobility that, as we have already seen in Part II and as I 
shal show below, is organized around the heterosexual and patriarchal accumulation of 
power. 
In a period of economic, social, and religious upheaval, the panicked Italian 
nobility could not but incessantly repeat the naturalized idealization of patriarchal 
heterosexuality in and through spectacular performances, through all the events that made 
up celebrations such as weddings and coronations and which formed the stage for the 
transition from intermedi to opera. In the Medici celebrations of 1589, the allegorical 
intermedi, where the symbolic elements where presented, were repeated five times 
throughout the month. All other events occurred just once, including the plays for which 
the intermedi were intermissions. It is as if the allegories needed repetition to be 
effective, as if they were constituted through repetition.31 As we know from a letter by 
Prince Francesco to his brother Ferdinando on March 1, 1607, Duke Vincenzo, “not 
content to have been present at [the February 24 L’Orfeo] performance, or to have heard 
it many times in rehearsal, has ordered it to be given again.”32 This means that the 
production of values through performance is not accomplished by a single event, but 
depends on repetition. This brings us to the question of the relation between the 
performance and the text since, if the value of the nobility does not exist before its 
performances, if the performance is not just a symbol of the nobility but constitutes it as 
such, and if performance depends on circulation, then we need to analyze how they 
                                                
31 Saslow, The Medici Wedding of 1589; Gino Stefani, Musica barocca (Milano: Bompiani, 1974). 
Treadwell, however, writes that, since the Medici were concerned mostly with impressing non-Florentine 
powers, the intermedi should be conceived not as “ritualized behaviors of court culture whereby subjects 
were inculcated through patterns of iteration. On the contrary, spectacles of this magnitude were only 
mounted on an ocasional basis, and attempted to be ‘one of a kind.’…[thus] for most spectators-auditors, 
witnessing the Pellegrina intermedi would have constituted a rare, possibly ‘once in a lifetime’ experience. 
Like travel narratives that recounted experiences in distant or ‘exotic’ lands, unofficial accounts of the 
Pellegrina intermedi emphasize the ‘truth value’ of direct experience.”Treadwell, Music and Wonder at the 
Medici Court, 25. As I noted, this seems to be contradicted by the fact that the same intermedi were used 
for different comedies. In fact, as many commentators—then and now—have noted, it is as if the comedies 
served as an excuse for the intermedi. Everything rides on the opposition between ritual as iteration and 
performance as event, which Treadwell exploits to emphasize meraviglia and magnificenza as the primary 
persuasive means in the intermedi while undermining the intended meaning of the allegories. 
32 Translation in Fenlon, Iain. “Monteverdi’s Mantuan ‘Orfeo’: Some New Documentation.” Early Music 
12, no. 2 (1984): 163–72. Fenlon also speculates a third performance was scheduled. See also Fabbri, 
Paolo. Monteverdi. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 286 n. 98 for possible records of other 
performances in the seventeenth century 
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circulate beyond the repetitions of the performances—in other words, performance and 
circulation are modes of repetition. 
A central concern for Calcagno is understanding why, and by what means, “the 
compound of words, music, and gesture characterizing Monteverdi’s madrigals and 
operas” is effective, both in their historical context, and for audiences today.33 Posed in 
the terms of this dissertation, the problem is to understand performative assemblages as 
having effectivity—and not merely symbolic or representative meaning—by emphasizing 
mimesis as a production of values, in this case the value of the nobility. In the case of 
L’Orfeo, Calcagno makes the important point that it was not only the 1607 event of the 
performance in the Mantuan Ducal Palace which had such a performative function, but 
that the two versions of the score need to be analyzed as also partaking of this effectivity. 
These scores—as most early modern documents of the sort—invert what is now the 
normal relation between a text and a performance, where the score contains the 
instructions for the performance and thus holds a status of original, an original which 
would sometimes be equated with the work as such, as we know from the critique of the 
“work concept.” The scores of L’Orfeo we possess today were produced after the 
performance and not before, and thus they invite for different modes of analysis. Yet, as 
is always the case with mimetological relations, it is not enough to simply invert these 
relations. In a suggestive move, Calcagno insists taking the scores not so much as records 
of the performance—that is, as secondary copies of a unique original—but as objects 
which are themselves involved in performance and possess a different function and 
meaning (making Orfeo go from the private, “angusta scena” to the public, “theatre of the 
universe”), such that it is unproductive to examine them in search of traces of previous 
performances.34 Thus, Calcagno argues for reconsidering the difference between text and 
performance, insisting that these scores, too, need to be considered as performances, in 
the sense that Barthes considers texts to be a dynamic site where the play of signifiers 
                                                
33 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 1. 
34 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 19. 
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consists of play, production, and practice.35 “Libretto and score are devised in fact not 
only to be completed, in the traditional sense, by reading, staging, and musical 
performance, but also are meant to prolong and enact the effectiveness of the symbolic 
values conveyed through the premiere.”36 
Seeking to blur the difference between text and performance brings up a 
traditional mimetological problem of distinguishing between the performance as an event 
and its material inscriptions (i.e., scores, sketches) as permanent objects. Opera, Calcagno 
holds, is a two-stage art where “converging symbolic actions originating from both artists 
and patrons conveyed meanings residing at the intersection of text and performance,” 
[B]oth a drive to compete and a need to symbolize rank and power led to 
permanent products such as commemorative descriptions, printed libretti, and 
scores—all products that in turn facilitated the elevation of these works to the 
status of exempla. In being both permanent and ephemeral, both texts and 
performances, early operas such as Orfeo displayed a double mode of existence—
a feature that, since then, has marked, at various times and in different degrees, 
the history of the genre.37 
Thus, descriptions of the performances, libretti, and scores make the works into exempla 
or paradigms. For Calcagno, these are both permanent and ephemeral. Thus, the 
materializations are also performances: the permanent product is also an event. The 
importance of this identification is crucial for understanding the case of Orfeo, whose 
original performance and score are not contemporaneous—and where, unlike most of the 
cases, the operatic event precedes its inscriptions. We must then affirm the claim that the 
text is a performance, i.e. a repetition with no precedent, a copy whose model is produced 
through its iterations. Simultaneously, the performance is a text: it is no less ephemeral 
than the paper in which the score is supposed to be preserved. In this sense, what ensures 
the permanence of the values that the performance conveys is not so much the medium 
that preserves it but, again—and true to the economimetic mode of being of value—
                                                
35 Ibid., 27. 
36 Ibid. 19. 
37 Ibid., 20. 
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through repetition. That is, we cannot assume that the difference between ephemerality 
and permanence depends simply on its preservation in paper. As argued in chapter 2—
after Derrida—inscription should not be understood in the restricted sense of alphabetic 
(or musical) writing, especially in the case of the widely distributed performative 
assemblages under discussion here, where all the elements, from backdrops to bodies, 
even the “reputation” of the Prince, constitute inscriptions. The type of value that is 
produced and circulated through them is never wholly present in nor exhausted by 
individual scores. This point is crucial for the model presented by Calcagno, where 
libretto, score, and performances are involved in a dynamic relation where all “emerge as 
producing, and not simply embodying, the work, which consists more than the sum of its 
textual parts.”38 Calcagno conceives of the relation between scores and performances, 
after Joseph Grigely, in a schematization in which all versions of the libretto, the score, 
and the performance are displayed in a linear sequence which adds them chronologically, 
and whose total summation produces the work as “an abstract, ideal, ever-absent entity, 
what is verbally referred to, in the case at hand, as “Monteverdi’s Orfeo, encompassing, 
but also exceeding, both Orfeo del monteverde and MONTEVERDI: ORFEO [Ponelle’s film-
opera].”39 
The model operates through a linear accumulation of events/texts, which add up 
to an ideal construction, an ever-absent work. In this sense, all of the elements are of 
equal “epistemological relevance regardless of their chronological position,” so that the 
first performance, or the first printing of the score, does not have any preeminence over 
other manifestations. In other words, there is no original event to speak of and, more 
importantly, since text is considered in the Barthesian sense of a site of play and 
openness, “the work that is opera is never fully realized, since its textual versions 
indefinitely defer completion.”40 
                                                
38 Ibid, 28. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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The openness of texts, however, is as much a productive field as it is a site of 
obscurity, (as critics of “poststructuralism” have been always been to point out), but 
especially a threat to the stability of any intended meaning. In the case of L’Orfeo, for 
example, the 1609 score constitutes a “public” supplement to the “private” event, which 
in its supplementarity exposes the incompleteness of the event as a performance capable 
of fulfilling the task of symbolizing values that it is required to. With Butler, we would 
say that by “coming out” in public, Orfeo can only produce a new opacity; and the 
private closet produces the promise of a disclosure that can, by definition, never arrive. If 
this is so, then the score in fact annuls the symbolizing work of the event that motivated 
it—it betrays it as it aims to magnify it. In the case of poststructuralist philosophy, this 
openness has always been understood as a site of praxis, as a way of conceiving reading 
and writing as a form of political resistance against totalitarian cooptation or, in the case 
of Butler, as a site of denunciation of oppressive models and of playful appropriation of 
these same strategies for the possibility of appropriating different constructions of the 
self. When incorporated into historiographical work—as Hayden White shows—it works 
towards showing that narrativity and figurality are not simply accessory for 
historiography but in fact determine what appears as historical, and how it appears. In this 
sense, however, is at odds with positivist historicism’s attempt to determine, as 
thoroughly as possible, the conditions, practices, and meanings of works for each specific 
period. The question, then, is how to conceive of history and historiography in a way that 
textuality and play continue to be politically effective, without foreclosing the means to 
understand what values and by which means the performance was supposed to achieve its 
symbolic work. In other words, the question is how the symbolic effectivity we see in 
these performances today can be established, and how we can understand the relation 
between texts and performances while questioning these distinctions. 
Calcagno’s solution is to treat both texts and performances as having equal value 
among them, by positing the ideal work as the product of all their different 
manifestations. There is, however, a problematic tension between this affirmation of 
openness and deferral—which is deconstructive at heart—and the ever-absent ideal entity 
that the various manifestations add up to. Not only does the ideal work—however 
Orpheus’s Modern Turn—Performance and Allegory 
 
205 
absent—seem to return to notions of the “work concept” whose critique was crucial for 
opening the way for analysis of performance in the first place, but it also seems to gain a 
preeminence over the particular events, as if they had to be added up in order to arrive to 
the whole.41 
In order to preserve their particularity, one would have to recur to historical 
circumstances, which for Calcagno means that relationship between the work and the 
performance is mediated by context. This introduces the problem of having to specify 
what is particular in each element, which presupposes that one can distinguish between 
the musical content and the extramusical context on the one hand, and that the context for 
each of the elements can fully be determined, on the other.42 Yet ignoring such mediation, 
on the other hand leads either to reaffirming the “work concept” position, or else 
produces what Amy Cimini and Jairo Moreno call “dematerialization” of the modes of 
production of musical value when performance is taken as a pure event, separate from 
other forms of inscription.43 By positing the ideal work as the sum of all the 
performances, then, we seem to be stuck between the Scylla of a total work with a purely 
ideal existence, and the Charybdis of multiple events that are disconnected from each 
other. Finally, it must be remembered that what is at stake is establishing if and how 
performances and texts participate in the construction of nobility through the mimetic 
production of values. In other words, what circulates among the various texts is not 
                                                
41 Unless, that is, we consider the Work from a nominalist perspective as simply the name that is used to 
refer to elements that otherwise have nothing essential in common, as Calcagno could also be seen as 
suggesting, in relation to the distinction between autographic and allographic, as developed by Nelson 
Goodman and adopted into narratology by Gérard Genette, which Calcagno refers to, which could be 
criticized from the perspective of this dissertation, especially through the notion of iteration as elaborated 
below, since, in the allographic regime, the same “permanence” that allows us to speak of the “same” work 
is what would allow us to relate different autographic events. Goodman’s analyses, on the other hand, are 
fruitful in showing the impossibility of developing rigorous analytical criteria to ascertain that something is 
a copy of something else. See Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968). 
42 On the impossibility of distinguishing between the “musical” and the “extramusical,” see Lydia Goehr, 
“Writing Music History,” History and Theory 31, no. 2 (1992): 182–99; On the impossibility of entirely 
establishing context as determining of a text, see “Signature Event Context” in Jacques Derrida, Margins of 
Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); I return to the latter text below. 
43 Amy Cimini and Jairo Moreno, “Inexhaustible Sound and Fiduciary Aurality,” Boundary 2 43, no. 1 
(February 1, 2016): 16. 
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meaning but value, not the identity of L’Orfeo as work but the type of value (symbolic or 
otherwise) which we seek to determine. 
The tension, as I see it, emerges from the assumption that questioning the 
opposition between the text and the performance is the same as questioning, or 
abolishing, the opposition between the ephemeral and the permanent: on the one hand, 
we have texts and performances which are both ephemeral and permanent, but somehow 
material, and on the other we have the ideal work which emerges from the various 
manifestations yet has a certain permanence in the minds of the listeners or the historian. 
As Calcagno writes, through the publication of the libretto and score “the work attained 
the status of an ideal object, each time materializing and reiterating itself in the minds and 
ears of the libretto readers as well as in those of the performers of and listeners of the 
score.”44 
Calcagno’s crucial move is introducing a distinction between performance as text, 
i.e. the possibility of interpreting a performance like a text (signified in the diagram 
reproduced below as P), and performance understood as “that which awaits completion” 
(signified as an arrow that connects the other elements L for libretto and S for score).45 
 
It is this formulation that has mostly attracted my attention, since it seems to me it can be 
interpreted in ways that can be productive by applying some pressure on it. Calcagno 
offers this interpretation just after the passage quoted above, in the course of showing that 
the libretto and score of Orfeo also partake of the work of performing nobility. Thus, he 
writes, “[i]f the term ‘performance’ is intended in one of its etymological meanings—as 
something that ‘awaits completion’ (from the French word parfournir) and as therefore 
                                                
44 Ibid., 19. 
45 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 29. Diagram reproduced from Ibid.  
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ab origine incomplete and unexecuted—these materializations can also be termed 
‘performances.’”46 Interestingly, the Middle French word parfournir was replaced in 
modern French by the Anglicism ‘performance,’ which means ‘to carry out,’ or ‘to 
execute.’47 More than to await completion, to perform is to accomplish something 
entirely and thoroughly. If we want to find an openness in performance, its etymology 
suggests rather the opposite. Etymologies, however, are interesting as heuristic resources 
and not as positive proof of the meaning of a word. But if what is crucial about 
performance is such an openness or, more precisely, an incompleteness, the sense of “to 
carry out completely” that emerges here points to an important distinction, one that 
illuminates the complications in understanding the type of work involved in considering 
performances as texts and texts as performances. 
In the scheme offered by Calcagno, performance in the sense of “to await 
completion” is signified by arrows that connect individual elements and add up to the 
ideal work, W. The ideal work is the sum total of all the performances: a teleological 
work. This means that the performance that relates them is somehow incorporated and 
taken over into the total work. Reading the two etymological variants of performance 
against each other, we could say that P, in the end, does amount to an accomplished 
product—the ideal work—with no remainder, with nothing left behind. If it introduces a 
deferral among the elements, this deferral is nevertheless finite and exhausted in the end. 
According to the model, if the text is a performance, it is so because everything that was 
there as a possibility was taken up and realized as a whole, transformed into the ideal 
work. 
Another way to understand this logic—and to bring back the issue of value—
would be to make a distinction between such a realization as Verwertung, the 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 “Performance: (anglais performance, de l'ancien français parformance, achèvement).” 
http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/performance/59512. In both cases, however, we can hear the 
etymology: ‘par’ + ‘fournir.’ The Latin prefix per- means through, ‘throughout’ or ‘thoroughly’ (as in per-
forate) or ‘completely’ (as in per-fect). The Old French Fournir, ‘to complete,’ ‘to accomplish,’ ‘to fulfill,’ 
is not related to the Latin ‘forma’ but to the West Germanic *frummjan, to further, promote, accomplish, 
supply; as in ‘to furnish’. ‘Perform, v.’; ’furnish, v.’ OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2016. 
Web. 18 May 2016. 
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transformation of something into value (wert), an exploitation that liquidates the 
resources without remainder, and realization as Wirkung, as making actual and 
effective.48 Wirkung translates the Greek ergon, function or work, which, as energeia, as 
actuality, is opposed to dynamis, to potentiality. Now, as Giorgio Agamben explains, 
what defines potentiality as opposed to a mere possibility for anything “is not simply the 
potential to do this or do that thing but potential to not-do, potential not to pass into 
actuality.”49 More radically still, this potential not-to, this impotentiality, needs to be 
preserved even in actuality: 
What Aristotle then says is: if a potentiality to not-be originally belongs to all 
potentiality, then there is true potentiality only where the potentiality to not-be 
does not lag behind actuality but passes into it as such. This does not mean that it 
disappears in actuality; on the contrary, it preserves itself as such in actuality. 
What is truly potential is thus what has exhausted all its impotentiality in bringing 
it wholly into the act as such.50 
What allows for the performance to produce value and to be repeated, to keep producing 
value throughout its repetitions and not being exhausted, is because actualization, 
                                                
48 A historical approach is not only concerned with identifying why some events are “historical” and others 
are not, but rather what makes something an event as such. And this decision, which is the historian’s, is 
entirely determined by her own historical situation: the past is a concern of the present and for the present, 
and the event is precisely the moment in which this relation becomes apparent to the historian, as Benjamin 
writes, not as illuminating the past through the present or the present through the past, but rather as the 
image “wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other 
words: image is dialectics at a standstill.” N3,1 Walter Benjamin and Rolf Tiedemann, The Arcades Project 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999), 463. This image, as Benjamin goes on to write, is better read 
through the technique of dream interpretation in awakening, which constitutes for him the paradigm for 
historiography: “The realization [Verwertung, the economic exploitation or utilization, the liquidation] of 
dream elements in the course of waking up is the canon of dialectics. It is paradigmatic [vorbildlich] for the 
thinker and binding [verbindlich] for the historian.” N4,4 ibid., 464. Hence, the importance of treating the 
metaphor of the Theatrum mundi and the lapsus of the “angusta scena” as overdetermined images and not 
as clumsy gestures or accidental events. 
What is crucial, then, is that there is always the possibility, another possibility, another reading; and the role 
of the historian, in awakening, consists in seizing that moment, on accounting for how the overdetermined 
dream elements are recognized “as just this particular dream image as such”: the point being, of course, that 
it could always have been otherwise. N4,1 ibid. Compare this notion of a dialectical image with the one 
attacked by Abbate of the traces or cyphers of history to which she reduces the work of Adornian critical 
musicology. Carolyn Abbate, “Music: Drastic or Gnostic?” Critical Inquiry 30, no. 3 (2004). 
49 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 180. 
50 Ibid., 183, emphasis in the original. 
Orpheus’s Modern Turn—Performance and Allegory 
 
209 
wirkung is not exhuastion, Verwertung; the performance produces value that gets used 
up, but in doing so the impotentiality, the possibility to be otherwise, of the performance 
does not disappear. 
Would it be possible, for the critic, to preserve impotentiality in performance, not 
to use up and exhaust all the possibilities in a total interpretation to produce an ideal 
work? Would it be possible, then, to speak not of performance as total accomplishment 
but rather as the actualization of potentiality? Under this form, actualization carries the 
power, the dynamis, of potentiality; it carries the power not-to be which is also the power 
to be otherwise. Wirklichkeit, as a translation of energeia, captures all these meanings: 
reality, as what has been realized, made actual, as what has passed into actuality. It is also 
effectivity, since it carries power. This effectivity is affective, transformative, and 
operative. We reencounter here, then, the power, the work of opera (as in Calcagno’s 
subtitle)—not opera as opus, as accomplished work, but as working effectivity or as 
efficacy; as an effectivity that is neither identical nor exhausted in its performance, but 
which is carried over as potentiality not-to be. Operativity is not performance—
completion—but incompletion: not which awaits completion but what, in being 
actualized and effective, does not actualize itself without also actualizing the possibility 
not-to be, to be otherwise. Should we speak, then, not of the performance of opera but of 
an effective actualization (of a score, of a story, of a myth)? But this is what opera 
already says and does.51 
With this we are in the position to elaborate on the analysis of the acoustic 
assemblage of inscription introduced in chapter 2, where mousikē was described as a type 
of writing avant-la-lettre. It was presented there as the means for the community to 
inscribe and transmit its ethos and nomoi, owing to a certain structural identity which 
remains even in the absence of those involved in its performance. What guarantees this 
                                                
51 In a related point, Treadwell argues that, “performance of courtly intermedi during the principate 
attempted to actualize the Duke’s power, most especially during the 1580s, when advances in technology 
pressed each element of the multi-media genre to its most extreme manifestation. This actualization, as I 
will describe it—in which the Duke’s (seemingly) divine power was not merely symbolized but enacted 
through performance—resonated with the conceptual premise of Ficinian Neoplatonism,” that is, the 
mimetology of similarities. Treadwell, Music and Wonder at the Medici Court, 24. 
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effectivity is what Derrida describes as iterability: the possibility of a mark to be 
extracted from its context, repeated, and cited, and to be legible—effective—in the 
absence of its addressee.52 What is iterable in a mark, Derrida holds, is not exhausted in 
the presence of its inscription, yet this does not make it ideal either: it is a remainder.53 
This notion of a remainder is crucial for overcoming the ontological ambiguity of texts, 
performances, and ideal work. It suggests that permanence is already alteration, but also 
that ephemerality (if by this one means the possibility of disappearance) is not the 
opposite of permanence: ephemerality is nothing other than alteration. Nothing keeps us 
from describing mousikē and Early Modern opera along the same terms, since for Derrida 
iterability is a condition of possibility of experience in general: 
This structural possibility of being severed from its referent or signified (and 
therefore from communication and its context) seems to me to make of every 
mark, even if oral, a grapheme in general, that is, as we have seen, the nonpresent 
remaining of a differential mark cut off from its alleged “production” or origin. 
And I will extend this law even to all “experience” in general, if it is granted that 
there is no experience of pure presence, but only chains of differential marks.54 
The courtly performances of the Italian nobility thus have the same mode of operation as 
ancient Greek mousikē, as they employ a broadly distributed assemblage to inscribe their 
ethos and nomoi, to exteriorize the memory of the community (to make the community a 
site for memory, a repository), an inscription that depends on iterability for producing 
and preserving a certain ideal of nobility. This structural repeatability—being structured 
through repetition and having the possibility (and hence the necessity) of being 
repeated—is what determines mousikē and opera as ritual, and not so much the context, 
                                                
52 In what follows I return to “Signature Event Context” in Derrida, Margins of Philosophy. 
53 ‘Remainder’ is the English translation for a French neologism, ‘restance,’ coined by Derrida in this text. 
In his reply to John Searle, published as “Limited Inc,” Derrida explains that this “quasi-concept” replaces 
the notions of “permanence” or “substance,” and any other that presupposes presence. “The remainder is 
not that of the signifier any more than it is that of the signified, of the “token” or of the “type,” or of a form 
or of a content…There is no doubt that the “permanence” or the “survival” of the document…imply 
iterability or remaining in general. But the inverse is not true. Permanence is not a necessary effect of 
remaining. I will go even further: the structure of the remainder, implying alteration, renders all absolute 
permanence impossible. Ultimately, remaining and permanence are incompatible.” Jacques Derrida, 
Limited Inc (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 53–54. 
54 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 317. 
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the function, or the participants. The context—the origin—of the performance is never 
the same, it is never identical, and yet the performance is repeated: if it is the same 
performance under different conditions, in a different context, it is because there is a such 
a differential mark by which it is the same even when, or as, it differs. And for this reason 
iterability is not affected by context, but rather exceeds it. If the performance is an event, 
what is nevertheless operative in it is its originary repeatability. Its effects carry over and 
are in excess of its immediate eventality—they carry over even for us to be able to 
receive these effects, but also if no one ever came to receive them (potentiality not-to be). 
What makes a something a performance, or rather an opera, is this effectivity, this mode 
of being in excess of itself, which carries over in all their iterations. 
In terms of analysis—i.e., of comparing texts and performances—what relates the 
1607 performance to the 1609 score is just such a nonpresent remaining (neither a 
material inscription nor an ideal entity, and much less a signified meaning or value) but 
the severed and repeated iteration, the mark that marks them as iterations of each other. 
They are not any more in the scores or the performances than they are in the affective 
transformations they produce in listeners, in their bodies as much as in their minds, and 
also in the instruments as much as in the painted backdrops and stage props; the “work” 
is not wholly in any of these elements, nor in the total sum of them, but is effective in and 
through all, each of one in-completing (completing by exposing the necessity for 
something extra to complete them) the others. All the iterations of the work—texts, 
libretti, performances, descriptions, machinery, and so on—continue to sever this 
remainder from its alleged “production” or origin and to cite and repeat—to iterate—
what is repeatable in the opera, what makes the opera be insofar as it is repeatable. What 
is repeated never remains the same, it is altered in its displacement and its repetition: with 
each iteration, the opera it is at the same time an original (for it is different) and a copy 
(for it points towards another original). 
Here, then, is the notion that is missing from the schematization of performance 
and text in Calcagno’s account. What is crucial in the relation between the operatic event 
and the score is not that one records the other or that it makes it pass from the private to 
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the public, for thus conceived, it rather shows that the original event lacks the 
performative force through which value is supposed to be produced and transmitted. 
Rather, and as Butler stated, value is produced by performance as repetition—a value that 
may be used up but which does not exhaust the effectivity of what is repeated. 
Mimetically, what establishes the relation between the event and the score is not 
inscription but the iteration by which the copy constitutes its origin—or de-constitutes it, 
by being removed from it—as source of value. It is not “symbolic value” that gets 
repeated here, and we cannot say that is preserved or signified in any of these iterations. 
Rather, value emerges in the insistent, panicked imitation or iteration of its presumed 
naturalized ideality. Finally, as Derrida notes, iteration is simultaneously a repetition 
(iter) and an alteration (itara, alter), a repetition that alters. An alteration, namely, of the 
value of what is repeated: it is made into an original. 
One final aspect in this economy needs to be noted. As Calcagno shows, there is a 
motive that runs through the text and paratexts of the opera, that of the sun’s rays (the 
description of Francesco as a bright star in the prologue and further in Rosa del Ciel and 
the final chorus), that implicitly evokes the myth of Memnon’s statue, given voice by the 
rays of dawn. 
This serves the purpose of highlighting the role of the patron, vital to the writer in 
giving birth to his work. In the case of Orfeo, however, the metaphor tells readers and 
performers that Prince Francesco authorizes not only the score, intended as a material 
inscription, but also the voice originating from it; not only the voice of the author, 
intended in a figurative, narratological meaning, but the actual one(s) heard in 
performance, springing from the singer’s lips. The composer, that is, receives from the 
patron authorization to “speak.” But, in a further transfer of authority, it is he, the 
composer, who in turn authorizes the singers to perform, as his proxies.”55 Thus Calcagno 
shows a linear chain of authority that travels through the score of L’Orfeo, from the 
“benigna stella” of Prince Francesco, becoming a figurative voice through a myth that is 
only implicitly alluded to, and ending in the real voices of singers in performance. Every 
                                                
55 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 25. 
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subsequent performance using the 1609 score, Calcagno writes, has been authorized by 
Prince Francesco. One could here object to the emphasis on the voice, which aside from 
the implicit reference to Memnon’s statue, is hard to locate in the preface. Clearer for the 
problem of authorial intention and inscription seems to be the patriarchal mimetological 
fantasy of asexual procreation (which guarantees divine ascendancy) sublimated in 
artistic production (Erasmus’s Venus). In this case, to recall Carter’s suggestion (that the 
Theatrum mundi metaphor in the preface is clumsy, for referring to the stage in the Ducal 
Palace as “narrow” scarcely paints the patron in a flattering light; see note 2. above), an 
“augusta scena” may be as appropriate as “angusta”—the latter somewhat more telling: in 
both cases, the patron (patronus, pater) illuminates the work/product that the composer’s 
labor (work/childbirth) brings to the world through a narrow/eminent passage like a 
bright star (like the sun, the father). Similarly, Monteverdi reaffirms the patriarchal 
analogy/lineage (Apollo : Orfeo :: Vincenzo : Francesco) that connects the 1607 
performance—where the printed libretto was dedicated to Duke Vincenzo Gonzaga—to 
its second birth, its dissemination in score form, by making sure that the latter is “not 
signed with a name other” than Prince Francesco’s (“con altro nome signata”) (Figure 2). 
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And yet, with this same gesture, Monteverdi appropriates the Prince’s signature, 
for what is a dedication but an appropriation of the patron’s name and renown through 
the iterability of the signature? The signature is a performative; it affirms that the signer 
agrees with what he is signing. Its function is to restore the nonpresence of the signer, to 
act in the absence of the signer, or to signify that the signer’s authorization can be 
repeated again. The signature, the reproducibility of the mark that presumes to ensure the 
presence of the signer and which preserves its effectivity in her absence, in the analysis of 
iteration, demonstrates that it there is a kind of sameness which carries over as it is 
removed from its source, cited, and altered.  
Yet the signature does not simply make the signer present: the signature marks the 
signer’s having-been present, the event of leaving his signature as a trace. That the 
signature continues to be effective as it is reproduced means that the event of the 
signature is repeatable through the trace that marks the signer’s presence, that the “now” 
 
Figure 2: Dedication Page of the 1609 edition of L’Orfeo 
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in which the signer left his trace is also somehow inscribed in the signature as it is 
repeated, and it is present “now” in what was a future then, so that it is impossible to 
distinguish between before and after: “the pure reproducibility of a pure event.”56 
What applies to the signature applies to every mark: the signature is but an 
exemplary case. In this case, furthermore it is exemplary of how value is produced and 
transmitted through iteration. By dedicating the work to Prince Francesco, Monteverdi 
uses Francesco’s signature as an origin(al) locus of authority and value. Thus, it is not 
that the Prince authorizes the performance, in the sense of transferring an authority he 
possesses into the work: the Prince is not the origin of his value as noble because, as we 
saw, this value is nothing without the performance by which it is produced. Rather, the 
name of Francesco is cited, through his signature, as someone who would be capable of 
authorizing a work, someone with the power and status of a Prince. His value, as 
nobleman and Prince, is created through the performance and ratified by appending his 
signature to the work. 
Or, more specifically, by a countersignature, a signature that ratifies or subscribes 
the prior signature: thus the dedication has the signature of the Prince only by having the 
countersignature of Monteverdi, which inscribes itself in the signature that it reaffirms, 
that it repeats. The Prince’s signature can accomplish much (the Duke’s signature too: he 
almost brought the Court to bankruptcy through gambling before turning to spectacles, as 
Susan Parisi shows).57 But in order to make the Prince’s signature work, to make it 
effective and so produce his value as nobleman, the signature needs a countersignature 
that ratifies it and authorizes it as doing a specific type of work, such as Monteverdi’s at 
the bottom of the dedication. By signing the dedication, Monteverdi countersigns the 
Prince’s signature as patron of the opera, as its owner. 
Yet by doing so, by countersigning the Prince’s appropriation of the opera, 
Monteverdi also reveals/betrays the truth of this appropriation as a parricide: a betrayal 
by the son, and a betrayal by Monteverdi (the father of the opera and the son of the 
                                                
56 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 328. 
57 Parisi, “Ducal Patronage of Music in Mantua, 1587-1627.” 
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patron). Every mark, as Derrida writes, necessarily implies the absence of its addressee to 
be constituted as such. By inscribing Prince Francesco into the paratext—and hence the 
text—of Orfeo, by making the addressee into part of the message, Monteverdi inscribes 
the patron’s death in the work itself, which is repeated with each iteration. Without going 
too far, it is a sacrifice—but we know that the relation between sacrifice, mimesis and art 
is not easy to pin down.58 But paradoxically, with this betrayal Monteverdi also inscribes 
himself in the divine lineage the opera aims to establish.59 At the same time as the patrons 
are inscribed within the lineage, the play of the text—the signature and the 
countersignature—reinscribes one name over the other. 
The signature and the countersignature also have the function, or the effect, of 
fixing and stabilizing the play of the text, the very play that makes performance 
incomplete. Every actualization of the work, every reading—and every listening, as Peter 
Szendy shows—has to deal with two contradictory requirements: that the play of the text 
be somehow fixed and located in order for it to have a meaning, however local, for the 
reader or spectator, who decides on opposed meanings that are, by definition, 
undecidable. Reading and listening in fact, consist on fixing such play, or having the 
temporary illusion of doing it.  
This opens a question that will be addressed in the remainder of this chapter: by 
insisting on the essential iterability of the operatic performance, of the necessary 
possibility for the opera to be repeated outside of its “original” context, remaining 
identical and different at the same time throughout its iterations, we risk losing what is 
specific about a certain iteration or another. As in Calcagno’s schema, they still threaten 
to become indistinguishable as pure events occurring outside history; but on the other 
hand, if we could locate them, specify what they were, in their context and with all their 
materiality, we would go back to the ambiguity between a performance that awaits 
completion and the one that to carries out completely. We would have to reword such 
                                                
58 As Lacoue-Labarthe elaborates on “Typography.” 
59 On the countersignature as betrayal of truth, see Jacques Derrida, “Countersignature,” trans. Mairéad 
Hanrahan, Paragraph 27, no. 2 (2004): 7–42. Derrida’s work on the signature is also elaborated in Jacques 
Derrida, Signéponge = Signsponge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); and Jacques Derrida, 
Glas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986). 
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definition (and preserve performance as a paleonomy, just as we still speak of writing, or 
“I”) as “that which defers completion,” for the logic of iteration, of repetition and 
alteration, is nothing other than différance: the spatial differing and temporal deferring on 
account of which each iteration is constituted as repetition, which differs and defers from 
itself in its iteration. 
This is why actualization and operability, the effectivity of the opera as work, the 
excess or remainder which constitutes the iteration, is a crucial question for 
historiography: how can we say that something happened without ignoring that each time 
we do it we risk closing off this very operability, this possibility to be otherwise. The 
question, then, to go back to Benjamin, is how to write a history that we can read like 
“the book of nature,” which indicates that one can read the real (Wirklichke) like a text 
(N4,2): a text, whose condition of undecidability is inscribed with the potentiality not-to 
be, or to be otherwise. The task of the historian, in reading the book of what happened 
(Wirklichkeit) is to show those moments where a certain reading was done, a certain 
interpretation was made, a decision enforced. We are all readers of the book of nature—
but only some have the power to call or countersign that reading as “history.”60 
ALLEGORIES OF/ON THE SCREEN 
What is repeated from the 1607 performance on to the 1609 score, its 1615 reprint, and 
their further iterations is not Francesco’s authorization, but rather his sacrificial 
inscription as the constitutive absence of the text: not a “real” sacrifice, of course, but not 
a “symbolic” one either. It is rather one that charges Francesco with a task that cannot be 
accomplished. The same conventional apparatus of paratexts, dedicatory paragraphs, and 
learned rhetoric that Monteverdi mobilizes to guarantee the permanence of his work, 
paradoxically opens both the work and the patron’s name to their own constitutive in-
completeness. Prince Francesco’s borrowed signature guarantees the permanence of 
L’Orfeo’s performative work. But, at the same time, it tears it open and submits it to 
                                                
60 I thank Ann Pellegrini who took my question about historiography seriously and generously offered 
‘power’ as the key to the enigma. University of Pennsylvania, Departmental Colloquium, April 19, 2016.  
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unending iterations—repetitions and alterations—each of which will be inscribed with 
the mark of deferral: the work will never be completed. We thus have to agree with 
Carter: this scarcely paints the patron in a flattering light…61 But how do we know that 
his intention was flattering and not betrayal? What is it that makes one turn towards the 
other? And how do we know that the turn to performance and materiality is also an act of 
love and gratitude towards music and not a betrayal? 
 
One of Calcagno’s motivations—and my own—for discussing the relation between text 
and performance is, as mentioned, Jean Pierre Ponnelle’s 1976 opera-film Monteverdi: 
Orfeo. For Calcagno, the production demonstrates an anxiety over authorization, a 
concern with locating the production in its historical context as a means of securing the 
authenticity of the production. Taking into consideration the above reflections on the in-
completion of performance, however, I cannot approach Ponnelle’s production without 
asking what is done and undone through the allegorical identification of Prince Francesco 
and Orfeo. Specifically, I am concerned with the question of establishing the type of 
historical work that the production accomplishes by suggesting such an identification: at 
what level can we affirm that the production is authentic of accurate, that it truthfully 
reproduces or repeats the 1607 event, so that we can claim—or deny—that in fact the 
purpose of L’Orfeo was to affirm the Gonzaga dynasty as divine? Can we still suggest in 
this case that the second performance, the repetition, produces the original? Is this not a 
preposterous exaggeration of my thesis? 
Preposterous (pre-post) might be the right word: it turns around the natural order; 
it places last what should be first. This form of musicological reflection, which can be 
termed preposterous analysis, after Mieke Bal’s formulation of a preposterous history 
(itself taken form Patricia Parker’s preposterous events), does not, as historicist analysis 
would, seek to reconstruct the past and the experience of the works by limiting analysis to 
its actors and objects (as Taruskin defines the historian’s work in the introduction to the 
OHWM), nor analyze according to present human experience disregarding or marking the 
                                                
61 Carter, “Some Notes on the First Edition of Monteverdi’s ‘Orfeo’ (1609),” 509. See footnote 4, above. 
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past as unreachable, but rather attempts to establish a new, experimental relation with 
music of the past, a relation that necessarily reinscribes it—or that recognizes this process 
as unavoidable.62 This operation, as Bal deploys it, is a turn that seems particularly 
appropriate to the baroque, since it “acts out what is itself a baroque vision, a vision that 
can be characterized as a vacillation between the subject and object of that vision and 
which changes the status of both.”63 Ponnelle’s production is preposterous in this way: 
once the allegorical identification is made, it seems impossible to turn back and consider 
L'Orfeo as a purely aesthetic drama about man as artist (as in Kerman’s account). Besides 
the possibility of demonstrating through documents that the performance was thus (and 
besides the real success of the performance as historical or artistic work), the production 
hints, in a flash, at a historical situation that may have been only too real to be preserved 
in documents, a truth that history has forgotten (read repressed). In this case, Monteverdi: 
Orfeo is not a repetition of a historical event because we do not possess any 
documentation that authorizes it as such, and yet its performance does make us turn back 
to ask questions about the relation between sovereignty, spectacle, and myth that locate 
L’Orfeo in a historical moment that was not articulated before as such. 
Preposterous or not, the production poses historiographical questions that we 
cannot ignore and which locate us as viewers, listeners, and historians in a particular 
position, looking at the past from a particular perspective. The film’s opening shot is 
                                                
62 Mieke Bal, Quoting Caravaggio: Contemporary Art, Preposterous History (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999); Patricia Parker, “Preposterous Events,” Shakespeare Quarterly 43, no. 2 (1992): 
186–213. 
63 Bal, Quoting Caravaggio, 7. Bal’s conception of history is of course only a recent form of what 
Benjamin had elaborated long before, a conception of history as the attempt “to hold fast that image of the 
past which unexpectedly appears to the historical subject in a moment of danger,” Walter Benjamin, Walter 
Benjamin: Selected Writings. Vol. 4, 1938-1940 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 391. 
This is a moment that is revealed as now-time, Jetztzeit, in which the historian “grasps the constellation into 
which his own era has entered, along with a very specific earlier one. Thus, he establishes a conception of 
the present as now-time shot through with splinters of messianic time.” Ibid., 397. It is not by coincidence 
that the first extended form of Benjamin’s “Theses on History” occurred in, or through, his book on 
baroque mourning drama. Benjamin’s writings on history and the baroque have called attention to the 
urgency of understanding the period as inevitably bounded with our own time, to the extent that the very 
notion of baroque is now almost inseparable from his materialist historiography—where “the materialist 
presentation of history leads the past to bring the present into a critical state.” Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: 
Selected Writings. Vol. 4, 1938-1940. 
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divided horizontally in three stages: the front row of a twentieth-century theater (the 
Zurich Opera House) in the forefront; Nicolaus Harnoncourt’s period-instrument 
ensemble in the pit; and a two-level stage depicting the outside of a castle covered with 
moss in the background (Figure 3).  
The second level of the stage has long balconies in either side the members of the 
chorus occupy, doubling also as a seventeenth-century audience, while their twentieth-
century counterparts find their seats; the musicians on stage lounge around and talk 
among themselves. The proscenium arch bears the inscription “FRANCESCO GONZAGA 
DUCA DI MANTOVA ET MONFERATO,” a clear hint that in this production the place and 
function of the “fourth wall” is blurred, at best. 
 
Here, time becomes space: the present as forefront and the past as background are 
mediated by the orchestra in the pit; the vanishing point is located in the entrance to the 
castle which will be occupied by the actors playing Vincenzo Gonzaga and Eleonora de’ 
Medici—but also Apollo (Roland Hermann), La Musica and Speranza (Trudeliese 
Schmidt), in the doubling that structures the main conceit of the production: the 
patriarchal analogy that makes Prince Francesco a direct descendant of Apollo.  
Figure 3:”Film-prologue” in Ponnelle, Monteverdi: Orfeo. 
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The sovereigns stand at the center, in the vanishing point of the perspectival 
construction. Their spatial and temporal coincidence at the center of the tripartite division 
accomplishes a flattening of historical distance and difference upon the flat screen 
employing the logic of mathematized perspective—itself a discovery contemporaneous 
with Monteverdi’s Orfeo—to negate the differences between front and back, up and 
down, bodies and intervening space, “so that the sum of all the parts of space and all its 
contents are absorbed into a single ‘quantum continuum.’”64 Collapsed time and 
mathematized space, everything is synthesized in a single shot; the opening of Ponnelle’s 
opera-film seems to accomplish, at the height of postmodernity, what the humanists 
sought for in early operatic and scientific experimentations: a unified glance upon the 
world, past and present; everything is articulated, held together by the ritornello of the 
Gonzaga toccata fanfare. 
Such a synthesis, of course, is not without its tensions—beginning with the 
contradictions faced by “historically informed performances” with regard to 
understanding composerly intentions, instrumental practices, and the “authenticity” of 
their performances.65 If Harnoncourt’s sound is the truly “modern sound,” insofar as only 
today do conductors attempt to restore the “authentic” sound of historical works, thus 
“reinventing music in the image of the twentieth century” malgré lui, Ponnelle’s mise-en-
scène shows that “modern” begins with the seventeenth century.66 In the three-stage 
division of the opening shot, the distance that separates us from the nineteenth century is 
the same that brings the seventeenth century to the present.67 
                                                
64 Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, 67. In chapter 7 I expand on the role of perspective as analyzed 
by Panofsky for the baroque spectacularization of the world. 
65 Richard Taruskin, Text and Act: Essays on Music and Performance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997). 
66 Ibid., 231. 
67 This inscribes the production in a long critical tradition, extending back to Benjamin‘s Origin of German 
Tragic Drama, and the formalist models of Wölfflin and Eugenio D’Ors, up to Deleuze, Lacan, Buci-
Glucksmann, and Bal which sees the seventeenth century as a crucial site for a critical understanding of 
modernity. For a lucid summary of this argument, see the introduction by Bryan Turner to Christine Buci-
Glucksmann, Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Sage, 1994). 
Omar Calabrese approaches postmodern aesthetics as a repetition of baroque aesthetics, as a neobaroque. 
Taken beyond an aesthetic category, the relation between the baroque and the present has been most 
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 We can read this attempt to erase temporality as the key of the production 
(whether critical or ideological remains to be established), effected through a vertiginous 
mise-en-scène, where the opening shot makes a paradigmatic mise-en-abyme of the 
Theatrum mundi trope. Not only is the world put on stage and the stage on a screen. The 
stage-within-a-stage also contains the past, the present, and the future, mapped onto the 
visual spaces of the opera house (with its divisions between the stage, the pit, and the 
audience). The construction is further displaced onto the tv-screen, where the Theatrum 
mundi passes from being a geocentric universe located in the opera-house to a 
constellation without center, disseminated across the heterogenous and anonymous 
viewers at home—a perspectival universe in which the entire world is contained within 
each monadic tv-screen.  
This liminal shot, indeed, acts as a prologue and paratext to the film, fulfilling the 
role of addressing the spectator, situating the performance, and determining its further 
meaning.68 We will call it the film-prologue, a chronotope (sensu Bakhtin) with the 
capacity for locating and specifying the spatio-temporal relations between the monadic 
tv-viewers and the unified universe presented by the performance.69 It addresses the 
spectators in their present and binds the historical gap by taking them in, by offering a 
common perspective in the opera house. From the beginning, the viewer is meant to 
understand that this is not a mere performance of a “historical work” which seeks 
authenticity through period costume. Rather, the very act of actualizing a historical 
work—performance—is the subject of the performance itself. It is an exploration of the 
means by which works can be interpreted as “historical” in a strong sense, as having the 
                                                                                                                                            
rigorously explored in Latin America. As Irlemar Champi argues, neobarroco is a reappropriation, or a 
recycling of the past, by which a poetic experience inscribes the past in the dynamics of the present so a 
culture can face the enigma of its future. Characterized as historically, geographically and aesthetically 
eccentric with respect to historicist canon and classicism, the baroque is revalued by writers like Severo 
Sarduy or Octavio Paz—following José Lezama Lima and Alejo Carpentier—to reinscribe the way Latin 
America enters Euro- and North American modernity. Irlemar Chiampi, Barroco y modernidad (México: 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2000). See also William Egginton, The Theater of Truth: The Ideology of 
(neo)baroque Aesthetics (Stanford, CA: Stanford university press, 2010). Calcagno, too, suggests that the 
baroque is a site for understanding the modern “dialogic subjectivity” from its origin and development 
through Petrarch and Monteverdi. Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 7. 
68 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 34ff. 
69 M. M Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981). 
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capacity of affecting the present due to their nature as historical objects, of making 
historical content into truth content.70 
Signaling its self-awareness as an absolutely contemporary (and postmodern) 
hybrid multimedia object—an opera-film, each of its components themselves a multitude, 
each an attempt at a Gesamtkunstwerk—, the first shot aims to emphasize its character of 
a live event by presenting the familiar temporality of the pre-event: as the credits flash on 
the screen, the tv-spectator is compelled to take her seat next to members of the 
twentieth-century theater audience, seeking to erase the forty years that separate her from 
the event. “This is not a film—it means to say—but a performance whose audience 
would have been ‘you,’” the deictic being given by the the empty seats which the 
spectator seems to be invited to take along with the audience on screen. The open seats 
are, quite literally, awaiting the for viewer to inscribe herself on the work. Yet after the 
liminal moment of the film-prologue, after the work properly begins, the tv-spectator, at 
first invited to join and lose herself in the performance, is sent back to her place in front 
of the screen—and outside of the theatre hall—as the traditional montage techniques that 
Ponnelle introduces for the new medium of “opera-film” begin interpellating her as tv-
spectator (and I use the term interpellation in the Althusserian sense). 
There is a contradiction between the “realistic” opening which marks the 
performance as a traditional operatic event in which the spectator is present, and the 
montage techniques that displace her. Thus, after offering a long shot of the pit from the 
stage (audience visible) as Harnoncourt reaches the podium and marks the downbeat of 
the Gonzaga toccata (although we first heard it non-diegetically), a jump cut reverses the 
perspective towards the stage and focuses on two trumpeters in seventeenth-century garb. 
The camera pans up from the trumpeters to offer a low-angle, close-up shot of the 
Mantuan coat of arms in the proscenium of the stage-within-a-stage, cuts back to 
Harnoncourt, and back again to the stage, where the curtains open revealing Duke 
Vincenzo and Eleonora De’ Medici (Figure 4).  
                                                
70 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London; New York: Verso, 1998), 182; Theodor 
W Adorno, Sound Figures (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 22. 
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Here we see realized temporally what the opening shot (discussed above) realizes 
in its tripartite division: a seamless connection between the past (Duke Vincenzo and 
Eleonora, who also stand in for the mythical “past” through their doublings) and the 
present (Harnoncourt and the audience), whose readability as continuum is only possible 
for a future tv-viewer, who is thereby included yet excluded from the event. This 
sequence follows immediately from the iconic “fake” score which is superimposed on the 
screen between the film–prologue and the opera-prologue. As Calcagno notes—no doubt 
reacting to the same contradiction we are analyzing here—the score, which does not 
correspond to the 1609 nor to the 1615 edition, is “an authentic fake” that unintentionally 
validates the distinction between allographic and autographic arts.71 For Calcagno, with 
this authentic fake, “an anxiety to authorize performance as being historically informed 
reaches an almost absurd degree.”72 
According to the reading offered here, however, the authentic fake score rather 
hints at a no less anxious (postmodern) historical awareness: the awareness, that is, that 
the mimetologies that until now have authorized critics and interpreters to distinguish 
between originals, copies, and fakes in order to construe a univocal version of history is 
being exposed with each attempt to affirm it. The score, we would argue, serves not so 
much to authorize the performance but to perform the same economimetic ritual of 
authorization that the opera aimed to do in 1607: as Monteverdi appropriated Prince 
Francesco’s signature, so does Ponnelle countersign the work, reaffirming and undoing 
the self-representation of nobility that motivated the work in the first place. In repeating 
the ritual, in performing it, the authentic fake score—invoking Butler once again—serves 
                                                
71 See note 25 above. 
72 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 28. 
Figure 4: “Opera-prologue” in Ponnelle, Monteverdi: Orfeo, (opening sequence montage). 
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to expose the normative (and the normative here applies to both the Italian nobility and 
contemporary HIP musicians) as a panicked imitation of its own naturalized imitation.73 
The contradiction, then, is that while we continue to analyze works and situate 
them with respect to their sociopolitical context, to understand them as they affect and are 
affected by the societies that produced them, we also find performances to be always in-
complete, always exceeding their context and undoing the work for which they seek to be 
mobilized. The situation reaches an “absurd degree”: a hyperbolic logic in which the 
difference between a particular mimetology—using the spectacle as a means of self-
representation of the nobility—and the general mimesis that makes it possible (the 
circulation of value and affect between the political, the aesthetic, and the economical) is 
made evident as the one is exceeded by the other, as the performance parodies itself—as 
performance, as drag—or as the historian seeks to pin down values and reality in terms of 
symbols, originals, copies, and fakes. 
Even before cinematographic technique enters the operatic stage, that is, still in 
the film-prologue, it is time which pictorially and sartorially marks the spectator as 
outsider. Onstage, the past is displayed as past: painted backdrops and period costumes. 
(The musicians in the orchestra are divided between those who will perform onstage, in 
full seventeenth-century garb, and those clad in modern performance clothes, including 
Harnoncourt himself). But the present—its 1975 present—is tinged with that familiar 
Benjaminian fate: the high fashion of the opera audience pins it down in a present for 
which our own time is future. If the signature has the capacity of producing an ever 
present now, maintenance, through which the absence of the signer is preserved through 
its iterations, the sartorial signature of the audience has the opposite effect: the 
minimalist, bourgeois high fashion of the 1970s which pretends to be timeless and post-
                                                
73 One of the reasons of Calcagno’s rather hasty dismissal of the production may be that he considers the 
opera-film as a “videorecording,” that is, as a transparent mediation of the performance—neither original 
event nor copy, under that logic—which does not seem to have a place within the ontology analyzed above. 
Since we agree with Calcagno in assuming “the dynamic view of the relationships between text and work 
outlined above [in which] librettos and scores, but also performances [and, we would add, opera-films and 
other iterations that contribute to its infinite dissemination], all emerge as producing, and not simply 
embodying, the work which thus consists of more than the sum of its textual parts.” Ibid. 
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historical, marks the present as a future that is not theirs except as death, even as they 
seek to evade it by losing themselves in the spectacle of mediatized history.74 If the 
flattening device of the opening shot brought us any closer to Monteverdi’s time, the 
sudden realization of the distance separating us from the experiments of historically 
informed practice and postmodern Regieoper shatter the work’s opening gambit. 
If Ponnelle’s production stages the theory that the historical role of L’Orfeo was 
to produce an allegorical identification between Prince Francesco and Orfeo, such that 
the Gonzaga dynasty was effectively put in continuity with the mythical gods, thus 
performatively deriving from them their authority as sovereigns—as the King and the 
Pope in monarchic absolutism are the representatives of God on earth—then the 
performance of the performance may still give us an insight into the mimetologies 
involved in producing and maintaining the relation between sovereignty, myth, and 
performance that motivate this chapter. And, if the identification is accomplished by 
means of allegory—that paradigmatically baroque mimetology—then it is to its mode of 
operation in this performance that we must now turn.  
After the “authentic fake” score fades out, the curtains of the stage-within-a-stage 
reveal Duke Vincenzo (Roland Hermann) and Eleonora de Medici (Trudeliese Schmidt) 
at the focus point of the historico-perspectival chronotope of the film-prologue. Vincenzo 
then descends two steps and faces Eleonora as the camera pans out, until the entire stage, 
the pit, and the conductor are visible—but not the bottom level which in the film-
prologue placed the viewer in 1976 (in fact, it will not return again throughout the 
performance). Eleonora starts singing the first verse of the prologue, “Dal mio Permesso 
amato a voi ne vegno,” as Vincenzo watches enthralled. Vincenzo gives Eleonora an 
allegorical tiara inscribed with the word MUSICA during the ritornello before the second 
strophe of the prologue, (“Io la musica son, ch’ai dolci accenti”) and a lyre before the 
                                                
74 See the famous “Convolute B” in Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project Edited by Rolf Tiedemann 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999) and; Caroline Evans, Fashion at the Edge: Spectacle, Modernity & 
Deathliness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). These pages, incidentally, have been written within 
a week after Harnoncourt’s passing. 
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third (“Io, su cetera d’or, cantando soglio”) (Figure 5). 
 
The tiara and the lyre turn Eleonora into La Musica. A close up permits the tv-
spectator see the tiara, but Vincenzo’s ruff hides the instantaneous metamorphosis. The 
transfiguration operates by means of allegorical mechanisms (a series of them: the 
allegorical tiara and the eponymous lyre turn the real character, Eleonora, into an 
allegorical character; it is hard to keep track of their dissemination) to accomplish the 
effects produced by deictics in performance as analyzed by Calcagno (in Luca Ronconi’s 
Figure 5: La Musica on stage in Ponnelle, Monteverdi: Orfeo. 
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1998 production), and then some (Figure 6) 
 
For Calcagno, La Musica’s gestures “[enable] the gradual transition from singer’s 
persona (“Cecilia Gasdia”) to character (“La Musica”) and, for the audience, the parallel 
transformation in perception from real to fictional times and places”75 Calcagno, after 
Gumbrecht, analyzes the prologue of the opera into three different “subject-effects,” by 
which performance actualizes an operatic text. The “self-reflexive effect” occurs when La 
Musica sings “I am music,” so that the referent of the semantically empty “I” locates the 
subject of the verse at a discursive level.76 This is complemented in performance by the 
presence-effect, by which the semantic emptiness of “I,” “an absence deferring to a 
presence” is actualized by an embodied subject which is thus positioned at the center and 
origin of deictic space—paradigmatically by pointing to herself at the same time as she 
sings “I,” and pointing to the audience as she sings “you.” These, in turn, are located by 
the use of temporal deictics, referring to “now,” and here; this, the “narrative effect” 
                                                
75 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 62. 
76 Ibid., 41ff. 
Figure 6: Allegorical Tiara and concealed metamorphosis in Ponnelle, Monteverdi: Orfeo. 
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introduces temporality and narrativity—some narratologists say history—into the 
utterance. 
Just like Ronconi’s production, Ponnelle’s emphasizes the sequence of deictics in 
the prologue by means of carefully coordinated body movements. She avoids the obvious 
gestural madrigalisms—pointing to herself for “I,” to the audience for “you”—and 
instead accomplishes the presence effects, the passage from “my” to “you,” through her 
gaze, looking beyond the stage and the audience—the beloved Permessus, visible only 
for her—and then to an indeterminate place in the center of the shot, just off from looking 
at the camera—that is, the tv-spectator. In the following verses, La Musica—or shall we 
say Eleonora, since she only gives herself that name in the second strophe—situates the 
“you” of her address not as the audience (as is often the case, including in Ronconi), but 
as, 
Incliti eroi, sangue gentil de’ regi,
Di cui narra la Fama eccelsi pregi, 
Nè giunge al ver, perch’è tropp’ alto il segno. 
 
famous heroes, gentle issue of kings, 
whose excellent merits fame reports, 
without nearing the truth since the aim is too high. 
The entire verse is addressed to Duke Vincenzo, whose bowing identifies him as the 
“illustrious hero,” as the only claimant to the “sangue gentil de’ regi.” Thus, the crucial 
function of identifying La Musica as the center, the source of the narrative to follow, is 
offset and displaced by the silent play of Eleonora’s gaze, which passes from an unseen 
Permessus to the silent Duke in front of her; at no point does she refer to herself or the 
audience in the theater or in front of the screen. Before we even get enthralled by La 
Musica’s “dolci accenti,” in the first strophe of the prologue we do not see La Musica 
singing; We see Eleonora seeing; we see her gaze: we see the instant by which her gaze 
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crowns Vincenzo as hero, king, and audience (Figure 7). 
 
This visual relay not so much fixes the deictics of “my” and “you” with La 
Musica at the center of the deictic field but instead unleashes a play of referentiality by 
which the allegorical conceit of the production is exposed. What the prologue 
accomplishes is situating the sovereigns as the spectacular center of the production, in a 
play of referentiality that recalls Foucault’s reading of Las Meninas as “a representation 
of representation.” 
The centrality of the sovereign couple thus depends on a tension between the 
empty deictics as delivered by song and how it is actualized on stage and on screen. 
There is a similar tension between sound and sight in Ronconi’s production. There, as 
Calcagno argues, the distinction between the self-reflexive effect and the presence effect 
disappears when La Musica establishes a series of visual identifications with a silent and 
blindfolded Orpheus onstage (blinfolded since, Calcagno explains, music cannot be 
seen).77 She stands behind him as she sings “I am music,” so that the two characters are 
united in a symbolic “split self” mediated by the lyre, while the perspective also makes 
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Orpheus’s Modern Turn—Performance and Allegory 
 
231 
her/them “the visual double of the conductor in the pit.”78 She then touches Orpheus’s 
hand as she sings the first verse of the second strophe “I, singing to the golden lyre.” This 
touch ultimately collapses the distinctions between self-reflexive and presence effects, as 
well as “the distinction between the subject touched and the one touching, and, more 
importantly, the distinction between self and other.”79 
If this is so, if touch abolishes the distinction between self and other, what 
happens when Duke Vincenzo—who was crowned king by Eleonora’s gaze—in turn 
crowns Eleonora with the allegorical tiara of Music? The identification between Orpheus 
and La Musica as a symbol of the “split subject” in Ronconi’s production is true to the 
letter: it seeks the organic unity of the particular and the general, Orpheus and Music 
through the mediation of the lyre. The means employed to signify this unity—the 
opposition between black (Orpheus) and white (La Musica), visibility and invisibility (La 
Musica’s position behind blindfolded Orpheus), subjects and object (the lyre), and so 
on—are binary abstractions that are united in what we could call, with Walter Benjamin, 
the “mystical instant” (the mystiche Nu, as opposed to the Jetz, “now”) of La Musica’s 
touch.80 If there is any embodiment taking place in this operation, it occurs as a 
representation, where the empty universals of “voice” and “self” attempt to fill in the 
empty deictics (hence its extremely calculated choreography, which aims to account with 
“meaning” for what it lacks in content). 
More crucially, what is entirely lacking, and which is introduced in the most 
baroque way in Ponnelle’s production, is history as allegory exposes it, as its facies 
hippocratica, a ruin that attests to the dialectics of natural history and human finitude.81 
Compare the notion of a “split subject” symbolized by two actors in opposite colors with 
                                                
78 Ibid., 62. 
79 Ibid., 64. 
80 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 183. As Buci-Glucksmann explains, Jetzzeit, now-time 
is opposed to the simple present of presence that can be added sequentially. Jetzzeit is “an active forgetting, 
peculiar to memory and the infinite capacity of reopening a past that the science of history claimed to be 
over and done with…the approach which awakens the forgotten is therefore archaeological and 
interpretative: its scanning of historical time bases itself upon an acute consciousness of crisis and 
catastrophe, making time capable of being seen and thought. Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque Reason, 67. 
81 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 166. 
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the dismemberment, the sparagmos, that the subject undergoes through the Orphic 
moment of psychoanalytic remembrance (with complicates the work of history as 
Benjaminian awakening suggested above), where, 
[I]n the moment of un-forgetting something happens to the person who is being 
re-membered. Anamnesis is a sundering of the person, a sparagmos or tearing 
apart, a dis-membering like Dionysius and Orpheus himself undergo. Anamnesis 
is a painful awakening, a re-membering of the flesh. It is not recollection 
contemplated in the comfort and safety of the critical, reflective mind.82 
If, to recall, the Benjaminian paradigm of historical work is to seize the dream elements 
in the moment of their liquidation (Verwertung) to retain the possibility that the over-
determined images can be actualized (Gewirkt), this process of actualization operates by 
dismembering and disseminating rather than uniting in symbols. Now, whereas the 
symbol aims to present the dynamic of the universal and the particular in an organic, 
univocal instant, allegory rather works by producing sequential and static relations 
between objects for a concept which is not entirely signified at any moment. Speaking of 
Harsdöffer, “the most consistent allegorist,” Benjamin writes: “With every idea the 
moment of expression coincides with a veritable eruption of images, which gives rise to a 
chaotic mass of metaphors.” This proliferation of metaphors makes up for the fact that 
the natural relation between words and things is radically put in question. Thus, “[a]ny 
person, any object, any relationship can mean absolutely anything else.” Yet, for this 
same reason, in the baroque even the most profane things appear to derive a power 
“which raises them onto a higher plane, and which can, indeed, sanctify them. 
Considered in allegorical terms, then, the profane world is both elevated [erhoben] and 
devalued [entwertet].”83 Benjamin notes how the dialectics between natural expression 
and arbitrary convention is repeated in that between sacred script, which would be 
univocal, and arbitrary, alphabetical script. Allegory is both convention and expression, a 
tension which the baroque exaggerates: baroque allegory is not “convention of 
                                                
82 Romanyshyn, “‘Anyway, Why Did It Have to Be the Death of the Poet?’: The Orphic Roots of Jung’s 
Psychology.,” 68. 
83 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 175. 
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expression, but expression of convention,” and its dialectics attains its more precise 
formulation in the idea of natural history.84 For Benjamin, the essence of allegory is the 
movement from history to nature, a movement that is characterized by decay and 
ruination: “not so much the process of an eternal life so much as that of irresistible 
decay.”85 As an object of imitation, nature is not nature as shaped by God [hence perfect 
and timeless] but fallen nature, “which bears the imprint of the progression of history.”86 
RUINS AND REMAINDERS OR, THE MIMETIC ENDS OF BENJAMINIAN ALLEGORY 
Allegory thus gives us a particular form of mimesis which is not exhausted in the 
opposition between the natural and the conventional which underpins the passage 
between the magical imitation to representation in the Foucaluldian model elaborated by 
Tomlinson in Music in Renaissance Magic (see chapter 3, above). Allegory exposes the 
limitations in this opposition, it is not so much a synthesis of the two, but rather appears 
to complicate the schematization that aims to distinguish it, revealing both the idea of the 
natural and the conventional, of “imitation” and “representation,” as ideologically 
suspect. Allegory is a form of writing in which the materiality of the signifier overpowers 
the signified as meaning. The images that make up baroque allegories are arbitrary, 
transitory, and decaying, for they are not understood in as uncritical representations of 
their signifieds. Rather, the meaning of baroque allegory appears in this dissemination, in 
the unremitting proliferation of differences that defers signification. The similarity 
between Benjamin’s notion of allegory and diffèrance have been noted before, for 
example in Craig Owen’s “the Allegorical Impulse.”87 For Owen, allegory consists on 
producing a double reading, of reading a text as or through another, it is allos + agoreuei, 
speaking in another voice. “Allegory is extravagant, an expenditure of surplus value; it is 
                                                
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., 178. 
86 Ibid., 180. 
87 “The Allegorical Impulse,” October 12 (Spring 1980): 67–86. See also Paul De Man, Allegories of 
Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979). 
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always in excess,” he writes.88 This gives allegory a supplementary structure as it 
operates by giving another meaning to the text, an addition that alters and defers 
meaning, that in-completes the text. We could also suggest that Benjamin’s notion of 
natural history is closer to diffèrance than it is to Adornian dialectics. But it is Benjamin 
who poses the question of the relation between writing and sound as crucial for 
understanding baroque allegory, since the writing of the baroque Trauerspiel, 
does not achieve transcendence by being voiced; rather does the world of written 
language remain self-sufficient and intent on the display of its own substance. 
Written language and sound confront each other in tense polarity…The division 
between signifying written language and intoxicating spoken language opens up a 
gulf in the solid massif verbal meaning and forces the gaze into the depths of 
language…In the baroque the tension between the spoken and the written word is 
immeasurable.89 
With the formulation of this antithesis, not only does Benjamin break with the Platonic 
mimetology of debased writing denounced by Derrida, but also points to the baroque as 
the crucial site to develop the critical intuition behind it. Even more significantly, this 
tension, which passes through echo and onomatopoeia, is what propels the Trauerspiel 
into opera. 
Benjamin examines the treatment that baroque authors had of the plasticity of 
language and how “in their techniques, in the anagrams, the onomatopoeic phrases, and 
many other examples of linguistic virtuosity, word, syllable, and sound are emancipated 
from any context of traditional meaning and are flaunted as objects which can be 
exploited for allegorical purposes.”90 In fact, the antithesis of sound and meaning is most 
evident, he argues, when it could actually come in a synthesis, such as in the popular 
“echo” scenes. After dealing with onomatopoeia and echo, Benjamin introduces music as 
the result of the antithesis between written and sonorous language, focusing on the role of 
ambiguous role of the chorus and the apparition of the musical overture. These elements, 
                                                
88 Idem., 84. 
89 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 201. 
90 Ibid. translation modified. 
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he argues, bring about the dissolution of the Trauerspiel into opera. Against Nietzsche, 
Benjamin argues, that if opera chooses meaning over sound, this is already a debased 
meaning: the productive tension between sound and meaning ceases or disappears; 
devoid of this tension, what initially evidenced the plasticity of language now becomes 
mere empty façade. 
Only Ritter among the Romantics, Benjamin argues, seized on the essence of 
baroque allegory when arguing that every image and every sound—as demonstrated by 
his experiments with the plates that today bear his name—is only a form of writing (alles 
Bild sei nur Schriftbild): “In the context of allegory the image is only a signature 
[Signatur], only the monogram of essence [Monogramm des Wesens], not the essence 
itself in an envelope [Hüllen]. But there is nothing subordinate [Dienendes] about written 
script; it does not fall behind in reading, like cinders [Schlacke]. It is absorbed [geht] 
along what is read, as its ‘pattern’ [Figur]”91 The solution to the antithesis, then, is, 
to bring oral and written language close to each other, identifying them—but only 
dialectically—as thesis and antithesis [auch immer einander zu nähern, so doch 
nicht anders als dialektisch, als Thesis und Synthesis, zu identifizieren]; to secure 
for music, the antithetical middle term [antithetischen mittelglied], and the last 
remaining universal language [der letzten Sprache aller Menschen] since the 
tower of Babel, its rightful central position as antithesis; and it would have to 
investigate how writing arises from music and not immediately from the sounds 
of the spoken word (wie aus ihr [Musik], nicht aber aus dem Sprachlaut 
unmittelbar, die Schrift erwächst.)92 
If these lines do not sufficiently anticipate Derrida’s formulations, if the “dialectical” cast 
threatens to throw us out of track, and if “erwächst” might seem to suggest an origin or a 
source (even more when translated as “grows out of”), then we might see the “middle 
                                                
91 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 1998, 183 translation modified; emphasis mine; thus, 
not only Benjamin but also Ritter would have escaped Platonic mimetology. For a different reading of 
Ritter, see Veit Erlmann, Reason and Resonance: A History of Modern Aurality (New York, NY: Zone 
Books, 2010), 197ff. 
92 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 183; translation modified. 
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term” as just another iteration (since the middle term is here no arche or telos nor 
synthesis, it is a remainder, der letzten); we might retranslate music as mousikē and recall 
how, in its ancient Greek context and in its early modern return, it functioned not as the 
origin nor the telos of civilizing or alienating processes but as a medium—a widely 
distributed and fragmented performative assemblage of media—that served effectively to 
inscribe the ethos and nomoi of a community; then, perhaps, we might see that the 
identification of oral and written language—if this identification consists in preserving 
their difference without submitting one to the other, or rather in accounting for their 
difference without posing a single origin as arche or telos—may be precisely the 
difference that arises from iteration, from the repetition in performance of the signature, 
by which the envelope, the exterior, is incorporated; by which the remains, the cinders, 
do not fall behind but become figure.93 
 
Baroque mimesis consists in putting history on stage, on presenting history as a natural 
process, where nature is understood as fallen, as decaying; natural history appears the 
disjecta membra of its fragments and ruins. These fragments do not refer to an absent 
totality but to the absence of totality, to the discontinuous and incomplete: they reveal 
death as inscribed upon the face of history. This expression is attained by means of 
shock, of a face or “a death’s head,” or again in the “awkward heavy handedness” of the 
way allegory personifies nature and in the way stage props and emblems become overtly 
material. “There is not the faintest glimmer of any spiritualization of the physical. The 
                                                
93 I thank Jean-Michel Rabaté for first calling my attention to these pages and suggesting that the 
Feuerschrift was archi-writing. This interpretation is placed, nevertheless, under Benjamin’s 
acknowledgment of the tentative tone of these suggestions. Adorno, too, had a crack at the enigma in his 
1934 essay “The Form of the Phonograph Record,” in whose grooves he sees “the phonograph record’s 
most profound justification, which cannot be impugned by an aesthetic objection to its reification. For this 
justification reestablishes by the very means of reification an age-old, submerged and yet warranted 
relationship: that between music and writing…It would be then that, in a seriousness hard to measure, the 
form of the phonograph record could find its true meaning: the scriptal spiral that disappears in the center, 
in the opening of the middle, but in return survives in time.” Adorno, Theodor W. Essays on Music. Edited 
by Richard D Leppert. Translated by Susan H Gillespie. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2002), 279-80. See also Chafe, Eric. Tonal Allegory in the Vocal Music of J. S. Bach. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1991, 21. 
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whole of nature is personalized, not so as to be made more inward, but, on the contrary—
so as to be deprived of soul.”94 There is nothing inconspicuous in baroque allegory. 
So it happens with the allegorical tiara in Ponelle’s production. The tiara cannot 
be described otherwise than as excessive. It is literally inscribed with its meaning, 
overlaying the emblem’s inscriptio upon itself, revealing in advance or interrupting the 
work of interpretation that the viewer would have to perform. It breaks down the role of 
signification by attempting to unite signifier and signified. Moreover, given that La 
Musica introduces herself through the paradigmatic presence-effect of pointing to herself 
as she sings “I am Music,” the tiara appears as entirely unnecessary, supplementary: and 
yet it is there, repeating—and thus altering—the personification of music through a prop.  
What’s more: the instant of the transformation is hidden on-screen by Vincenzo’s 
ruff, yet another prop—part of the period costume that seeks to enhance the 
“authenticity” of the performance—, whose effect in the performance is that of an 
obstruction. The performance interrupts the aural dimension of the transformation by 
calling attention to material surface, to the material inscription in the tiara and the stiff, 
elaborate, yet out-of-focus ruff. These appear now to be clearly arbitrary props, whose 
lack as symbols is remarked by the introduction of yet a third prop, the lyre, in the second 
verse, to repeat the metamorphosis. In this case, again, the instant of the transformation is 
elided through montage, as the camera cuts to a medium close-up of three musicians as 
they play the ritornello. The effect, once again, is obstruction: the moment when 
Vincenzo hands the lyre to Eleonora is not only in the background and out of focus, but 
also blocked from view by a bow that swings in front of the camera (Figure 8). The 
perspective is entirely artificial, structured through a horizontal plane and an 
accumulation of figures, movement, and dark colors in the front and middle-ground, 
while the important event, the transformation, almost goes unnoticed. 
The return of the prop, the repetition of the allegorical effect that turns Eleonora 
into La Musica—the turn and return of the allegorical identification of historical and 
                                                
94 Herbert Cysarz, quoted in Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 187. 
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allegorical characters which forms the conceit of the entire production—contaminates the 
first turn, it marks it as needing yet another turn to be completed, thus in-completing it. 
The performance simultaneously establishes the rules of its mode of signification and 
undermines them by remarking their artificiality, the materiality of its spectacular effects. 
With this repetition, which marks and remarks the mimetic ground of its ideological 
intention, the performance disrupts the effect, offering itself both as (plain) performance 
and interpretation.95 
If in Ronconi’s production Orfeo and La Musica are united in a mystical instant 
through the Merleau-Pontian touch, the transformations by which Schmidt turns into 
Eleonora and then La Musica (to then return to her role as Eleonora), produced by a 
stage-prop that remarks itself as allegorical, produces the exaggerated, indeed baroque, 
effect by which “allegory emerges from the depths of being to intercept the intention, and 
                                                
95 The similarity, indeed the anticipation of Brecht’s theater in Benjamin’s analysis of allegory has been 
noted. Buci-Glucksmann signals the Theatrum mundi metaphor, adapted by Benjamin from Cysarz as a 
“panoramatic” temporality, joins medieval and baroque drama to Brecht.Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque 
Reason, 71. 
Figure 8: Second obstruction Ponnelle: Monteverdi: Orfeo 
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to triumph over it.”96 This moment, a Now that is permeated by history, necessarily 
exposes the bodies involved in their materiality as finitude. And if this transformation is 
exposed as an artifice, why would we believe the one that aims to identify Vincenzo and 
Francesco with Apollo and Orfeo? 
For Calcagno, Ponnelle’s production attempts “almost desperately, to recreate the 
premiere.”97 While this may be true, one also could say that Ponnelle’s staging recreates 
the desperation of any attempt to perform a work with any kind of “historical awareness,” 
especially with the awareness that history signifies decay, rupture, and death. The 
“authenticity” of Ponnelle’s production (the allegorical identification of Apollo, La 
Musica, and Orpheus with the members of the Gonzaga family) does not only derive 
from the early modern habit of depicting noble rulers as mythological figures, but rather 
from an awareness of what the mechanisms of this “habit” are, in how they operate in the 
politico-theological framework to which these works owe their existence and to which 
they contributed in actual, productive ways. This political context is entirely erased if one 
understands these allegorical practices as aiming to blur myth and reality. As argued 
above, the production is only minimally concerned with recreating the premiere as an 
original event, as an event of origins in which its full meaning could be found: if 
anything, it only contributes to its in-completion. Nor is it interested in further blurring 
the difference between myth and reality, for how can one account for that difference in 
the first place? 
By examining performance as in-completion in Ponnelle’s production, we find 
allegory as the key to understand the articulation between performance, myth, and 
sovereignty. Yet, besides an emphasis on the materiality of the signifier, we have not 
reached what is properly historical in allegory—in Benjamin’s sense—and which 
distinguishes it as allegory, and not merely as a sign or a representation. So far, allegory 
does not more perform the identification between the historical and the mythical 
characters as it reveals this identification to be ideological. Either we deny any success to 
                                                
96 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 183. 
97 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 30. 
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the presumed identification, or we accept the identification and its repetition, which 
undoes it. In both cases, we return to seeing the performance as a pure event with no 
consequences beyond itself. In other words, it is impossible to affirm, simply, that the 
identification is successful and that the historical and mythical characters are present in 
front of us in any sense that goes beyond a restricted aesthetic sphere—that is, without 
the political effects that we attribute to the operation. We fall back into the affirmation 
that music mirrors the social order, whose effectivity, if any, is that of solving the 
contradictions of this social order at a purely formal and symbolic level.98 This is, 
additionally, the mimetological limit of any analysis that seeks to argue for baroque opera 
as ideology tout court, one that relies on such types of identification to produce a 
representation of the sovereign that has real effects, as tends to happen in Calcagno, 
Feldman, or Stein. 
Under the critical notion of mimesis advanced here, we can argue further that, if is 
accepted that under general mimesis the distinction between copies and originals is a 
product and not an empirical given, and that such a distinction needs to be questioned 
from the perspective of an economy of distribution of value (i.e., economimesis), then the 
claim that music mirrors the social order would mean that its effects are not limited to the 
symbolic level. Music—and any representation of the social order—is effective and 
indeed productive of said order, yet it seems simply wrong to suggest that, because 
Apollo and Duke Vincenzo were identified in performance, the spectators—in 1607 or 
today—would take this identification to be politically effective in any strong way. While 
we agree with the claim that modernity is characterized by a turn towards a form of 
representation that has the capacity to shape the world, and that power may harness this 
capacity to affirm itself, how this capacity is enacted needs to be articulated through a 
critique of ideology and mimetology.99 
                                                
98 As post-Marxist thinkers from Jacques Attali to Frederic Jameson and Terry Eagleton would argue. Attali, 
Noise: The Political Economy of Music; Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1990); Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981). 
99 This question depends on ascertaining the historicity of the “aesthetic.” Jacques Rancière’s analysis of 
different regimes of artistic identification aims to show that art as such does not exist before 1800, and that 
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The question is all the more important at the time of absolutist power of which 
L‘Orfeo is the precursor where, as Martha Feldman writes, “opera seria inevitably 
reproduced, as narrative and social/symbolic practice, the prevailing social structure, 
broadly supporting the absolutist trope of sovereignty despite inflections indigenous to 
different forms of political organization across Italy.”100 Feldman’s further claim, that “no 
one person or group could claim [opera’s] symbolic capital in toto, and the mechanisms 
of identification were many, varied, and complexely mediated” is key.101 Feldman locates 
spaces of resistance in attitudes like distracted, anarchic, and erratic listening in the face 
of operas with librettos in which “endless, insuperable patriarchy was a foregone 
conclusion.”102 These techniques of distracted listening work towards the decentralization 
of opera’s sovereignty, securing the place for autonomous individuals outside of a 
simplistic ideological model, yet they do not seem to go far enough in the direction of 
ideological and mimetological critique, working instead towards affirming more 
traditional musicological objects such as the “ineffable power of the human voice.”103 
An important problem emerges from the reading of Ponnelle and Benjamin that 
will set the direction in the following chapter. We have been operating under the 
hypothesis that L’Orfeo is an allegory, that its meaning and function as ritual in the court 
do not have a purely aesthetic function but especially a political one, that of displaying 
the rank of the sponsoring dynasty through self-representation. However, in examining 
what is at stake in this self-representation, and especially when a production such as 
Ponnelle’s stages it, this explanation seems to crack. It is not that the hypothesis might be 
                                                                                                                                            
political distinctions. Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible, trans. 
Gabriel Rockhill (London: Continuum, 2004), 24. As argued in the introduction, however, Rancière’s 
writings on art seem to privilege the aesthetic regime over the representative regime, which appears only as 
preparatory of the categories that the aesthetic one would disrupt, thus conforming to the teleological 
narrative that this dissertation aims to resist. 
100 Martha Feldman, Opera and Sovereignty: Transforming Myths in Eighteenth-Century Italy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 6. 
101 Ibid., 8. See also Feldman, Martha, “The Absent Mother in Opera Seria,” in Siren Songs: 
Representations of Gender and Sexuality in Opera, ed. Mary Ann Smart (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2000). 
102 Feldman, Opera and Sovereignty, 25. 
103 Ibid., 26. 
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wrong or that we need more historical information to prove it. No amount of information 
would be enough to fill in all the gaps. What happens, rather, is that the performance in-
completes itself. As soon as it sets weight on one specific referent in order to ground 
itself historically (such as the filial analogy between the Gonzagas and the gods) another 
referent (La Musica as an allegory) remarks the first allegorical device as being itself an 
allegory (and not a purely historical referent). Although this is the case with any text, the 
fact that it is precisely allegory that is employed here, makes things more critical. This 
crack or breakdown complicates the simple reference between a work performed in the 
present and the historical past where we assume it is located.  
In Benjamin’s terms, we would say that there is a flash of now-time that exposes 
our relation to the past. If the performance today sought to be a purely aesthetic event, it 
now becomes political. It reveals that, in order to perform these works, we must grapple 
with the ideological and theological elements of the work. Not simply as a matter of 
context but also of content—but we already lose the ground to distinguish between the 
two. A further examination of allegory as Benjamin conceives it, elaborated in the 
excursus that follows, will show that baroque allegory and the political theology of 
sovereignty are fundamental to solving this question, as well as the specific affect that 
these performances seek to mobilize, which we will explore in the chapters that follow. 
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WALTER BENJAMIN: MUSICOLOGIST  
(FIRST DISCIPLINARY EXCURSUS) 
In the following chapter I will undertake a closer examination of the mimetological and 
ideological structures of baroque performance. In this excursus, I will remain with 
Benjamin’s theory of allegory in order to situate it with respect to L’Orfeo more 
accurately since, as readers familiar with The Origin of Baroque Tragic Drama might 
already have noted, there seems to be little relation between the Trauerspiele analyzed by 
Benjamin and early modern opera. The works analyzed by Benjamin—and this is the 
starting point of his investigation—are not inspired either by Greek tragedy nor by 
pastoral drama; they do not depend on myth but history, through a mediaeval tradition of 
mystery cycles and Jesuit theater; they do not present heroes in action and moral conflict 
but tyrants, intriguers, and martyrs who die on stage. In other words, just as L’Orfeo is far 
from Greek tragedy are the Trauerspiele distanced from L’Orfeo. Thus, in order to 
employ Benjamin’s notion of allegory, developed as it is through careful examination of 
a particular repertory, we will need to establish some common concepts and interpretive 
keys to put them in relation to each other. Finally, this excursus aims to provide the 
ground for reintegrating Benjamin’s early work into traditional questions of musicology, 
namely affect, historicity, and meaning. In contrast to Adorno, Benjamin’s work has 
received little attention from scholars in the field, if only because he seldom writes about 
music. Whereas scholars such as Eric Chafe and Daniel Chua do cite him as an influence 
on their work on allegory and history, they remain at a considerable distance from the 
text. My reading here aims to make up for these gaps, so the following pages will remain 
rather close to Benjamin’s text yet providing sufficient points of articulation for this 
dissertation and his work. 
Some common concepts have been announced in the preceding chapter, most 
centrally the disrupting role of the allegorical props in Ponnelle’s production that recall 
Benjamin’s insistence on the transient nature of the allegorical ruin. More generally, 
these props evidence a tension between the sonorous and the visual that runs through the 
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performance, to the point that we assist to a performance of representation. The 
allegorical means that characterize the Trauerspiele, for Benjamin, also depend on 
remarking the tension between the audible and the visual, experimenting with echo, 
onomatopoeia, and pure sound on the one hand, and developing the trope of the theatrum 
mundi to its spectacular extreme, with the sovereign at the center, on the other. 
Materiality, transience, and spectacularization—in short, natural history—are 
articulated in the body of the dead sovereign of the Trauerspiel; but is it the same for 
early modern opera? To be sure, the relation between death and sovereignty in this 
performance, especially in the prologue, appears weakly at best, unlike the Trauerspiele. 
Moreover, neither catharsis nor mourning—the two central affects of tragedy and 
Trauerspiel—are present in L’Orfeo, a favola which, in a “flagrant contradiction” 
remarked by Lorenzo Bianconi, is taken from Ovidian mythology and not the “true” 
Greek tragedy whose effects the humanists aimed to revive.1 For Bianconi, “the adoption 
of Ovidian transformation myths and their pastoral setting complies with certain aesthetic 
requirements which, to the perpetrators of the earliest attempts to sustain an entire 
dramatic action through music, seemed inescapable.”2 In addition to the requirement of 
the lieto fine initiated by Rinuccini’s Euridice, the privilege of the pastoral in general 
results from a certain interpretation of Aristotelian verisimilitude presented in the 
anonymous treatise Il Corago (c. 1630)3 and by G. B. Doni, for whom the pastoral 
deities, nymphs, and shepherds conform to the requirement of verisimilitude because they 
belong to a time in which “music was natural and speech almost poetic.”4 For Benjamin 
on the other hand, the integration of the pastoral in the baroque does not depend on such 
aesthetic reasons or in the emergence of the anti-artistic, theoretical man of Nietzsche’s 
Birth of Tragedy. Rather, the function of this integration is to undo, or rather overcome 
the opposition between nature and history by secularizing the historical in the state of 
                                                
1 Bianconi, Music in the Seventeenth Century, 174. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Paolo Fabbri and Angelo Pompilio, Il corago. (Firenze: Olschki, 1983); Roger Savage and Matteo 
Sansone, “‘Il Corago’ and the Staging of Early Opera: Four Chapters from an Anonymous Treatise circa 
1630,” Early Music 17, no. 4 (1989): 495–511. 
4 Bianconi, Music in the Seventeenth Century, 175; see also Roger Savage, “Precursors, Precedents, 
Pretexts in Peter Brown and Suzana Ograjenšek, Ancient Drama in Music for the Modern Stage (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 1–30. 
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creation. Thus, as a response to the “disconsolate chronicle of world-history” the baroque 
opposes not eternity but “the restoration of the timelessness of paradise” through the 
idyllic nature that appears in the pastoral.5 For Benjamin, that is, verisimilitude is not a 
reason or a motivation but an effect of a deeper historical and theological concern that 
defines the character of the baroque. 
This eschatological opposition of nature and history is, for Benjamin, the key to 
understand the baroque, which he places it within a historical framework of catastrophe 
and crisis.6 Not just an economic one—which it was—but a crisis of the very concept of 
sovereignty in the Counter-Reformation as analyzed by Carl Schmitt. In Benjamin’s 
gloss, 
A new concept of sovereignty emerged in the seventeenth century from a final 
discussion of the juridical doctrines of the middle ages. …Whereas the modern 
concept of sovereignty amounts to supreme executive power on the part of the 
prince, the baroque concept emerges from a discussion of the state of emergency, 
and makes it the most important function to avert this. The ruler is designated 
from the outset as the holder of dictatorial power if war, revolt, or other 
catastrophes should lead to a state of emergency.7 
 The antinomy in sovereign power consists in defining the figure of the prince in terms of 
crisis and catastrophe. The emergency, Schmitt writes, is unpredictable: one cannot 
anticipate its characteristics nor specify in advance how it is to be dealt with; it exists 
outside of the law. The most the constitution can do is to specify who acts in such a case, 
yet since the emergency is unpredictable, it falls to the sovereign to decide whether there 
is an emergency at all. The sovereign depends on the emergency to be defined as 
sovereign, and thus his authority is also outside the law. Yet he is also included since 
                                                
5 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (New York, NY: Verso, 2009), 92. 
6 “For a critical understanding of the Trauerspiel, in its extreme, allegorical form, is possible only from the 
higher domain of theology; so long as the approach is an aesthetic one, paradox must have the last word. 
Such a resolution, like the resolution of anything profane into the sacred, can only be accomplished 
historically, in terms of a theology of history, and only dynamically, not statically in the sense of a 
guaranteed economics of salvation.” Ibid., 216. 
7Ibid., 65. 
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only he can decide whether the constitution needs to be suspended.8 In other words, it is 
“a vicious circle of the political, where absolute power rises up on the basis of 
catastrophes, in order to avert a catastrophe.”9 As Christine Buci-Glucksmann comments, 
Benjamin uses Schmitt’s analysis to uncover the foundational violence of seventeenth 
century political theology, which liberal political philosophy would quickly seek to 
conceal as a move from “savagery” to “civil” nature, “contract” or reason.10 And in this 
lies one of Benjamin’s motives for approaching the baroque: it is not an aestheticist or 
historicist approach but rather one which locates the period as key to understanding the 
logic of modernity, of uncovering the hidden violence that philosophy sought to conceal 
and which allegory reveals in an indirect way. 
If the essence of sovereignty consists in facing crisis with decision, then “the 
sovereign is the representative of history; he holds the course of history in his hands like 
a scepter.”11 History, power, and spectacle are embodied in his figure. Thus, the German 
Trauerspiel and the theatre of Calderón appear as the two extremes by which the 
sovereign appears on stage. In protestant Germany, and as Weber shows, the affirmation 
of grace as the only form of redemption, which places salvation only in the afterlife, 
providing no transcendent reassurance for earthly life, means that “whereas the middle 
ages present the futility of world events and the transience of the creature as stations on 
the road to salvation, the German Trauerspiel is taken up entirely with the hopelessness 
of the earthly condition.”12 In contrast, the Counter-Reformation did not present history 
as catastrophe and apocalypse but as a golden age of peace and culture, where “the 
conflicts of a state of creation without grace are resolved, by a kind of playful reduction, 
within the sphere of the court, whose king proves to be a secularized redemptive 
power.”13 
 
                                                
8 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1985), 7. 
9 Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity, trans. Patrick Camiller 
(London: Sage, 1994), 69. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 65. 
12 Ibid., 81. 
13 Ibid. 
Orpheus’s Modern Turn—First Disciplinary Excursus 
 
247 
In both cases the death of the sovereign, the corpse on stage, operates as an emblem, an 
allegory: this is what I have proposed in relation to my reading of L’Orfeo thus far. It is 
only as corpses devoid of life, exposing the materiality and fragility of mortals—as 
opposed to the instantaneous transformation of the soul in tragic peripeteia—that the 
characters of the Trauerspiel can “enter into the homeland of allegory.”14 The Dionysian 
finale of L’Orfeo could be a candidate for such an emblem in the birth of opera. Yet, it is 
not the simple presence of the body onstage what makes it an allegory of death, in 
defiance of what the French classicists would call bienséances, but precisely as a point of 
articulation between natural history and theology. To understand its function in a 
Catholic context, Benjamin must trace it back to the Christian, medieval tradition: “There 
is a threefold material affinity [sachliche Verwandtschaft] between baroque and 
mediaeval Christianity. The struggle against the pagan gods, the triumph of allegory, the 
torment of the flesh, are equally essential to both…And it is only in these terms that the 
origin [Ursprung] of allegory can be illuminated.”15 The passage from pagan antiquity to 
modern Christianity, moreover, is a task of translation realized by the medieval Church 
and repeated by the neoplatonic Renaissance. Allegory emerges as the strategy to mediate 
between the two: “If the church had not been able quite simply to banish the gods from 
the memory of the faithful, allegorical language would have never come into being; for it 
is not an epigonal victory monument; but rather the word which is intended to exorcise a 
surviving remnant of antique life.”16 Allegory ensured the survivance [Fortleben] of the 
world of the ancient gods in a time which was acutely aware of the impermanence of 
things, both during the middle ages as in the period of crisis of the seventeenth century. 
                                                
14 Ibid., 218. 
15 Ibid., 220. 
16 Ibid., 223. Peter Burke also notes role of allegory as mediation between the pagan and the Christian 
world. Burke sees the entry of Mercury in the prologue of Poliziano’s Orfeo as replacing the angel that 
commonly introduced Italian mystery plays or rappresentazioni sacre. Peter Burke, The Italian 
Renaissance: Culture and Society in Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 23. Another 
important genre to consider in this context are the Spanish autos sacramentales, for example Calderón’s El 
Divino Orfeo, a highly allegorical work where the Orpheus myth is christianized through, among other 
devices, a prologue where actors on stage spell the word EUCHARISTIA and then re-spell it as CITHARA IESU. 
Pilar Martín-Retortillo, “Notas a «el Divino Orfeo» de Calderón de La Barca,” AISO Actas IV (1996): 251–
61. 
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In the face of transience, of the threat of disappearance, “allegory established itself most 
permanently where transitoriness and eternity confronted each other most closely.”17 And 
in the context of Christianity, this permanence was ensured by a conflict between a two 
conceptions of nature, a fallen one which produced guilt, and a purer one belonging to the 
pagan gods who could only be admired through statues, through the mournful 
contemplation of their corpses, where pagan divinities appear in the deadness of their 
concrete tangibility.18 
There are two mimetic dimensions to this survivance of the gods: first, the 
revaluation of statues as eidola, not as representations, simulacra, or hallucinations—
whose debased status depends on the Platonic mimetology—but as earlier forms of what 
Jean Pierre Vernant calls the “double”: a specter whose presence is a sign of absence and 
whose embodiment in stone, in the colossos, mediates between this world and the world 
of the dead.19 Second, this mournful revaluation of mimesis is an introjection by which 
the lost other is made part of the self.  
The mourning that the Renaissance would develop over the pagan gods and which 
guaranteed their survivance was not so much about their “loss,” since in truth they never 
had them, but it was a form of a primary, identificatory mimetism through which the self 
is constituted through separation, through in-completion, a point that Judith Butler argues 
after the groundbreaking analysis of mimesis and trauma from the perspective of 
psychoanalysis and affect theory developed by Ruth Leys. For Butler, separation and loss 
is what constitutes the self as self, a loss which is primary because the self does not exist 
without this loss. This initial loss is provisionally resolved through a melancholic 
incorporation of the other, which makes up for loss but also makes it impossible for that 
self to achieve self-identity. “It is as it were always already disrupted by that Other; the 
                                                
17 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 224. 
18 Ibid., 226. 
19 Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Thought Among the Greeks (London; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1983), 311. Euridice, as Orpheus finds her in the underworld, also belongs to the category of the eidolon. in 
the Symposium, Phaedrus says that Orpheus was shown a phasma of Euridice. 
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disruption of the Other at the heart of the self is the very condition of that self’s 
possibility.”20 
At the end of the Trauerspiel book, Benjamin writes: “As those who lose their 
footing turn somersaults in their fall, so would the allegorical intention fall from emblem 
to emblem down into the dizziness of its bottomless depths[.]”21 The only thing that stops 
the endless deferral, the dissemination of images and writing of the allegorical drift is a 
turnaround, an Umschwung [which also translates peripeteia], by which the panorama of 
fragmentation, decay, and destruction, is interpreted as “an allegory of resurrection. 
Ultimately [Zuletzt] in the death-signs of the baroque the direction of allegorical 
reflection is reversed; on the second part of its wide arc it returns, to redeem.”22 This 
decision abandons playful abandonment [spielerisch] and turns seriously [Ernsthaft] 
towards heaven; it “does not faithfully rest in the contemplation of bones, but faithlessly 
leaps forward to the idea of resurrection [Auferstehung].”23 
The limit of allegory, the moment when the movement of allegory is arrested, is 
the securing of a signified, of a presence. Not earthly, immediate presence but the 
absolute securing of all presence by which death is submitted, made accessory, to the 
resurrection, to the preservation of life; the Evil that appears as signified is itself only 
“the non-existence of what it presents.”24 The turn towards heaven, to recall an earlier 
term, is a Verwertung, a liquidation of the potentiality of the allegory for securing the 
highest value. “In the allegorical image of the world, therefore, the subjective perspective 
is entirely absorbed [restlos einbezogen] in the economy of the whole.”25 
But if the signified of the allegory is another signifier, this means—although 
Benjamin does not need to spell it out—that the final signified, resurrection, does not 
need to be taken as the final word. Allegory, the materiality of the signifier, as he stated 
                                                
20 Judith Butler, “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” in Inside/Out, ed. Diana Fuss (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1991), 27. This is a similar logic as the one presented in chapter 4, after Lacoue-Labarthe, as 
desistance. 
21 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 232. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 233. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 234. 
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from the beginning, thwarts intention, and only faithlessness—i.e., metaphysics—allows 
for play to turn into seriousness. If representing the impossibility of representing the 
Good is the function of allegory in the Trauerspiel, this does not mean that the iterative 
and mimetic logic that Benjamin unearthed by arresting the moment of allegory’s 
liquidation in awakening exhausts all allegory as such. Rather, by identifying its social, 
historical, and theological origins, by distinguishing between its manifest and its latent 
content, Benjamin identified the key to interpret seventeenth-century allegory beyond its 
metaphysical aspirations and against the ideological dismissal of his time. 
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CHAPTER 6  
THE RETURN BEFORE THE TURN: DISENCHANTMENT, SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
MACHIAVELLIAN FUTURITY IN L’EURIDICE (1600) 
Orpheus descends to the underworld—a feat that no human can normally accomplish—
and manages to persuade Pluto to yield Eurydice. Pluto accedes but imposes a new law: 
not to turn back, which repeats the first law (not to go into the underworld) and which 
Orpheus again transgresses. This fatal turn, which is a repetition of the transgression, 
restores the ordering of living and deceased, gods and mortals, that for a moment music 
had seemed to overturn. These two transgressions illustrate, present or re-present, the 
laws of nature as they apply to mortals: the vertical separation between the mortal world 
and the underworld and the linear or horizontal passage of time from the past to the 
present. They establish, in short, the fate of mortals, their finitude. This poses a problem: 
either the repetition of the transgression undoes the first transgression, or by repeating it 
it reaffirms the first one. How to decide? 
What enables these transgressions—at least the first one—is music, Orpheus’ 
song. Its power over gods, animals, stones, and all creatures is well known; his song 
tames, persuades, moves, overpowers its listeners, it stops the wheel of Ixion and makes 
the Eumenides weep—hence, everyone seems to agree, the obvious appeal of the myth 
for the first opera. This feat, this mythical testimony of the magical power of musical 
excess—the association of love and persuasion in the affective power of music—
constitutes the paradigm of Early Modern “musical aesthetics,” of music’s power to 
move the affections. Yet in the context of these transgressions and when addressed to 
Pluto, ruler of the underworld, we are past the magical realm or persuasion, but we are 
not yet into the self-contained world of aesthetics. 
We are in a particular space created by the intersection of humanist 
reconstructions of a silent musical past and the visibility of political configurations in the 
present. These coordinates (interest in the artistic past, political reconfiguration or crisis) 
create a paradoxical space which aims to be present and past, in which the legitimacy of 
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the political is obtained through the authority of the past. We would say that with Orfeo 
time becomes space if it wasn’t because this turn, in such a turn or re-turn, is a time that 
exceeds the space of its (re)presentation. In Althusser’s reading of Machiavelli, this space 
is also the space of a new politics, of a new possibility for a historical transformation, for 
the emergence of a new class. For Machiavelli, “one needs to be…a man of the people to 
understand properly the character of rulers,” or, in Althusser’s gloss, that “there can be no 
knowledge of rulers except from the viewpoint of the people.”1 This space is occupied by 
no-one: it is a space designed to be filled, a utopian space. What defines it is a certain 
theatrical perspective, with the sovereign at the center of the stage, facing the people. 
Thus, perspective, sovereignty, and politics coincide in a historical conjuncture, staged in 
the courts of the very Prince that Machiavelli sought to describe. This space, we may now 
add, is produced, maintained, and transgressed by mimesis—the representation of a 
second birth, from a narrow stage (the angusta scena) to the Theatrum mundi—and its 
limits can only be defined by joining two terms that constantly exceed each other: 
aesthetic politics.2 
It would seem, then, that the only way of grasping the logic of this space without 
space, which produces time anew or a new time by abandoning it, by turning towards the 
past, was through the power of music, through the staging or representation of the power 
of music: hence—once again—Orpheus. Music, many have claimed in more or less 
words, “exceeds beyond social and rational structures. It structures the nonstructurable 
and represents the nonrepresentable (which is the Kantian definition of the sublime).”3 
For Mladen Dolar, this excess is represented paradigmatically by Monteverdi’s Orfeo, 
which “is based on two primeval, perhaps original, functions of music that defined most 
of its fate throughout its entire history: the religious and the erotic.”4 These two primeval 
functions are joined in Orpheus, who wins Pluto’s mercy through music yet loses 
Eurydice out of an excess of love. In his paradigmatic formula (paradigmatic of all opera, 
                                                
1 Louis Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, trans. François Matheron (London; New York: Verso, 1999), 24. 
2 In chapter 5 I referred to Derrida’s reading of Machiavelli in The Beast and the Sovereign, trans. Geoffrey 
Bennington, vol. 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009). For the mimetic aspects of the 
Theatrum mundi trope in Machiavelli, see Potolsky, Matthew. Mimesis. New York, NY: Routledge, 2006. 
3 Slavoj Žižek and Mladen Dolar, Opera’s Second Death (New York: Routledge, 2002), 10. 
4 Ibid. emphasis mine. 
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according to Dolar, from Orfeo to The Magic Flute, until mercy disappeared after two 
centuries): “the power of music elicits mercy, the power of music is the only thing that 
equals the power of love, music is another word for love and its irresistible 
force…love=mercy=music.”5 By placing L’Orfeo as the origin of this schema, with 
culminates with Mozart’s operas, Dolar suggests a way in which we can begin to map the 
coordinates of this paradoxical space of political aesthetics, as “the birth of opera from 
the spirit of absolutism.”6  
The only problem, which is more evident for the musicologist than for the 
philosopher—although as philosophers we could also object to its teleological 
framework—is that these so-called primeval and original functions of music are not as 
self-evident and are historically far more problematic than Dolar and Zizek might reckon. 
Nor is the singular place afforded to L’Orfeo, which appears here again as a foundational 
moment, a unique event. Philosophy, once again, posits music as an origin and a limit, 
but characteristically stops short of questioning what it means to posit it as such. The 
power and the unrepresentability of music are the ultimate philosophical axioms. Hence 
the task of reconstructing historically the genealogies of these original functions and 
events. In this case, a traditionally musicological strategy, that of tracing the influences of 
an earlier work upon another, will show that what is presented as original in L’Orfeo, the 
association between music and sovereignty through love and mercy is already a 
transformation of a structure that is found first in Peri’s version of Euridice (1600), to 
which this chapter is dedicated. 
DISENCHANTED VOICES OR, PRELUDE TO A MISS 
And yet, it has not been remarked enough, in musicology, that in the most well-known 
settings of the Orpheus myth as early opera, music has, in fact, little of its fabled power to 
enchant and move its listeners.7 When we approach the work with historical distance we 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 More often, his failure is taken to be a rhetorical one, that is, choosing words the inappropriate, modes, or 
styles. See John Whenham and Richard Wistreich, The Cambridge Companion to Monteverdi (Cambridge: 
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already grant Orpheus these powers: we await the spectacle of a magical capacity 
elsewhere lacking in the world, and we know where to expect it—in all those laments and 
pleas—even if it does not actually take place. To repeat a joke by Carolyn Abbate, it 
seems that in L’Orfeo song has had more power over its post-Wagnerian audience than it 
does in the opera or for the audiences of its own time.8 Our belief in song’s magic 
precedes its effects, and so we seem to take it for granted, while in fact such a power 
borders on the unrepresentable. This paradox is at the center of the Orpheus myth and 
determines its operatic actualization, its becoming-modern. When the world turns 
towards representation, when “what is” is defined as “what is seen,” magical song 
remains behind as audible as it is invisible: the unrepresentable. Within a progressively 
dis-enchanted world, magical song signifies—and identifies—both a bygone world and 
the unrepresentable itself (as Dolar would argue). 
The reflections offered in this chapter should help us to see the equivalent scene 
in L’Orfeo from a different perspective. Consider the reasoning behind the various 
interpretive strategies that seek to account for the many oddities in “Possente spirto,” a 
number which, as Abbate writes, “has acquired such mythic status that there may seem 
little aria left to contemplate.”9 As in L’Euridice, it is somewhat odd that an opera that 
                                                                                                                                            
Cambridge University Press, 2007) and especially; Joel Schwindt, “‘All That Glisters’: Orpheus’s Failure 
as an Orator and the Academic Philosophy of the Accademia Degli Invaghiti,” Cambridge Opera Journal 
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move the heart and mind of the listener, as well as its limitations in regard to moral instruction.” 256. 
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VerSteeg and Nina Barclay, “Rhetoric and Law in Ovid’s Orpheus,” Law and Literature 15, no. 3 (2003): 
395–420. VerSteeg, & Barclay show this rhetorical failure to be also in Ovid (as they show, moreover, 
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elaborate on this last point below. 
8 Carolyn Abbate, In Search of Opera (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 19 Whenever its 
absence is noted, it is only to posit a further development of which L’Orfeo is an incomplete beginning, 
either in Monteverdi’s technique (Tomlinson, Rosand) or in opera as a whole (Kerman, Abbate’s “post-
Wagnerian listeners”), problematic teleological narratives which are of little historical or philosophical 
interest. 
9 Ibid., 18. The first commonplace, advanced by Kerman and Schrade, is the observation that Orfeo’s song 
becomes persuasive only when he abandons ornamented singing for natural declamation. The first four 
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takes it as its theme to display the power of music, where the most important moment is 
Orpheus’s plea to Pluto to release Eurydice, should avoid doing it. The obvious reason is 
that music is unrepresentable, yet such a turn is not without its consequences. In L’Orfeo, 
not only magical song is utterly ineffective, but the place of the plea is strangely 
displaced by the theatrical non sequitur pointed out by Abbate: “Possente spirto,” the hit 
number, the paradigmatic lamento-plea, is not addressed to Plutone, as in L’Euridice, but 
to Caronte. Orpheus has not yet crossed the Styx when he sings the piece. Moreover, it 
does not have the desired effect: Caronte says he enjoys the music yet refuses to yield—
pity is “unworthy” of him. Orfeo only makes it into Hades after Caronte falls asleep to an 
instrumental Sinfonia that represents Orfeo’s lyre. This, Tim Carter argues, is the true 
success of Orfeo’s song: not moving to pity but sending to sleep, casting an enchanting 
spell. The third act concludes with a “Chorus of Spirits” after Orfeo takes Caronte’s boat. 
Act IV then opens with Plutone and Proserpina along with the spirits from the chorus, 
and it is the Queen who convinces Plutone to grant Orfeo’s plea. But, as Abbate notes, it 
is nowhere clear if, and how, Proserpina heard Orfeo, or if she heard the same number as 
we did. 
Beyond any discussion that seeks to identify natural declamation with lack of 
coloratura—which Abbate rightly denounces as having a retroactive Wagnerian bias—
the other puzzling duplicity in “Possente Spirto” lies in the two versions given in the 
score (present in both the 1609 and 1615 editions) for the first four strophes of Orfeo’s 
song: a simple, unadorned version in the stile rappresentativo of Peri, and the 
ornamented one of dazzling virtuosity described by Kerman. There is no agreement as to 
why the two versions are given, and the indication on the score states that the Orfeo sings 
only one of them (a counter-argument to the claim that the score registers the event as it 
                                                                                                                                            
strophes are as spectacularly ornamented as they are ineffective. For Kerman, it is only by “forgetting 
himself” and turning to recitative in the fifth strophe and then to the “vaguely ecclesiastical” style of the 
sixth one, that Orfeo manages to persuade the “stony-hearted” Charon, although Kerman seems to forget, 
too, that Charon simply falls asleep to Orfeo’s lament. Kerman, Opera as Drama, 35. For Schrade too, the 
number shows a progression of rising intensity as Orfeo passes from the virtuosity of the first strophes to 
the simplicity of the last one. Schrade, Monteverdi, Creator of Modern Music. 
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happened: here it gives no indication of which one, if any, was performed in 1607).10 In 
Calcagno’s suggestion Orfeo is here addressing both Caronte (with the unadorned one) 
and the audience with the virtuosic, crowd-pleasing aria. Focusing more on the deictic 
elements than in the style of each aria, Calcagno argues that the first version is mimetic 
(in a narratological sense): it is addressed to Caronte and sung in a style that might 
persuade him, it remains within the narrative and hides the role of the singer as 
performer. The second one operates in the diegetic mode, it presents Orfeo as a performer 
and is directed to the audience instead of Caronte. The representational one, Calcagno 
argues, is never performed because it is ineffective: it does not persuade Caronte but 
sends him to sleep. Thus, Calcagno tacitly agrees with Abbate’s indictment of 
“hermeneutical stitching” that aims to resolve the non sequitur in the scene. 
By “hermeneutical stitching” Abbate means those interpretations that suggest that 
the linearity of the performance can be interpreted outside of its presentation in real time 
on stage, such that, for example, “the singing that Proserpina describes in act 4 is the 
same singing Charon yawns over in act 3, and that she overheard the aria though she was 
not present in the scene.”11 This solution is offered in, among other places, Ponnelle’s 
production of which, like Calcagno, Abbate is not a fan.12 In that production, act 3 and 4 
                                                
10 For Pirrotta, the first aria is a lamento in stile rappresentativo, while the second is nothing short of “an 
‘orphic’ rite, a highly stylized and hieratically formulated incantation, through which a superhuman singer 
soothes and subdues the forces of darkness crossing his path.” Nino Pirrotta and Elena Povoledo, Music 
and Theatre from Poliziano to Monteverdi (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 
277. Carter suggests, based on period performance practices, that the first one might be for amateur singers, 
or else Monteverdi’s attempt to record and notate the original performance; or indeed how he wished it had 
been. Tim Carter, Monteverdi’s Musical Theatre (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 133. One 
could also imagine that the first one is given as a kind of Schenkerian middleground elaboration of the 
basso continuo, while the second one gives a version of a possible foreground, where the singer is free to 
follow or to improvise a similar one; that the entire passage is built on the form of strophic variations could 
support this interpretation, as no formal constraint forbids more versions of the same basso continuo to be 
composed or improvised by the singer. 
11 Abbate, In Search of Opera, 19. 
12 Whenham argues, after Pirrotta, that in observation of the unity of action all acts were performed without 
other interruption than the changes of scene after acts 2 and 4—into the Underworld and back to the 
Thracian fields. It follows that acts 1 and 2, but especially 3 and 4, are connected (there is in fact no 
indication for a scene change) so that Proserpina was in effect present for Orfeo’s “Possente spirto.” The 
reason for the separation, for Whenham, is to fruitfully employ Caronte as a reference to Dante to evoke the 
poet’s description of Inferno as the setting for both acts, an effect that would be ruined by separating them. 
John Whenham, ed., Claudio Monteverdi, Orfeo (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 71. 
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are separated by an intermedio, staged over the opera’s ritornello, in which Vincenzo and 
Eleonora walk on stage and meet another couple dressed in red armors and royal garb. 
The scene camera focuses on the Gonzaga coat of arms in the proscenium. When it 
focuses back on stage, the scene has magically changed: we are in Hell, replete with 
skulls and smoke. Vincenzo leads the other male figure—we now recognize him as 
Plutone—to join him on the left side of the stage, while Proserpina takes her place on the 
right. Eleonora remains on stage, as she also doubles as La Speranza. Orfeo appears. 
Thus, the infernal couple is present during Orfeo’s plea to Caronte and attend to his 
performance. In fact, Plutone’s hand can be seen reaching from the screen, magically 
putting Caronte to sleep at the end of the number. Abbate’s own solution to the problem 
is equally suggestive. I quote her at length: 
But [supposing that Proserpina was present during “Possente spirto,” as in 
Ponnelle] is a contrivance in the reading, an attempt to erase the non sequitur, 
responding to anxieties about theatrical logic that are historically conditioned, 
troubling to post-Wagnerian habits of libretto appreciation. Perhaps the 
uncontrived, literal assumption is inherently preferable, as less strained: 
Proserpina heard some other song, one neither Charon nor the theater audience 
has witnessed. But this reversion to the uncontrived, ironically, opens up the 
possibility for several strange elaborations. The first is that “Possente spirto” is a 
red herring: Orpheus’s most important song is being excluded quite carefully 
from any actual onstage manifestation. Just as the song by the floating head was 
suppressed, so the mythic song before Pluto is suppressed, once more in response 
to dismay, since no opera can discover the song that brings back the dead, and any 
attempt to create it fails before a note has been written or sung. An ultimate 
operatic noumenon can be kept safe (along with one’s compositional self-respect) 
by being shown indirectly, or not at all. Thus the netherworld performance in the 
opera is not the primal operatic scene at all, but a prelude.13 
                                                
13Abbate, In Search of Opera, 19. 
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If “Possente spirto” is not the song we expected to hear, Abbate nevertheless locates a 
magical moment in it, which “contains and conceals [the song that Proserpina claims to 
have heard], a mythic performance that exists only by implication. Thus, the prelude or 
preamble, the song heard by Charon and the theater audience, harbors the primal song 
without ever allowing it to be heard.”14 Abbate invites us to hear Orpheus’ “phantom 
singing” in the famous instrumental echo effects within strophes; the various 
“passionately vocal” instruments echo each other in “expulsions of coloratura, pauses for 
breath, and repeated floods of singing,” without bearing any resemblance to Orpheus’s 
own lines. Rather, she suggests, they are echoes of the primal song that we never hear: 
they imitate Orfeo’s voice yet not exactly what he sings. What she suggests, in short, is 
that these repetitions, these musical copies, create their model, the original primal song, 
the one we cannot hear. 
Or at least this could be a reading of her point, a reading she nevertheless resists, 
recoiling into a more traditional mimetology: “Thus the instruments seem to hear an 
Orpheus voice that is not present. But they suggest its presence without ever suggesting 
that their melodies provide exact copies of its unimaginable music. This ‘brings the 
beyond’ into orbit, not as a distant physical space, but as a transcendent object.”15 I have 
to admit that, as suggestive as I find this interpretation, I do not find it less lacking in 
hermeneutical stitches than the options she otherwise dismisses. In the end, Proserpina is 
also either present in act 3 and hears in “Possente spirto” the parts that we cannot, or else 
there is a missing scene that needs to be posited, along with a more problematic “unsung” 
plea. 
I am not too concerned with debating that point. However, there is an issue that is 
of direct relevance for this dissertation. Abbate’s response preserves a mimetology based 
on a pure original and defective copies along with its musicological version, the idea of a 
“metaphysical” or “transcendental” music, of the unrepresentable, that serves as model 
and paradigm for its physical versions. Although it is suggestive to hear the echo 
instruments in “Possente spirto” as copies of something we do not hear, I find it 
                                                
14 Ibid., 20. 
15 Ibid. 
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surprising to find them mobilized for positing the existence of a “transcendental” music 
which appears at every move as uncritical, ahistorical, and apolitical. I elaborate on these 
aspects in chapter 7, where I introduce the trope of the dorsal turn that preserves and 
carries along an unseen music which stands in for the metaphysical, and which is 
surprisingly recurrent in the musicology of the past decade. I elaborate upon the 
disciplinary consequences of this in the second disciplinary excursus in order to signal 
this problem: that in the recent turn towards materiality and performance, the discipline 
has carried along, unquestioned, its own metaphysical history. The more we strive to 
grasp the musical experience as such, turning in the direction where it properly should be, 
the more we preserve the traditional mimetology that we sought to turn away from in the 
first place. This issue, I argue, characterizes all the recent musicological turns, since its 
mimetologies have not been critically questioned; one of the merits of Abbate’s insightful 
work is to expose—instead of masking—the way the discipline still depends on the 
dualism between the metaphysical and the material in order to make sense of musical 
experience, including the fascination opera exerts upon its enchanted listeners. For this 
same reason opera becomes a crucial text for beginning to deconstruct such opposition 
and the mimetology that grounds it. 
 
I defer beginning such a deconstruction until chapter 7 and the disciplinary excursus. 
Here I focus on the issues of unrepresentability and disenchantment in Early Modern 
Italian settings of the Orpheus myth, specifically in Peri’s L’Euridice, following on yet 
another suggestion by Abbate. As quoted above, “Possente spirto” is the prelude to the 
primal scene of opera. The idea of a prelude to a primal scene is characteristic of Abbate, 
but it also has a deconstructive ring to it: posing anything as the preparation of a primal 
scene, of an original event, undoes its originality and makes it derivative. But we only 
know it is a prelude of the event if it shares something with that event, something we 
already identify as primal in the event and which the prelude anticipates: the prelude is 
thus a copy of an event that was presumed to be original. Calling it a “primal scene,” 
moreover, brings in the issue of Freudian Nachträglichkeit, whose structure complicates 
   260
the one just described: an undefined “something” leaves a mark in memory, which is 
afterwards reinterpreted as a traumatic event.  
Nachträglichkeit, in fact, sets in crisis the metaphysical interpretation of time 
based on causes and effects. Insofar as it reorganizes what comes and what follows, time 
does not seem to precede its development but rather emerge from it. This is also evident 
in the thought that a copy produces the paradigm, and we will see more of its 
consequences in what follows. What leaves the mark can be insignificant or violent, 
common or unique, but it is charged with meaning and singled out—thus constituted—as 
a traumatic event only after the fact. The primal scene is made an origin only after it has 
passed, in the après-coup. If the prelude of the primal scene undoes the originality that 
Nachträglichkeit constitutes for it—and the prelude, as we have seen, also comes after 
the event, après-coup, but presents itself as preceding it, avant-le-coup (as one says that 
something is avant-la-lettre). It might be too bold to suggest that such a prelude has the 
therapeutic effect of undoing the trauma that is produced through Nachträglichkeit, that 
setting the stage for the trauma makes it disappear. Perhaps, to return to the terms of 
chapter 5, it does not make it disappear but, in challenging its originality as a primal 
event, it in-completes, opening it to other possibilities, to the possibility of being 
otherwise, or of not being at all. Perhaps this is the therapeutic power of history and 
historiography.  
The reader might be well advised to know that I will not return to L’Orfeo in this 
chapter, and will not discuss “Possente spirto” any more. Yet, according to the above, if 
examining the prelude of the primal scene has any capacity to re-open its possibilities, 
then attending to Peri’s Euridice, to L’Orfeo avant-la-lettre, whose importance for 
Monteverdi’s composition is as recognized as it is underplayed, might prove productive. 
L’EURIDICE BEFORE L’ORFEO 
Orfeo and Euridice, L’Orfeo and L’Euridice: one follows another, one precedes the other. 
Euridice follows, but she (it) was first. But if we look back to Euridice it is only from the 
perspective of Orfeo. Orfeo, the male, the singer, the work of the better composer. In the 
ending of Ovid’s telling—a lieto fine, after all, Eurydice follows Orpheus, who looks 
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back (respicit) at her: respicere, which often means imitation.16 Model, precursor, 
motivation, or prelude, Euridice still remains disciplinarily subordinate to Orfeo, caught 
within a mimetology of aemulatio, where Monteverdi’s merit is shown in how skillfully 
he succeeds in surpassing his model. Within this interpretive scheme, one is limited to 
finding elements in common between the two works, or points of divergence, often those 
where Monteverdi can be shown to improve on Peri’s version—examples are legion. A 
less common approach is to attempt to repeat what happens in the myth: what disappears 
when we look back to Euridice from the position of Orfeo; what does not return in the 
imitation. 
In chapter 5 I showed the place of sovereignty in L’Orfeo, which only Ponnelle’s 
performance attempts to stage as central to the work. With this I sought to reintroduce the 
issue of history and politics, taking Benjamin’s insight that the baroque is a unique 
moment of their intertwinement. Insofar as the intertwinement of sovereignty and history 
in L’Orfeo depended on allegory, however, its centrality was as soon suggested as it was 
undone. In L’Euridice, on the other hand, I argue, its centrality is unescapable although it 
takes no less effort to bring it to light. But once it does it will be unmistakeable: 
                                                
16 Shane Butler, “The Backward Glance,” Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics 17, no. 2 
(2009): 67. 
hie modo coniunetis spatiantur passibus ambo, 
nunc praecedentem sequitur, nunc praevius anteit 
Eurydicenque suam iam tu to respicit Orpheus. Met. (11.64-6). 
 
The case for L’Euridice as the direct model for L’Orfeo has been made by scholars since Pirrotta, most 
forcefully in the case of Tomlinson. As Tomlinson shows, L’Orfeo takes many expressive, harmonic, and 
poetic devices from L’Euridice, even when Striggio’s libretto seems to offer little motivation. In 
Tomlinson’s argument, the similarities between the pieces are consistently shown to be borrowings, while 
the departures attest the genius of Monteverdi’s innovations. In our terms, they show Monteverdi as 
appropriating the model, to the extent that L’Euridice is now most commonly approached as just that: the 
model or source that regulates Monteverdi’s innovations. The similarities and differences between the two 
works that I trace below (and their relation to their sources) should be read outside of this logic of original 
and copy, and rather as variables and invariables that repeat themselves—for reasons we will need to 
analyze—as L’Orfeo looks back to L’Euridice (to borrow the terms from Buller’s and Butler’s work, cited 
above). Gary Tomlinson, “Madrigal, Monody, and Monteverdi’s ‘via Naturale Alla Immitatione,’” Journal 
of the American Musicological Society 34, no. 1 (1981): 60–108; Frederick W. Sternfeld, The Birth of 
Opera (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Sternfeld, “The Orpheus Myth and the Libretto of Orfeo”; 
Jeffrey L. Buller, “Looking Backwards: Baroque Opera and the Ending of the Orpheus Myth,” 
International Journal of the Classical Tradition 1, no. 3 (1995): 57–79. 
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sovereignty is a central issue in L’Euridice, as I argue, at a structural, formal, harmonic, 
and dialogic level. From this central position the sovereign appears as the one who can 
decide upon the exception, upon life and death. In this way, L’Orfeo and L’Euridice 
become early exemplars of the intimate relationship between sovereignty, biopolitics, and 
spectacle. But placing the sovereign at the center also brings about a change of 
perspective, which I articulate through the political and theatrical writings of Machiavelli. 
Machiavelli is not often mentioned in connection with Early Modern Italian 
opera, even though he can be said to be one of its precursors—another prelude—given 
his role in writing not only the first Italian comedies in the vernacular, but especially in 
using musical interludes between acts and as frame, thus giving birth to the intermedi.17 
With my reading of Machiavelli I offer a way to understand the central and yet 
inconspicuous place of sovereignty in Early Modern opera. I suggest that, like The 
Prince—in Gramsci and Althusser’s reading—, L’Euridice is a text addressed not to the 
prince but to the people, a people that perhaps does not exist yet but that it helps 
constitute and which addresses a prince that also does not exist. 
                                                
17 For Machiavelli in the history of the intermedi, Pirrotta and Povoledo, Music and Theatre from Poliziano 
to Monteverdi, 128ff. John Bokina, “Deity, Beast, and Tyrant: Images of the Prince in the Operas of 
Monteverdi,” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 12, no. 1 
(1991): 48–66, sees King Ulisse as “a Machiavellian half-beast willing to use both force and guile as means 
to secure his kingdom,” 51. Il retorno de Ulisse in Patria is for Bokina “an artistic representation of 
Machiavelli’s famous notion of the beastly prince.” He argues also that seventeenth-century audiences were 
very familiar with [the injunction that the ruler should be cunning like a fox]. Despite the banning of his 
books by the Index, Machiavelli’s books were typical parts of Venetian aristocratic libraries in this period. 
(Bouwsma, 1968: 501). My approach here will be somewhat different. I will not try to claim that Rinuccini, 
Peri, or their audience had any familiarity with Machiavelli, nor that they needed it. The works are not so 
much a representation of Machiavelli’s idea, but a staging in which the opera partakes of the same political 
crisis and turns that Machiavelli responded to. In any case, Machiavellian thought can be said to permeate 
Florentine politics at every level, for centuries after he wrote. As Samuel Berner shows, a significant part of 
Florentine political theory during the the seicento consisted in working through Machiavelli’s politics 
without mentioning him, and the favorite strategy was using Tacitus. Given the mimetic relationship that all 
Florentines hoped to maintain with Rome, it was easy to produce a double writing when issuing 
commentaries on Tacitus: writing on Tacitus was like writing on Florentine history, and moreover, 
camouflaging the name of Machiavelli under the name of Tacitus; as Curcio puts it, “a Machiavellianism 
without Machiavelli.” More directly, Scipione Ammirato (1531-1601), who published the most influential 
commentary on Tacitus, would write “Ma il bello si è che egli è tanto imbevuto di Machiavelli che non 
s’intende se egli imiti più questo o Tacito.” Quoted by Berner, 198. 
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ORFEO BEFORE THE DIAMANTINE LAW 
The problem of representing the unrepresentable, of staging a miracle, is as old as the 
story of Orpheus itself: already in Ovid’s telling there is a disjunction between what we 
read and what we hear (even if the poem is recited). The difference can be seen at a 
narratological level. Orpheus’s plea to Pluto is in the first person (in Plato’s mimetic 
lexis), but we learn about the music and its effects in narrative (diegetic) form: 
And through the unsubstantial throngs and the ghosts who had received burial, he 
came to Persephone and him who rules those unlovely realms, lord of the shades. 
Then, singing to the music of his lyre [pulsisque ad carmina nervis; emphasis 
mine.],18 he said: “O ye divinities who rule the world which lies beneath the earth, 
to which we all fall back who are born mortal, if it is lawful and you permit me to 
lay aside all false and doubtful speech and tell the simple truth: I have not come 
down hither to see dark Tartara, nor yet to bind the three necks of Medusa’s 
monstrous offspring, rough with serpents. The cause of my journey is my wife, 
into whose body a trodden serpent shot his poison and so snatched away her 
budding years. I have desired strength to endure, and I will not deny that I have 
tried to bear it. But Love has overcome me, a god well-known in the upper world, 
but whether here or not I do not know; and yet I surmise that he is known here as 
well, and if the story of that old-time ravishment is not false, you, too, were joined 
by love. By these fearsome places, by this huge void and these vast and silent 
realms, I beg of you, unravel the fates of my Eurydice, too quickly run. We are 
totally pledged to you, and though we tarry on earth a little while, slow or swift 
we speed to one abode. Hither we all make our way; this is our final home; yours 
is the longest sway over the human race. She also shall be yours to rule when of 
ripe age she shall have lived out her allotted years. I ask the enjoyment of her as a 
                                                
18 The ablative absolute with ‘ad’ has a sense of causality or movement, so it is literally “with the strings 
having been plucked into songs,” i.e. a metamorphosis. I thank Tim Chandler for this moving insight (and 
many others). 
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boon; but if the fates deny this privilege for my wife, I am resolved not to return. 
Rejoice in the death of two. 
 As he spoke thus, accompanying his words with the music of his lyre, [Talia 
dicentem nervosque ad verba moventem; “the strings moving with the words”; my 
emphasis] the bloodless spirits wept; Tantalus did not catch at the fleeing wave; 
Ixion’s wheel stopped in wonder; the vultures did not pluck at the liver; the 
Belides rested from their urns, and thou, O Sisyphus, didst sit upon thy stone. 
Then first, tradition says [fama est], conquered by the song, the cheeks of the 
Eumenides were wet with tears; nor could the queen nor he who rules the lower 
world refuse the suppliant. They called Eurydice.19 
Faithful to the Platonic program, the mimetic mode presents Orpheus’ pleas directly, 
transparently. Mimesis adds nothing: the words appear as words—good if their model is 
good, bad if the model is bad.20 The diegetic mode, on the other hand, introduces distance 
and mediation, and with it a dimension of criticism and doubt. While the eponymous 
transformations of the Metamorphoses are described with an exemplary hypotyposis (i.e., 
making the scene vivid before the reader’s eyes), music is stripped down to its most basic 
unit: a plucked string.21 Orpheus’ words reach us unmediated and seduce us just as they 
seduce Pluto, we are captivated by them—that is, until we hear from the diegetic narrator 
about a music we can’t hear and of magical effects we can’t see. 
                                                
19 Met., 10.15-47 Ovid, Metamorphoses: books IX - XV, ed. George Patrick Goold, trans. Frank Justus 
Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2005), 64–67. 
20 This distance, moreover, might make us look back to the mimetic moment and doubt its verisimilitude, as 
Barclay and VerSteeg do, arguing that Orpheus’ plea is cast in an ironic mode, parodying legalistic 
rhetorical manuals and using their terminology. By means of this parody, Ovid skillfully sidesteps the 
challenge of representing the unrepresentable. VerSteeg and Barclay, “Rhetoric and Law in Ovid’s 
Orpheus.” 
21 And is not nervos a rather material thingly metonymy for music, along with the pun on human nerves, 
fruitfully exploited in the Apollo and Marsyas myth. Consider, in contrast, the scene of Daphne’s 
metamorphosis, coming at the end of Apollo’s chase that extends for over 100 lines: “Now was her strength 
all gone, and, pale with fear and utterly overcome by the toil of her swift flight, seeing her father’s waters 
near, she cried: ‘O father, help! if your waters hold divinity; change and destroy this beauty by which I 
pleased o’er well.’ Scarce had she thus prayed when a down-dragging numbness seized her limbs, and her 
soft sides were begirt with thin bark. Her hair was changed to leaves, her arms to branches. Her feet, but 
now so swift, grew fast in sluggish roots, and her head was now but a tree’s top. Her gleaming beauty alone 
remained.” Met., 543-552. 
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To be sure, there is a certain musicality in Ovid’s verse, be it mimetic or diegetic; 
but what we call musical in verse (what the Romantics would call “lyricism”) is not the 
same as music “proper.” Although we do not hear as a full, sonorous event, the power of 
Orpheus’s song in Ovid seems to be thoroughly effective: “conquered by the song, the 
cheeks of the Eumenides were wet with tears.” Ovid reports on Orpheus’ success as 
“tradition says (fama est),” amplifying the distance produced by the diegetic narration, 
but also diminishing our possible doubts about Orpheus’ powers. Among the most 
effective devices in this passage is precisely that of Orpheus’s performance isn’t what 
happens, but what doesn’t happen: “Tantalus did not catch at the fleeing wave; Ixion’s 
wheel stopped in wonder; the vultures did not pluck at the liver; the Belides rested from 
their urns, and thou, O Sisyphus, didst sit upon thy stone.” Even if we cannot hear 
Orpheus’s song without Ovid’s mediation, this mediation serves to preserve song’s 
magic. Music’s unrepresentability is part of the literary medium and its narrative 
techniques. 
For our humanists on the other hand, inflamed as they were by Ficino, Mei, and 
Galilei, musical power resided not only in the words but also in rhythm and harmony. It 
was necessary to sing while reciting, recitar cantando. But if music was always on stage, 
there seemed to be no way of avoiding, in a representation of the Orpheus myth, to 
represent in sound, the magical aspects of his song. This is the source of an everlasting 
problem for opera: if all the characters are singing, how to make it clear that Orpheus 
song is different? To use Abbate’s terms, how to distinguish not only between 
“noumenal” and “phenomenal” music—where only the second one is recognized by the 
characters as music, while the first one is only music for the audience—but especially 
how to make “phenomenal” song be itself magical. Rinuccini clearly saw the difficulty, 
indeed the impossibility, of living up to the task: 
To some I may seem to have been too bold in altering the conclusion of the fable 
of Orpheus, but so it seemed fitting to me at a time of such great rejoicing 
[allegrezza], having as my justification the example of the Greek poets in other 
fables. And our own Dante ventured to declare that Ulysses was drowned on his 
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voyage, for all that Homer and the other poets had related the contrary. So 
likewise I have followed the authority of Sophocles in his Ajax in introducing a 
change of scene, since it is not possible to represent otherwise the prayers and 
lamentations of Orpheus [non potendosi rappresentare altrimenti le preghieri et i 
lamenti d’Orfeo].22   
If magical song is unrepresentable, how did it appear in its early modern stagings? Or 
more precisely, what aspect of Orpheus’ song is represented in those early works and 
with what purpose? In fact, looking at Euridice, we can see that magical song is not at the 
center of the work. Rinuccini not only introduced a change of scene (nor only a lieto 
fine), but displaced the focus of the myth and the role of song within it. In Euridice, as I 
show below, Orfeo’s magical song turns into affective song at the same moment as a new 
figure—the sovereign—enters the stage. 
Plutone’s words to Orfeo sum up the argument of this chapter and provide its 
motivation, and I will return to them often. After Orfeo has reached him, addressed him 
as an “Eccelso Re,” and asked him for mercy, offered pleas, tears, and the music of his 
lyre to have Euridice back, Plutone makes a crucial distinction, in the form of an 
opposition, a contrast, between affect and law: 
Dentro l’infernal porte
Non lice ad uom mortai fermar le piante.
Ben di tua dura sorte
Non so qual novo affetto
M’intenerisce il petto:
Ma troppo dura legge,
Legge scolpita in rigido diamante,
Contrasta a’ preghi tuoi, misero amante. (Euridice, 474-481) 
 
Within the gates of Hell 
                                                
22 Solerti, Gli albori del melodramma, 1969, 1:107; translation modified after Strunk, Source Readings in 
Music History, 368; Notice here, incidentally, Rinuccini’s appeal to the mimetological strategy of imitatio 
for justifying novelty and variation: the new is valid as long as it is not new, as long as a model, an 
exemplary example, justifies it as insight and not as deviation. 
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No mortal is allowed to take his stance 
And yet, hearing of your hard fate 
I don’t know what new emotion 
Softens my breast: 
But a most rigid law, 
Laws sculped in the most rigid diamond 
Opposed your pleas, wretched lover.23 
Orfeo’s music does not touch, does not move Plutone. Orfeo’s tough luck, his hardship, 
might do it; it touches his heart, it moves him with a new affection, a je ne sais quoi. If 
the terms of the Artusi-Monteverdi controversy are still ringing in our ears, we cannot 
avoid hearing music—the music that Plutone does not, or does not want to hear—in this 
“non so qual novo affetto.” However, with his response Plutone preempts—or seeks to 
preempt—the effective claims of the new music, its powers not only to delight but to 
affect, to transform and change, to transgress the law. He preempts it, moreover, with a 
“however”: “ma troppo dura legge,” a very hard law, a solid, immovable law, sculpted in 
rigid diamond that contrasts, however, not only with the miserly pleas, the eponymous 
preghiera, of Orfeo but also with his own heart—moved, susceptible (unlike diamond) to 
be moved, to be softened (intenerire, “to make soft or tender”). The rigidity of the law 
contrasts with the tender heart of the sovereign, and against this contrast, against this 
rigid opposition, music—however affective, however touching and moving—is helpless. 
Music and affect on one side, the rigid law on the other; this is a sovereign distinction, 
the sovereign distinction that opera seeks to transgress. 
                                                
23 Translations from L’Euridice modified after Jacopo Peri Euridice. Roberto de Caro, Conductor (Arts 
Music 472762, 1992, CD).  
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DISENCHANTING UNREPRESENTABILITY  
Scene 424 of Euridice opens with Venere escorting Orfeo to the gates of Hell, leaving him 
with an exhortation to sing his noble song to the sound of his golden lyre, hoping that as 
his gentle tears moved heaven may they also move hell: 
Prega, sospira e plora: 
fors’ avverrà che quel soave pianto 
che mosso ha il Ciel, pieghi l’inferno ancora. (415-17) 
 
Pray, sigh and weep; 
Perhaps it will come to pass that the soft lament 
Which moved Heaven 
may cause Hell yet to submit. 
Orfeo addresses the shadows of Hell in a through-composed three-strophe lament, the 
famous “Funeste piagge” (endecasillabi and settenari lines, 10, 8 and 12 verses 
respectively, in free rhyme), imploring them to weep along with him: “Lagrimate al mio 
pianto, Ombre d’Inferno,” a refrain that punctuates each of the strophes of his plea.25 The 
setting of this lament is a textbook example of stile rappresentativo: as Peri writes in the 
                                                
24 In Solerti’s edition, Gli albori del melodramma, 1969, 1:129. The original text has no scene divisions. 
Solerti’s division coincides with a break in Rinuccini’s text that states “Qui il Choro parte, e la scena si 
tramuta.” It is not unlikely that this change of scene is all that Rinuccini meant in the preface by saying that 
Orfeo’s pleas and lamentations could not be represented otherwise (that is, than by introducing a change of 
scene from the earlier setting to the underworld—thus breaking the Aristotelian unity of place. Ottavio 
Rinuccini, Poesie del signor Ottavio Rinuccini. (In Firenze: Appresso i Giunti, 1622). Peri’s score has no 
act divisions either: the change of scene occurs after a five-part shepherd’s chorus (“Finito questo a v. il 
Coro si parte, e la scena si muta in inferno,” and Scene IV finishes with another change of scene after the 
“Coro di Ombre e Deità d’Inferno”). Line numbers are after Solerti. See also Bojan Bujić, “‘Figura Poetica 
Molto Vaga’: Structure and Meaning in Rinuccini’s ‘Euridice,’” Early Music History 10 (1991): 33 and; 
Jacopo Peri, Euridice: An Opera in One Act, Five Scenes, ed. Howard Mayer Brown (Madison, WI: A-R 
Editions, 1981), for a division into five acts. 
25 As Sternfeld notes, the plea or prayer (preghiera) is, since Poliziano’s Orfeo through “Possente Spirto,” 
“an important subdivision of the lament, combining eloquent pleading with poignant bewailing,” and he 
suggests for this reason treating it indistinctly with laments, elegies, threnodies, and so on, the important 
aspect being reference to the protagonist’s chagrin or pains, or more generally the “melancholy note.” 
Sternfeld, The Birth of Opera, 145–6. This passage confirms Sternfeld’s thesis, for this is as much a lament 
as a plea, addressed to the Ombre d’Inferno before the one addressed to Plutone, to be examined below. 
For the formal irregularity of “Funeste piagge” and the unifying role of the refrain, see F. W. Sternfeld, 
“Aspects of Aria” in Iain Fenlon, Con Che Soavità: Studies in Italian Opera, Song, and Dance, 1580-1740 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 113. 
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prologue, the aim is to find a kind of music that is “lying between the slow and suspended 
movements of song and the swift and rapid movements of speech.” Instead of reaching 
for madrigalisms that create sounding (yet abstract) parallels to the text’s meaning, Peri 
sought to create a style of singing that resembled speech, where the notes seek to reflect 
the contour of spoken speech as it is affected by emotions such as joy and grief: 
I knew likewise that in our speech some words are so intoned that harmony can be 
based upon them and that in the course of speaking it passes through many others 
that are not so intoned until it returns to another that will bear a progression to a 
fresh consonance. And having in mind those inflections and accents [a che’ modi 
et a quegli accenti] that serve us in our grief, in our joy, and in similar states, I 
caused the bass to move in time to these, either more or less, following the 
passions [affeti], and I held it firm throughout the false and true proportions until, 
running through various notes, the voice of the speaker [la voce di chi ragiona] 
came to a word that, being intoned in familiar speech [nel parlare ordinario], 
opened the way to a fresh harmony [nuovo concento].26 
Peri’s Orfeo talks in passionate speech, not song. He does not seek to enchant but to 
move his interlocutors to tears, to persuade them through sympathy and pity. Persuasion 
is less “magical” than what we would call “rational”: the effectivity of Orfeo’s voice [la 
voce di chi ragiona] does not depend on it being a magical song but a rational speech 
inflected and affected by emotion. Its affections are punctuated by the music, which 
moves along to highlight the crucial words through dissonance and consonance. 
                                                
26 Reproduced in Strunk, Source Readings in Music History, 374; Solerti, Gli albori del melodramma, 
1969, 1:107. 
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The first strophe of the song begins in G minor, tending towards D major (in 
cantus mollis).27 When it reaches the last verse, the refrain “Lacrimate al mio pianto, 
Ombre d’Inferno,” the tonal ambiguity makes for precisely the type of effects 
championed by the Camerata. In this exemplary refrain, the melody remains within the D 
major triad, with leaps that emphasize the accented syllables of the words: to A in La-cri-
                                                
27 Jacopo Peri, Le Musiche di Jacopo Peri nobil fiorentino Sopra L’Euridice del sig. Ottavio Rinuccini 
(Florence: Appresso Giorgio Marescotti, 1600); hereafter Peri, Euridice. Examples taken from Euridice: An 
Opera in One Act, Five Scenes. Edited by Howard Mayer Brown. Madison, WI: A-R Editions, 1981. 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 9 Peri, L’Euridice, mm 100-119. 
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MA-te, and especially a minor sixth rising to D, sustained for half a measure in “Ombre.” 
There, Peri (to say it in his own words) “caused the bass to move…following the passions 
[affeti]” to C, forming a ninth with the melody, moving back to D and cadencing on G 
(Figure: 9, mm. 107-112). The second strophe cadences in D at various points and returns 
to G minor with the same refrain, while the third one—where Orfeo apostrophizes 
Euridice, calling her “Luce di questi lumi” (l. 437)—moves to E minor, again closing 
with the refrain in G minor. 
Yet the prevalence of D in the first part of the first strophe makes the arrival on G 
minor in the refrain poignantly ambiguous, an effect which is emphasized by the 
immediate turn to G major in the cantus durus under the exhalations “Ohimè, Ohimè” 
that begin the second strophe, harmonized with a juxtaposition of G major and E major, 
which highlights the false relation G-G#, and a D major chord with a melodic descending 
tritone C-F#, returning to G minor for one bar, only to move to A minor in “Misero, 
Misero,” thus resolving the E major chord in the first “Ohimè” (Figure 10, mm. 114-116).  
 
Figure 10: L’Euridice, mm. 124-134. 
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Just as with “Ohimè,” wide leaps and long-held dissonances emphasize the plagal arrival 
on “Misero” in contrast with the conjunct motion and rapid movement of the surrounding 
music (Figure 10; mm. 122-125).  
This madrigalist juxtaposition of G major (sometimes G dorian) and E major and 
the harsh false relation it produces is a veritable leitmotif in Euridice. It appears in 
Dafne’s description of Euridice’s pallor, (scene 2; p. 15) and no less than three times in 
Orfeo’s first lament, “Non piango et non sospiro,” (p. 17). More importantly, the device 
made its way into L’Orfeo, and thus for Tomlinson, and for us here, it is crucial for 
tracing Monteverdi’s emulation of Peri.28 As I show below, moreover, the keys in which 
each character sings, and their arrangement in contrasting pairs, (such as G and E Major) 
are part of an organizational strategy aimed to center the listener’s attention upon 
Plutone, which also made its way into L’Orfeo.  
The repetitions of Ohimè and Misero (which are not in Rinuccini’s libretto),29 are 
intensified through rappresentativo melodic contour and the large-scale harmonic 
relation (the unexpected E major resolving to A minor five bars later). Other lament-like 
madrigalisms include a melodic chromatic descending tetrachord (G-F#-F-E-D, the G 
forming a 4-3 suspension when the bass moves to D) on “Morte spense i bel lume,” 
echoed in the following verses in a diatonic descent motive transposed upwards by steps 
                                                
28 See Tomlinson, “Madrigal, Monody, and Monteverdi’s ‘via Naturale Alla Immitatione’”, and Sternfeld, 
The Birth of Opera, 146. 
29 As reproduced in Solerti, Gli albori del melodramma, 1969 they are also not in Caccini’s setting. These 
repetitions confirm once again what Sternfeld writes about repetition as a crucial expressive device in 
lament settings: “the device that intensifies this expressive vocabulary [of ‘a’ and ‘o’ to ‘addio’ and 
‘ohimè’] is repetition in some form or other, and repetition carried out to a surprising degree: without fear 
of introducing the sensation of ‘repetitiousness.’ The operatic lament wallows in grief and scorns the danger 
of monotony.” Sternfeld, The Birth of Opera, 144. See also Tomlinson, “Madrigal, Monody, and 
Monteverdi’s ‘via Naturale Alla Immitatione,’” 77: “Sequence occurs rarely in Peri's Euridice. His favorite 
rhetorical device is, instead, varied repetition; and his most subtle musical transformations of Rinuccini's 
poetic structures usually depend on rhythmic, melodic, or harmonic equivalences matched to the poet's 
syntactic parallelisms. In addition, Peri employs repetition as a large-scale structural device; his speeches 
often unfold as a series of variations on their opening gestures.” Varied repetition is the key, for—as we 
argue here—all repetition is alteration, all repetition is varied repetition, repetition that alters and changes. 
The baroque dimensions of L’Euridice can be seen then in the mise-en-abyme, traced here, by which the 
trope of change is changed through repetition. Thus, there should not be such a strong opposition between 
Peri’s stile rappresentativo and, for example, Monteverdi’s elaborations on it with respect to repetition 
understood as a rhetorical and expressive function of speech. Joachim Steinheuer, “Orfeo (1607)” in 
Whenham and Wistreich, The Cambridge Companion to Monteverdi, 121. 
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(A-F# on “e fredd’e solo restai,” Bb-A on “frai pianto el duolo,” this time over an 
appogiatura E#-D in the bass, with a 7th in the figuration) and restated in the last verse 
(C-G, on “piaggia il verno”), where it connects with the refrain on F#. The only element 
that marks “Funeste piagge” as song and not speech is the refrain that splits it into three 
“strophes” of unequal length.30 When that device disappears, the style in which Orpheus 
sings his address to the Ombre d’Inferno is very much like the style in which he answers 
Plutone in the duet that follows (ll. 448-501).  
Although the verse in this exchange is freer and the refrain is gone, Orfeo’s music 
sounds much like the previous song, including syllabic, conjunct movement, expressive 
madrigalisms for the lament-like exclamations of “Ahi Lasso” and “piangendo,” and a 
particularly poignant chromaticism (Eb-C to E-C#) in “Lacrimando.” Some elements of 
repetition also appear in his plea (“Rendi a ques’ochhi il dessiato sole” is echoed as 
“Rendi de le la dolcissime parole,” ll. 469-71; “Mira, Signor, deh mira” in l. 458 is 
repeated in l. 462), but these anaphoras have a more expressive or rhetorical than formal 
effect. In a celebrated tonal contrast to Orfeo’s G dorian, Plutone sings in F (in cantus 
mollis) without any madrigalisms, abrupt modulations, or other expressive effects, 
defending the law with a stentorian voice that seems to lack any affection, or that presents 
itself as lacking any: the voice of sovereignty.31 
The G-major-E-major juxtaposition and the tonal contrast between Plutone and 
Orfeo (and others we will find below) are some exemplary examples of Peri’s attention to 
a device also prized by Rinuccini: the Petrarchan contrapposto.32 We already encountered 
the most important of these, Plutone’s contrast between the diamantine law, on the one 
hand, and musical affect on the other. 
                                                
30 For considerations on referring to these units as strophes, see Tomlinson, “Madrigal, Monody, and 
Monteverdi’s ‘via Naturale Alla Immitatione,’” 83 n. 31. 
31 With respect to this passage, Tomlinson emphasizes the tonal juxtaposition and contrast in melodic style, 
especially Plutone’s triadic, foursquare melodies that “define the affective charge of each key—F major 
unyielding and bright, G minor plaintive, soft,” and notes how the same dichotomy is emulated in the two 
Underworld acts of L’Orfeo. Ibid., 62. 
32 Bujić, “Figura Poetica” 31. 
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For Bujić, such devices are not merely manneristic commonplaces, but serve a 
crucial political and historical function. L’Euridice was composed and performed for the 
marriage between Maria de’ Medici and Henri IV of Navarre, a wedding that served 
various political and dynastic functions for the Medici dynasty, such as rising their status 
above the other Italian aristocracies and, most prominently, maintaining the stability of 
alliances with the Holy Roman Emperor and the Habsburgs. This delicate balance was 
crucial to reaffirm Medici dominion of Tuscany and re-align the dynasty with France as 
well (already underway with the 1589 wedding between Francesco de Medici and 
Christine of Lorraine). As Bujić shows, by marrying his daughter Maria above the ducal 
status with a member of the French nobility, Francesco achieved a symbolic union 
between the Habsburgs and the Valois-Bourbon.33 The marriage was achieved after 
several setbacks, including disagreement about Maria’s dowry and various attempts by 
Spain to disrupt it. For Bujić, then, the motives and devices of union and reconciliation of 
opposites are directly symbolic of the event through which the Medici brokered a 
European-wide alliance, only two years after the end of the French Wars of Religion. 
Specifically, Bujić shows how the line (quoted above) by which Venere sends 
Orfeo to the underworld, “Che mosso ha il ciel, pieghi l’Inferno ancora” (l. 41) is a 
transformation of the famous line by Virgil, “flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta 
movebo,” with which Venus seeks to prevent the wedding between Aeneas and Lavinia, 
Aen. VII, 31. In Rinuccini’s version, the meaning of the opposition (moving heaven and 
hell) is inverted, achieving a marriage instead of disrupting it. Finally, since the marriage 
was brokered by Francesco and was seen as his greatest achievement, the line by Virgil 
refers not only to the accomplishment of the union but to Francesco as its agent.34 The 
marriage, after all, is a large scale political affair, of which Maria is only a means. For 
Bujić, the central allegory of the work does not revolve around Euridice/Maria but around 
Orfeo/Francesco. 
These contrapposti signal the articulation of myth and history as inversions or 
transformations that the myth undergoes to become effective, to be actualized in, or as, 
                                                
33 Bujić, “Figura Poetica Molto Vaga” 52. 
34 Ibid. 
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history. The contrapposto that binds law and affect (in Plutone’s “legge scolpita in rigido 
diamante”) is a key transformation of the myth in Euridice. For the first time, that is, 
unlike the tellings in Ovid, Virgil, or Poliziano, it places the relation between sovereignty 
and mercy (the crucial articulation for Dolar) at the center of the myth. In the classic 
sources, as we have seen, Orpheus’ magic song—however unrepresentable—easily 
fulfills his desire. Music is effective and transgressive, although as readers we are not 
exactly privy as to how this occurs. In Euridice, on the other hand, not only is magical 
song not represented—or representable—but also not effective. Plutone, recall, is moved 
by Orfeo, but not enchanted. The concern in what follows is to understand how and why 
Plutone finally accedes to the disenchanted plea of Orfeo. 
My wager is that such a transformation of the myth has historical significance, in 
the sense I have been elaborating, namely, as an actualization of the myth, a 
transformation of its potentiality into another form of potentiality that alters the myth—its 
ending, to the puzzlement of all audiences to follow—to make it effective within a new 
context, one defined, as Peri writes in the prologue, by allegrezza, a specific affective 
disposition that regulates the entire spectacle. 
ENTER UPSTAGE, CENTER: THE SOVEREIGN 
The section that follows “Funeste piagge” is contrasting in various respects, including 
length: 106 lines (ll. 448-554) against the mere 29 (ll. 418-447) of Orfeo’s lament. As 
opposed to Orfeo’s paradigmatic solo lament, the longer section is distributed among 
Orfeo, Plutone, Proserpina, Caronte, and Radamanto (judge of the dead in Aeneid VI). 
The structure of Scene 4, in fact, can be recognized as a typical one that opposes 
expressive solo singing to the “choral” finale (the scene ends with a four-part, spezzato 
“Coro di Ombre e Deità d’Inferno”).35 
For the sake of analysis, the ensemble number could be divided in two parts of 
roughly equal length (ll. 448-501; 502-553), the first comprising the duet between Orfeo 
                                                
35 For an analysis of the lament as a structural device of this type in various settings of the Orpheus myth, 
see Sternfeld, The Birth of Opera, 140. 
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and Plutone, joined in the second part by Proserpina, Radamanto and Caronte, a 
disposition that again mirrors the solo-ensemble cast of the whole scene. When the 
chorus takes over (ll. 554-583), the scene falls in a symmetrical arch-like structure of 
contrasting parts.36 
Table 1: Peri, L'Euridice, Scene 4; formal scheme. 
 Section Character Incipit Lin
e 
Introduction Venere 
 Orfeo 
Venere 
Scorto da immortal guida  
O dea, madre d’Amor, figlia al gran 
Giove, 
L’oscuro varco, onde siam giunti a 
queste 
398 
401 
406 
Solo Orfeo 
 
Funeste piaggi 
  Ohimè ! che su l’aurora 
  E tu, mentre al Ciel piacque 
418 
428 
436 
Duet Plutone 
 Orfeo 
   Plutone 
   Orfeo 
 Plutone 
Orfeo 
Ond’è cotanto ardire 
O de gli orridi e neri 
Sì dolci note e sì soave accenti 
Deh, se la bella Diva, 
Dentro l’Infernal porte 
Ahi ! che pur d’ogni legge 
448 
451 
457 
460 
474 
482 
Ensemble Proserpina 
 Orfeo 
  Plutone 
   Radamanto [Caronte] 
     Plutone 
   Orfeo 
  Caronte 
 Plutone 
Orfeo 
O re, nel cui sembiante  
A si soavi preghi 
Dunque dal regno oscuro 
Sovra l’eccelse stele 
Romper le proprie leggi è vil possanza; 
Ma de gli afflitti consolar l’affano 
Quanto rimira il sol, volgendo intorno 
Trionfi oggi pietà ne’ campi inferni 
O fortunate miei dolci sospiri! 
502 
511 
521 
524 
531 
533 
535 
540 
551 
Choir Coro 1 
 Coro 2 
  Radamanto 
 Coro 1 
Coro ambedui, e cori 
insieme 
Poi che gli eterni imperi, 
  Unqua nè mortal piede 
   Or di soave pletro 
  Si trionfaro in guerra 
 Scendere al centro oscuro 
555 
560 
566 
572 
578 
 
A short introduction featuring Venere and Orfeo leads to his solo which is balanced by 
the chorus at the end; this pair, solo-chorus, frames the ensemble number, which is also 
contrasting: duet-ensemble. Each individual part has also an arch-like structure, 
                                                
36 This formal sketch should be complemented with the thematic one offered by Bujić, which shows what 
he rightly calls “an extraordinarily fastidious plan which relies on small, strategically placed details that 
ensure that the shape, resembling a giant arch with two sub-arches, is firmly held in 
place.” Bujić, “Figura Poetica Molto Vaga” 45-6. I offer a possible approach below. 
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determined by the number of characters and their respective parts. In the short 
introduction, two interventions by Venere frame one by Orfeo. The ensemble section falls 
in two parts as well, the first half involving Proserpina, Radamanto, Plutone and Orfeo, 
the second half replacing the former two by Caronte.37  
The final chorus consists of five sestine (settenari verses, ABABCC). The first 
two strophes are sung by each half of the coro spezzato (Cori 1 and 2, or Shades and 
Deities), followed by a solo by Radamanto in the middle. The fourth strophe is set to the 
same music as the first one and is sung by Coro 1, while the last one, set to the music of 
the second one, combines both choruses (“Coro ambedui, e cori insieme”) for the full 
choral finale of which L’Euridice would become paradigmatic. 
The effect of this symmetrical structure, however, is not of rigidity. Rather, it 
sustains a dazzling play of contrasts and oppositions, of contrapposti, that intensify as the 
scene progresses. The number of characters on stage grows (Venere departs→Orfeo 
solo→Orfeo + Plutone; Orfeo + Plutone + Proserpina + Caronte (+ Radamanto)	→Coro 
spezzato→full chorus) as the general affect of the scene changes from Orfeo’s despair 
after losing Euridice to the joyful, collective celebration that closes the scene, a local lieto 
fine that mirrors that of the whole opera. 38 Scene 4, framed by two changes of scene—
setting it in the Underworld—starts at the very middle of the opera (790 lines in total).39 It 
is the lowest point of Orfeo’s catabasis and the turning point of the story, a turn that is 
announced by the chorus of nymphs that closes scene 3, echoed by Proserpina and 
Caronte, and finally affirmed by Plutone. 
As Bojan Bujić shows, this turn shapes the work into a general pattern (happiness-
sorrow-happiness) that displays, in affective form, the programmatic announcement of La 
Tragedia in the prologue: not only to change the ending of the myth into a lieto fine, to 
turn from sorrow to joy, but of thematize change and affect together, or change through 
                                                
37 In Peri’s score, Radamanto’s lines in the ensemble (ll. 524-530) are given to Caronte, while Radamanto is 
given one strophe of the choral finale (ll. 566-571). Thus, the balance between the two sections of the 
ensemble emphasized in the opera. But, as we shall see, this is not the only effect of this change. 
38 Replacing Caronte for Radamanto also helps maintain the progressive increase of characters on stage. 
39 Bujić, “Figura Poetica Molto Vaga” 34. 
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affect. The event, the transformation announced by La Tragedia is not just to change one 
affect for another, but to make change sensible through affect, to make change into an 
affective event, to make change into a stage character by presenting it as affect, and to 
return, thus changed, to the stage of the royal wedding:40 
Lungi via, lungi pur da’ regii tetti, 
simolacri funesti, ombre d’affanni: 
ecco i mesti coturni e i foschi panni 
cangio, e desto ne i cor più dolci affetti. 
 
Hor s’avverrà che le cangiate forme 
non senza alto stupor la terra ammiri, 
tal ch’ogni alma gentil ch’Apollo 
inspiri del mio novo cammin calpesti l’orme, 
… 
Tal per voi torno, e con sereno aspetto 
                                                
40 The prominence of the lieto fine in early modern opera and the apparent contradiction it produces with 
the typical endings of the ancient Greek tragedy that the humanists aimed to revive has been frequently 
noted, at least since Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy. For a classic elaboration of the lieto fine as aesthetic 
principle in early opera, see Sternfeld, The Birth of Opera. I address the discrepancy between pastoral 
operas and ancient Greek tragedy with respect to Benjamin’s treatment of the distinction between 
Trauerspiel and tragedy in the first “excursus” (above). But the apparent contradiction between tragedy and 
pastoral seems to have played out. Blair Hoxby has recently argued that the only reason the lieto fine seems 
to be at odds with ancient Greek tragedy is because today we have a skewed vision of the latter, mediated 
as it is by German Romanticism and Nietzsche, which makes a few works by Aeschylus and Sophocles into 
the paradigm of tragedy. This interpretation dismisses the much more popular Euripides, whose works have 
as many “tragic” as “happy” endings, and which—more appropriately for the humanists’ purposes—
emphasize the affective role of music. Focusing on cinquecento readings of Aristotle (who praises 
Euripides), Hoxby demonstrates that this was a prevalent view in the seventeenth century. Even the 
Apollonian ending of L’Orfeo can be argued to be inspired by the ending in Euripides’ Orestes. Blair 
Hoxby, “The Doleful Airs of Euripides: The Origins of Opera and the Spirit of Tragedy Reconsidered,” 
Cambridge Opera Journal 17, no. 3 (2005): 253–69. In his reading, (and close to Benjamin) it is not the 
tragic or the unhappy as such that makes tragedy, but the more general principle of organizing and shaping 
affection through artistic means, of leading the soul (psychagogein) through an “art against grief.” Hoxby 
thus concludes that “[Euripides’] di ex machina are not just a way to tie up his plots, or to pander to a taste 
for spectacle. They are a means, or so seventeenth-century readers could reasonably interpret them, of 
completing the affective script of his tragedies by stirring the audience to intense wonder - a passion that, 
according to many commentators, had its own purgative qualities. They are, in other words, an integral part 
of his 'art against grief.” On music and tragedy in Euripides, see Peter Wilson, “Euripides’ Tragic Muse,” 
Illinois Classical Studies 24/25 (1999): 427–49. 
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ne’ reali imenei m’adorno anch’io,
e su corde piu liete il canto mio 
tempro, al nobile cor dolce diletto. (9-24; emphasis mine) 
 
Away, away from this royal house, 
Funeral simulacra, shades of sorrow! 
Behold, my gloomy buskins and dark robes 
I change, to awaken in the heart sweeter emotions 
 
Should it now come to pass 
that the world admire 
With great amazement, 
these changed forms, 
So that every gentle spirit 
that Apollo inspires 
Will tread in the tracks of my new path, 
… 
Thus changed, I return; serenely, 
I, too, adorn myself for the Royal wedding 
and temper my song with happier notes, 
Sweet delight to the noble heart. 
At the center of the work, at the bottom of the katabasis and at the moment of the turning 
point, of the articulation and change of polarity of the opera’s affective charge, is the 
ensemble, and at the center of the ensemble is Plutone. He is the formal axis upon which 
all the articulations and all changes turn. He is after all the one who can decide on 
Eurydice’s fate: it is him who can make sorrow turn into joy. His centrality is also 
emphasized at a dialogic level: the characters in the ensemble do not address each other, 
but only speak to Plutone, who stands alone at the center. Even when Orfeo refers to 
Proserpina—in an echo of Ovid (“you, too, were joined by love.” Met. 10.29)—he does 
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so indirectly, turning to from G dorian to A major (through E-flat and a neapolitan-
sounding, first-inversion G dorian). A double speech, speaking about her without 
speaking to her, making her turn towards him, all the while addressing Plutone: 
mira, signor, deh mira 
com’ al mio lagrimar dolce sospira 
tua bella sposa, e come dolci i lumi 
rugiadosi di pianto a me pur gira. (458-461) 
 
Look, lord, see 
How at my weeping 
Your beautiful wife sweetly sighs, 
and how, sweetly 
Her eyes, dewy with tears, turn to me.  
Proserpina does not respond to Orfeo. If she turns towards him, as Orfeo claims (“a me 
pur gira”), she does not speak to him but to the king, specifically to the king’s face, 
looking up to his face—leaping from E to C through an A minor triad, (“O Re, nel cui 
sembiante,”[if only English preserved the sense of appearance of the “face” as 
semblance])—where she sees change, the memory of change, of the bright skies that she 
left behind to live in the shades of the underworld after being reaped by Plutone (“si che’l 
ciel sereno e chiaro/con quest’ ombre cangiar m’è dolce e caro”; 503-505).41 Thus, in a 
device that would become popular in comic opera, Orfeo and Proserpina talk to each 
other while addressing a third. I will argue it is a case of a double speech, a dialogue with 
a third, an allegorical speech, for reasons that will come clearer when I turn to 
                                                
41 A bolder interpretation of this passage might still insist on the magical powers of Orfeo, such that he is 
able to move Proserpina to his side, to make her (and Caronte) speak on his behalf, to make her do the work 
that he is unable to do, either through magical psychagogy or at least a magnificent ventriloquy, using them 
as his marionettes. This reading would invite us to examine magic in relation with the art of the marionette, 
which, as Derrida says, is also mimetic: “is a question of art, of technē as art or of technē between art and 
technique, and between life and politics.” Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, 1:186. Perhaps the 
marionette, mechanical and rigid, has the capacity to break the diamantine law that Orfeo’s affective song 
lacks. 
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Machiavelli.42 With Proserpina on his side—next to him, turning back to G major, both 
facing Plutone—Orfeo opposes the single soul of Euridice to the many that will remain in 
Hades, for what is a single soul in comparison with all those that will remain, and all 
those that will return after they have lived their allotted years? 
Che fia però se fra tant’alme e tante 
riede Euridice a rimirar il Sole ? 
Rimarran queste piagge ignude e sole ? 
Ahi !, che me seco, e mille e mille insieme 
diman teco vedrai nel tuo gran regno. 
Sai pur che mortal vita a l’ore estreme 
vola più ratta che saetta al segno. (511-520) 
 
What, if, from among so many souls, 
Only Euridice returned to gaze at the sun? 
Would these shores be bare and solitary? 
Ahi! Thousands and thousands of souls, 
And me among them 
Will you see here with you 
in your kingdom tomorrow. 
For you know that at the last hour 
Mortal life flies here 
As swiftly as the arrow to its target. 
This contrapposto is a key argument in Orfeo’s plea that builds on Ovid (Met., 10.32-37), 
and which Caronte will have transformed.43 In fact, it has been building up along with—
                                                
42 From a Lacanian perspective we could say that what happens is the reverse: we always address only the 
Other, even when we think we are simply talking to one another. 
43 For Versteeg and Barclay, the equivalent passage in Ovid’s telling is, “in terms of legal argument, this 
[the] only allegation of substance that Orpheus raises. Thus, it is logical to assume that this is the argument 
that Hades and Persephone find persuasive. In one sense, Orpheus’ argument reminds us of warranty law. 
Orpheus asserts that, like all mortals, Eurydice too will return to the Underworld but only after she has 
lived a fair number of years (cum iustos peregerit annos)…. Both legally and logically, Orpheus’ 
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or through—the trope of change, of the turn as change, which is also a central structuring 
device in the libretto.44 It is the law of mortals: all things change, nothing is eternal, and 
every mortal must return to Hades, “Sai pur che mortai vita a l’ore estreme/Vola più ratta 
che saetta al segno.” But it is also the principle formulated at the beginning, in La 
Tragedia’s prologue: sorrow must turn into joy. It is repeated by the chorus of nymphs, at 
the end of scene 3 at the very middle of the work, announcing and preparing the change 
of scene and the change of affect that will soon follow: 
Al rotar del ciel superno 
Non pur l’aer e ‘l foco intorno, 
Ma si volve il tutto in giro : 
Non è il ben né ‘l pianto eterno; 
Come or sorge, or cade il giorno, 
Regna qui gioia o martire. (384-9) 
 
As heaven rotates in its course 
Everything, and not just air and fire, moves with it: 
Neither the good nor the unhappy is eternal; 
As the day now rises, now falls, 
So joy reigns on earth for a while, and then sadness. 
Here, as Bujić shows, change is presented as transformation, as the necessary flux of 
night to day, from one thing into the other, from joy to sorrow. No earthly state is eternal, 
however: everything changes—ma si volve il tutto in giro: everything turns; everything 
changes with the turn—however. But this eternal change is cyclical, like the turning 
                                                                                                                                            
argumentation in lines 32-37 is sound. He begins with a syllogism that has an unstated but obvious premise. 
He acknowledges that all humans eventually go to the Underworld where Hades ultimately controls them. 
All humans go to the Underworld. The unstated premise, of course, is that Eurydice is human. He then 
concludes this strand of reasoning by noting that Eurydice, too, will eventually go to the Underworld. 
Interestingly, there is yet another legal basis for this claim in Roman law. In the Roman law of real 
property, a landowner was considered the owner of all things both above and below his soil. Thus, in one 
sense, Hades, in addition to owning all things in the Underworld, owned everything and everyone above as 
well. 
” VerSteeg and Barclay, “Rhetoric and Law in Ovid’s Orpheus,” 405. 
44 Bujić, “‘Figura Poetica Molto Vaga’: Structure and Meaning in Rinuccini’s ‘Euridice,’” 35. See note on 
trope and change above. 
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skies. The passage of joy to sorrow is as inevitable as sunset and dawn; it is no change at 
all. 
And yet there is change, since the trope is changed as it returns—a repetition of 
the trope which involves its alteration—in Caronte’s address to Plutone, at the end of the 
ensemble. The turning skies no more signify renovation but transience and impending 
death: the life of mortals is as brief as one day; everything returns to the Underworld. 
Quanto rimira il sol, volgendo intorno 
La luminosa face, 
Al rapido sparir d'un breve giorno 
Cade morendo e fa qua giù ritorno : 
Fa’ pur legge, o gran Re, quanto a te piace. (535-539) 
 
All that the sun can see, turning about  
His luminous torch, 
At the rapid disappearance of one short day 
Will fall, dying, and return here below: 
Make your laws, O great King, as you please. 
If the programmatic theme of the opera is change, Caronte’s last verse expresses the 
ideological message of the work by presenting change as the decision of the sovereign. 
As argued above, in Ovid the decision is beyond Pluto—it lies with the fates—, and by 
appealing to him Orpheus seeks less to persuade than to enchant. Orpheus’ reasoning, or 
even offering himself in sacrifice, is not what makes Pluto return Eurydice: pure 
(unrepresentable) magical song does. The natural order, the division between mortal life 
and sovereign power, cannot be transgressed neither by reason nor by force, but only by 
song. Pluto offers no counter-argument, no resistance to the magical enchantment.45 
                                                
45 “Hither we all make our way; this is our final home; yours is the longest sway over the human race. She 
also shall be yours to rule when of ripe age she shall have lived out her allotted years. I ask the enjoyment 
of her as a boon; but if the fates [fata] deny this privilege for my wife, I am resolved not to return. Rejoice 
in the death of two.” (Met. Bk. 10, 33-39). 
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 When Caronte recalls this passage in L’Euridice, associating change, transience, 
and inevitability through rhyme (volgendo intorno/un breve giorno/fa qua giù ritorno), he 
inverts the sense of the trope: change is no more the passage of time, the cyclical 
transformation of day into night or the inevitability of death.46 For Caronte,—who joins 
Orpheus in his plea, echoing him as he transforms the trope—these laws are secondary, 
they are only the background for the law of the sovereign, which alone is his to make. In 
Caronte’s formulation the law is the law of the sovereign, in both senses of the double 
genitive: the law that belongs to the sovereign, that he makes and that he imposes, but 
also the law that makes him the sovereign, the law by which he becomes a sovereign as 
he makes the law. If the law of mortals is transgressed in this scene, it is not because of 
Orfeo’s magical song, but because the law has been displaced, because it now belongs to 
the sovereign as his decision, hence as his being sovereign. For Bujić, as for many 
allegoric readers of L’Euridice and L’Orfeo, the hero of the work is meant to represent 
and flatter the ruler, in this case Ferdinando de’ Medici, and through the devices 
elaborated in the previous chapter. In Euridice, Bujić argues, Ferdinando was to be seen 
as the effective ruler who managed to unite the Habsburgs and the Valois-Bourbon 
through the mediation of the Medici.47 Allegory, however, never gives us just one 
meaning. Its semiotic drift does not end with the author’s or the reader’s intentions, 
which it thwarts at every step, but proliferates through the materiality of its signifiers. 
What is opened is the possibility of reading such allegories from a historical perspective 
and not simply from the particular historicity of their deployment.  
                                                
46 Compare also the same motive in Poliziano which in this respect is closer to Ovid’s: 
“Ogni cosa nel fine a voi ritorna, 
ogni cosa mortale a voi ricade: 
quanto cerchia la luna con suo corna 
convien ch’arrivi alle vostre contrade. 
Chi più chi men tra’ superi soggiorna, 
ognun convien ch’arrivi a queste strade; 
quest’è de’ nostri passi estremo segno: 
poi tenete di noi più longo regno.” 
(Orfeo, 205-212). 
47 Bujić, “‘Figura Poetica Molto Vaga’: Structure and Meaning in Rinuccini’s ‘Euridice,’” 54. See also Roy 
Strong, Art and Power: Renaissance Festivals, 1450-1650 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 
97ff. 
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I see the possibility of opening more interpretations in the conflict, the 
contrapposto, between Orfeo as the hero of the story, and the formal and dialogic 
centrality of Plutone, which we can now formalize in the following diagram. I take this 
formal disposition—on stage—along with its structural centrality in the opera, as having 
a material effect upon perception. The keys each character sings repeat or redouble the 
formal disposition. Plutone’s F major is the tonal center. It is in contrast with Orfeo’s G 
major; it has Proserpina’s A as its mediant; and it is shared with Caronte. Proserpina and 
Caronte are on both sides of Orfeo and do not address each other but only Plutone and, 
instead of sharply contrasting with his tonal areas, provide modulations (through E-flat in 
Proserpina) or share them, as in Caronte’s last and final appeal, just as he shares 
Plutone’s F major: 
     Plutone 
     (F - C) 
    
  Proserpina  Orfeo    Caronte 
     A    (E-flat)   G      G – F 
 
Thus, not only is Orfeo’s first plea devoid of magical effectivity, but in the end it is not 
even Orfeo who succeeds in winning Euridice back. If Caronte is the last one to speak—
and the one to articulate the reason for transgressing the law, the reason of transgression 
(which is also the reason of sovereignty, as we shall see)—his appeal is only the last in a 
mounting series of pleas by which the sovereign is put in crisis at the same time as it is 
placed at the center. 
THE CRACK IN THE DIAMANTINE LAW 
Before Caronte’s explicit formulation of the ideological message, the point had been 
prepared by Radamanto (replaced by Caronte in Peri’s setting) in a more indirect, and 
affectively charged way, and earlier by Plutone himself. In fact, Orfeo explicitly utters it, 
too early perhaps to have any rhetorical effect: “Ahi ! che pur d’ogni legge/Sciolto è 
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colui, che gli altri affrena e regge (ll. 483-4).” He is unbound from any law, who rules 
and commands others. This formulation, itself a contrapposto, is not elaborated upon at 
this juncture. Rather, Orfeo turns suddenly towards Proserpina, appealing to Plutone’s 
affection once more. At this point, he only echoes the opposition that Plutone has just 
made, so the point falls flat. 
However, we can trace the preparation for Caronte’s formulation to the moment 
when Orfeo makes the Ovidian point that thousands of souls will soon come (so that 
Euridice’s can be spared without loss for the Underworld). There, Plutone voices what 
might be a dismissal of Orfeo’s argument, but which sounds as a fracture, as a crack in 
the rigid, diamantine law: the possibility that the hard law might be spurn (sprezzata), 
that its necessary solidity might be ignored or given up, that it might be broken. This is a 
possibility that he intimates and averts at the same time, but not without leaving it open 
as a question: 
Dunque dal regno oscuro 
Torneran l’alme al cielo, et io primiero 
Le leggi sprezzerò del nostro impero ? (521-523) 
 
From this dark kingdom 
Are souls thus to return to earth 
And should I be the first  
To scorn the laws of our empire?  
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He means it as a negation, but it sounds like an affirmation: as if he was tempted, at the 
same time as he denies it, to break the law, to be the first in breaking the law (io 
primiero). This ambiguity, this ambivalence in his regard for the law, is audible: it is, if 
not the first, at least the most expressive passage in his music. The moment when his 
sovereign, stentorian voice is most touched and inflected by affect. We hear it in the 
madrigalism that paints the souls as they return from the “regno oscuro” to heaven, from 
C to A over the plagal B-flat→F, and again in the conjunct-motion, trochaic fall from C 
to F in “Le leggi sprezzerò,” but especially in the spurning chromaticism F→F#→G and 
the arrival on C that emphasizes the open question (Figure 11). 
Caronte, in Peri’s setting, responds to Plutone, picking up on the arrival on C and 
leading it home to F just as he picks up on the sovereign’s doubts and dissipates him in a 
mocking, but effective, admonishment. Once again, the affective device is the 
contrapposto, a series of them: The vasto Inferno is as wide as the law is narrow; Nettuno 
 
 
Figure 11: L’Euridice, mm. 445-454 
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and Giove (Neptune and Jupiter) command the skies above and the ocean below, at will; 
a talento/ a suo voler. Only Plutone, in a space between, or outside them, is an unfree 
lord: non libero signor. The sovereign, to be such, must be absolutely free, unbound by 
any laws, however rigid they might seem: 
 
Sovra l’eccelse stelle 
Giove a talento suo comanda e regge; 
Nettuno il mar corregge 
E move a suo voler turbi e procelle; 
Tu sol dentr’a i confin d’angusta legge 
Avrai l’alto governo, 
Non libero signor del vasto Inferno ? (524-530) 
 
Above the lofty stars 
Jove commands and rules according  
to his own wishes; 
Neptune commands the waves 
And creates storms and tempests as he will; 
Should you alone have your high power  
restricted within the bounds of a narrow law, 
You, unfree Lord of the vast Hell? 
This ironic formulation reveals the contrast made earlier by Plutone—law/affect—to be 
ill-posed or besides the point, to be a false opposition. The real contrapposto is between 
himself as sovereign and the rigid law which he does not dare to break. Seen from the 
perspective of Caronte, he can only be a sovereign if he is above the law, if he has “alto 
governo.” It makes sense, then, that Caronte should receive these lines instead of 
Radamanto, as they repeat, or prepare, what I called above the ideological message of the 
opera: that the sovereign is outside the law. 
 
Orpheus’s Modern Turn—The Return Before the Turn 
 
289 
We reach here the figure that Benjamin identifies as central to the Trauerspiel: the 
sovereign, Plutone, at the center of the stage, who must make a decision in the face of 
crisis. An enemy, Orfeo, is inside his realm; but he also faces an internal crisis: his 
sovereignty is now in question. Plutone, to paraphrase Benjamin, holds in his hands the 
course of the story like a scepter. To recall Carl Schmitt’s argument, there is a mutually 
constitutive function between the sovereign and the emergency or the crisis. The 
justification for the sovereign’s power relies in the need to create a figure that will be 
capable of ruling when the limits of the law are put in question, when the extreme 
circumstances of a crisis, of a state of emergency that suspends the law demand that a 
decision be made. But the emergency is, by definition, unpredictable. It is an event. The 
decision is not only how to deal with the emergency but to decide whether there is an 
emergency in the first place. Thus, the decision is made by someone who is outside the 
law, who is above it, capable of suspending it and declaring the emergency. Yet, insofar 
as the sovereign is required by an emergency that does not exist until he declares it, the 
decision also the decision of his self-constitution. The sovereign “decides whether there 
is an extreme emergency as well as what must be done in order to eliminate it. Although 
he stands outside the normally legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who 
must decide whether the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety.”48 
For Benjamin, the ideological function of the Trauerspiel—and here we are 
concerned with establishing how close or removed opera might be from mourning 
drama—consists in placing the sovereign on stage, presenting him as a figure that 
embodies history, power, and spectacle, legitimizing his power as necessary for averting 
the crisis, all the while masking the scandalous vicious circle by which sovereignty and 
crisis presuppose each other.49 The reason of the sovereign, the principle by which the 
sovereign is who he is, is at the same time the reason for transgression, the argument or 
justification for the law to be transgressed. 
                                                
48 Schmitt, Political Theology. 5. 
49 Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque Reason, 69. 
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Here, then, is the paradox: by asking the sovereign of the underworld to suspend 
the law, in addressing Plutone as sovereign, is not Orfeo making Plutone the sovereign, 
constituting him as such? We can call this the Orphic apostrophe of sovereignty, which is 
also an enchantment, a magical creation of sovereignty through his plea. Hence, in the 
performance of the myth as opera, a figure is identified and localized on stage as having 
the capacity to institute the law, to dictate the new laws of the community, its nomos. In 
general, it matters less which specific laws are uttered (e.g., do not enter the underworld; 
do not look back) than the formal identification of such a nomothetical capacity. But we 
should go further: in appealing to Plutone, Orfeo not only addresses someone who rules 
and has the capacity of suspending the law. He addresses him not just as a guardian of the 
law, but as the condition of the law, as sovereign. More specifically, he addresses him as 
a supreme sovereign, the one who has the capacity to rule over life and death themselves. 
When Orfeo asks Plutone to return Euridice, we should not hear it so much as a 
plea out of love, out of his lost wife in a romanticized relation, but as a statement on the 
role of the sovereign on deciding upon life and death. Orfeo’s apostrophe, in Early 
Modern Italy, speaks the inauguration of the modern intertwining of sovereignty and 
biopolitics. In asking for Euridice, Orfeo asks for the suspension of the death penalty. His 
plea is not a plea motivated by love or mobilized by the mythical power of music, but the 
declaration of a new power that thus constitutes itself, embodied by one figure in the 
performance, validated through the structure of the myth, and actualized through the 
spectacularization of its role and function. 
 
As Derrida has shown in the “Death Penalty” seminars, the relationship that Schmitt 
identified between sovereignty and the exception—the self-constitution of sovereignty as 
the capacity to decide upon the exception—finds its most extreme form in the right to 
decide upon life and death: the death penalty is the exceptional exception, the extreme 
case of the exception, and as such regulates sovereignty in general.50 As Schmitt shows, 
                                                
50 Jacques Derrida, The Death Penalty. Volume I, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago, IL: Chicago University 
Press, 2014), 85ff. 
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and as Benjamin had emphasized, this power of decision upon the exception, coming 
from outside the law and hence from outside of the political, has a theological structure: 
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized 
theological concepts not only because of their historical development—in which 
they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for 
example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but also because 
of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a 
sociological consideration of these concepts. The exception in jurisprudence is 
analogous to the miracle in theology. Only by being aware of this analogy we can 
appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas of the state developed in 
the last century.51 
The relation between politics and theology, the relation between the exception and the 
miracle, is one of analogy, hence a mimetic relationship. The absolute sovereign is 
analogous, hence imitates, the absolute power of God. In other words, what Schmitt 
called “political theology” is the mimetopolitical operation by which the absolute power 
of the sovereign legitimizes itself by locating God as a model of imitation, and hence of 
authority and legitimacy. Schmitt locates its explicit formulation in Rousseau: “imitate 
the immutable decrees of the divinity.”52  
This mimetic relationship began to emerge in Renaissance Italy in the form of the 
idea of the “King’s two bodies”: a mortal one, subject to persuasion or error, and “a Body 
politic,” immune to the human deficiencies.53 By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
unity of these two bodies was a magical feat for English jurisprudence; but as Ernst 
Hartwig Kantorowicz shows, its origins are well grounded in the context of medieval and 
Early Modern political theology. However, this theory was never developed as such 
during the period. Rather, as Samuel Berner shows, it emerged slowly and almost 
imperceptibly in funerary orations and other political instruments. Unsurprisingly, the 
                                                
51 Schmitt, Political Theology, 36. 
52 Ibid., 46. 
53 Ernst Hartwig Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
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point of culmination of this slow process is in the funerary oration devoted to Duke 
Ferdinando de’ Medici in 1609, where the Duke was consistently compared to a god due 
to his inscrutable designs; for Berner, the rhetoric of these texts is “obvious and at times 
quite ludicrous, because the genre was so new.”54 In this line, then, we have to see court 
spectacle as another field in which this theory was developed and mobilized.  
To be sure, the importance of divine-right theory for Medici spectacle has been 
highlighted by James Saslow and Nina Treadwell in the case of the intermedi. I, however, 
argue that L’Orfeo and L’Euridice are even more important stages where this occurs. The 
crucial, mimetological point, is that we cannot see spectacle as “representing” a divine-
right theory that existed elsewhere—since it did not—but that spectacle was the very 
stage of the constitution of such a theory. I return to these issues in chapter 7, but first we 
have to see what kind of a sovereign, what kind of being is Plutone. Is he a man or a god? 
Or both, like the sovereign himself? 
Orfeo’s plea addresses—and constitutes—this magical double being; but which of 
these is subject to its power? For Mladen Dolar, crucially, both are: the ruler gives in to 
the plea by an exceptional act of mercy by which the monarch affirms himself as beyond 
the law—capable of transgressing it—and is simultaneously subject to it as human, since 
the act of mercy is an act of love.55 In Dolar’s reading of L’Orfeo, which for him 
exemplifies and programs early modern opera, Plutone resembles not the magical double 
being of Kantorowicz but Montesquieu’s monarch, whose greatest attribute is to be able 
to show mercy. In this reading, hegemony—to use an appropriate anachronism—is 
obtained not by legitimizing the beyond-the-law of the sovereign but rather, taking his 
being-beyond-the-law for granted, displaying him also as a human being. “His true 
humanity can come to the fore only if he is a sovereign and not a tyrant, insofar as he is a 
just and noble ruler and not the capricious Other, insofar as his superior justice surpasses 
the dead letter of the law.”56 
                                                
54 Berner, “Florentine Political Thought in the Late Cinquecento,” 189. 
55 Žižek and Dolar, Opera’s Second Death, 22. 
56 Ibid. 
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The capriciousness that such a sovereign needs to avert is also that of the 
providential God of Protestantism, as seen from the perspective of Italian Catholicism. In 
this context, Dolar argues, self-sacrifice and renunciation win mercy: “once the subject 
has shown the unconditional readiness to sacrifice his/her life without reservation, God, 
or monarch, grants him his/her life.”57 What Dolar fails to see, however, is that mercy is 
here already subordinated to sovereignty, precisely on the condition of the exception. 
As we have seen, the story in Rinuccini’s Euridice goes in a different way. 
Nowhere does Orfeo, as it does happen in Ovid, offer himself in sacrifice.58 His request 
for mercy, the first time he addresses Plutone, falls flat against the rigid law. The call for 
mercy appeals to Plutone’s heart, it touches it with new affections, yet, however, it cannot 
touch the diamantine law. What succeeds, instead, is a displacement of the opposition, 
precisely by placing the sovereign beyond law and beyond affect, and hence beyond 
mercy. 
But affect does not leave the stage as soon as that. Plutone seeks to preserve his 
opposition for the third time (the first being the diamantine law [ll. 480-481], the second 
the spurning of the law [523]): “Romper le proprie leggi è vil possanza/Anzi reca sovente 
e biasmo e danno,” to which Orfeo replies “Ma de gli afflitti consolar l’affanno/È pur di 
regio cor gentil’usanza.” Thus, Orfeo finally identifies (matching his rhyme pattern but 
emphasizing the tonal contrast that characterizes the couple, F and G dorian) what seems 
to be Plutone’s true concern: not so much the impossibility of breaking the law, but of the 
status of the sovereign, his appearance, saving his “face” if he were to break the law. 
Plutone is not as afraid of breaking the law—he even seems tempted to do it—as he is of 
the shame that will come if he does and whether this will correspond to the nature of the 
sovereign he purports to be. His concern is with spurning the law, afraid of the blemish 
                                                
57 Ibid., 23. 
58 Besides, that is, transgressing the gates of Hades, although, according to Phaedrus in Plato’s Symposium, 
this was precisely the opposite of sacrifice. “Orpheus, however, they sent unsatisfied from Hades, after 
showing him only an image of the woman he came for. They did not give him the woman herself, because 
they thought he was soft (he was, after all, a cithara-player) and did not dare to die like Alcestis for Love’s 
sake, but contrived to enter living into Hades. So they punished him for that, and made him die at the hands 
of women.” Sym. 179 d-e. Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M Cooper and D. S Hutchinson (Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett Pub., 1997); emphasis mine. 
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(biasmo) and wrong (danno) that comes through “breaking one’s own laws” (Romper le 
proprie leggi). When he says it, a mostly unadorned, triadic F major passage, it is the 
rigidity of the law that he now begins to distance himself from which makes his line ring 
hollow. It is as if affect passed from being the opposite of law to being the mark of a true 
sovereign. This mark, pace Dolar, is now not a natural quality of the sovereign as human, 
but a mark of display of the sovereign as a noble. Affect is how the sovereign appears to 
others, how he performs, and hence becomes, what he is. 
THE MACHIAVELLIAN RE-TURN: MIMESIS AND FUTURITY 
What Orfeo and Caronte have to do is to give Plutone—and the audience—a lesson in 
Machiavellian politics: not only that helping others (i.e., showing mercy) is proper to 
noble hearts, something that would belong to him if he were the sovereign that he would 
like to be, if he possessed the virtù of the successful ruler, but rather, and especially, that 
they are not his laws if he cannot break them, that he is not the sovereign that he would 
want to be if he did could not show sovereign power, the freedom to “Make your laws, o 
great King, as you please.” 
Many things in this scene begin into fall in place if we see it from a Machiavellian 
perspective. We can displace the level at which the allegorical interpretation should take 
place, not so much at the level of the action—the successful wedding between Orfeo and 
Euridice thanks to the power of music—but at the level of narrative, recalling the 
structural centrality of Plutone. As in Ponnelle’s opening shot for Monteverdi: Orfeo, all 
the lines in the tableau of scene 4 converge on the same point: the sovereign. Such a 
displacement could account for the somewhat uneasy identification between Orfeo and 
Ferdinando de’ Medici (suggested by Bujić) where the unifying trait would be the 
Prince’s achievement in bringing together the two families.59 This interpretation, of 
course, relies on the various precedents of Medici attempts to appropriate the image of 
Orpheus mentioned in the previous chapter, and confirms the generally acknowledged 
function of early modern spectacle as flattery to the patron, on the one hand, and as 
means of “performing nobility,” as suggested by Calcagno. 
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However, as I argued, such an interpretation has a mimetological flaw: in a strict 
sense, an allegorical identification between a mythical and a historical character is no 
sooner made than it is disrupted by the allegorical mechanism itself, by its tendency to 
thwart intention. As I see it, we assign at the same time too much and too little effectivity 
to spectacle if it remains within the boundaries of performance and flattery. Too much, 
for we cannot be sure that such allegorical identifications were understood, and if they 
were, that they were believed through and through, that they were effective. Too little, 
because as flattery we undermine other political functions that such spectacle had in such 
a spectacular economy of power. Thus, in what follows I suggest a way in which we can 
complicate the mimetology involved in such allegorical interpretations from the 
perspective of Machiavelli, who I argue most radically and rigorously defined the 
political function of mimesis in Early Modern Italy.60 
 
In his analysis of Verdelot’s setting of the prologues and intermedi of Machiavelli’s 
comedy La Clizia—arguably the first allegorical intermedio—, Calcagno notes the role 
that Machiavelli assigns to music and imitatio “as part of his his larger, ideological 
discourse.”61 In the prologue, Machiavelli writes that “[i]f men reappeared in the world in 
the same way as do events, not a hundred years would go by before we would find 
ourselves together once again, doing the same things.”62 The plot of La Clizia, based on 
Plautus’ Casina, is also, or so Machiavelli tells us in the prologue, based on real life 
events: “Would you believe that the very event [as happened in ancient Athens] occurred 
not so many years ago, once again, here in Florence?”63 This somewhat gnomic 
                                                
60 For the relation between Machiavelli and Schmitt with respect to sovereignty and exception, see Andrea 
Moudarres, “On the Threshold of Law: Dictatorship and Exception in Machiavelli and Schmitt,” I Tatti 
Studies in the Italian Renaissance 18, no. 2 (September 1, 2015): 349–70, doi:10.1086/683136; for a 
reading of mimesis in Machiavelli from the perspective of Girard’s mimetology, see Harald Wydra, 
“Human Nature and Politics: A Mimetic Reading of Crisis and Conflict in the Work of Niccoló 
Machiavelli,” Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture 7, no. 1 (2000): 36–57. 
61 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 109. 
62 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Comedies of Machiavelli, trans. David Sices and James B Atkinson 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 2007), 279. 
63 Ibid., 281. 
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statement, which we could call a mimetology of the eternal return, contains a powerful 
theory of the imbrication of history, literature, and music, where the latter servers, 
according to Nino Pirrotta, as the means to bridge the past and the present, just as it 
serves since the intermedi of Machiavelli’s comedies to bridge the passing of time 
between acts without breaking the unity of action.64 It could be argued that this statement 
is the philosophical formulation, avant la lettre, of the ideological role that allegorical 
intermedi would take on during the sixteenth century, culminating with the Medici 1589 
celebrations, and passed over into opera with L’Euridice and L’Orfeo. From this 
perspective it matters little whether we can advance any positive proof of Rinuccini’s 
knowledge of Machiavelli, or to demonstrate any textual connection between L’Euridice 
and The Prince, to which I turn below. What matters, as Hugh Grady argues in his 
reading of Shakespeare’s Machiavellian moments, “is that we can observe the discursive 
parallels among them [sensu Foucault] parallels which help us read the plays in new and 
(sometimes old) ways…”65 I elaborate on Machiavelli’s mimetology and highlight its 
various relations to intermedi and early modern opera as a means to articulate a more 
rigorous account of the political effectivity of such spectacular productions and their 
mimetological underpinnings in the late Renaissance and the Baroque. 
The two maxims that Plutone utters with respect to the law (i.e., that it is rigid and 
diamantine, and that it is unbecoming to a sovereign to break it) sound like pieties taken 
from the Renaissance precept-books written in imitation of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and 
Seneca that Machiavelli rallies against in The Prince. Both these classical sources and 
their imitations are for Machiavelli based on ideal, non-existent models of how a ruler 
should be. Rather, in what many consider to be the beginning of realist—or materialist—
political philosophy, Machiavelli proposes to focus on fact: “[B]ecause I want to write 
what will be useful to anyone who understand, it seems to me better to concentrate on 
what really happens rather than on theories or speculations. For many have imagined 
                                                
64 Pirrotta and Povoledo, Music and Theatre from Poliziano to Monteverdi, 128ff; Calcagno, From 
Madrigal to Opera, 107. Calcagno emphasizes the autobiographical aspects of La Clizia. Incidentally, the 
fact that it is impossible to read the prologue without thinking of the “Eighteenth Brumaire” shows what a 
careful reader of Machiavelli Marx was. 
65 Hugh Grady, Shakespeare, Machiavelli, and Montaigne: Power and Subjectivity from Richard II to 
Hamlet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 30. 
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republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist.66 Instead, 
Machiavelli tacitly examines the precepts of these books and presents them with 
examples from history and mythology, who he advises his princely reader to emulate: 
As for mental exercise, a ruler should read historical works, especially for the 
light they shed on the actions of eminent men…and above all, to imitate some 
eminent man, who himself set out to imitate some predecessor of his who was 
considered worthy of praise and glory, always taking his deeds and actions as a 
model for himself, as it is said that Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar 
imitated Alexander, and Scipio imitated Cyrus.”67 
Machiavelli’s mimetology can be grasped in this passage: there is a bad mimesis, closer 
to aemulatio, which consists in following the ideal models, however perfect these might 
be. The ruler that follows persists in following models or speculations, constructed 
according to what “ought to be done,” cannot withstand the changing circumstances, the 
unexpected crisis: they are helpless against Fortune. Machiavelli’s good mimesis, on the 
other hand, consists on examining what happens in fact, in real life situations, and 
selecting as models those historical figures those which are most appropriate for its own 
circumstances.68 These models, then, are historical particulars. They are located within 
precise circumstances—a singular conjuncture—and each of them displays a specific 
quality that the ruler should pick up as model according to his own particular situation. 
Models are not defined as being good or bad but rather as variably apt or unapt according 
to the situation. Or, more precisely, the historical individuals are taken up as exemplary 
of specific virtues (e.g., mercy, cruelty, fidelity to one’s own) that are neither good nor 
bad, in fact, which do not exist outside of those conjunctures in which they are put to test 
                                                
66 Niccolò Machiavelli, Machiavelli: The Prince, ed. Quentin Skinner, trans. Russell Price (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 54. 
67 Ibid. 
68 “Likewise, it was harmful for Caracalla, Commodus and Maximinus to act like Severus, because they 
lacked the ability required to follow in his footsteps. Therefore, a new ruler in a new principality cannot 
imitate the conduct of Marcus, nor again is it necessary to imitate that of Severus. Rather, he should imitate 
Severus in the course of action that are necessary for establishing himself in power, and imitate Marcus in 
those that are necessary for maintaining power that is already established and secure, thus achieving glory.” 
Machiavelli, The Prince, 71. 
   298
by historical individuals. Their effectivity can only be measured within the political, not 
the moral sphere.69 Thus, reasoning along the same lines as in the prologue to La Clizia, 
there is a relation between men and events based on imitation and repetition: while “the 
same men” might not be able to return in the same ways that events do, a wise ruler 
might still imitate the men involved in such events when these recur in his own time, and 
thus expect similar outcomes. It is thus not a matter of choosing the “good” ideal models 
from a moral perspective, but the most appropriate models from a historical perspective. 
Returning to our interpretation, Caronte seems to speak in such a voice when he 
shows the difference between Plutone on the one hand, and Nettuno and Giove on the 
other, whom he instills Plutone to emulate. These gods command ocean and heaven, they 
rule over them. Giove commands and rules (commanda e regge) above the lofty stars; 
Nettuno corrects (correge) turbulences and storms, sets them right at his will. Plutone 
rules over a realm that is as vast as theirs, and yet, in this case, facing Orfeo, he is bound 
to a law that Orfeo has exposed to be narrow: Euridice is but one soul among many—
what does it matter? Furthermore, Orfeo has already succeeded in entering Hell alive, 
that is, he has already transgressed one of Plutone’s laws and is facing him. He is an 
enemy past the gates. And he not only demands to have Euridice back, but he puts 
Plutone in a position where his sovereignty is at stake, upping the ante in Plutone’s 
performance of nobility: whereas Plutone finds it unseemly to scorn the law, Orfeo shows 
it is gentil’usanza, a good habit, of a royal heart to offer consolation to others, to show 
mercy. 
When Caronte and Orfeo make this distinction clear, they lay bare the crisis of 
nobility that threatened early modern Italy, the disjunction between being a noble and 
looking like one. From this moment on, the noble’s concern, especially if he is to be also 
a sovereign, is to appear as one, to engage in the performance of nobility, in the 
production of his value as noble (see chapter 5.) In the context of spectacle, moreover, it 
is an inversion of Platonism or rather, a hyper-Platonism, which I address below.  
                                                
69 Thus, politics and morals are separate and autonomous realms, in Croce’s famous interpretation of 
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Machiavelli: Cynic, Patriot, or Political Scientist? (Boston: Heath, 1960). 
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Caronte’s advice—who is no more moved by Orfeo’s pleas than Plutone or 
Proserpina—is not that Plutone should give in to Orfeo’s pleas. Rather, the advice is not 
to persist in acting the role that Orfeo already has undermined. Caronte advises that 
Plutone should act like Giove and Nettuno: to preserve his sovereignty by acting like a 
sovereign, like those joyous rulers who gain admiration and respect from their might as 
much as they do from their freedom. As Machiavelli would say, “every ruler should want 
to be thought merciful, not cruel; nevertheless, one should take care not to be merciful in 
an inappropriate way.”70 Constant mercifulness easily becomes indulgence and, as with 
cruelty, leads to hatred and contempt for the ruler, which is the worst threat: “a ruler must 
avoid contempt as if it were a reef.” Instead, Machiavelli advises, “[h]e should contrive 
that his actions should display grandeur, courage, seriousness and strength…He should 
maintain this reputation, so that no one should think of lying to him or scheming to trick 
him.”71 For all that Plutone insists on the law being rigid and diamantine, he has, as a 
ruler, been shown to lack precisely these qualities. In fact, there is already an intimation 
of contempt in Caronte’s own advice by calling Plutone a “non libero signor.” 
THE VIEWPOINT OF THE PEOPLE—TO COME 
But now the scene begins to look not simply as a telling of the myth but of a staging of 
the relation between the sovereign and its others—the other of the Other, Dolar dixit. 
Plutone is at the center, yet he does not seem to know how to be a sovereign, how to act 
as one. Unlike the Trauerspiele analyzed by Benjamin, we do not see a sovereign making 
decisions, “performing sovereignty,” but one that is advised on how he is to behave and 
appear to be a sovereign. The mise-en-scène described here, centering on the sovereign 
from the perspective of various characters who address him without addressing each 
other, or who address each other by addressing the sovereign, recalls the Althusser’s 
reading of Machiavelli where what is at stake in The Prince is not so much defining the 
role of the sovereign but of establishing the place of a people, a point of view, a 
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perspective from which the sovereign can uniquely be defined.72 In his dedication to 
Lorenzo de’ Medici, Machiavelli describes his position as a man “of a man of a very low 
and humble condition,” as a cartographer who places himself on low ground to better 
understand the character of the mountains: “It is necessary to be a man of the people to 
understand properly the character of rulers.”73 Althusser identifies here the definition of 
“the space of the political,” a topological position that Machiavelli occupies as an 
observer and that he secures for his text in order for it to become a political act, “an 
element in the transformation of this space.” This political space is defined by a paradox, 
that in addressing the sovereign, what is secured is instead the place of the people. To 
recall the terms of chapter 5, in Monteverdi’s dedication of L’Orfeo to Francesco 
Gonzaga, a dedicatory is a countersignature that betrays the prince as it flatters him. 
Furthermore, Althusser notes that in the prologue, Machiavelli speaks of a singular 
“people” in opposition multiple “princes.”74 This not only defines his class position as a 
member of the people with a specific point of view, a perspective, upon the sovereign, 
but also, in talking about princes in the plural, Machiavelli emphasizes the possibility that 
there be different princes and that there must be a choice between them “from the 
viewpoint of the people.”75 In this sense, Althusser agrees with Gramsci in reading the 
Prince as a manifesto that speaks to the people as it addresses the sovereign. However, 
Althusser continues, The Prince does not establish who will occupy the position of the 
sovereign. Although the ruler must be popular, he does not himself belong to the people, 
and the people are not summoned to become the ruler, 
 So there is an irreducible duality between the place of the political viewpoint and 
the place of the political force and practice; between the ‘subject’ of the political 
viewpoint— the people—and the ‘subject’ of the political practice: The Prince. 
This duality, this irreducibility, affects both the Prince and the people. Being 
uniquely and exclusively defined by the function he must perform - that is to say, 
                                                
72 Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, 24. 
73 Machiavelli, The Prince, 4. 
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by the historical vacuum he must fill—the Prince is a pure aleatory possibility—
impossibility.76 
Since the Prince has no ties to the people, no compromise with class membership, his 
success depends solely on his virtù, thus the centrality of this concept in Machiavelli’s 
text. This gives The Prince a utopian character, concerned with defining the place and the 
conditions which the ruler will occupy, without specifying who this will be. 
And although Althusser does not emphasize the theatricality of this space, it is not 
hard to conceive of his analysis as a politicized version of the Theatrum mundi that opens 
it to the future. Instead of being a mere ideological tool where the message is centralized 
and distributed, the viewpoint of the people is a body, a collective, whose gaze upon the 
stage is assigned a transformative power, namely the capacity to decide what type of ruler 
there should be in front of them. In L’Euridice, the people is not only the audience in the 
theater, but especially the three figures—Orfeo, Proserpina, Caronte—that face the 
sovereign, situating him at the center, demanding, reminding, and advising him on how to 
act and how to appear. These figures, addressing each other while addressing each other 
in an allegorical speech, occupy Althusser’s political space, the people from whose 
viewpoint alone can the sovereign be understood. 
Returning to the prologue of La Clizia, to Machiavelli’s mimetology of the eternal 
return, where new subjects are expected to occupy their place in returning events, we 
could begin to see the role of theatrical allegory in such a mimetology as concerned not 
only with the representation and flattery of patrons in their precise historical conditions, 
but as setting the stage for future transformations in the repetition of the coming event, 
for an impossibility. Machiavelli’s political and theatrical writings hint at such futurity: if 
The Prince is the turn of the political towards a people that is not yet, La Clizia is the 
return, as imitatio, of the comic theater of Plautus, itself an imitatio of Athenian New 
Comedy.77 
                                                
76 Ibid., 26; emphasis in the original. 
77 Machiavelli’s first theatrical work, in fact, is a translation of another Latin play in the style of the New 
Comedy, Terence’s Andria. Machiavelli, The Comedies of Machiavelli, 5. 
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When it returns in Machiavelli, the chorus of such tragedies is transformed into 
prologues and canzonas, which will begin to return, insistently, as intermedi and finally 
as opera. This gives us a new perspective on the history of opera: the turn towards earlier 
models is not only an attempt to revive past forms or, as I have described the 
economimesis of imitatio up to this point, as a means to accrue on the value of the models 
thus constituted. Here, a turn towards the past does not only have the effect of producing 
something in the present through constituting a model for it, but also, or especially, it has 
the effect establishing future sites for something to return. The logic of this return is not 
empty utopia nor the programming of what is to come, since what returns does not return 
as its copy. The future that is opened through the return is without name and without 
model: it is the unrepresentable. 
When contemplating L’Euridice, when seeking to account for its ideological 
message—given, as we saw, by Caronte—as the sovereign’s position beyond the law, we 
must take into account this opening, the necessary incompletion that each performance 
carries along. For if centering on the sovereign, making all the voices fall upon him at the 
center of the stage, his centrality cannot appear without at the same time positing the 
people, the spectatorship, that constitutes and conditions him. L’Euridice dramatizes this 
by making Plutone quite inept about his own place, but once established it is a structure 
that persists in all “ideological” usages of opera, at the same time their condition of 
possibility and impossibility. 
This is precisely what Lacoue-Labarthe finds Mallarmé and Wagner engaged in, 
many centuries later (see introduction, VII). It consists in determining art as having a 
political purpose, and of using a particular mimetology—an ontotypology—to ground 
this function. In Wagner it was the myth of the German people, while for Mallarmé it was 
a post-Christian communion brought about by the “type.” In Machiavelli, if we take the 
title of the “Exhortation to Liberate Italy” as a guide, it would also be a question of 
nationalism. (This is emphasized by the fact that the title of this chapter is in the 
vernacular, as opposed to the Latin titles of the previous chapters). His address to 
Lorenzo de’ Medici, like the dedication, is done from the viewpoint of the people. 
Machiavelli contrasts the failures of previous leaders like Francesco Sforza and Cesare 
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Borgia with the Italian people. What is needed is a leader that brings new military 
techniques and that is “willing to emulate those great men” that he posits as models. As 
we have seen, these model are always contingent, depending on the situation (and they do 
not have a national character either). What Machiavelli says to Lorenzo is simply that the 
right circumstances are set for the Medici to take upon their role if they decide to. The 
crucial point, the site where the onto-typology shows itself, is here: 
The reason [for the failed campaigns] is that our old military practices were 
unsound, and there has been nobody capable of devising new ones. Nothing 
brings so much honor to a new ruler as new laws and new practices that he has 
devised. Such things, if they are solidly based and conduce to achieving greatness, 
will make him revered and admired; and in Italy there is no lack of matter to 
shape into any form [in Italia non manca materia da introdurvi ogni forma].78 
It is not clear that by materia he means the people, in the sense of a receptacle for a 
national character or an ethos that would be imprinted—typed—by the forma. The people 
is rather defined by its power, not its character and what it is lacking is just guidance. To 
be shaped into form does not necessarily imply here a hylomorphic or ontotypological 
model, but rather the disposition of the forces that are already in place. He goes on to say 
“Here individuals [the soldiers] have great skill and valor; it is the leaders who lack these 
qualities. Look how in duels and combats between several men Italians are superior in 
strength, skill and resourcefulness. But when it comes to fighting in armies, they do not 
distinguish themselves.”79 
What he seems to be calling for is a sort of formalism, which is just as aleatory 
and impossible as the prince itself, depending on contingent possibilities that might be 
seized and lost to fortune at any moment. Further, he opens again the space of this 
impossibility by emphasizing that what is needed of a new prince are “new laws and new 
practices.” The unrepresentability of the prince is matched by the incompletion of the 
laws. It is against this radical mimetology that all other theories of divine sovereignty and 
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their appropriations of the political spectacle that Machiavelli devised would have to 
measure themselves against in the following centuries. 
 305 
CHAPTER 7  
AFFECT AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE MEDICI 1589 INTERMEDI: BETWEEN 
SPECTACLE AND SPECTRALITY 
 
Chapter 5 approached Orpheus’ turn as a trope for the peculiar historicity of the humanist 
interest in ancient tragedy and the pastoral—an effort to transform art by looking back 
towards the past. Chapter 6 saw L'Euridice as the presentation of a paradoxical space 
between the political and the aesthetic, where the centrality of the sovereign on stage 
works towards producing a return of the unrepresentable. We can also take such a turn 
more generally as a trope about modernity, understood as a turn towards a vision-
centered and mechanized universe. For the turn to modernity at the end of the 
Renaissance was precisely that: a new ordering the cosmos in which the human eye and 
the new technology of painterly perspective—or rather the new “symbolic form,” to use 
Cassirer’s and Panofsky’s term—signified the triumph of the distancing and objectifying 
sense of the real, as well as the “triumph of the distance-denying human struggle for 
control; it is as much a consolidation and systematization of the external world, as an 
extension of the domain of the self.”1  
To put it in more general terms, for example Peter Burke’s adoption of the history 
of mentalities approach, the Renaissance ends with (and already contains the beginnings 
of) the “mechanization of the world picture,” in which a traditional, “animate” vision of 
the world organized by correspondences and not causality was finally replaced by the 
rationalist and Enlightened rule of instrumental reason.2 But the more explicit 
formulation of the importance of vision in modernity is advanced in Jay’s Downcast 
Eyes.3 Jay forcefully demonstrates the progressive emergence and imposition of vision, 
                                                
1 Erwin Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form (Cambridge, MA: Zone Books, 1991), 67. 
2 Peter Burke, The Italian Renaissance: Culture and Society in Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), 211. 
3 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994). 
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“the noblest of senses” from Plato to the early twentieth century, and locates the end of 
the Renaissance as the turning point of his narrative, which climaxes with the 
Enlightenment and begins its decline with the perceptual transformations brought about 
by the impressionists and symbolists. 
 
Now, if this narrative about the modern as a turn towards vision, to technical perspective 
and objectifying distance looks like a worn-out trope with little to offer to musicology, 
seeing it as embodied in Orpheus’s turn might give us a different view. 
On the one hand, in the words of Christine Buci-Glucksmann, what is tragically at 
stake in Orpheus’ turn is that he chooses “the visibility of love over the invisibility of 
Hearing.”4 Orpheus is granted access to the underworld and is given Eurydice back 
through the magical, persuasive power of music. Yet by turning back, by seeing 
Eurydice, he loses her. According to this myth, to see is not necessarily to gain or to 
possess, especially when seeing is opposed to music; here, the gaze undoes the musical 
spell.  
But turning back, for the human, is also to render invisible what is in front. More 
precisely, turning backwards is choosing one visibility over another, denying the full 
visibility of frontality and suggesting the possibility of another visibility, while at the 
same time negating the visibility of what one turns away from. The turn produces both 
visibility and invisibility through a decision, a determination that chooses what is 
concealed behind as visible over the visibility of what is in front.5 Closing one’s eyes, one 
may suggest, also is also a possible way to make “invisible” what is in front. Yet when 
turning, the invisibility of what is left behind is necessary. This is, to put it bluntly, the 
structure of finitude at its most basic: it is not simply the purely biological fact of having 
our eyes always pointing forward, just as it is not simply the fact that we eventually will 
die. If being human is being-[turned]-towards death, then we will have to count turning 
                                                
4 Christine Buci-Glucksmann, The Madness of Vision: On Baroque Aesthetics (Athens, OH: Ohio 
University Press, 2013), 3. 
5 This undecidability is fodder for medieval and Neoplatonic allegorical interpretations of the myth, for 
example by suggesting that Orpheus gives up the worldly beauty of Eurydice in order to turn towards the 
true beauty of the immutable ideas. See Frederick W. Sternfeld, The Birth of Opera (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
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itself as one of the ontological (and not simply ontic) determinations of the human.6 
Alluding to Heidegger in this context brings me impossibly close to the question of his 
“Kehre” (turning), which I will have to turn away from (remembering, again, that turning 
“away from” does not at any point involve making something disappear but involves a 
repetition that carryies it along).7 I rather return here to the tension between the written 
and the spoken word, or more generally between the visual and the audible, between the 
gaze and sound and between literacy and orality. To turn towards vision is at once to 
choose vision over hearing, and to determine hearing as invisibility. And because the 
invisibility of hearing is necessarily produced by the turn towards visibility, we must 
consider sound as inseparable from the turn, as essential and determining of it.  
On the other hand, to speak of modernity as the progress of reason, as a passage 
towards technology and the rationalized view of the world is to repeat a trope that, as 
David Wills writes, negates an articulation that is as old as the human itself or that, more 
precisely, makes the human as such: anthropogenesis is always already technological, a 
turn towards the technological.8 There is never a simple, natural human that then turns 
                                                
6 That is, turning is an existential and not simply existentiell matter. Heidegger, Martin, and Joan 
Stambaugh. Being and Time: A Translation of Sein Und Zeit. Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1996, §4. 
7 Arne Melberg, to give one example, suggests that it is not a matter of turning away form the question of 
Being as pursued in Being and Time, but simply a matter of approaching it differently—a repetition. Instead 
of facing it frontally, Heidegger returns to the question of Being through a turn towards art, poetry, and 
sound. Theories of Mimesis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 161ff. See also her 
reading of Orpheus (including the tension between the visible and the audible) through Blanchot in 
Kierkegaard’s “Repetition,” 148. 
8 David Wills, Dorsality: Thinking Back Through Technology and Politics (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2008), 5. Anthropogenesis has been a problematic close to deconstruction since Derrida 
wrote in Of Grammatology the enigmatic proposition that differance is “the history of life,” of which 
restricted writing is but a stage. In fact, insofar as the genetic code itself is a form of inscription which 
spatializes itself as life (thus also “temporalizing” itself) then we have to understand life as being already 
technical: from amoebas to homo sapiens, life writes itself. Considering the work of paleoanthropologist 
André Leroi-Gourhan, Derrida argues that restricted writing (and everything we understand by technē, such 
as mousikē) are exteriorizations, a form of “liberation of memory” of what is already a made possible by 
the trace (84). In other words, there is an originary technicity (the ‘trace’) such that on the one hand, the 
human is always already prosthetic and, on the other, that technics is not an essential characteristic of the 
human that would oppose it to “nature” or phusis. In this context, Bernard Stiegler, goes on to argue that it 
is technicity itself that creates the human, insofar as, as Leroi-Gourhan shows, the brain and the hand 
evolved through the fashioning of tools, or in other words, co-evolved. And, as he argues, it also follows 
that technical entities are themselves self-organized, only operating within a longer timeframe (or indeed 
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technological. Rather, as soon as the human moves its articulated limbs, uses a tool, or 
stands erect thanks to the vertebral column in its back—and even when it walks—there is 
articulation and deviation, a turning back from the “natural” which would be opposed to 
“technology.” For Wills, the technological turn is originary, but this means that there is 
no purely natural origin, nor a purely technological one; they are originally imbricated. 
To move forward is already to acknowledge the technological origin. But in taking up 
tools, the anthropoid turns its back on what is behind him. “We know how it abandons 
the animal, refines the senses by downgrading smell and hearing, and reconfigures the 
knowable other within a frontal visual perspective, prioritizing a certain version of the 
fore-seen or fore-seeable.”9 In such a turn, however, the human does not truly abandon 
what it radically leaves behind but carries it along: nature and technology are joined in 
the dorsal turn. 
In this context, understanding the dorsal turn as the originary articulation of 
nature and technology in the human exposes as problematic those narratives of modernity 
based on an opposition from phusis to technē, as the progressive abandoning the 
“animate” world for a “mechanized” one (sensu Burke) or even a discontinuous shift of 
archeological grounds (sensu Foucault), which in the case of modern music means 
leaving behind a world where the connection between affect and musical devices such as 
the lament “is not founded in the given similitudes of things, in a folding-out of the world 
on itself [but instead in] a new and arbitrary connection between the world and a 
                                                                                                                                            
another conception of time altogether). Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, vol. 1 (Stanford, CA.: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 134ff. However, Geoffrey Bennington has warned about this reading which seems 
to conflate a particulr form of technology with the more general technicity that Derrida describes (that is, 
by taking human technology as the paradigm for technicity as such), with the consequence that Stiegler 
turns out to be more anthropocentric than the metaphysical framework he seeks to question. Geoffrey 
Bennington, Interrupting Derrida (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 169. In this context, moreover, it 
bears noting that in considering the various oppositions to phusis that are overturned when considering the 
originarity of differance, Derrida writes notes that, in considering all the pairs of opposites on which 
philosophy is founded in terms of differance, as differing-deferring from each other, is one might see “the 
site of a reinterpretation of mimēsis in its alleged opposition to physis”). It is this task, of course, that is 
being suggested in this dissertation. Jacques Derrida, “Différance” in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 17. 
9 Ibid., 9. 
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deontologized [sic] langauge.”10 Conceived as a passage—however fluid—or a break—
however deep—this narrative implies that myth, magic, and the mimetology of 
similarities are simply left behind as modernity leaps towards reason, technology, and 
Enlightenment. Conceived as a turn, instead, we recognize that neither myth nor mimesis 
are abandoned with the onset of modernity. If phusis and technē are not opposed but 
constitute and supplement each other, and if the new is not a step forward but a 
deviation—a deviation which is also a form of retroversion—, then what Enlightenment 
affirms as progress carries over the past that it seeks to leave behind. Seeing modernity as 
a turn and not a forward development is another way of emphasizing the negative 
dialectics by which Enlightenment reverts to myth, while myth is already Enlightenment. 
Mimesis and magic, in fact, constantly fall on both sides of the opposition 
between phusis and technē. In describing the world as “an animal,” Leonardo, 
Machiavelli, and Michelangelo, says Burke, can be seen as saying not so much that the 
world is “like an animal” than as saying that it is “like a work of art.”11 This is precisely 
the analogy that Aristotle deploys in the Poetics to insist on the need for a teleological 
arrangement of parts to wholes, where mimesis is understood as technē, “imitating” 
nature but at the same time “supplementing” nature.12 Similarly, magic is a technology, as 
shown in Martha Feldman’s description of the singer as magus (which she elaborates 
following Alfred Gell’s analysis of technology and Mauss’s theory of magic as ensemble 
of techniques). Its performance and effectivity relies on the formal and structural patterns 
(and their degrees of variation) that can be found in the arias of eighteenth-century opera 
seria. These patterns, she argues, serve to mobilize political objectives through the 
narrative of myth. For Feldman, their effectivity in mobilizing the collective relies 
                                                
10 Gary Tomlinson, Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1990), 240. 
11 Burke, The Italian Renaissance, 214. 
12 Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 49. 
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ultimately on virtuosity and spectacle, in the “ineffable power of the human voice.”13 
Quoting Gell, Feldman recalls that magic haunts technical activity like a shadow.14  
Orpheus too stands at the interstice between magic and technology: as a singer, 
having the capacity to enchant animals, mythical creatures and stones, he is on the side of 
phusis; his magical song, for Ficino, was a means of divine inspiration.15 Yet, in Bacon’s 
1607 De Sapientia Veterum, as John Hollander shows, the harmonious structure of 
Orpheus’ lyre is an allegory of the civilizing influence without which humanity returns to 
barbarism.16 
As these glosses show, turning away from nature and myth makes them invisible, 
as a specter is invisible: only for a certain conception of vision, an instrumental and 
empiricist reason that only takes as real what it can see and dominate, a restricted 
anthropocentrism in which what is not its object is no object at all. Spectacularization—
the ontological determination of the real as what is visible for, in front of, the 
technological human—turns into, or rather comes with spectralization—the production of 
an invisible “behind” that haunts any attempt to reduce the real to what is in front of the 
anthropocentric human. For Wills, the space of obscurity produced by the turn stands in 
for the unknown, the unforeseeable, and the Other. 
But sound, as we know—as Orfeo learned—is not bound to frontality. For the 
forward-facing gaze, the specter may be unseen, but it is already audible. It manifests 
itself through sound, through the effectivity and operativity of noise, song, harmony, and 
other sounding forces—it does not announce its location sooner than it repeats and 
dislocates itself—as resonance, echo, and feedback—multiplying its position without 
ever presenting itself as frontal. Sound is always behind and invisible, whatever direction 
one turns towards, as Nina Treadwell shows in her reading of the first intermedio in the 
Medici Wedding of 1589, where Dorian Harmony ended her performance by singing 
                                                
13 Martha Feldman, Opera and Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 26. 
14 Ibid., 28. 
15 D. P. Walker, “Orpheus the Theologian and Renaissance Platonists,” Journal of the Warburg and 
Courtauld Institutes 16, no. 1/2 (1953): 100–120. 
p. 100. See also Gary Tomlinson, Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993), chs. 4 and 5. 
16 John Hollander, The Untuning of the Sky Ideas of Music in English Poetry, 1500-1700 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), 169.  
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echoes of her own song by hiding behind a rock.17 Ronconi’s production of L’Orfeo, 
analyzed by Calcagno, makes the further point: La Musica already stands behind Orfeo, 
singing the prologue behind and through him. He does not need to turn to hear her—and 
even if he did, he would not lose her as he will have lost Euridice, since he is 
blindfolded.18 Even if Harmony hides, La Musica remains. From unseen dorsality to 
invisible music, the semantic drift easily drives towards a familiar commonplace in the 
recent musicological approaches to the operatic voice, a voice that gives access to the 
beyond, to the metaphysical (as in Walker’s and Tomlinson’s Ficino, Hollander’s Bacon, 
and Feldman’s singing magus). Attending to Orpheus in his turn, in the turn to 
modernity, allows us to understand why it seems necessary to insist on the metaphysical 
as the correlate of the modern point of view and of music’s role in it, without 
presupposing that there is effectively something like “the metaphysical” that precedes 
and opposes the modern. 
Joining these two themes—of the turn to visuality and technology with invisibility 
and myth as their counterparts—this chapter retakes a suggestion offered in chapters 4 
and 5, namely that Monteverdi’s (or Signor &c.’s) claim for a “Second Practice which 
should be called first with respect to origin” has a structure that is emblematic of 
modernity, that of a retroactive split which at the same time inaugurates and repeats time. 
In this chapter I offer an overview of the very-well known story of the establishment and 
development of the “world picture,” of the general determination of the world and being 
itself as visible, with the corresponding affirmation of representation as its ruling 
mimetology (here, more than ever, an onto-mimetology; Heidegger, as we see, is still 
there). 
                                                
17 Nina Treadwell, Music and Wonder at the Medici Court: The 1589 Interludes for La Pellegrina 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 73. 
18 Mauro Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera: Monteverdi’s Staging of the Self (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 2012), 63. 
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LITANIES OF THE SPECTACLE: VISION, PERSPECTIVE, AND THE THEATRUM MUNDI 
If the elevation of invisibility and the “metaphysical” in contemporary musicology are the 
result, and not the origin, of an economimimetical redistribution of musical value, then 
we can reassess the place of music, specifically early opera, in the spectacularization of 
the world, and examine its ideological function. Music and sound constitute the “behind” 
of the spectacle, its condition of possibility: what holds the spectacle together without 
appearing as such. But in this sense it is also its condition of impossibility, insofar as, by 
not appearing, by supplementing the dominance of the visual with a constitutive behind, 
it undoes its claims to universality. Which does not mean, however, that the behind is 
first or that the invisible (the “metaphysical”) is more real: it remains a by-product of the 
turn. 
This can be seen clearly in accounts of modernity as the passage from orality to 
literacy (whose basis on a problematic mimetology of writing as mediation, specifically 
in Havelock, is examined in chapter 2), particularly in the theological dimension of 
Walter Ong’s approach that Jonathan Sterne has denounced as the “audiovisual litany.”19 
This trope consistently associates vision with perspective, surfaces and distance, hearing 
with interiority, immediacy and presence, and so on.20 The litany thus corresponds to 
narratives of disenchantment and rationalization where the modern gaze is the aesthetic 
correlate of instrumental reason, while the ear preserves the qualities of presence, 
immediacy, and empathy. One of Sterne’s key insights in his reading of Ong is pointing 
out how the orality/literacy paradigm is in fact created, as every paradigm is, out of two 
particular forms of experience as interpreted by mid-twentieth century biblical scholars, 
projected backwards into his analysis of Ramus’ pedagogical revolution at the end of the 
Middle Ages. For Sterne, 
Ong essentially extrapolated the general categories of oral and literate from the 
figures of the Jew and the Greek in mid-century Christian theology. Ong’s “oral 
man” was [biblical scholar Thorlief] Boman’s Jew, who lived in a dynamic, 
                                                
19 Jonathan Sterne, “The Theology of Sound: A Critique of Orality,” Canadian Journal of Communication 
36, no. 2 (2011): 207–25. 
20 Ibid., 212.; See also Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 15. 
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ephemeral, and engaged world shaped by sound as an event, where the power of 
words is carried in their sound. Ong’s “literate man” was Boman’s Greek, who 
lived in a world defined by sight and oriented toward distance, objectivity, 
rationalism, disembodiment, and form, where words derive their power from 
being seen.21  
According to Ong’s schema, then, sound has a privilege in Judeo-Christian experience (of 
a certain interpretation of the word as an event) as the means by which men are brought 
“close to each other and therefore closer to God.”22 The disappearance of orality with the 
emergence of literacy is thus understood as a second falling of man, as the sinful 
perversion brought about by mediation, while the notion of “secondary orality” appears 
as a new promise of salvation, and this messianic logic organizes the whole: “Ong’s 
sensory history is the story of the fall from innocence and a possible future redemption.”23 
Along this narrative of redemption, we can place a complementary one, as told by 
Martin Jay, in which the ancient Greeks determined vision as “the noblest of the senses,” 
a determination which was kept alive through both philosophy and religion through very 
pervasive mimetologies. Theoria, as everyone knows, is a densely charged word. In 
Heidegger’s famous etymology, it has two roots: thea and horao. Thea (cf. ‘theater’), is 
the outward appearance in which something shows itself, its eidos. Horao means to 
contemplate something attentively. “Thus it follows that theorein is thean horan, to look 
attentively on the outward appearance wherein what presences becomes visible, and, 
through such seeing, to linger with it.”24 Yet Heidegger suggests that in Theoria, the 
Greeks also heard Thea ora, the respect and honor bestowed on the goddess Aletheia: 
“theoria is the reverent paying heed to the unconcealment of what presences.”25 As Jay 
notes too, theory also suggests a potential intertwining of viewer and viewed, prevalent in 
                                                
21Sterne, “The Theology of Sound” 214. 
22 Ibid., 218. 
23 Ibid., 219. 
24 Martin Heidegger, “Science and Reflection”, quoted in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, 
Philosophy, Politics (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 93 n. 80. 
25 Idem. 
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presocratic thought, while Gadamer emphasizes that for the Greeks it had a dimension of 
“sacred communion,” “namely being totally involved and carried away by what one 
sees,” an experience that, as we know, depended on mousikē.26 Yet, if theoria could 
preserve such a sense of communion, at least to ancient Greek tuned ears, its translation 
into Speculatio emphasized a mimetology of reflection, hence of separation. Aiming to be 
a perfect mirroring, the pure knowledge of self-reflection, or at least an earthly mirroring 
of divine knowledge, speculation was a purely Platonic mimetology: presenting itself as 
the pure contemplation of the idea, it was a “specularization,” a trick or turn of the mirror 
that sought to dominate mimesis by presenting the restricted, visual mimesis of mirroring 
and reproduction as a general mimesis, as a science.27 We saw how this generalization of 
mimesis operated in Part I; here we attend to its modern consequences.  
Medieval Christianity also preserved the purity of vision in the form of a 
“metaphysics of the light” and which was further “purified” by Aquinas by distinguishing 
between “representation and fetishism” in the Church’s quarrels against idolatry, which, 
Jay argues, prepared the way for the “the secular autonomization of the visual as a realm 
unto itself,” which was crucial for the preparation of the “scientific worldview.” For Jay, 
then, the “rational” and “mystic” aspects of vision were somehow kept together as they 
became modern. Thus, “vision, aided by new technologies, became the dominant sense in 
the modern world, even as it came to serve new masters.28 
Both of these narratives converge in the period that we can properly call the 
baroque. For Jay, the baroque occupies a particular place in the passage from the 
medieval, Christianized elevation of vision towards its secular, Enlightened dominance in 
modern scientific reason and political representation as elaborated by Panofsky. For 
Panofsky, art’s embracing of mathematized perspective made it possible, in the early 
modern period, to “reduce the divine to a mere subject matter for consciousness…but, for 
that very reason, conversely, it expands human consciousness into a vessel for the 
divine.” And by affirming the certainty of perception over the truth of being, this turn 
                                                
26 Quoted in Jay, Downcast Eyes, 31. 
27 Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 95. See also chapter 2, above. 
28 Jay, Downcast Eyes, 44. 
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towards vision entailed a turn towards the spectacle, the spectacular, and the meraviglia, 
or what Panofsky calls “the visionary,” by which the miraculous and the divine becomes 
part of direct human experience, signaling the passage from “theocracy” to 
“anthropocracy.”29 The perspectival techniques developed towards the end of the 
sixteenth century, doing away with the mirror, with speculation—and thus presumably 
with mimesis—, transformed “real space” into “visible space” by positing an abstract, 
immobile “eye” as the apex of a visual pyramid connected with the individual points in 
the visual image. Further, the position of the eye determines the position of the vanishing 
point towards which every line—and hence all content—is directed. In this way, 
Panofsky argues, perspective constructs an entirely modern understanding of space, by 
abstracting not only ideal positions from the objective world, but also from the particular 
characteristics of actual subjective optical impression.30 That is, the space created by 
perspective is neither coextensive with the “material world” nor with the purely 
subjective perception of the observer, but is instead a mathematized, homogenous space 
constructed to overcome both psychophysiological perception (including retinal 
distortion caused by projection on a concave surface) and the “discontinuous space” of 
antiquity. By accomplishing a representation of systematized space, mathematized 
perspective is the “symbolic form” of modernity: a concrete, material sign endowed with 
a particular meaning, namely that of making the observing subject the rational locus of 
the systematization of the world.31 Thus, the representation offered by mathematized 
perspective attained an ontological, formative power that sought to replace the specular 
mimetology of the world as Imago dei for a frontal re-presentation of the world as it 
appears to the eye. This operation is the aesthetic instrumentalization of the ontological 
power given to the eye in the baroque, which as Buci-Glucksmann puts it, proclaimed 
that “to be is to see.”32 
 
                                                
29 Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, 72. 
30 Ibid., 29. 
31 Ibid., 41. 
32 Buci-Glucksmann, The Madness of Vision, 2. 
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But to see, and Orpheus knew this all too well, is also to lose what is behind, or above—
or to make them invisible. The dorsal imbrication of the visible and the audible is quite 
evident (or audible) in the religious schisms of the baroque. As the primacy of the voice 
as unmediated connection with a personal God is made one of the central tenets of the 
Reformation, the Catholic Church, especially under the direction of the Jesuits, turns to 
what Jay, after Barthes, calls an “imperialism of the image.” Through a conjoint 
operation, the Church and the Court turned towards the spectacularization of both secular 
and religious ritual, reaching its apotheosis in the absolutist court of Louis XIV.33 Where 
Protestants turned their back on spectacle, the Counter-Reformation embraced it and 
brought it to unseen extremes. The consequence, as Jay shows, was the production of the 
baroque “ocular regime,” a subterranean presence or an “uncanny double” of what we 
might call the dominant scientific or ‘rationalized’ visual order,” which complicated 
reason’s claim to universality.34 The seeing subject appears as the locus of two opposite 
claims: the unifying center of a rational view of the world, and an object on display, a 
participant in the spectacular display of the baroque court. Art operates as the mediation 
between these two functions of the subject, and more broadly as the mediation between 
power and religion: this is the operational mode of the general dispositive of aesthetic 
politics in the baroque. This ocular regime was not restricted to religion, art, or science, 
but pervaded them all, constantly pitting each camp against each other: The Church 
against Galilei; Kepler against Fludd; Kircher against Kepler; Descartes against Kircher. 
At stake in these conflicts was how to ground—or re-ground—the possibility of empirical 
knowledge based on the senses upon a form of reason that was not theological or 
speculative. Or, alternatively, how to preserve order and the religious and political 
institutions. A typical example of this tension is the prevalence of anamorphosis as the 
paradigm of baroque visual mimetology (in Holbein), which, by combining two visual 
orders in one planar space, “subverted and decentered the unified subject of vision 
painstakingly constructed by the dominant scopic regime.”35  
                                                
33 Jay, Downcast Eyes, 46. 
34 Jay, Downcast Eyes, 45. 
35 Jay, Downcast Eyes, 48.  
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The trope of the Theatrum mundi stages this dualism in a paradigmatic way: the 
world is a theatre, a theatron, a place to see, and a spectacle. As Gunter Gebauer and 
Christoph Wulf remark, a theatricalization of political life characterizes the European 
seventeenth-century in general, especially in Spain and England.36 If the structure of the 
world is theatrical, the theatre attains a privileged role for structuring the world. We are 
familiar with this chiastic structure of the mimetic mediation of power from Elizabethan 
theatre.37 If the medieval deployment of the trope emphasized the role of men as actors 
with no free will, its elaborations from the Renaissance to the baroque pointed towards 
the spectacle, the world as given-to-be-seen in which the lack of immediate contact with 
God was supplemented by the spectacularization of experience. A world, moreover, 
separated between objects enclosed within defined frames and subjects who contemplated 
them. 
Writing about the role of the world-as-theatre metaphor in English Renaissance 
poetry, Frank Warnke points to the specific mimetic difference that will define the trope’s 
deployment in the baroque: “To see the world is to see it as it is—not because life, in its 
‘dramatic’ texture, sometimes resembles a stage spectacle, but because life, recognized as 
a conflict of opposites and as a shifting phantasmagoria of appearances, is fully 
identifiable with a stage spectacle.”38 In other words, the world and the theatre are not 
two different spheres which can sometimes coincide due to perceived similarities or 
because the theater imitates actions; rather, they constitute two aspects of the same 
ontological determination of reality according to an earlier and more pervasive 
mimetology, one which affirms a radical separation between what is and what appears. 
For Warnke, this metaphysics produces a general experience of confusion, which José 
Antonio Maravall describes as a simultaneous affirmation of mutability (everything is 
transitory) and immutability (natural laws—and even historical laws, for Vico—are 
                                                
36 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1995), 337 n. 2. 
37 See Gebauer and Wulf, Mimesis; Stephen Orgel, The Illusion of Power: Political Theater in the English 
Renaissance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). 
38 Frank J. Warnke, Versions of Baroque: European Literature in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1972), 69. 
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simple and unchanging).39 The common ontology between world and theatre as a play of 
simulacra allows for the specifically baroque nature of its deployment, namely that the 
relation is invertible: in the baroque, “the stage of the world,” Theatrum mundi, means 
both that the world is on stage and that the world is a stage. Or again, “If reality is 
theatrical, if the spectators find themselves submerged in the great theater of the world, 
what they contemplate on the stage is a theater to the second degree.”40 
Yet, if poetry—in Marvell, Burton, Browne, Gracián, Calderón, and Shakespeare, 
in Warnke’s reading—exploits this identity by “expressing the radical conviction that the 
phenomenal world is illusion,” it is also necessary to remark that this affirmation is the 
correlate—or rather the means—of the theologico-political apparatus through which 
illusion becomes an ideological technology of what Maravall calls the “captivation of the 
will.”41 The invertibility of the Theatrum mundi trope evidences or conceals—depending 
on how one reads it—the imbrication of aesthetics and politics of the baroque. 
IDEOLOGY, AFFECT, AND SPECTRALIZATION 
In fact, as much as the stage and the theater might claim to a shared reality, there is a 
constitutive schism in its very structure which complicates its presumed invertibility. The 
predominance of modern perspective in the theater has been described by Bonnie Gordon 
as an ideological formation that, by isolating the viewer from the represented world, also 
segregates the spectator and the stage. For Gordon, “the increasing spatial, temporal, and 
ideological detachment of stage worlds from the real world opened up a rift” that made it 
possible, in the theatre (but also in museums, laboratories, botanical gardens and anatomy 
theaters), for what Gordon calls the “ventriloquization” of women by composers such as 
Monteverdi (in compositions such as the Combattimento and Ariadne in which male 
                                                
39 Antonio José Maravall, Culture of the Baroque Analysis of a Historical Structure (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 200. 
40 Idem. 
41 Citing Spanish novelist Gonzalo Céspedes y Meneses (1585-1638): “Novelty draws one's eyes and they, 
one's will.” Ibid., 228. 
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narrators overpower female characters on stage), it made it possible “for the emergence 
of a modern male subject who colonized the female object.”42 
Gordon’s attention to the structure of power in spectacle is crucial for highlighting 
the “ontological” power of the eye in the baroque. Gordon here is in accord with the 
general reading of the baroque as consisting on a large-scale repressive apparatus which 
effectively organizes its subjects through its monopoly of all forms of representation. 
This thesis, which lies at the core of the New Historicism, insits on the separation 
between “real worlds” and “stage worlds” and at the same time supposes that what is 
represented on the second corresponds to the first, such that, effectively, we can read 
artistic works as bearing the traces of the societies that produced them—that is, that 
artistic works are representations of reality—mimesis. 
But this thesis is not exclusive to that school. Consider the work of a Marxist 
historian such as Maravall. For him, the paradigmatic tropes of the baroque—the 
elevation of the new, the delight on illusion, awe through excess, difficulty and obscurity 
but also laconism (in conceptismo and culteranismo, respectively) which Maravall groups 
under the term “artifice”—are psychological expedients and mechanisms (resortes) 
through which absolutist monarchs shaped the lived experience of the people.43 The 
baroque hyper-Platonism (i.e., the oppositions between appearance and essence, between 
mutability and substance, and so on) which was exploited and affirmed through art and 
philosophy, was a general ideological strategy by which “a force reconstitutive of 
traditional interests was smuggled in by means of the novelty that one was attracted to for 
                                                
42 Bonnie Gordon, Monteverdi’s Unruly Women: The Power of Song in Early Modern Italy (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 180. 
43 See the translator’s preface to The Culture of the Baroque for Maravall’s usage of the word “resortes,” 
where it is noted that the term captures the crucial ambivalence with respect to agency that characterizes 
ideology, since “the will [la voluntad] is both subject and object, it is acted upon in order to act, or (to put it 
another way) it acts by means of having been acted upon. This complexity becomes even greater, for 
ideology cannot be described in simply teleological terms, in the familiar sense of ‘instrumental reason’” 
Ibid., xxvii. 
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enjoyment.”44 In his account, the “baroque” is a historical concept which describes the 
period between 1605 and 1650 in Spain, where, 
[T]he crisis economy, monetary upheavals, credit insecurity, economic wars, and 
(along with this) the strengthening of seigniorial agrarian landholdings and the 
growing impoverishment of the masses foster a feeling of being threatened and of 
instability in one’s personal and social life, a feeling that is held in control by the 
imposing forces of repression that underlie the dramatic gesticulation of the 
baroque human being and permit us the use of such a name. So the baroque is a 
concept of epoch that in principle extends to all the manifestations making up this 
epoch’s culture.45 
Maravall thus identifies the conjunction of political elites and the Catholic Church led by 
the Jesuits in seventeenth-century Spain as having a determining role on the shaping of 
the cultural life of Europe, consisting on widespread strategies of repression and control 
                                                
44 Ibid., 227. From this position one can question the established narrative, in Tomlinson’s account, 
according to which the transformation in Monteverdi’s late style depends on his having “succumbed” to the 
new and fashionable poetry of Marino, such that “Marinist idioms in dramatic texts could not help but 
dilute the potent rhetoric, joining poetry and music, that Monteverdi had mastered in Ariadne’s lament.” 
Gary Tomlinson, Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1990), 179. If, according to Maravall, the baroque operates by means of extremes, if both laconism and 
studied complexity are but faces of one same artifice, then it is not enough, as Carter attempts, to show that 
Marinist poetry—and Monteverdi’s treatment thereof—is more than “the empty wit, the tawdry eroticism, 
and the superifcial cult of the ‘marvelous’ for which the poet was so often derided, at least from the late 
seventeenth century on” if this “something more” is nevertheless understood as the elaborate play on 
intertextual referentiality and manipulation of voices, which would only make it pass—to use now outdated 
terms, from conceptismo to culteranismo—while still remaining a form of artifice. Tim Carter, “Beyond 
Drama: Monteverdi, Marino, and the Sixth Book of Madrigals (1614),” The Journal of the American 
Musicological Society 69, no. 1 (2016): 41. 
45 Maravall, Culture of the Baroque, 6. The importance of Maravall’s work for understanding early modern 
spectacle is well acknowledged, although from my perspective, the mimetological conception of power and 
ideology that it upholds (the real vs. appearance; the elite vs. the masses) is insufficiently critical. 
Nevertheless, Maravall is alone in identifying the characteristic conjuncture of politics and aesthetics of the 
baroque and describing the multiplicity of strategies by which experience and affect are shaped, organized, 
and directed through dispositives that are still cursorily (and anachronistically) understood as purely 
“aesthetic,” that is, as autonomous art. Another aspect that must be reconciled is the disregard Maravall 
shows for music, which has a role in seventeenth-century monarchic Spain that is arguably not lesser than 
that of the theater to which Maravall gives sustained attention. For works which make up for this omission 
while elaborating on the ideological function of opera in Spain and the New World with recourse to Jacques 
Attali’s and Frederic Jameson’s theories of ideology, see Chad M. Gasta, Imperial Stagings : Empire and 
Ideology in Transatlantic Theater of Early Modern Spain and the New World (Chapel HIll, North Carolina: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2013); see also Louise K. Stein, Songs of Mortals, Dialogues of the 
Gods: Music and Theatre in Seventeenth-Century Spain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), who 
subscribes more fully to Maravall’s formulation of the problem. 
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of the masses. Where Benjamin identified a theologically produced melancholy, Maravall 
suggests an affective disposition marked by insecurity and instability which the dominant 
class, in the midst of the crisis, simultaneously produces and seeks to conceal through the 
production of cultural spectacle—indeed a mass spectacle.46  
To put it in the orthodox Marxist terms that Maravall does not make explicit, 
there is a distinction between real material conditions and merely superstructural 
reflections, between sovereign power and repressed masses, which leads him to state that 
the Theatrum mundi metaphor and the question of the use of the theater as an instrument 
are “unrelated.”47 Thus, while identifying the ideological function of the metaphor, 
Maravall leaves unquestioned the mimetology that grounds it—real subjects and 
transitory roles, i.e. substance and appearance—which is also preserved in the dogmatic 
distinction between infrastructure and superstructure. 
As we know, ideology is also matter of turning. In Althusser’s well known scene, 
the subject is recruited into ideology through the hail of “hey you, there!” upon which the 
individual turns round.48 And this turn, like every turn, is conditioned by dorsality. The 
point of Althusser’s example is that the individual turns without having seen who is doing 
the hailing, and indeed if it is directed to him. The turn, the “mere one-hundred-and-
eighty-degree physical conversion” is an acknowledgment of his identity as a subject, 
turning to face the point from which the interpellation comes. Coming from behind, the 
interpellation is invisible yet audible. In order to press the point that ideology is 
                                                
46 According to Maravall, the baroque developed the Medieval interpretation of the trope—we are all actors 
since our fate is in written in the script of Providence—in three simultaneous ways: 1. The role of each is as 
transitory as it is in in the theater; 2. There is a rotation of roles, so that what one is today is someone else 
tomorrow; 3. Since everything is an appearance, nothing really affects the substance of the person who 
endures the changing roles. For Maravall, these three interpretations have the explicit ideological function 
of preserving the status quo and impending mobility, since it convinces everyone, especially those enduring 
inferior roles, that there is no reason to protest or struggle because these transitory roles will eventually be 
switched. Ibid., 155. Compare this interpretation with the Shakespearean locus classicus of the Theatrum 
mundi trope: “All the world’s a stage, /And all the men and women merely players/They have their exits 
and their entrances/And one man in his time plays many parts.” This is, of course, not the only place in 
Shakespeare’s corpus where the metaphor is deployed. See Warnke, Versions of Baroque, 75ff. 
47 Maravall, Culture of the Baroque, 154. This claim is ignored by authors who take Maravall as a point of 
departure for an analysis of early modern spectacle as, for example, “re-presentation of reality itself.” 
48 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation),” in 
Mapping Ideology, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London; New York: Verso, 1994), 286. 
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“everywhere” and “eternal”, Althusser subsequently rewrites the scene to insist that there 
is no such sequentiality, that the existence of ideology and the interpellation of 
individuals are one and the same thing. But this indicates only that frontality is always 
already the result of a dorsal turn: just as there is no outside of ideology, there is no 
directionality that is not conditioned by dorsality and the invisibility that it implies. 
Moreover, the example (and Althusser’s frequent comparisons of ideology with the 
Freudian unconscious) makes it clear that there is necessarily a disjuncture between the 
call and the response which is entirely irreducible to the logic of mystification.  
From this position we can see the limit in Maravall’s analysis of baroque 
ideology: it depends on the orthodox notion of ideology in which the people are fed 
fictions and illusions by the ruling class in order to keep them enslaved by dominating 
their imaginations. Not only this account cannot show why would the people simply 
believe these stories when the contrast with their material realities was as sharp but it 
fails to explain how the particular cultural objects, especially “high” creations such as 
poetry and all sorts of allegorical constructs, would have a such an immediate effect upon 
a people that was barely literate. 
The spectacle is not ideological because it keeps an audience enthralled in 
contemplating what is presented in front of them while keeping their backs away from 
their real conditions or the truth—as in the very ideological allegory of Plato’s cave. 
Indeed, as Althusser would say, what is ideological about such a model is only its name: 
that it is oriented towards an idea, an eidos, which is defined in terms of true or false. 
Althusser’s version of ideology seems to shatter this mimetological conception of 
ideology. Rather, Althusser insists on a “materiality of ideology,” wherein ideology exists 
thoroughly in its practices, in rituals that are inscribed within the material existence of an 
ideological apparatus, such as the church or the theater.  
Althusser describes the mimetology of ritual through an example that is also 
classic: Pascal says: “Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe.”49 It is 
the actions, in their very materiality, that give rise to belief, to the idea of God. By acting 
                                                
49 Idem., 278. 
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the role of a believer, by enacting the performance or ritual of prayer, the subject 
produces not only the model of such a prayer but even the ideas that organize it. Ideas are 
produced by matter just as paradigms are created from copies. In fact, it is a repetition of 
instances of materiality, an assemblage, which produces ideology’s ideas: 
I shall therefore say that, where only a single subject (such and such an 
individual) is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that 
his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by 
material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological 
apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject.50 
Althusser insists throughout the text on abandoning “metaphors,” “representations” and 
“descriptions” in order to arrive to a thoroughly “theoretical” or “scientific” discourse. 
This tension traverses the entire text with surprising results. In the telling example of the 
ideology of the Church, Althusser moves from the voice of God, who speaks to his 
subjects in the first person, to showing that the subjects are indeed interpellated as 
mirrors, and reflections. From this restricted example he draws, as a general consequence 
and expressed in “theoretical language,” that 
 We observe that the structure of all ideology, interpellating individuals as 
subjects in the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject, is speculary, i.e. a mirror-
structure, and doubly speculary: this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology, 
and ensures its functioning.51 
Interpellation works just as God commands: ideology depends on the Imago dei. What 
then is the difference between the “bad” notion of ideology that is defined with respect to 
its content, from the “theoretical” one that arrives to its own formulations? But it is not 
that Christian dogma determines Althusser’s scientific notion of ideology. Rather, it is the 
very Platonic mimetology he sought to reject with a single blow, and with results that are 
equally “ideological.” The general question that orders “Ideology and Ideological State 
                                                
50 Idem., 279. Emphasis in the original. 
51 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, 294. 
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Apparatuses” is how is to assure the reproduction of the the relations of production. The 
answer, in a spectacular thaumaturgia, is the same as is offered in the Republic to define 
mimesis: it is a mirror that does no other work than reflecting—which then passes as 
production. 
Among the productive objections that have been posed to Althusser’s still 
relevant model is Butler’s questioning of the notion of sovereignty that is at stake. 
Returning to the example of God, Butler focuses on the performative power of God’s 
word (which she elsewhere calls magical), a voice that brings the subject into being. 
Ignoring the appearance of the mirror, Butler objects to the generalization of the divine 
performative as the paradigm of ideology, arguing that “Interpellation must be 
dissociated from the figure of the voice in order to become the instrument and mechanism 
of discourses whose efficacy is irreducible to their moment of enunciation.”52 
Instead of such a logocentric notion, which relies entirely in a notion of sovereign 
power as emanating from a subject and activated through a voice, Butler mobilizes the 
logic of iteration to show that interpellation works even where there is not a voice and 
even where it is not directly emanating from a center of power or addressed to a 
particular subject. This is a crucial amend to Althusser, for indeed the presumed power of 
the performative is presumed on the problematic notions of performative utterances 
(which depend on the simultaneous presence of speaker and statement) and of power as 
sovereignty emanating from a single point.  
Crucial, too, is that Butler disavows the mirror (which has to be shown in its 
complicity with the model she denounces) and especially the turn. As she writes, “The 
subject need not always turn around in order to be constituted as a subject, and the 
discourse that inaugurates the subject need not take the form of a voice at all.”53 Yet even 
if there is no turn, interpellation is conditioned by dorsality: one does not know from 
where the hail comes from or whether it is directed to oneself or someone else until it is 
too late. And it is always already too late: any frontality always implies a turn. 
                                                
52 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997), 32. 
53 Idem., 31. 
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We end up with various models of ideology that, in one way or another, imply a 
mimetology on the side of theory. Whether it is the orthodox model of superstructure and 
infrastructure and its correlatives, or Althusser’s various reformulations and even Butler’s 
amend, it seems impossible to describe ideology from the outside. What remains are a 
series of oppositions—real/illusion, voice/mirror, subject/God, matter/idea, 
infrastructure/superstructure, and so on. Mimesis, as a productive force, is effectively 
what separates these distinctions while exceeding them. As such, mimesis is not in or of 
either of these, for example the infrastructure or the superstructure but always in alterity 
with them—making it possible to distinguish, for example, between an economic 
situation and its aesthetic counterpart in terms of model and copy or reflection. Thus, 
elements that belong to the economic or the political do become aesthetic functions—the 
new, illusion, drama, the difficult and so on—and conversely that aesthetic elements—
opera, the theater, myth—become repositories of value and power with political 
effectivity, while affects such as fear, rivalry and dispossession are shaped, mobilized, 
and incorporated into a general assemblage. What is crucial, however, is that mimesis 
constantly overturns the primacy of each. 
I will retain, for my purposes, something about the Pascal model. Kneeling down 
is effective as a performative not because it magically brings into existence the belief that 
one does not have before, but because in its repetition—and iteration—it constitutes a 
disperse network of practices and technologies in which ideology is inscribed. But also, 
because in praying, in turning towards oneself, one already determines the dorsal as the 
(non)place of ideology: either a voice that is heard or an address that one does not 
acknowledge until it is too late (and it always is), ideology is thoroughly material but also 
thoroughly invisible. 
Which is not surprising given how well music works as ritual, hail, or 
mystification. Going back to Maravall and Benjamin, I emphasize the affective 
dimension of the ideological rituals of the baroque. Kneeling down is also turning the 
body into a site of affection, just as going to the theater or participating in any other Court 
spectacle. The effect seems to be the same in the case of the German and the Spanish 
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baroque, where the dominant affects were melancholy and sorrow. In the Italian case, as I 
will argue below, we might first speak of display and ostentation, meraviglia, and 
magnificenza; gioia and allegrezza. In fact, in the baroque festa everyone is hailed by a 
voice that comes from nowhere, by a sovereign power that—even at the center of what 
we consider the origin of absolutism—is invisible. And yet everyone responds to its call. 
It says: enjoy! 
As a counterbalance to Maravall’s top-down model of power, or Saslow and 
Treadwell’s invisible center model, we can conceive of a different mode of production of 
the collective, operating through a certain affective interpellation, that does not conceive 
of the public as a mystified mass, on the one hand, nor as the abstract spectator of 
painterly and spectacular prospettive.54 Where perspective depends on a single and 
immobile “eye,” the spectacle makes it possible for this eye to embody a collective gaze. 
Rather than uniting several views under one sovereign eye that stands for all, the baroque 
spectacle in its Italian form is a collective phenomenon which depends on a particular 
mimetic inversion described in Gino Stefani’s provocative reading of the ideology and 
the poetics of the baroque, to which we now turn. 
For Stefani, the festa, which constitutes the symbolic and productive center of 
baroque culture, appears as a total theatre, as the “global manifestation of an integral 
society.” In this society, baroque life constitutes the “natural model of which melodrama 
is the artistic and artificial imitation.”55 A crucial difference in the Italian context, made 
prominent by Stefani’s emphasis on the festa, is the collective aspect of this 
theatricalization, unlike the absolutist stages of Spain and northern Europe described by 
                                                
54 For Maravall, it should be noted, perspective is another resorte, a mechanism which permits organizing 
the disorderly world of appearances while affirming its nature as changing, mutable, and irreal; moreover, 
Maravall notes that this role of perspective is not only a painterly one, but also political and theological: 
‘Perspective is the way whereby the world came into view and and was captured by baroque painting. What 
we are saying about painting is valid for every type of consideration: for art and for thought. Paravicino, in 
indicating the central theme of one of his funeral orations, would say: ‘The entire field of eloquence is 
foreshortened to this perspective,’ a text in which the introduction of the concept of foreshortening 
reinforces the function of the concept of perspective. Lope tells us about ‘the distant views that perspective 
reveals to us…. But this manner of seeing was projected onto whatever fell in the human world, even 
though it was considered something as transcendent vis-à-vis the world as the interventions of divine 
providence.’” Maravall, Culture of the Baroque, 195. 
55 Gino Stefani, Musica barocca (Milano: Bompiani, 1974), 20. 
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Maravall. In Italy, the figure of the Prince acts as a symbolic center for a collective that 
contemplates itself as spectacle, rather than the elevation of the monarch or the Sun King 
as absolute center. In this total theatre, artifice is not secondary or deceptive: it remarks 
the fact that the festa is itself an act of self-display, it is an autocelebration. The society 
becomes “integral” when it gives itself to be seen, when it places itself as the essential 
center of the theatron. 
While the festa is an event and a spectacle in itself, melodrama is a celebration 
which, by imitating festivity, allows the collective society to contemplate itself in the 
theatre, an operation that depends on the baroque invertibility of the Theatrum mundi. 
Remarking on the global and systematic aspect of the celebration—the concatenation of 
events such as ceremonies, processions, panegyrics, banquets, and concerts into a 
whole—Stefani notes that music participates in every aspect, as an autonomous event as 
well as connective tissue or backdrop.56 Even if the structure is theatrical, spectacular—
visual—, the effect is synesthetic: from the ensemble machine/music, hearing is 
presented as the binary counterpart of sight, but it also shares with smell the pervasive 
adjective describing “una soavissima armonia,” which remits one to the incense in the 
church and further to invisibility, impalpability (thus to touch), delicacy, levity, 
immateriality and so on.57 This synesthetic experience, a total, affective assemblage not 
unlike ancient Greek mousiké (as described in chapter 2), is epitomized in melodrama, 
which adds a further philosophical function: initially only a fragment, the melodrama 
acquires a central role in condensing the total experience of the festivity. 
In the Baroque, festa gives form to society just as melodrama gives form to festa 
(where “just as” has the strength of homology, of isomorphism [we may add, of 
course, of mimesis]). If melodrama is the mirror of baroque society, it is so 
through the diaphragm of festa.58  
                                                
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 23. 
58 Ibid., 26. 
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We have thus passed from the trope of the Theatrum Mundi to that of macro- and 
microcosmic correspondence, the great chain of being and the harmony of the spheres. 
The joint operation of these two tropes in regulating and producing a global conception of 
the universe, a cosmopolitics, attains its apotheosis in Athanasius Kircher’s 1650 
Musurgia Universalis, explored the excursus to this dissertation. These tropes share a 
mimetic structure (art repeats—and thus constitutes—the structure of the world as 
theatrical and harmonic) and thus an economimetic function: they serve less as 
illustrations or explanations of social, aesthetic, or ontological orders than as a way of 
controlling aesthetic practice as a means of producing these orders. 
For Stefani, the collective and systematic aspects of festa (as total theatre) define 
the character of opera. The festa, enclosed in itself, is only concerned with 
autocelebration, with self-display. It exists in the now, evanescent fireworks and the 
melodies consuming themselves and vanishing in the night. The celebration of a 
wedding, a victory, a banquet, as a particular event, is simply an event in history but it 
does not belong to it.59 Myth, Stefani argues, provides the mediation that joins these 
particular celebrations with history, “and the continuity between history and symbol is so 
narrow that it sometimes gives the vertiginous impression of continuity.”60 Myth, true for 
all times and thus specific for none, is an empty universal.61 The celebration is a 
particular event, embodied by the Prince, the court, and the people, and limited to their 
immediate existence; while they come together as society in the celebration, this union 
has no permanence beyond the celebration itself. Conversely, in the words of Stefani, 
without the people, myth lacks actualization: it lacks the material to compose. When 
opera employs mythological themes for the festivity, it sublates both the immediacy of 
the celebration and the abstract character of myth into the concrete, and collective, 
universal. Music, more specifically opera, constitutes such a singularity: it is both history 
                                                
59 In a different reading of this characterization, that would go by way of Bakhtin and Bataille we could say 
that the celebration is a pure expenditure, not a celebration in history but the denial of history, a sovereign 
event in the now, and not the bureaucratic operation of family marriages. It remains a further task to 
continue this line of though and confront it with Stefani’s analyses. See also Feldman, Opera and 
Sovereignty. 
60 Stefani, Musica barocca, 28. 
61 Here I follow Stefani’s characterization of myth, highlighting a Hegelian framework that will be 
modified below. 
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and myth, event and celebration, total spectacle and universal harmony. Stefani then turns 
to Orpheus, the symbol that culminates festive and musical representation in baroque 
society; with Orpheus, he writes, myth becomes rite. 
We already encountered the interpretation of L’Orfeo as a rite in Calcagno’s and 
Annibaldi’s reading, where Orfeo’s catabasis was to be seen as a transformation that 
Prince Francesco himself underwent (see chapter 5). Departing from this interpretation, I 
suggested that there is a limit to the power of allegory in maintaining these 
identifications, a limit that depends on the mimetic nature of allegory. No sooner is the 
allegorical identification suggested than it is eliminated. But this does not mean that the 
identification did not take place at all. It is made and subsequently undone, and it is 
within this play, I argue, that we can consider the ideological role of such identification 
as ritual. 
My contention is that the allegorical identification of Prince Francesco with Orfeo 
works towards creating a certain perspective, a spacial and affective distribution which 
organizes the collective celebration around one figure. However, the perspective through 
which the Prince is placed at the center of this spectacular disposition does not mean that 
its effects as ideology are exhausted with the affirmation of his centrality or the 
production of its invisibility. As I showed in chapter 6 by looking at Euridice through 
Machiavelli, centering on the sovereign is also a way of questioning sovereignty and 
defining the place of a people, a viewpoint, from which the sovereign is contemplated. 
This displacement from the center, even if there is a center, recalls Buci-Glucksmann’s 
point that the baroque is concerned with a proliferation of perspectives, where the 
traditional mimetology of the eidos, of a distinction between the original and the copy, is 
carried to its hyperbolic consequences, such that any privilege assigned to a central point 
as a center or an origin is relativized by the differential points of view. 
MIMESIS OF NOTHINGNESS (INTERLUDE) 
This proliferation of points of view, however, is not without its dorsal complications. In 
fact, the interpretation of modern turn towards the visual for the history of mimesis 
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cannot be underestimated, for what is at stake is a recasting of the Platonic mimetology of 
original and copy, which, as presented in chapter 2, is subordinated to a restricted, visual 
conception of mimesis. This restricted mimesis, recall, is presented as general, displacing 
other forms of mimesis, such as that of musikē. Something similar happens with the 
implementation of perspective, as analyzed by Panofsky. Perspective—and here lies the 
“modern” aspect that interests us—does not betray the true being (ousia) of things by 
producing a deformed appearance (phainomenon). Rather, by constructing the system 
upon an abstract point of view, and by affirming the point of view—and not the object 
seen—as true being, it complicates the revaluation of the traditional metaphysical 
opposition between essence and appearance. 
In the history of music, the mimetological consequences of this ontological 
determination of the world as visible are well-known through Tomlinson’s Monteverdi 
and the End of the Renaissance. Monteverdi’s late style, for example in Il Ritorno and 
Poppea, is for Tomlinson characterized by “a delight in musical language itself, in the 
versatile and virtuosic manipulation of its varied linguistic devices…[which often] do not 
so much reflect changing passion as give iconic or mimetic treatment to individual 
images,” for example in the new concitato portrayal of rage, or “mimetic laughter.”62 
Tomlinson traced this change to Monteverdi’s embracing of the Marinist aesthetics of 
meraviglia and acutezza, characterized by a lack of introspection and an intensification of 
the devices from the Petrarchean tradition, such as the contrapposto. Monteverdi’s 
librettists, Badoaro and Busenello, privilege the tendency “to objectify poetic utterance 
through reference to things in the real world. Their protagonists forsake the unmediated 
emotional expression of Orpheus and Ariadne and often seem unable to voice their 
feelings except by comparison to natural objects or objective concepts.”63 
Tomlinson rephrased his appraisal of Monteverdi’s late style in his Music and 
Renaissance Magic to argue, through an appeal to Foucauldian epistemes, that it was not 
so much a matter of superficial aesthetic transformations but of deeper ones, only 
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accessible through an archaeological approach that revealed the massive shift from the 
episteme of similarities, which allowed for the musical interiority of L’Orfeo and 
Ariadne, towards one of representation, characterized by the separation between subject 
and object, of which the Lament of the Nymph is paradigmatic. For Tomlinson, the new 
music cannot be said to be mimetic since it does not replicate in its form or substance 
some elements of the nonmusical world, as opposed what would be “a true and deep 
imitation in music of the nymph’s ethos of lament, as it happens in a work like “Sfogava 
con le stele,” for example. Rather, what characterizes the Lament is a thorough separation 
of music and speech. It operates in a space where “its relations with the world of which it 
is no longer a part are artificially, not ontologically defined.”64 Tomlinson thus locates 
here the emergence of a sort of autonomous musical syntax whose reference to the world 
is arbitrary and which abandons the interior connections of magical similitude. 
But if the development of perspective through the Renaissance is structured on a 
polarity between the seeing and the seen, it will not be long until such a structure is 
exceeded by the very logic that makes it possible. If the Renaissance mimetology 
affirmed a single point of view as the axis upon which the total construction could be 
ascertained as certain and true, the baroque consists in the affirmation of multiple points 
of view. Considering the way in which the eye is made into the “central physical organ of 
the baroque system” through the work of painters such as Brueghel, Rubens, and 
Velásquez, Buci-Glucksmann emphasizes that in the baroque vision is understood not so 
much as the center but as the possibility for affirming multiplicity and plurality, since 
vision offers an “inventory of multiples.” As in Baltasar Gracián and Leibniz, “vision is 
the sense of plurality, infinite multitudes, profusion, and differences—beauty.”65 
Buci-Glucksmann’s unique work bridges her reading of the baroque through 
Benjamin with Merleau-Ponty’s late work, the most rigorous formulation of the 
ontological power of vision, of the existential “madness” in which vision bridges subject 
and object, where seeing is first of all the affirmation of “a sort of insensate preexistence 
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in which, even before taking place, ‘I am looked at from all sides.’”66 In her reading, all 
the topoi of baroque visuality—speculum, mirror, omnivoyant world—are the same 
elements that operate in Merleau-Ponty’s chiasmic intertwining between the seer and the 
world. Thus, the proliferation of points of view and the exuberance of the visible that 
characterize the baroque effectuate the same displacement from a phenomenology of 
perception, where a single, abstract point of view defines the totality of the world as what 
falls within its perspective, towards an ontology of seeing “Being is plural sight that is 
subjected to ‘points of view,’ to the realities of intersections and encountering sights.”67 
This ontology of the seen, however, is not a pure act of grounding. Along with 
Lebnizian perspectivism is an affirmation, and obsession, with nothingness—Il niente, 
emptiness, la nada, that negates the doctrine of a pre-established harmony—thus, a 
Lebnizianism without Leibniz—turning instead towards a more Nietzschean 
perspectivism—found in Tesauro—where there is no Being, ousia, behind the 
multiplicity of perspectives, neither as Platonic forms or as Aristotelian morphé, but 
rather as the result of a technē, an artifactual proliferation of points of view, which Buci-
Glucksmann calls a mimesis of nothingness.68 Furthermore, 
[T]he resort to nothingness—the art of nothingness—coincides with a crisis of 
“mimetic” models of knowing and statements of Platonic origin. The empty 
interval, like the articulatory silence in baroque music or the compelling opening 
in a painting by Tintoretto, permits artifice, dramatization and the advent of form, 
the power of antithesis, metaphor, and metamorphosis, beyond all referent or 
signified. A true oxymornonic practice of nothingness delights in its sophistry 
against Platonism.69 
Nothingness, that is, of being: there is nothing, no being behind appearances. The 
proliferation of points of view is possible by the denial of an original or a common point 
towards which the perspectives are oriented. There is nothing behind or in front of the 
multiplicity that the baroque produces so that, as Gracián writes, “the art of display fills 
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many voids and offers a second being.”70 The praise of the simulacrum, as we have seen 
with Eggington’s “minor strategy,” is a common theme in affirmative accounts of the 
baroque and it is easily identified with anti-Platonism and with a rejection or an end of 
mimesis. 
Calcagno, furthermore, emphasizes the centrality of the theme of nothingness, Il 
Niente—through the 1634 Le Glorie del Niente (The Glories of Nothing), written by 
Marin Dall’Angelo—for the Venetian Accademia degli Incogniti, active between ca. 
1623 and 1661, of which Marino, Badoaro, and Busenello were members. Through the 
treatise of Dall’Angelo, the Incogniti rejected the possibility of using language to know a 
world that they argued was “nothing.” As for Tomlinson, these authors are exemplars of 
the episteme of representation, where words and things are separated by a void and thus, 
“the former, emancipated from the latter, become free to wander off in their own and to 
play with themselves as pure sonorous entities.”71 Similarly, he argues that this separation 
allows for a music that is progressively autonomous, where the semantic weight of words 
tends to give place to their sonorous qualities, and similarly the musical techniques take 
prevalence over intended meanings, and thus that “the Renaissance ideal of art imitating 
nature loses its raison d’être, and verisimilitude becomes dispensable.”72 
We also found this radical separation of signifier from signified in Benjamin’s 
theory of allegory, where, crucially, it was presented less as a rejection or an overcoming 
of mimesis than as an exacerbation of the tension between two forms of signification, 
expression (of magical similarities) and convention (arbitrary signification, or 
nothingness), instead of the overcoming of one by the other. As Benjamin puts it, 
allegory is expression of convention, that is, a redoubled reading of the arbitrary or 
conventional signification of language, which rather than offer a nihilistic and libertine 
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vision, as the Incogniti had been, shows this process to be a part of natural history and a 
question of political theology.73 
Benjamin’s concept of allegory indicates the problem with the affirmations of 
simulacrum and autonomy per se. As I have argued in the previous chapters, these 
interpretations not only presume that a new representative regime or episteme cleanly 
supplanted the other one, but that it can only affirm this logic by positing a “magical 
episteme” of pure natural expression, of an unbroken continuity of similarities without 
mediation, alteration, or interference of writing, of a fall into the exteriority of meaning, 
and moreover, that these changes occur either in the archeological substratum, or in the 
autonomous sphere of the aesthetic. 
As I show in chapter 4, however, this episteme is also the result of a 
mimetological operation where what is at stake is the repression of mimesis as the 
production of alterity, or, in its seventeenth-century name, “novelty”: by affirming natural 
expression as the continuity of being and thought, this mimetology affirms an eternal, 
self-same world, the rule of the same over the insistence of alterity. The preservation of 
this unbroken fulcrum of similarities was an operation of power, of the enforcement of a 
certain mimetology over others. As Luiz Costa Lima defines it, Renaissance imitatio is a 
mechanism by which a certain notion of truth and history—as divine creation—was 
reconciled with the then-emerging individual that was considered a source of unruliness 
and uncontrollable impulses (an individual that, although Costa Lima does not make 
explicit, is feminized by its very description and the mimetology that is implied). By 
affirming the primacy of models over individual, “subjective” production, imitatio served 
as a reconciliation—that is, a hegemonic suppression of conflict—of the opposed camps 
of ecclesiastics and Humanists, serving as “legitimation for the subjectivity to the extent 
that it presents itself according to a model acceptable to all, doctores and commons, 
Humanists and representatives of ecclesiastical thought alike.”74 However, he writes, 
“[that] reconciliation was successful only if imitatio permitted the control of the 
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individual subjectivity and if one of its possible discourses, the fictional, were controlled 
aprioristically as well, through its subjugation to legitimated models.”75 
If the baroque broke with this continuity, if Monteverdi’s dissonances were able 
to provoke new concenti, and thus new affetti, as L’Ottuso put it, this is not just because 
the archeological ground had shifted underneath, so that a new, more dissonant musical 
syntax could emancipate itself from the web of similarities and emerge in its free, 
autonomous glory. Rather, as with all other transformations during the crisis of the early 
modern period, one type of hegemony gave way to another one. The obscene truth that 
Machiavelli denounced, that sovereignty and nobility are a matter of performance and not 
of substance, novelty itself became a function of power, a means by which the play of 
appearances could be regulated, replacing the “hard” hegemony of Scholastic argument 
with the “soft” fascination with the new.76 Thus, what can be seen as an emancipatory 
affirmation of individuality coming from Republican Venice—or even the aestheticist 
emergence of pure forms of art—is better understood as the replacement of one 
mimetology for another one, which simultaneously produces and adapts itself to new 
social conditions as it distributes experience between power, knowledge, art, spectacle, 
and so on. 
No overcoming of mimesis or magic, then, but a turn, a crisis or a catastrophe 
(from the Greek katastrophein: overturning or subversion) by which Platonic mimetology 
is brought to its extreme, turning back on itself. If words and sounds are separated from 
the world, if they seem to be emancipated, transformed into autonomous things with their 
own syntax, allegory harnesses them in their flight and insists on the tension between the 
written and the spoken, between the visual and the aural, between materiality and 
ideality. If we can describe the mimetology of Renaissance imitatio as a turn towards a 
model that is thus created, then baroque allegory repeats the turn: first it makes copies 
into autonomous entities—simulacra—but then forces these simulacra into being. 
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 In the quote by Gracián we see that the same mimetology is at stake in such a 
play of appearances, of ostentation and display. Holding that there is no being behind the 
appearances is only a step towards the affirmation of a second being, so that baroque 
mimetology is nothing other than the production of a multiplicity of points of view with 
which to challenge the centrality of the single perspective, whereas the end continues to 
be the production of new originals. The affirmation of nothingness is no more an unruly 
or subversive theory than it is a displacement or a readaptation of the same mimetology 
to new experiences of the world, in which ostentation and display become integrated into 
the warp and woof of political life—as they already have been at least since Machiavelli. 
We have seen, in my readings of L’Orfeo and L’Euridice, to what purposes this 
production can be put in the space of courtly spectacle: to produce the values of nobility 
through which a decaying dynasty can maintain itself in power, or to decenter the place 
of the sovereign by exaggerating the perspective upon him, by placing him radically at 
the center so that the multiplicity of views can undo him even as they constitute him. 
What was truly new in these spectacular productions, especially by turning back 
to the paradigm of ancient Greek mousikē, was to conceive them as performative 
assemblages, using rhythm and harmony as a means to synchronize the proliferation of 
images, sounds, and words, into events with a consistency and spectacular dimensions 
enough to accomplish the “captivation of the will.”77 
The major discovery, which also depended on the actualization of mousikē into 
modern spectacle, was with respect to the mimetology of performance: it was not simply 
a matter of producing spectacular images for a captivated audience, who would be fooled 
into thinking that such images corresponded to reality. Seeing their rulers transfigured as 
gods would not make them hate or praise them any less. In fact, it is questionable whether 
audiences were capable to make sense of the allegories as they were presented, especially 
in the absence of the written-out, authoritative libretti that explained them, as Saslow and 
especially Nina Treadwell in the case of musical performances, have shown.78  
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If the spectacularization of the world of the Theatrum mundi established a 
continuity between the world and the stage, the medium of this continuity was not pure, 
frontal vision. As the mimetology that insisted on the sharp distinction between originals 
and copies and its stubborn, restricted visualism reached its point of “madness,” the 
claims that Humanist musicians were making for music as a matter of producing new 
affections—affetti and costumi—started to be implemented within large scale spectacles: 
they became once again, performative assemblages of inscription, whose central 
functions were to inscribe the ethē and nomoi, the customs and the laws, of the society. 
More precisely, early modern spectacle was to make possible the ontological power of 
the “madness of vision” by making it into a question of affect: distributed, impersonal, 
exceeding restricted senses and moving through and across individuals, shaping a 
collective, a new people. 
INVISIBILITY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
The Medici Wedding of 1589 between Duke Ferdinando I de’ Medici and Christine de 
Lorraine is the paradigm of such an affective spectacularization of the world. Saslow has 
made this point eloquently, starting from the subtitle of his 1996 study: Florentine 
Festival as Theatrum Mundi. For Saslow, the festa epitomize the way Ferdinando sought 
to control the entire principate. The Medici court is the embodiment of the modern 
increase towards rationalization and total control of all spheres of life, a strengthening of 
command over both physical nature and human societies over three overlapping spheres: 
1. “Physical nature,” dominated through technology and economics, specifically by the 
developments on infrastructure, apparati, and the famous account-books; 2. the social, 
through governmental administration, surveillance, and the formalization of etiquette in 
court life, oriented towards sacralizing the monarchy and the ruling family “by shrouding 
them with an aura of mystery and pomp”;79 3. The “discursive-intellectual sphere”—
political and social thought—is controlled by monopolizing representations of the 
monarch and the state through intellectual and visual conceits oriented towards 
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maintaining order and uniformity, for example through the founding of the Accademia 
della Crusca and the Uffizi museums, to standardize the Tuscan language and appropriate 
cultural history for the dynasty.80 
The celebration, then, unifies these three spheres, mobilizing at the same time 
economic and technological resources, centralizing the ritualization of social life, 
organizing it around their proprietary symbolic discourse, thus fashioning everything into 
a total experience. The Theatrum mundi, then, is first of all the whole spatial 
environment: the natural world was physically rebuilt as a stage for human actions, 
especially the city, which becomes a stage for all urban dwellers. Secondly, and in 
correspondence with the baroque invertibility of the metaphor, actual theater buildings 
constitute a space “where the apparatus of state presentation could operate at a more 
contained and private—but correspondingly intensified—level.”81 
However, what makes the 1589 celebrations a paradigm of such a total 
organization of experience is the theme of the intermedi, which included compositions 
and texts by members of the Florentine Camerata led by Bardi: Giovanni Battista and 
Piero Strozzi, Caccini, Rinuccini, and Peri. While most of the music was composed by 
Cavalieri, Bardi was in control of the concetto, the underlying conception of the entire 
production, and hence the theme was predictably enough the power of musical harmony. 
Thus, the first intermedio was conceived as a representation of the Platonic cosmology of 
the Harmony of the Spheres, as presented in the myth of Er at the end of the Republic, as 
well as episodes from Virgil, Ovid, Plutarch, and the Laws. According to the official 
Descrizione of the intermedi issued by the Medici, written by Bastiano de’ Rossi,82 
musica mundana was represented in three of the intermedi, nos. 1, 4, and, 5 (1. Harmony 
of the Spheres; 4 Prophecy of the Golden Age; 5. Arion and the Dolphin) while musica 
humana, the influence and power of music over gods and mortals, was represented in the 
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other three (2. The Contest of Muses and Pierides; 3. Apollo and the Python; 6. The Gods 
send Rhythm and Harmony to Earth).83 
In Saslow’s reading of the descrizione, the theme of the harmony of the spheres 
was to be read as an allegory of social and political orders as microcosmic reflections of 
the macrocosm, such that “the political cosmos of individuals and social classes revolved 
around the monarch just as the heavenly bodies revolved around the earth.”84 The 
allegory was made explicit on the mise-en-scène or prospettiva of intermedio 1, where 
the main characters, Dorian Harmony at the center—the “best of all the harmonies” 
according to Plato and Aristotle in Rossi’s libretto—with the “celestial Sirens” in the 
circumference of the spheres, floating above a representation of Imperial Rome.85 The 
timeless and ahistorical—but also generic, as Saslow notes—nature of this device is then 
actualized through spectacular, instantaneous transitions of scenarios, changes of 
prospettiva which were the non plus ultra of theatrical engineering, through which the 
Platonic cosmos and Rome were transformed into contemporary Pisa for the performance 
of the comedy La Pellegrina. A further device for such actualization was intermedio 4, 
the “Prophecy of the Golden Age” in which a sorceress from Virgil’s Eclogue 4 flies over 
Pisa, retelling the restoration of the peaceful and glorious mythical times thanks to the 
virtù of the newlyweds, a messianic political device the Medici had adopted since 
Lorenzo the Magnificent’s motto “Le temps revient.”86 Combined, intermedi 1 and 4 
stage the mimetology of the turn towards the ancients which would bring about the return 
of their glory, a historical movement supported by the concentric harmonic structures of 
the spheres, turning around the immobile axis of the divinized sovereign.87 
There is a disjunction between the abstract and timeless character of the 
allegorical devices, and the pragmatic and material realities that made it possible and 
                                                
83 Saslow, The Medici Wedding of 1589, 33. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Judging from later accounts, the representation of Rome was dropped before the actual production: it is 
only mentioned in Rossi’s descrizioni, which were only published 10 days after the first performance of the 
intermedi due to various production mishaps. Treadwell, Music and Wonder at the Medici Court, 19; For 
the publication history of the descrizione, Saslow, The Medici Wedding of 1589, 60. 
86 Saslow, The Medici Wedding of 1589, 32. 
87 Ibid., 35. 
   340
which the spectacle endeavored to obscure. More insightful, in Saslow’s reading, is that 
the concetto of the intermedi also figure this ideological contradiction: 
The principal performances may be likened to the concentric universe they 
figured: the closer one approaches to the physical and symbolic center—the 
granducal theater, as the axis of sacred power expressed in purest fantasy—the 
less reference is made to mundane realities. Where such acknowledgments do 
intrude, they are now restricted to the margins of this solar system, defined either 
discursively, politically, or socially.88 
Allegory, to say it again with Benjamin, thwarts intention. For all the strict control 
and determination that the prince and his team could exert upon the production, the 
hyperbologic of allegory implies that it can never be arrested in one predetermined 
meaning. In Saslow’s dialectical reading, the more it emphasizes its unity and totality, the 
more it makes evident its total disconnection with the social reality that made it possible. 
In its attempt to represent the prince as a divinity, as the center of the universe, Medici 
spectacle fails to present, or to produce, the actual reality it aims for: it only produces a 
spectacle, a representation or a fiction of what it aimed for. In Lacoue-Labarthe’s terms, 
the more it resembles, the more it differs.89 
This is the case even more with the intermedi’s musical components, which, as 
Treadwell forcefully demonstrates, constantly exceeded the capacities of the audience. 
When comparing the official descrizione with unofficial accounts produced by other 
members of the audience, the numerous discrepancies make it clear that not only they 
failed to identify the characters and thus the general conceit of the production, but even 
the words themselves in the musical performance—a fact that, as Treadwell notes, flies in 
the face of musicological certainties about the predominance of the text as the main 
aesthetic pronouncement of the Florentine Camerata. Focusing on the elaborate 
Neapolitan-style ornamentations in the part of Dorian Harmony in intermedio 1, 
performed by soprano Vitoria Archilei in a cloud that descended from the sky, Treadwell 
argues that the entire performance, from swift changes of prospettive to ethereal singing 
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was intended to produce a “dreamlike state,” to “initiate the spectator into the magical 
world of the intermedi” that sought above all to achieve the effect of meraviglia.90 
This effect is for Treadwell as ideological as the attempt for total control in 
Saslow’s description, linked to the increasing dominance of theories of divine-right 
sovereignty, which replaced, or rather supplemented, those of continuity. As mentioned 
in chapter 5, the main conceit in the introduction to the descrizione is that of presenting 
Florence as an imitation of Imperial Rome, specifically in the reconstruction of their 
buildings and spectacles, a task that each ruler of the Medici dynasty has carried through 
imitation of his predecessor, as a manifestation, through his works (opere) of the love for 
their virtù. With Ferdinando, officialist publications such as funeral orations tended to 
emphasize the divinity of the prince. Besides these rhetorical devices, the favorite means 
to mobilize an image of the god-like prince was, as Treadwell shows, to present him—or 
rather not to present him—as invisible. The city was furnished with spaces that allowed 
the prince to see without being seen, such as private balconies and grills, and especially 
the Vasari corridor that connected the Pitti Palace with the Uffizi through the Ponte 
Vechhio, which allowed high-rank officials and guests to go unseen from the ducal 
palace to the Uffizi offices and theater.91 With total control of the urban space through 
this panoptical infrastructure, the Prince was as much an omnipotent god as he was a 
neoplatonic magus. Even if the more overt neoplatonic aspects of the intermedi were 
missed, Treadwell argues, the entire production was based on the mimetological magic of 
similarities, especially Ficino’s, which, in Tomlinson’s reading, privileged sound and 
music as the most effective means to manipulate the hidden correspondences between 
things. For Treadwell, this is especially true of the intermedi, where the 
comprehensibility of the text in performance gives way to a mystical, hypersensorial 
experience where meraviglia and invisibility are privileged. 
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Although Kircher, as I show in the last part of this dissertation, would make explicit the 
bridge between Ficinian natural magic and divine-right monarchy, I find it less 
suggestive as an explanation for the otherwise crucial aspect, pointed out by Treadwell, 
of the sovereign’s invisibility and music’s role in its production in the context of Medici 
intermedi. In the previous section I showed how ideas about the “invisibility” and 
“metaphysical” nature of music were the necessary consequence of the mimetology of 
modern frontal perspective, by which only what is in front is defined as being. Turning 
towards texts, materiality, or performance and spectacle always produces a site of 
invisibility, a behind, of which music is a paradigmatic figure. Treadwell’s work 
demonstrates how this continues to be the case, drawing the further, necessary 
consequence: if the entire spectacular production is organized around the sovereign, 
where the attempt is made to produce only one perspective which, in the Uffizi theater 
coincided with the seat of the ruler, as Saslow shows, then the sovereign himself is such a 
point of invisibility. 
The spectacularization in the Theatrum mundi carries within itself the 
spectralization of the sovereign. Call it the mimetopolitics of the spec(tacu/tra)lization of 
the world. 
In Treadwell’s reading of the intermedi, the sovereign is godlike because he acts 
like a hidden puppeteer, or magician, producing spectacular effects for a mesmerized 
audience focused only on saturated meraviglia. But one should go further. The situation 
is mimetological: as soon as the Medici begin to attain the visibility and magnificenza 
they desired for decades, as soon as they effectively become the center of the spectacle 
and have all gazes upon them, they are forced to disappear. As Barber shows, allusions to 
divine-right theories of sovereignty in cinquecento Florence begin to appear (no full 
theory was ever developed) as a means to supplement the lack of accountability of the 
absolute monarch, making him work, not for the people, but for god’s grace, who elected 
him for that purpose.92 Thus, in more “Machiavellian” terms, one could argue, as Barber 
does, that the emergence of divine-right theories responded to more real, historico-
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political situations—such as the need to remove the prince from the common world and 
protect him from the scrutiny of the people. None of these aims require or benefit from a 
prince who fashions himself as a neoplatonic magus or by throwing the court into a 
hyper-stimulated frenzy.93 
Saslow’s and Treadwell’s accounts share the same mimetology that dominates 
New Historicist readings of the intersection of arts and politics, and they reach the same 
limits. This mimetology presumes that one can simply invert the model-copy schema and 
suggest that, as there is a relation between the reality and its representations, then having 
control of these representations—their means, objects, and spaces—equals to a 
transformation of the world. At its most uncritical, this mimetology suggests that power 
is made through its representations and corresponds to them. This would mean that the 
people would in fact believe, in their saturated world of meraviglia, that Ferdinando was 
a neoplatonic magus, capable of accomplishing everything. Saslow and Treadwell, of 
course, take a critical position: they describe the mechanisms, contents, and symbolic 
meanings through hermeneutical readings, and show how these fail to live up to their 
own ambitions, either because of complications in its production (Saslow) or its reception 
(Treadwell and Feldman). Thus, the people could have believed, would have believed, 
the divinity of the ruler, and hence all spectacle would have been constitutive of reality, 
but it failed. Representation has in fact no power for constituting reality as such; it only 
works through an as if, or in a social mystification, in a world of ideology and absolutism 
which "we" have overcome. This double strategy allows such approach to delight in the 
materials, producing works with lavish illustrations, descriptions, erudite interpretations 
of the symbolism, and most of all rejoicing in the virtuosity of the vocal performances 
while keeping clear of the absolutist “intentions” of the productions by denouncing them 
and showing their limits in listener’s capacities, distracted attention, and so on. The 
glorification of the “invisible,” the “metaphysical,” the magic of similarities, and so on, is 
                                                
93 For similar and other objections to Treadwell’s interpretation of the intermedi and her use of divine-right 
theory, see Tim Shephard. "Music and Wonder at the Medici Court: The 1589 Interludes for La pellegrina 
(review)." Music and Letters 92, no. 2 (2011): 285-287. 
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entirely complicit with this operation, especially when coupled with Tomlinson’s 
principle of history as “an anthropology of the other,” which grants the historian the 
security that the absolutist world she lavishes on describing is radically distant and 
different distant from ours. But the mimetology remains in place. 
And what this mimetology hides is the essential, dorsal connection between 
sovereignty and spectacularity, a complex spectacularity that produces a site of 
invisibility to be occupied by the sovereign. And this position, this invisible, 
unaccountable place which the Medici produced through their spectacular productions, 
their spec(tacu/tra)lization, and which passed into opera, is not a relic of the past. Rather, 
it was precisely spectacle and opera what allowed for the logic of sovereignty to be 
disseminated and affirmed before being codified, and what enabled it to survive, to have 
an afterlife, even after absolutism was, as we tend to think, abolished. 
In the fourth chapter of his “Political Theology,” Schmitt develops a “sociology 
of concepts” which demonstrates, against dogmatic idealist and materialist histories, that 
political concepts do not simply “mirror” but correspond entirely to each other: “the 
metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges of the world has the same structure as 
what the world immediately understands to be appropriate as a form of its political 
organization. The determination of such an identity is the sociology of the concept of 
sovereignty.”94 For Schmitt, this is evident in the similarity between the Cartesian system, 
Lebnizian, and Hobbesian systems and absolutism: in all there is a continuous thread that 
runs through “the metaphysical, political, and sociological conceptions that postulate the 
sovereign as a personal unit and primeval creator.” As we have seen, it also extends to its 
“artistic” productions such as spectacles and drama, where the sovereign is on stage (as in 
L’Euridice and soon literally with Louis XIV), or at the privileged axis of the entire 
perspectival construction of the spectacle, located at the center of the entire spectacular 
structure but protected by dazzling effects of invisibility supported by music. Schmitt, 
however, does not specify what kind of “a continuous thread” it is that runs through all 
spheres, but we already know that it is of a mimetic kind. Not a mirror, as he argues 
                                                
94 Schmitt, Political Theology, 46. 
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(especially against orthodox materialist history) but a different kind: analogy, imitation 
and so on, in short, mimesis itself, specifically mimesis as an affective continuity, as 
affect. 
 
Accounts of the beginning of opera which see the multimediatic assemblages of the 
Medici celebrations and their rivals as a means to demonstrate power, impress supporters 
and terrorize opponents, greatly underestimate the productive aspect of these aesthetic 
politics.95 True enough, power is put on display in these performances and their effect is 
certainly through the affective mobilization of technologies, bodies, texts, and sounds, 
but to limit their purpose to these ends is to miss precisely what is political about these 
affective assemblages: not because they display some specifically located power for 
friends and foes, but rather because they constitute power as such at the level of affect: 
they organize and constitute the political bodies which, as a result, appear as supporters 
or enemies. 
Mimesis here produces a collectivity that differentiates itself from others by 
organizing a series of machines and sounds around a “model” that invokes, defines, and 
implements the ethos of such a political body, and its economimetic aspect consists on 
the distribution of bodies that the Prince and his court are able to produce. To be 
affected—overwhelmed, impressed, terrorized—is certainly the political objective of 
Early Modern opera, and these affects are constitutive of the political. In this sense, there 
is a continuity, and not a rupture, between Florentine and Mantuan celebrations and the 
later Venetian carnival. Baroque opera is political because it constitutes—by means of 
affect—the political bodies that it addresses, whether takes place in a court or in a public 
space. 
                                                
95 For an exemplary example of this deflationary position it is enough to turn to Carolyn Abbate and Roger 
Parker’s A History of Opera (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2012), 40. What, if not a simplistic 
understanding of mimesis, of its productive power especially in this context, explains the reductionism of 
this characterization of early opera, which necessarily leads to the phantasy of an autonomous aesthetics for 
opera as a whole, that most political of the arts, whose permanent inscriptions are now offered to “posterity 
(ourselves included) to wonder at their scope and ambition”? 
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AFFECT AND SPECTACLE: THE POLITICS OF ALLEGREZZA 
The relation between affect, mimesis, and spectacle is traditionally located in tragedy 
according to Romantic readings of Aristoteles’ Poetics, where mimesis is understood as 
the successful representation of an action such that its peripeteia, its turning point, will 
have a transformative effect upon the spectator, a catharsis. But Benjamin’s analysis of 
allegory has a different approach to such an affective dimension, which is more 
appropriate to understand early modern spectacle. For Benjamin, mourning, sorrow, 
lament—Trauer—are not the same as catharsis. Benjamin devotes an entire section of his 
treatise to show the Romantic misapprehension of tragedy, arguing against Nietzsche 
over the claim that in tragedy the audience and the chorus are one insofar as they occupy 
the same space and experience the same pathos. For Benjamin, however, this 
identification—if it existed—does not mean that what is crucial about tragedy is an 
emotion. As Benjamin reads it, the death of the sovereign in tragedy does not aim to 
provoke any horror or sorrow in the spectator. It is not a representation but a social ritual 
through which the community is brought together, more specifically a sacrifice of 
atonement to the gods, on the one hand, and on the social sacrifice of the individual for 
the sake of the emerging community. As Benjamin puts it, “the tragic death has a dual 
significance: it invalidates the ancient rights of the Olympians, and it offers up the hero to 
the unknown gods of a new harvest of humanity.”96 The death of the tragic hero has for 
Benjamin an almost legal dimension. It is equated with a trial—paradigmatically the 
death of Socrates—and in this sense it is “a decisive, cosmic achievement. The 
community is assembled to witness and to judge this achievement.”97 This sacrificial 
aim—more a foundational, nomothetical event than a sublimation of desire—, Benjamin 
argues after his contemporary Franz Rosenzweig, does not have a place or any effectivity 
in modernity given the centrality that individualism and consciousness acquire, given that 
                                                
96 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 106. This reading of tragedy of tragedy as ritual 
sacrifice must be distinguished from that of René Girard, where art is posited as a means of release for 
mimetic desire, for the desire of identifying with the other to the extent of taking the place of the other, of 
killing the other. Mimetic desire, for Girard, amounts to a foundational violence that is sublimated in art. 
This theory, moreover, forms the core of Attali’s theory of noise and music as prophecy, discussed in the 
introduction to this dissertation. 
97 Ibid., 119. 
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the sovereign is made a sovereign through decision. Sovereignty and individuality 
presuppose each other insofar as both are defined by the emergency as the unexpected 
event; the sovereign is such because the decision is always a specific decision that cannot 
be regulated in advance. 
In Greek tragedy, on the other hand, the hero is not an individual as much as the 
expression of timeless laws that transcend him and of which he is the expression; while 
his sacrificial function is that of secularizing these rules, this does not make the hero a 
specific individual. Rather, “the hero, as tragic hero, always remained the same, always 
the same self, defiantly buried in itself.”98 A conception of the individual, of the nature of 
the law, and of the figure of the sovereign absolutely separates ancient tragedy from any 
modern attempt to revive it, including the Trauerspiel. 
Distinguishing the tragic dimension of death as a community-building operation 
from any sense of psychological pain or sorrow is also crucial to understand the role of 
affect in the images of death in the Trauerspiele, which bring us closer to the mimetology 
of L’Orfeo and early modern courtly spectacle in Italy. Just as it is wrong to assume that 
allegory operates as a simple sign, is it wrong to suppose that because the Trauerspiel has 
mourning as its content, its aim is to cause mourning in the spectator. For Benjamin, 
rather, the Trauerspiele are 
plays through which mournfulness finds satisfaction: plays for the mournful [über 
dem die Trauer ihr Genügen findet: Spiel vor Traurigen]. A certain ostentation 
[Ostentation] is characteristic of these people. Their images are displayed in order 
to be seen, arranged in the way they want them to be seen. Thus the Italian 
renaissance theatre, which is in many ways an influential factor in the German 
baroque, emerged from pure ostentation, from the trionfi, the processions with 
explanatory recitation, which flourished in Florence under Lorenzo de Medici.99 
The portrayal of a certain emotional quality on stage, then, does not mean that the 
spectator reacts with the same emotion to it. Rather, there is a shared affect that precedes 
                                                
98 Ibid., 112. 
99 Ibid., 119. 
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and transcends its specific representations and thus enables the spectator to “find 
satisfaction” in them; he is moved by something that should be sorrowful, but given his 
mournful disposition, he is moved by what he contemplates as mournful. Benjamin’s 
discussion of the tragic as an expression of fate aims to distinguish the tragic from the 
categories of empirical psychology (Kategorien der empirischen Psychologie) parallels 
the distinction between emotion and affect elaborated by contemporary affect theory. “If 
the laws which govern the Trauerspiel are to be found, partly explicit, partly implicit, at 
the heart of mourning, the representation [Darstellung] of these laws does not concern 
itself with the emotional condition of the poet or his public, but with a feeling which is 
released from any empirical subject and is intimately bound to the fullness of an 
object.”100 Just as the tragic does not depend on a feeling but on the affirmation of human 
laws in contraposition to ancient divine laws, so the mournfulness of the Trauerspiel does 
not depend on any emotional reaction to the image of death, but rather in the 
contemplation of a world on stage in which history is represented “in the form of a 
mask,” as natural history, as a history of decay and death. 
This notion of history, as we have seen, is the specific affect of a Protestant 
conception in which salvation depends entirely on grace, such that earthly life is entirely 
divorced from redemption. The rigorous attachment to duty produced a sense of the 
world as empty, devoid of purpose (insofar as nothing would make a real difference sub 
specie aeternitatis). This insight, Benjamin argues, is what made the great men of the 
time into melancholics, who ended up taking pleasure in seeing the world revealed as a 
ruin.101  
Additionally, there is “a certain ostentation” that has its origins in the Italian 
renaissance. This formula, based as it is on the intermedi and Theatrum mundi trope, 
already points us towards the meeting point of Trauerspiel and L’Orfeo: there is a 
specific affect, mournfulness, that results from a socio-religious context, on the one hand, 
and a specific mimetology of spectacular identification, of the objectification of this 
affect in the stage. It is as if the point was not to be moved by the performance, but to 
                                                
100 Ibid., 139. 
101 Ibid., 139. 
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produce a performance that was as thoroughly permeated by affect as the social world 
was. In chapter 4, the mimetology of the Renaissance was described as a seamless thread 
of similarities, antipathies and analogies by which, in Foucault’s words, the same remains 
the same, riveted onto itself; by which the “new” was denied any ontological role or 
function. In this mimetology, which the Second Practice seems to threaten, the affective 
listener is nowhere present: the continuous fulcrum of similarities is woven in such a way 
as to leave no place for her. 
What I now call a mimetology of spectacular identification functions along the 
same lines, it functions because of the Same: The Theatrum mundi, in this case, affirms 
that there is an affective continuity between the world and the stage, that whatever 
happens on the stage is an extension of the world, and hence is the world. The 
mournfulness of the court is satisfied by seeing itself on stage, by the comforting 
satisfaction of seeing itself in the form and in the order that the court wants itself to be 
seen. Affect, in this case, is but a medium through which the heterogeneous elements of 
the performance—the performance on stage but also the court’s performance, its 
ostentation—are synchronized, through which the continuity of the fulcrum of 
similarities is made sensible not only for the natural magician or the humanist, but for all 
those involved in the performance. 
Thus, whereas the meaning of death and finitude in the Trauerspiel is 
ultimately—that is, lastly but not necessarily—resurrection and transcendence, its 
function is that of preserving a mimetology of spectacular identification on place while 
constituting (which is also an in-completion) the modern as modern, as the irredeemable 
present, as fallen time. Allegory shows modernity’s distance from the past not through 
signifieds but through affect, that is, an affect that replaces the new with crisis. This 
affect constituted a common medium by which the spectator could see herself in the 
performance, how she could “identify” with the world on stage or take that world as real. 
We can see why for Rinuccini it seemed necessary to transform the ending of the 
Ovid telling into a lieto fine in his Euridice: “To some I may seem to have been too bold 
in altering the conclusion of the fable of Orpheus, but so it seemed fitting to me at a time 
   350
of such great rejoicing [mi e parso convenevole in tempi di tanta allegreza], having as my 
justification the example of the Greek poets in other fables.”102 This “convenience” has 
been interpreted in the sense of a “happy ending” that is fitting for the “happy” 
celebration which is the wedding. If, however, we approach allegory from the perspective 
elaborated here, this interpretation appears restricted and even misleading. As we have 
seen, the referent of the allegory does not correspond with its meaning in a 
straightforward sense; that is, what is “happy” as a crucial difference is not in whether 
Orpheus gains Eurydice back or loses her again and finds his death at the hands of the 
maenads. The “convenience” of the Orpheus story for a celebration such as the wedding 
is not limited to the theme of a wedding and its outcome. Nothing in Rinuccini’s 
dedication allows us to draw such a conclusion. Rather, what it suggests is that the 
function of such performances in Italian courts around 1600 preserved, and perhaps 
intensified, what Benjamin described as “a certain ostentation.” It suggests that if the 
concept of sovereignty was also undergoing a crisis in Italy (and it was), the affect that 
defined and mobilized was not mourning as in the Protestant north, nor simply the 
splendor of Counter-Reformation Spain, but rather something like an “allegrezza” or 
“gioia” an imperative to enjoy and contemplate enjoyment, to avert both the new and the 
crisis with the affirmation of a permanent joyful celebration guaranteed by the prince. In 
fact, in the Medici intermedi of 1589 it was delivered precisely as an imperative, 
delivered by an ensemble of gods that arrived from the sky. Giove, Apollo, più che ma 
giocondo, e allegro, accompanied by Amor (in the words of Rossi), Bacchus, the Graces, 
and the Muses, distributed in seven moving clouds that descended from the sky; at the 
center was castrato Onofrio Gualfreducci, dressed as Giove, singing (to a chitarrone, with 
music by Cavalieri): 
Godi turba mortal, felice, e lieta, 
Godi di tanto dono 
E col canto e co suono: 
I faticosi tuoi travagli acqueta. 
                                                
102 Reproduced in Strunk, Source Readings in Music History, 368; Solerti, Gli albori del melodramma, 
1969, 1:107. 
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Rejoice, happy and joyful mortal throng 
Rejoice in such a great gift; 
And with song and music 
Rest from your toilsome travails.103 
Early modern Italian courtly spectacle and culture have been commonly approached 
through the affects of Meraviglia and Magnificenza, for example in Treadwell’s study, 
but little attention has been given to the affects of gioia and allegrezza which, I argue, are 
crucial for the aesthetics of the pastoral and the lieto fine especially as adopted by early 
opera, particularly since these were born in the same scenario of festa, of Carnival and 
Wedding celebrations. If meraviglia and magnificenza as affect have the ideological role 
of representing the sovereign as being beyond any human measure and thus form an 
essential part of the political theology that was developing simultaneously in various 
spheres, then allegreza and gioia are the affective mechanisms by which the people, 
separated as they are from the divinized sovereign, are also made a part of the sovereign 
state and kept as subjects. After all, carnival and weddings are another type of exception, 
another exemplary moment in which the sovereign constitutes and defines himself. 
Magnificenza and meraviglia might help to produce a vision of the sovereign as divine, 
but it is only through allegrezza and gioia that the people can be made a part of the 
spectacle, both as laborers and as the bodies upon which the sovereign’s power is 
actualized.104 
Treadwell and Saslow emphasize the role of intermedi 4, “The Prophecy of the 
Golden Age” and 6, “Dono degli dei” as establishing a symmetrical structure to the work, 
where the primordial harmony and peace, at first only juxtaposed to earth, is announced 
                                                
103 Translation in Treadwell, Music and Wonder at the Medici Court, 214; Solerti, Gli albori del 
melodramma, 1969, 2:38. 
104 Saslow emphasizes the role of the citizens from all social strata and genders into producing the 
celebrations, such as the housewives that sew the costumes and backdrops for the intermedi and the livery 
for the guests or the cooks that were in charge of producing the banquets and hors d’ouvres that were 
distributed throughout the events, and even the patricians that were asked to build their own model ships 
for the naumachia. 
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as returning and then regained as a gift of the gods—allegorized by Jove’s golden rain. 
This structure of happiness—sadness—happiness is the same in L’Euridice, L’Orfeo, and 
countless other productions that affirmed the lieto fine. As Treadwell writes, “even 
though most mythological intricacies of the return were lost on the audience, the visual 
symmetry was not, and its attendant meaning was likely understood, at least on a 
subliminal level.”105 This “subliminal” level is the same one in which the lieto fine of 
L’Euridice operates and that makes it effective in spite—or because—of its 
transformation of the myth. In this way, by means of allegrezza, myth is actualized into 
an affective dispositive of political theology, as the rewriting or performance of history in 
which the sovereign not only holds the scepter, but also delivers the “gift” of happiness to 
his people. 
As in Euridice, intermedio 6 works by accumulating musical resources on stage 
until reaching a massive choral epithalamic finale—the most ambitious work of the 
evening, as Treadwell says. After Giove’s O Turba mortale, a thirty-part madrigal with 
two singers on a part follows, titled “O Fortunato Giorno,” with lyrics by Rinuccini and 
music by Malvezzi. 
O fortunato giorno 
Poi che di gioia e speme 
Lieta canta la terra e ‘1 ciel insieme! 
Ma quanto fia più adorno 
Quando farà ritorno 
Per Ferdinando ogni real costume, 
E con eterne piume 
Dall’uno all'altro polo 
La fama andrà col suo gran nome a volo. 
 
O fortunate day 
Because of joy and hope 
                                                
105 Treadwell, Music and Wonder at the Medici Court, 158. 
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Heaven and earth sing happily together. 
But even greater adornments will come 
When every royal custom, 
Will be returned by Ferdinando 
And with eternal wings 
From one Pole to the other 
Fame will fly with his great name.106 
 
The madrigal was followed finally by a collective ballo over a musical dialogue between 
the three Graces—speaking in name of the gods—and a chorus of men, which for Saslow 
is “the ultimate metaphor and ideal spiritual form of the Neoplatonic cosmology” on the 
one hand, and an archaic fertility ritual, on the other, where “the proximate goal of all this 
sensuously pulsating movement was symbolic orgasm, with its ecstatic promise of 
renewal and continuity in the birth of an heir.”107 The three Graces, as Treadwell shows, 
were performed by the Florentine court’s leading female sopranos—Vittoria Archilei 
(who also sang Dorian Harmony in the first intermedio), Lucia Caccini, and Margherita 
della Scala,108 singing from a cloud at the center of the stage, as can be seen in Epifanio 
d’Alfiano’s sketch (Figure 12). 
                                                
106 Translation in ibid., 162; Solerti, Gli albori del melodramma, 2:39. 
107 Saslow, The Medici Wedding of 1589, 158. 
108 Treadwell, Music and Wonder at the Medici Court. 
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Not only does the final intermedio provide the conclusion for the tripartite affective 
structure and the affirmation of gioia and allegrezza and not only does Giove delivers it 
as an imperative, but the entire intermedio is itself a thematization of such arrival, of the 
return of the “Golden Age,” of a time of happiness guaranteed by Duke Ferdinando. I 
already noted the ideological meaning of this structure, remarked by Saslow and 
Treadwell.  
But there is more at stake. Firstly, the figure of the Graces, which, as Denis Vidal 
argues, constitute the origin of logic that equals or anticipates that of the gift as analyzed 
by Mauss. As Seneca puts it in his allegoresis of the three Graces, 
Some people advance the view that one of them stands for giving a benefit, one 
for receiving it, and one for returning it. Others hold that they represent three 
kinds of benefactors: those who confer benefits, those who return them, and those 
who accept “benefits” and return them at the same time. But no matter which of 
these interpretations you decide is true, what good does this specialized 
knowledge do for us? And what about the fact that the group dances in a circle 
with intertwined hands? It is because a gift (or “benefit”) goes through an orderly 
sequence, passing from hand to hand and yet returning to the giver, and loses its 
 
Figure 12: Epifanio d'Alfiano's sketch for intermedio 6. 
New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art. 
Harris Brisbane Dick Fund, 1931, no. 31.72.5(16) 
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integral character if the sequence is at any point broken, being most beautiful if 
the continuity is maintained? In the dance, though, the older sister has a greater 
value, like those who confer “benefits.” The Graces have joyful expressions, just 
as those who give and receive benefits generally do. They are youthful because 
the remembrance of “benefits” should not grow old. They are virginal because 
benefits are unspoiled, pure, and revered by all. Benefits should not be 
constrained or obligated—that is why the Graces wear loose robes. And the robes 
are translucent because benefits want to be in full view. (Seneca 2011: lines 20–
21)109 
Seneca’s passage, Vidal argues, combines two different notions, the Greek charis and its 
Latin translation gratia. Charis, found in texts as early as Homer, he argues, is close to 
the Polynesian hau on which Mauss bases his analysis on the gift. Both Vernant and 
Detienne emphasize the binding nature of the gift as reciprocity in Greek charis, and note 
their origin in economies of transactions in which a woman gives herself to a man. 
Further on, they were associated with the fertility of nature, the pleasure and joy in love 
and human relations. In early Christianity, charis came to signify, especially in St. Paul, 
the free, self-giving act of God in the person of Jeusus Christ. Thus, Vidal shows, 
the notion of gratia, however, disseminated and preserved the Greek connotations 
of charis, but also altered them quite significantly. It came to denote an 
increasingly particular type of exchange (“gracious,” “gratuitous”) and specific 
qualities, be they sensible—the beauty of a woman—or, on the contrary, 
immaterial—Divine Grace.110 
The allegory was adopted and elaborated upon by Ficino, who made it a centerpiece of 
his neoplatonic conception of a universe that revolved around Amor so that “The image 
of the Graces, linked by the knot of mutual charity (segnesque nodum solvere Gratiae), 
                                                
109 Quoted in Denis Vidal, “The Three Graces, or the Allegory of the Gift: A Contribution to the History of 
an Idea in Anthropology.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4, no. 2 (October 31, 2014): 339–68. 
110 Vidal, “The Three Graces”, n.p. 
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supplied a perfect figure to illustrate the dialectical rhythm of Ficino’s universe.”111 This 
interpretation had become a house staple among the Medici through not only through 
Ficino, but also through Boticelli’s Primavera, which, as Vidal notes, seems directly 
influenced by Seneca’s passage. Rossi notes that, as in both these sources, the three 
“fanciulle” held hands with each other. In fact, the Graces and their allegorical 
meaning—both neoplatonic and Senecan—was so familiar to the audience that Rossi 
finds it superfluous to explain why they are dressed in “very bright, and transparent 
robes” (“di drappi lucentissimi, e transparenti”): le cagioni son manifeste.112 
The reasons are transparent and for all to see. As Seneca puts it, “the robes are 
translucent because benefits want to be in full view.” But it is hard to imagine that all of 
these superimposed meanings were so evident for all to see and understand (the words 
were not clearly audible; only one unofficial description mentions recognizing Giove, but 
not the Graces, who are referred to as Ninfe). However, they are quite telling for us. The 
Graces, acting as the mouthpieces of the gods, come in a pagan celebration of joy and 
pleasure, a collective orgy of fertility in which the Princess gives herself to the Duke, 
ensuring not only the reestablishment of the “Golden Era” of harmony in the neoplatonic 
cosmos, but also its permanence through their descendants, called demigods in the final 
epithalamium. Moreover, by giving joy as a gift through harmony and rhythm, by 
ensuring that the audience of the intermedi, the “Turba mortale, felice e lieta” was the 
recipient of such a gift, they also ensured that the gifts would return to them, that, as 
Seneca writes, they would “go through an orderly sequence, passing from hand to hand 
and yet returning to the giver…[losing its] integral character if the sequence is at any 
point broken.”113 
Such happiness, however, is a particular gift. In this most happy scene [nella più 
lieta] scene, Rossi explains, the poet sought to represent a passage from Plato’s Laws: 
Jove, having compassion for fatigued and distressed humanity, decided that, in 
order to give some relief, Apollo, Dionysos, and the Muses [would] take care of 
                                                
111 Edgar Wind, Pagan mysteries in the Renaissance (London: Faber & Faber, 1958) quoted in Ibid. 
112 Rossi, Descrizione dell'apparato, 67. 
113 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, On Benefits, trans. Miriam Griffin and Inwood (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2011), 21. 
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this, and he sent them to earth, carrying Harmony and Rhythm, so that, dancing 
and singing, cheered by such delights, [“e con si fatti diletti rallegrandosi”] 
[humanity would] be somewhat revived after so much toil.114 
The passage in question is at the opening of book 2 of the Laws 653 c-d, a book that, to 
simplify vastly, repeats or reinscribes the legislation upon music in book 3 of the 
Republic.115 As Létitia Mouze shows, the Laws discusses not only selection and control of 
what is already given, as in the Republic, but also offers an aesthetic analysis for the basis 
of such control. And it is, moreover, a question regarding the educative function of 
music, firstly in what the correct education consists of and secondly what are the 
conditions that music must satisfy in order to be educative; more specifically, it is a 
question about the relation between education of the affects and mousikē, as the latter is 
not aimed to reason but to aisthesis. Education, as the Athenian holds in the dialogue, is a 
matter of correctly disciplined feelings of pleasure and pain, and the role of harmony and 
music is that of ensuring that this discipline continues throughout life.  
In other words, the gods’ gift of allegrezza is precisely the economimetic role of 
mousikē as the possibility of inscribing the citizens’ dispositions, their ethos. The gift of 
allegrezza through harmony and rhythm binds the community to the prince as the 
dispenser of gifts. “Cheered by such delights,” by such acts of selfless entertainment, the 
audience of the Medici did not only see the Duke—or did not see him—as a neoplatonic 
magus, with a supernatural capacity to orchestrate spectacles of dazzling meraviglia, but 
was in fact bound to him through a widely distributed performative assemblage that 
inscribed their bodies with a collective ethos—allegrezza. 
The ritual of spectacle fulfills crucial functions in the “age of the world picture.” 
In the context of the Church and the Court (and other “sites” of power), it organizes and 
commands a general visibility which has a thoroughly ideological function: it posits a 
                                                
114 Treadwell, Music and Wonder at the Medici Court, 159. 
115 For the relation between the Laws and the Republic on the question of mousikē and education, see 
Létitia Mouze Le Législateur Et Le Poète: Une Interprétation Des Lois De Platon (Villeneuve d'Ascq: 
Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2005) and Rachana Kamtekar, “Psychology and the Inculcation of 
Virtue” in Bobonich, Christopher, Plato’s Laws (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010), 127-148. 
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center that gathers (and hence brings into existence) the community around it according 
to a mimetology in which “to see is to be.” Similarly, the centrality of vision is countered 
with a proliferation of points of view, of perspectives and simulacra, that seek to undo the 
dominant mimetology which disposes everything into being and appearance. 
Furthermore, the turn towards the visual is always characterized by dorsality, by the 
production of a space that remains behind, invisible yet audible. It is occupied by 
different elements that challenge the rational-speculative dominance of the visual by 
through a certain spectrality: from magic, to music, to the voice of god and the hail of 
interpellation. These become the support, indeed the condition for frontal vision’s claim 
to universality (and hence are the condition of its impossibility). The ideology of baroque 
spectacle consists in the negotiation of this behind with what is in front, through the turn, 
towards producing and maintaining a community. As soon as such a center is defined, a 
multiplicity of perspectives upon the center arise that threaten its power. What results is a 
form of sovereignty that, while in principle located in the specific body of the prince, 
does not necessarily appear as the center or does not necessarily appear at all. Political 
theology depends not only on the discursive identification of the prince with god, but 
especially on occupying the spaces of invisibility that guarantee its ideological 
hegemony. Music always occupates such a dorsal space, even taking its determinations as 
“metaphysical.” It does not only provide a common support for the multiplicity of 
perspectives—a certain “harmony”—but moreover provides a generalized medium of 
affective continuity that organizes the ritual and hence the community through a 
mimetology of spectacular identification in which the difference between the stage and 
the world seeks to be undone.  
It is through these affective means that sovereign biopower penetrates both the 
political and the physical bodies during times of peace. In The Odd One In: On Comedy, 
Alenka Zupančič has emphasized the ideological function of positivity and humor. She 
speaks of the spectacular rise of a “bio-morality” in which affect is charged with moral 
injunctions aimed towards determining a specific set of affects and dispositions as being 
socially acceptable while others are silently, or explicitly, corrected. Thus, 
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Negativity, lack, dissatisfaction, unhappiness, are perceived more and more as 
moral faults—worse, as a corruption at the level of our very being or bare life. 
[This bio-morality or a morality of feelings and emotions] promotes the following 
fundamental axiom: a person who feels good (and is happy) is a good person; a 
person who feels bad is a bad person. It is this short circuit between the immediate 
feelings/sensations and the moral value that gives its specific color to the 
contemporary ideological rhetoric of happiness.116 
As Butler emphasized, it is not necessary to hear the voice to be interpellated into 
ideology—but there is always the turn. The specific form that Zupančič describes 
corresponds to a thoroughly neoliberal ideology in which every subject is compelled to 
turn into his own entrepreneur down to his very biological being. In the case of early 
modern Italy, the emphasis of this ideological dispositive was not individuality but 
collectivity, yet we can also speak of a general biopolitical dispositive of ideology 
through which a certain social organization is naturalized, inscribed in the body as its 
ethos by making it turn a certain way. Early modern spectacle, then, contains the archive 
of today’s widespread biopolitical apparatus of enjoyment. 
                                                
116 Alenka Zupančič, The Odd One in: On Comedy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 5. 
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RETURNING THE GIFT OF THE DRASTIC  
(SECOND DISCIPLINARY EXCURSUS) 
In chapter 5, I examined a recent proposal to combine interpretation and performance, 
identifying its important features and outlining its limitations in order to obtain a more 
rigorous, account of the mimetological relation between text and performance, which 
produced the notion of opera as actualization and incompletion. In that chapter, however, 
I do not engage directly with what I consider the call to arms of the performative turn in 
musicology, as inaugurated by Carolyn Abbate’s In Search of Opera and, more 
pressingly, her 2004 “Music: Drastic or Gnostic?”1 
Significantly, the essay that opens Abbate’s In Search of Opera focuses on 
Orpheus’ songs, more specifically in the “last” song, the one escaping from his 
disembodied head in Ovid’s telling which, as she notes, “every one left alone.”2 In the 
first section of this excursus I examine Abbate’s critique to hermeneutics within the 
performative turn in order to identify the complicity of the metaphysical (sensu 
Tomlinson), the materiality of texts and the performance network privileged by the New 
Historicism as a reactionary, ahistorical, and apolitical reply to post-Adornian critical 
musicology. Continuing the previous chapter’s reading of performance as incompletion, 
and through Benjamin’s injunction to approaching history as awakening—a condition for 
any non-positivist historiography that allows for a critical account of the present—, the 
first section of this chapter aims to reopen the Orpheus myth in its operatic form from its 
performative closure in Abbate’s reading. Following Amy Cimini and Jairo Moreno, I 
focus on the logic of musical value deployed in Abbate’s drastic musicology, where 
everything is distributed between an ineffable, pure musical gift and the radical 
materiality of presence. For the specific purposes of this dissertation, I highlight the 
economimesis that (silently) underpins this distribution, one that remains tied to the 
uncritical mimetology of secondary copies and debased inscriptions that also 
                                                
1 Carolyn Abbate, In Search of Opera (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003) and “Music: 
Drastic or Gnostic?” Critical Inquiry 30, no. 3 (2004): 505–36. 
2 That is to say, it was never the subject of any operatic representations Abbate, In Search of Opera, 2. 
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characterized the post-Adornian musicology of the past three decades. By turning its back 
on questions of representation and inscription, the performative turn is haunted by the 
very force—mimesis—that it sought to leave behind. 
 
What do we lose in what we seek? This seems to me to be a crucial historiographical 
question; and there is a certain pathos when formulated in this way, one which recent 
musicology seems to mobilize at every (disciplinary) turn. As the status of the musical 
work (along with the figure of the composer) loses its unity and authority, a new archive 
appears which is as rich as it is unassailable. Abbate, for example, signaled Tomlinson’s 
Music in Renaissance Magic and Metaphysical Song as a thorough reinterpretation of 
opera’s origins and its essence as providing “access to the supersensory.” Through this 
reinterpretation, musicology opened a new archive for sources and techniques for 
analyzing works but also discovered a new referential space outside of the opposition 
between restricted imitative and expressive music on the one hand, and absolute thus 
non-referential music on the other. A new “realm,” in fact: the “metaphysical.” This 
realm is as formally unified—validated by historically-situated philosophical 
constructions which posit an “immaterial” world in opposition to the “material” world 
available to the senses and which the voice mediates—as it is empty of any content just 
as soon as it is made into such a historical constant, even if approached, in Adorno’s 
terms, as a “shimmering.”3 Music, in the most Orphic way, opens access to the beyond. 
Descriptions of this continual transformation are counteracted and complemented by the 
rigorous work of the New Historicism joined with the lineage of Nino Pirrota, which 
seeks to reconstruct a historical listening experience, networks of production and 
                                                
3 I am paraphrasing Tomlinson’s preface to Metaphysical Voice. With respect to the passage in Adorno’s 
“Bourgeois Opera” essay (to which I return below) which he quotes, it bears insisting in that what the 
metaphysical might mean for Adorno has little to do with the opposition between “immaterial” and 
“material,” and lacks any historical continuity: if anything, it represents precisely the irruption of the 
unexpected, the event, which is always outside of any opposition and which no amount of historicization 
can level. At least, as we saw, it is not even clear that it remains as consistent within the spaces of 
continuity outlined by Tomlinson. 
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performance, and authorial intentions through extensive examination of archival material 
and close readings of musical works: Eurydice awaits in the material text.4  
There seems to be no way of arresting this movement, as we are only presented 
with the choices of accounting for the metaphysical by historicizing it (so that it simply 
stands in for an epoch’s idea of “the invisible” tout court) or by embracing the apparent 
contradiction of this injunction so that we end with music that is itself inaudible along 
with its very material counterparts, the bodies and machines onstage. We still find 
ourselves on this eponymous search, namely of looking for ways of accounting for the 
elusive “materiality” of sound that would stop the metonymical drift at the very moment 
of its emission, of its embodied performance, looking for things that feel and look 
material—objects that turn out to be often the traditional materials of the historians 
(scores, lists, letters and other “inscriptions”) which are presented as the permanent 
counterpart of the very metaphysical constructs of the work and the voice themselves. 
These apparently divergent ends, the “metaphysical” and “materiality,” are 
constantly intertwined: they constitute, in Abbate’s words, “a paradoxical amalgam—one 
could even say, [a] quintessentially operatic phenomenon.”5 What they have in common 
is nothing other than what Abbate would later name the “drastic”: an experience of an 
ineffable but full meaning afforded by attention to musical performances and which 
opposes the “cryptographic sublime,” the fascination produced by the encoding 
mechanisms that both criticism (which she calls hermeneutics) and formalism posit and 
seek to disclose as knowledge (a rather mystical knowledge, hence “gnostic”) in musical 
works.6 By calling attention to the meanings of live musical performance, Abbate 
                                                
4 Wendy Heller, Emblems of Eloquence Opera and Women’s Voices in Seventeenth-Century Venice 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Tim Carter, Monteverdi and His Contemporaries 
(Aldershot; Burlington, USA: Ashgate, 2000); Tim Carter and Richard A Goldthwaite Tim Carter and 
Richard A Goldthwaite, Orpheus in the Marketplace: Jacopo Peri and the Economy of Late Renaissance 
Florence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); Ellen Rosand, Opera in Seventeenth-Century 
Venice the Creation of a Genre (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991); Ellen Rosand, 
Monteverdi’s Last Operas: A Venetian Trilogy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Gordon, 
Monteverdi’s Unruly Women; Feldman, Opera and Sovereignty; Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera. 
5 Abbate, In Search of Opera, vii. 
6 Abbate, “Music: Drastic or Gnostic?” 524. See the responses by Karol Berger, “Musicology According to 
Don Giovanni, or: Should We Get Drastic?,” The Journal of Musicology 22, no. 3 (2005): 490–501; 
Lawrence Kramer, “Oracular Musicology; Or, Faking the Ineffable.,” Archiv Für Musikwissenschaft 69, no. 
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outlines the closure of the “new musicology” by exposing its dependence on the same 
attitudes as the formalism it sought to overcome, the privileging of “works” as 
abstractions that precede the performances—which for the formalist as well as the critic 
are only secondary sources of information. Hermeneutics and formalism, she argues, are 
twins because they have a common enemy: “performed music’s action, as opposed to an 
abstract musical work’s formal shapes or representational implications.”7 Moreover, 
where the “new musicology” aimed to reintroduce a critical dimension to musicology by 
posing its objects as more than “beautifully moving forms,” Abbate denounced rather an 
attempt to mystify and monumentalize “unremarkable” claims—“historical patterns (the 
emergence of fascist states) and cultural force fields (biologism and utopianism) and 
biographical data (Stravinsky’s anti-Semitism)”—through what she calls “the opera 
gambit,” by which ordinary claims take an aura of revelation by being clothed with 
music.8 Musical ineffability, unlike the sounding structures of formalism or the cyphered 
objects of hermeneutics, Abbate argues, is experienced rather than decoded. It is 
unintellectual and hedonist, taking pleasure in the unmediated significance of musical 
performance’s aural presence as such. 
The strong attack on hermeneutics in Abbate’s text includes an antimimetic 
position of a particular historicism: the historical pendulum has swung, she says, and we 
cannot conceive of music as mimetic any longer. With this offhand remark, which is also 
“not just quaint” (as she says of a claim by Janet Wolff), she bids farewell to both “hard” 
historical narratives of autonomy as the telos of musical development as well as “Sub-
low” accounts based on the discontinuity of changing paradigms, regimes, epistemes, and 
so on.9 For Abbate, what matters is that there has been a change, that there is only 
                                                                                                                                            
2 (2012): 101–9. and further Michael Gallope and Brian Kane, eds., “Colloquium: Vladimir Jankélévitch’s 
Philosophy of Music,” Journal of the American Musicological Society 65, no. 1 (2012): 215–56. 
7 Abbate, “Music: Drastic or Gnostic?” 530. 
8 Ibid., 517, 520. 
9 Ibid., 516 emphasis mine. Abbate refers to “low” and “soft” hermeneutics, the former referring to “a 
musical hermeneutics craving the blessing of history or the dead and seeing immanent supra-audible 
content in musical artifacts from the past (low) from that which acknowledges such content as a product 
born in messy collisions between interpreting subject and musical object (soft).” As one of her critics notes, 
“low” refers to writers such as Susan McClary and Lawrence Kramer, but especially Adorno, while “soft” 
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historical contingency. This contingency, however, is precisely what criticism, in her 
view, seeks to erase, since, 
Contemporary music-hermeneutic writings can present their faith as a truth that 
terminates history by deeming it wrong, permanently false to think, for instance, 
that musical works are neither ciphered media nor decipherable text or that 
music’s beauty is an aspect of its humane value. Yet the forms assumed by 
hermeneutic faith are culturally and historically contingent…for instance, in the 
sense that it could be seen as one minor byproduct of classical music’s slow-
motion death in the twentieth century.10 
Abbate’s dismissal of hermeneutics implies, from the start, that music is nothing but 
“beautiful noise,” and everything that the critic claims to find in music is but a projection. 
Music, as the formalists would have claimed, is entirely self-referential, it means nothing 
outside of itself. But this antimimetism, as it happens with any mimetology, is simply the 
displaced affirmation of a broader, more incisive mimesis that remains repressed. The 
disjunction between “drastic” and “gnostic” is thus a choice of faith (or more precisely 
belief, according to Cimini and Moreno—more on this difference below) linked to a 
determination of music’s ontology either as “coded” or as “ineffable,” in other words as 
inscribed (or at least inscribable)—as text—or as pure event. For Abbate, these two are 
incompatible, self-exclusive. Music’s ineffability means denying the fundamental claim 
that grounds the hermeneutic claim to approach musical works as having historical 
specificity beyond themselves: 
Faith in specificity and legibility means believing that musical artifacts at later 
points can be read for exact localizable traces, that once upon a time something 
                                                                                                                                            
seems to refer to Richard Taruskin. “Hard” here refers to an equally unfair and uninformative 
generalization that aims to account for historical narratives such as Carl Dahlhaus, Realism in Nineteenth-
Century Music (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Carl Dahlhaus, The Idea of 
Absolute Music (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); John Neubauer, The Emancipation of Music 
from Language: Departure from Mimesis in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1986); Hollander, The Untuning of the Sky Ideas of Music in English Poetry, 1500-1700.. “Sub-low” 
historical narratives here refer to post-Marxist historiographies based on underlying continuities and 
discontinuities acting as the condition of possibility for “historical” transformations which avoid narratives 
of development, telos, emancipation, or progress, for example Attali, Foucault, Rancière, and others writing 
under their influence. 
10Abbate, “Music: Drastic or Gnostic?” 515; emphasis mine. 
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left a mark, and that reading such traces for the facts they reflect accesses the 
proper meaning that one should attach to musical sounds11 
It is here, in this denial of the trace—and not in her (also “not just quaint”) dismissal of 
“scoffing at presence”—that a deconstructive approach to the distinction between drastic 
and gnostic can prove useful for an elaboration of mimesis in music, for the denial of the 
trace implies an affirmation of autonomy, self-identity, and closure—paradoxically the 
same characteristics that romanticism affirmed and with which, according to its own 
ideology, music aimed to emancipate itself from its subjugation to nature and its demoted 
place in the hierarchy of the arts in the eighteenth century.12 Why, in this argument about 
historical contingency, are the values of antimimetic music taken up to counter the 
discipline’s efforts to historicize? How did mimesis become a threat to the turns to 
performance and materiality in the discipline? 
As she would recognize, her retort includes the very position she defends: the 
drastic is also culturally and historically contingent. As she also recognizes, the work of 
historicizing cultural products has been a successful task, one that hermeneutics has taken 
up as a way of reintegrating critical work and political action into the academic sphere; if, 
however, she sees it as a “byproduct” of the death of classical music, if she sees 
hermeneutics as a violence done onto the freedom afforded by the ineffability of the 
musical gift, is not her position even more reflective of the self-defensive isolation of the 
musicological institution? 
If the drastic appears as an ahistorical and apolitical gesture, it makes up for this 
lack by proposing instead an ethics of gratitude and distance from the performance’s gift 
                                                
11Ibid. emphasis mine. 
12 See the response by Judy Lochhead in Gallope and Kane, “Colloquium,” 231 who argues that 
“Jankélévitch aesthetics remains fixated in the nineteenth century”; Lawrence Kramer also denounces the 
ineffable as tied to Romantic ideals, “a secularization of the metaphysical impulse” and a sanctification of 
the secular experience of music, p. 103; he further compares the discourse on the ineffable to negative 
theology, defined with Derrida as itself a type of language that produces its own emptying out, its own 
kenosis. Kramer, “Oracular Musicology; Or, Faking the Ineffable,” 104. 
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of (interpretive) freedom.13 Essential to this ethics is music’s ineffability, an excess of 
meaning that hermeneutic statements can only limit, fix, and reduce. To the gnostic, 
which seeks meanings inscribed in the world, the drastic opposes an inexhaustibility of 
meaning that abolishes all meaning.14 Yet this excess, this plenitude, has a remarkable 
temporality which is irreducible to presence. It is not simply, as her critics were quick to 
point out, that, “there is no such thing as pure experience, uncontaminated by 
interpretation.”15 On the contrary, before being given in the aural presence of 
performance, music’s plenitude is given in the form of “potential meanings in high 
multiples.”16 Its gift is the “promise” of a “vast future” of which “we” (but who’s 
listening?) are the recipients. Given as a promise, the ineffable musical gift avoids the 
structural aporia that threatens all gifts, whereby the recipient of the gift is in turn 
indebted to the giver, such that the gift is in fact not a gift but a command to repay which 
annuls the gift as gift.17 The musical gift is therefore a pure gift, because it is never given: 
it remains potential—hence unrealized—while deferring repayment to the future. Since it 
is potential, thus not given, it does not command repayment from the recipient. And, even 
if it were given, what is given is a promise: a deferral of fulfillment—another promise. 
Musical meaning is ineffable because it is never given as such. 
Furthermore, by structuring its logic in terms of a gift which gives itself as a 
promise of repayment in the future, the value of the musical gift is a hyperbolic form of 
the fiduciary—and Abbate’s talk of faith already evidences it.18 The fiduciary, as Cimini 
                                                
13 Abbate, “Music: Drastic or Gnostic?” 512, 517. Yet isn’t there is something narcissistic about this ethics 
where, as James Currie put it, “we seek to see ourselves in an ethically flattering light by proving that those 
things that feel good to us are therefore of the Good”? James Currie, “Where Jankélévitch Cannot Speak” 
in Gallope and Kane, “Colloquium,” 251. 
14 For a different view, see the reappraisal of Jankélévitch beyond Abbate formulated by Gallope, which 
sees the ineffable as an affirmation of music’s heterogeneity. Michael Gallope, “Jankélévitch’s Fidelity to 
Inconsistency” in Gallope and Kane, “Colloquium,”239. 
15 Berger, “Musicology According to Don Giovanni, or: Should We Get Drastic?,” 497. 
16 Abbate, “Music: Drastic or Gnostic?” 516 emphasis mine. 
17 Jacques Derrida, Given Time. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
18 Lawrence Kramer also identifies the economic dimension of the resurgence of the trope of the ineffable. 
Kramer asserts, ironically, that “The I and its institutions are no longer a safety net but an entanglement, a 
trap. But what saves us is still the ineffable, particularly in its durable, accessible, and nowadays portable 
form: music…Forget for a moment that the everyday world is so saturated with music that the currency of 
music’s ineffability is debased at best, which is why, perhaps, some writers on the topic have worked so 
hard, rhetorically, to refurbish it.” Kramer, “Oracular Musicology; Or, Faking the Ineffable,” 107. 
Orpheus’s Modern Turn—Second Disciplinary Excursus 
 
367 
and Moreno write, “structures the production of value, for music, sound, and sense 
perception, according to their capacity to faithfully work on behalf of something else.”19 
As the authors show, the recent turns to performance and affect in musicology are 
implicated in a general economy that banks on the assumption “that sound and music, as 
well our capacity to engage them in and as sense perception, are inexhaustible.”20 This 
inexhaustibility is entrusted to—made to work for—a diversity of political claims, yet it 
operates under a “radical contradiction”: “if music and sound are considered as 
inexhaustible, non-rival commodities—their use by anyone does not impinge on the use 
by others—“they nevertheless “appear to be limited or at least to demand that they be 
limited to carry out a particular purpose or use.”21 In the case of 1990’s feminist 
musicology, nothing restricts the disidentificatory claims made on behalf of the feminized 
performer body to also be made of the male analytic mind, since by retaining the dualistic 
schema, it retained the latter as the constitutive exclusion necessary for the revalorization 
of the former.22 Moreover, the turn to performance in musicology required a “dialectic of 
dematerialization” by which the substantiality of music was selectively reduced to the act 
of its performance (instead of an acknowledgment of broader, distributed materialities 
including the laboring bodies of performers whose decay Abbate would register as a mere 
act of failure, not of expenditure, sensu Bataille, an investment without return within a 
general economy). Thus, music’s inexhaustibility is entrusted to work on behalf of a 
historically and culturally reduced beneficiary and to do so indefinitely into the future. 
Music’s promise is precisely that of its inexhaustibility. 
In Abbate’s case, however, this selectivity is not at play. While she benefits 
theoretically and effectively from the revaluation of the body of 1990’s musicology,23 the 
                                                
19 Amy Cimini and Jairo Moreno, “Inexhaustible Sound and Fiduciary Aurality,” Boundary 2 43, no. 1 
(February 1, 2016): 8. 
20 Ibid., 6. 
21 Ibid., 7. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Abbate anticipates Cimini and Moreno’s distrust of the risk of co-optation of the embodied 
performative’s fiduciary, writing that, “while one can distinguish devils from angels based on liking or 
loathing the social conclusions they have drawn out of musical works, the hermeneutic process is the same 
on both sides. Neither the process nor the global conviction about musical legibility it supports can separate 
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drastic marks a distancing from the politics of identity that binds the embodied 
performative turn to the contradictions of the fiduciary. Abbate seems to preempt Cimini 
and Moreno’s attacks avoiding these political commitments, and while the selectivity of 
the reduction of the musical to the act of performance seems even more radical than her 
predecessors, the real difference lies in the type of faith demanded by the drastic, which 
is not only an upping of the ante of the distinction between the feminized body and the 
masculine mind of some feminist musicology or the celebrated pliability of fixed genre 
categories, after Judith Butler. While the embodied performative claimed a stake in a 
form of knowledge that could exist simultaneously with that of the analytic mind, the 
drastic makes them self-exclusive, thus declaring the game to be a winner-takes-all. 
This is accomplished, again true to Cimini and Moreno’s analysis, by giving up 
identity politics. On the one hand, the musical gift is not given by “anyone” but the 
musical experience as such, thus no claims can be made on behalf of any beneficiary: 
music is only on the side of true (disembodied) angels. On the other, and more 
importantly, the musical gift is never received, it is never actualized. In fact, what Abbate 
articulates as “the coherent stance towards the situation” of the pure selfless gift of 
musical freedom is refusing the gift, “not taking advantage of it, hesitating before 
articulating a terminus, or restricting music to any determinate meaning within any 
declarative sentence. And, perhaps, drawing back.”24 For Abbate, every determination is 
a negation of the whole, a blemish that threatens the purity of the gift. This principle 
should be taken in all its rigor, for not only is this the ethical stance that she expressly 
formulates, but it is also the only way of distinguishing musical ineffability from the 
sublime, romantic autonomy, or hermeneutic’s cyphered objects. In Gallope’s reading of 
heterogeneity in Jankelevitch, the drastic depends on preserving ineffability as an excess 
of meaning such that any specific meaning can be ruled out as partial. Even the sublime, 
pace Lochhead, is already a determination: in fact, it is the paradigm of all determination 
of intuitions by reason. The drastic must remain drastic, excessive, and irreducible to any 
                                                                                                                                            
the scurrilous or low quality answer from the acceptable answer.” Abbate, “Music: Drastic or Gnostic?” 
519 emphasis mine. 
24 Ibid., 516. 
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particular expression. Embracing the drastic, after all, is “a radical step.”25 Any 
“declarative sentence” in the face of the musical gift acknowledges reception of it—
identifying the listener as a political subject—and thus annuls it. This non-transaction is 
what appears effectively as ineffability: even an applause, a sigh here or there, or the 
synaptic fires by which an operatic performance becomes her experience, receives the 
gift, acknowledges it, and thus destroys it. There is no more future repayment, the gift is 
given in part and this part delivers the whole. 
If the “radical contradiction” in Cimini and Moreno’s view was that the claims 
made on behalf of music banked on its inexhaustibility yet effectively mobilized it as if 
such inexhaustibility was in truth limited, the drastic turns this contradiction into an 
article of faith. Or, to put in more radical terms: the gnostic represents a violence, a 
violation and hence a complete devaluation of the purity of the musical gift.  
The term “violation” hints precisely at the patriarchal logic that underpins this 
general economy, whereby the value of a woman within bourgeois patriarchy is 
predicated upon the profit obtained through her marriage, and which depends on the 
unconditional purity—that is, the virginity—of the woman as a guarantee that 1. She will 
give a child to her husband (who will work for him if he is a male, or repeat the same 
operation in the case of a female) and 2. That there will not be illegitimate claimants over 
these profits in the case of illegitimate children.26 Since the deferred temporality of the 
drastic locates music’s value within the space of potential meanings and the promise of “a 
vast future” whose fulfillment depends on retaining such a purity, of preserving its status 
of pure gift until it is delivered as full plenitude, any blemish, any unsupervised contact 
with its suitor, can bring the whole enterprise into bankruptcy. 
                                                
25Ibid., 510. 
26 In his anthropological critique of political economy (which also doubles as a genealogy of morals), 
David Graeber argues that posing barter at the origin of economy is a liberal construction, and shows 
instead a logic of debt at the origin of money and other economic concepts, a debt for which the currency 
was often people—slaves or family members. He argues, following feminist historian Gerda Lerner and 
Jack Goody, that the value of virginity, and the modern notions of honor and price (both meanings of the 
ancient Greek word tīme) are the result of a moral crisis stemming from Mesopotamia which stands at the 
origin of patriarchy and extends onwards. David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (Brooklyn, NY: 
Melville House, 2011), 176ff. 
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It hardly needs mentioning that Abbate does receive the gift, under the condition 
of not receiving it. The pure musical gift is torn asunder, split into the “two 
quintessentially operatic phenomena,” two remainders which require and annul each 
other: the “metaphysical” and the “material.” Abbate invites us to hear them together in 
Orpheus’ “last performance,” the song that continued to resonate from the disembodied 
head of our hero after his terrifying sparagmos. The invitation is as radical as always: 
Orpheus’s inaudible music—with its repression in operatic stagings—is a paradigm “not 
only with respect to opera, but in thinking about music in general…the sound is a wholly 
operatic motif, one could even say the operatic motif in his myth…Orpheus’ last 
performance reflects on the nature of musical execution in general, as well as the forms 
of musical power and how such power is construed.”27 A hyperbolic logic as always, it 
does exactly the opposite of what the drastic would soon interdict, namely determining 
music as a symbol, a paradigm, or as meaningful in any way. Yet it follows the logic of 
the drastic to the letter: on the one hand, it does not determine the myth as having this or 
that meaning. On the other hand, and again true to the structural logic of the pure gift, she 
never receives the musical gift as music: such is the strategic role of this metaphysical 
inaudible music, which she thus preserves in its purity. 
 Rather, through this strategy she affirms the particular as a totality. The myth 
says something about opera, nay music, in general. Inaudible music is the paradigm for 
all music—and thus all works and performances of the myth which focus on any other 
aspect miss the point. We are familiar with this strategy from Plato’s Republic as 
examined in chapter 2 (“what is mimesis, in general?”), which is here in plain sight: the 
paradigm is produced by making one particular aspect stand in for the totality, while the 
particular—which preceded it—is made into a secondary copy. Abbate rejects a 
conventional sense of mimesis—the hermeneutic notion that music bears the traces of its 
social and historical context—only to (covertly) affirm a more pervasive form of mimesis 
while abandoning historicity and politics as a whole. 
                                                
27 Abbate, In Search of Opera, 5. 
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Unheard music on one side, materiality on the other. Yet this materiality, as 
Cimini and Moreno argue, is thoroughly dematerialized: it selectively chooses one aspect 
of music’s ontology complex distribution and affirms to the exclusion of the others. The 
drastic, as we noted, is explicit and radical about it: recordings (even of live 
performances), scores, and all the other elements in this distribution are nothing but 
“souvenirs”—that is, degraded copies.28 
Even the privileging of performance and action is selective, for it privileges a 
particular mode of experience by presupposing it as empirically given. In this respect, the 
difference between faith and belief that Cimini and Moreno posit as the crux of the 
production of value in their analysis is made clear, as well as Abbate’s denunciation of 
hermeneutical faith in the possibility of reading social traces in music. Faith, for Cimini 
and Moreno, is relational, it produces a “symbolic pact” and “binding agreement” 
between the human, on the one hand, and sound and music, on the other.29 Thus, 
hermeneutics truly has faith, it expects something in return—meaning—which 
proportionally limited to what it deposits, i.e. it does not expect plenitude from music but 
rather conditioned, historicized, specific meanings which are subject to further 
elaboration, contention, and destruction. Belief, on the other hand, depends on a “quasi 
realist” posit of sensorial experience as given and as true, which, as Currie remarks, is 
modulated into an ethics by being identified with the Good.30 
The demotion of musical inscription to the level of secondary copy serves to 
uphold the primacy of unheard music as paradigmatic, to monopolize it as the only 
source of value and preserve it in its purity. The same logic, it bears noting, is there even 
before its formulation in the drastic essay, where Orpheus’ head—along with the 
monstrous spectacle of his dismemberment—is there only as support, as “master 
symbol,” which aims to stand in for a broadly distributed performance network. Writing 
with respect to the turn to affect, Cimini and Moreno contrast the “reduced” body of the 
                                                
28 Abbate, “Music: Drastic or Gnostic?” 506. 
29 Cimini and Moreno, “Inexhaustible Sound and Fiduciary Aurality,” 7. 
30 Ibid., 9. James Currie, “Where Jankélévitch Cannot Speak” in Gallope and Kane, “Colloquium,” 251. 
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embodied performative with a “diffuse body,” where the singularity of bodies and things 
is bracketed with the affirmation of a common affect that traverses and joins them. The 
“performance network” that is acknowledged before the drastic is one such type of 
diffuse body bound by affect, and Abbate reduces it to one single affective dimension: 
Put bluntly, the singing head represents the uncanny aspects of musical 
performance, operatic performance in particular, precisely because we cannot say 
how it sings, who is in charge, who is the source of the utterance, and what is the 
nature of the medium through which musical ideas become physically present as 
sound.31   
In short, the performance network is reduced, in the monstrosity of a disembodied 
head that sings and which no one hears, into the representative of a set of humanist values 
(autonomy, sovereignty, self-presence, mediation, the humanity of the human), which are 
assembled together under the affective blank slate of “the uncanny.” Far from being 
rejected, criticized, historicized, let alone deconstructed, these values are preserved and 
delivered as the necessary support for the non-transaction that preserves the purity of the 
musical gift. And the most traditional mimetology is there to uphold them. 
The space, the gap, between invisible performances—the “metaphysical”—and 
the “materiality” of the performance network remains as wide as ever, and the crucial 
question is not their unification or the privilege of one over the other, but the turn from 
one to the other, their actualization and operability. If in Abbate’s analysis the singing, 
disembodied head unifies them in a symbol that represents music “in general,” this 
symbol does not, after all, exhaust all the possibilities of the opera, as Abbate would 
recognize. Nor does it explain how the two extremes arise; they are posited as faith in the 
promise of the musical gift, and as belief in the performance network; but this fiduciary 
structure remains concealed in Abbate’s essay. Because, if the analysis of the fiduciary 
structure of the drastic as a pure gift above is correct, Abbate’s opening gambit in 
“Orpheus’ Last Performance”—identifying three moments in the opera that display 
Orpheus’s singing (the plea to Pluto, his mourning after Eurydice’s second death, and the 
                                                
31 Abbate, In Search of Opera, 5. 
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disembodied head [p. 2]) only to retain the latter (the impossible performance) as the 
truly symbolic of music in general, constitutes a closure of the potentialities of the myth. 
And this closure, as I have argued, is absolutely necessary to preserve the purity and the 
value of the musical gift. Only by listening to unheard voices is it possible to receive the 
gift without acknowledging reception so that it does not turn into a transaction or an 
obligation to repay. Understanding the economimesis involved in the production (or more 
importantly, the preservation) of the drastic, then, is crucial to reopening the myth and its 
operatic actualizations if we want to find an alternative between the impossible 
performance and the dematerialized performance network, between the “metaphysical” 
and the “material.” 
 
 374 
CHAPTER 8 
THE NOISE BEHIND: CORRECTING MYTH, PUSHING HISTORY, INSCRIBING 
NOMOS 
 
Pieter Paul Rubens 
Orpheus and Eurydice 
1636 - 1638. Oil on canvas, 196.5 x 247.5 cm 
Museo Nacional del Prado 
 
CORRECTING MYTH 
It seems everything has already been said about the paradoxical and tragic gaze of 
Orpheus which constitutes itself (as gaze and as trope, as the trope of the gaze) in the 
dorsal turn, by losing what it turns to look at. As critics of L’Euridice will not cease to 
repeat, Orpheus would not have been what he always was without the loss of Euridice. 
The point was best made by Blanchot: by losing Eurydice, Orpheus becomes himself, his 
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turn in turn organizing the myth about this movement where the constitutive loss of the 
modern subject is staged.1 
The definition of modernity, or more precisely “modernism”—the attempt to be 
thoroughly original, without past dependences or any trace of secondariness—is analyzed 
by Paul de Man and more recently by Jean-Michel Rabatè as symptomatic of the current 
disciplinary state of literary criticism. For Rabatè, the backlash against deconstruction 
and poststructuralism that characterizes the new historicism (and we may add, more 
recently, the affective turn, the material text turn, and the distance-reading methods 
stemming from the digital humanities turn) is a politically reductionist, “regressive urge 
that welcomes—with joy and relief—the restoration of ‘full’ meanings,” based on the 
uncritical mimetological assumption that texts imitate a reality “‘out there,’ easily 
described and verified.”2 This becomes only more complicated in the case of historical 
musicology (to make explicit the polemical stance of this chapter), which faces the 
traditional issue of the “materiality of sound” that makes more enticing the fantasy of the 
“full meaning” promised by the new historicism. The end of the story is up to one’s taste: 
an Apollonian ending in which opera rises to its artistic apotheosis—with the return to the 
stage of L’Orfeo and Stravinsky’s 1948 Orpheus and as its culminations—or the 
Dionysian sparagmos, where Orpheus’ disembodied head resonates with the uncanny 
tension between the enthralling metaphysical voice (sound, invisibility, magic) and the 
materiality of the text and the performance network (visibility, technology, reason).3 
                                                
1 Blanchot, The Space of Literature. 
2 Jean-Michel Rabaté, The Ghosts of Modernity (Gainesville, FL: Univ. Press of Florida, 1996), xi. 
3 Carolyn Abbate, In Search of Opera (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Gary Tomlinson, 
Metaphysical Song: An Essay on Opera (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). This dichotomy, 
of course, is offered “programatically,” so to speak, and is restricted only to the musicological 
interpretations. The field of literary criticism has many more diverse interpretations, some of which will 
become pertinent to this essay below. See MacGahey, The Orphic Moment; Strauss, Descent and Return; 
the Orphic Theme in Modern Literature. These works take as its point of departure Elizabeth Sewell’s 
classic The Orphic Voice: Poetry and Natural History. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1960). For 
a work combining these interpretations with an emphasis on music, see Jason R. D’Aoust, “The Orpheus 
Figure: The Voice in Writing, Music and Media” (Ph.D. Diss., The University of Western Ontario, 2013), 
http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/1857. 
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In this sense, then, the critical question to pose with respect to Monteverdi’s 
Orfeo is this: how does it actualize—and thus in-complete—Orpheus as myth, one might 
say as the myth of the humanist project? And further, what does it mean to actualize, to 
turn a timeless myth into a story that speaks to the present and has actuality and 
effectivity, that is, an opera? What is the medium of this actualization, the matter that 
gives it consistency and singularity in the present, and what changes with the medium? 
And, in this context, what does the myth mean for historical musicology as a critical 
discipline, today? What, as we repeat the Orphic turn, is it that we seek—and lose—in, 
and as, history?4 
The mutual entwinement of constitution and loss as embodied in Orpheus lays 
out, for Adorno, the effectivity of opera as a bourgeois artistic form—that is to say, as the 
aesthetic mouthpiece of Enlightenment. Opera, he argues, is no simple copy or imitation 
of myth. It does not work by simply replacing mythical interconnections with musical 
ones (as Wagner and Lévi-Strauss after him supposed). Instead, opera seeks to “correct” 
the inescapable ties of fate and nature through music. Thus, Orpheus manages to 
persuade Pluto “only to fall prey to the very fate he had just escaped because of his 
inability to break the spell and to tear his gaze away from that infernal realm.”5 
But the way in which Orpheus is the archetype of opera is not spelled out in this 
passage in all its consequences. Before understanding what “correcting myth” means for 
Adorno, we need to ask what exactly is “the spell” that Orpheus fails to break with, 
where it is coming from and how it is enforced. Is the spell, with its overtones of magic 
and enchantment, what nevertheless binds Orpheus as a progressively modern and 
disenchanted subject to the past? Is the spell another name for the dialectics by which 
Enlightenment only discover freedom by developing further forms of magical 
                                                
4 This is not, however, to make the Orpheus myth into the myth of modernity, the principal myth or the one 
that holds the key to everything—especially since, as commentators from Guthrie on point out the Protean 
quality of the Orpheus myth. We understand it rather, with Levi-Strauss, as “simply a transformation, to a 
greater or lesser extent, of other myths originating either in the same society or in neighboring or remote 
societies…From this point of view the key myth is interesting not because it is typical, but rather because 
of its irregular position within the group [a position which we could gloss, with Agamben, as paradigmatic: 
a part of the whole and simultaneously outside the whole and representing it as a whole]. Claude Lévi-
Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 2. 
5 Theodor W Adorno, Sound Figures (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 21. 
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submission? If this is so, although Adorno does not spell it out, Orpheus would be a 
better figure than Odysseus for the dialectics of fate and logic described in the Dialectic 
of the Enlightenment, whereby the mythical passes into modernity only to preserve its 
magical contents in new structures that negate the freedom that Enlightenment promised 
as emancipation. As Adorno puts it in “Bourgeois Opera,” turning in the sequence of 
“authentic operas” from Orfeo through Magic Flute to Fidelio, “this interlocking of myth 
and Enlightenment defines the bourgeois essence of opera: namely, the combination of 
imprisonment in a blind and unself-conscious system with the idea of freedom, which 
arises in its midst.”6 This is why it is surprising to find how disenchanted Orpheus is 
when he reaches the operatic stage. We already saw in chapter 6 how in L’Euridice, 
which does not even include the fatal turn (and which Adorno does not mention), 
Plutone’s mercy was won less through musical enchantment than through political 
persuasion. In L’Orfeo it happens much in the same way, but with a crucial 
transformation, a displacement, a de-centering of the law. The importance of Caronte—
who in L’Euridice delivers the most effective parts of the collective appeal to Plutone—is 
at the same time foregrounded and eliminated—put to sleep—in L’Orfeo. Just as in 
L’Euridice, the plea to the sovereign is at the formal center of the work, yet that place is 
occupied in L’Orfeo by Caronte, not Plutone: the subordinate takes the place of the 
sovereign, but only to preserve the sovereign’s proper place. Further, the contrapposto 
between affect and law in L’Euridice, the diamantine law that Orfeo’s misery could not 
move, and which Plutone sought to defend until the end, is replaced by an equally 
unmoved Caronte, for whom pity is “an unworthy feeling of his courage,” and whose 
heart is full of “bitter memory” and “just anger” against ancient offenses. However, 
Caronte does not mention the law. Thus, if law and sovereignty were a central concern in 
L’Euridice in their opposition to affect, or to the Machiavellian display of affect as 
politics after Caronte’s admonishing, in L’Orfeo law and sovereignty seem to be just the 
background over which this ineffective display of affect is performed. In the end, Caronte 
                                                
6 Ibid. 
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offers no major resistance to Orfeo and he falls asleep to “Possente spirto,” to the 
puzzlement of audiences to come. The “primal scene,” the operatic moment par 
excellence, the moment to which we will never cease to return in search of music’s 
magical powers, comes as a disappointing non sequitur—if not as a comic gag, 
depending on how a production manages to deal with Caronte’s defeat. 
In this light—and besides issues of fidelity to the original myth or the 
appropriateness of the lieto fine—the prominence that this episode acquires in Striggio 
and Monteverdi’s setting becomes an important site for understanding the myth in 
modernity and the modernity of the myth in—and as—opera. In other words, if Orpheus’ 
gaze is now what constitutes the turning point of the myth, and if “all opera is Orpheus,” 
as Adorno claimed, if music has the power to affect and move not only the souls and 
bodies of an ontologically diverse array of listeners—humans and gods, animals and 
stones—but also to alter fate or transgress the law, we would have to say that, 
nevertheless, what music does in opera, i.e. “correcting myth,” is undone by the eye.7 
The notion of “correcting myth,” from the essay on “Bourgeois Opera,” presents 
us with the fundamental mimetic problem to be addressed in this chapter. If opera does 
not cease turning towards myth—from its Florentine origin onwards—it is not simply as 
an imitation or a repetition of myth but its transformation into a performative practice. By 
affirming the magical aspect of operatic mimesis, opera accomplishes what 
Enlightenment rationality utterly fails to do: it transforms the myths that serve as their 
models without presuming to overcome them, thus allowing for man’s reconciliation with 
nature. Just as a child—in Benjamin’s evocative image—displays the mimetic impulse 
constantly when playing, for example, at being a windmill, Adorno sees the in childish 
delight on the operatic “aura of disguise”—and not in an aesthetic appeal, pure virtuosity, 
or drama—in which the child “wants to confirm its own pleasure in dissimulation.”8 
The value of opera is of preserving a certain magic, which is thoroughly mimetic, 
and which has been lost through the process of disenchantment, using rational means—
from harmony to costumes and machines. This dialectic merits closer examination: for 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 16. 
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Adorno, opera strives to preserve the magical element of art, its primitive, communal 
role, in a world that tends towards disillusionment by using its own disenchanted means. 
More precisely, opera constantly exposes Enlightenment as myth, while presenting music 
as capable of intervening in and transforming what myth presents as “fate’s blind, 
inescapable ties to nature.”9 Unlike drama, opera never meditated directly upon 
philosophical or social issues, thus becoming dialectically more philosophical than 
drama: opera is a “vacation spot” whose distance to reality allows it “to mirror so crassly 
the developing tendencies of bourgeois society itself.”10 Thus, opera’s libretti (especially 
in the nineteenth century) incessantly deal with exogamy (a ritual escape from natural 
ties) and incest (a “law” that blurs the distinction between nature and culture). The 
mediation between nature and culture, however, is nowhere best achieved than in music: 
through song, mortals are exalted and transfigured into gods; social orders—mirrored in 
operatic conventions—become identified with the “the order of the absolute or the world 
of ideas.”11 Yet, at the same time, Adorno finds in passionate song the only escape, or 
rather the sublation (Aufhebung) of the dialectics of Enlightenment, as “the hope of the 
reconciliation with nature”: 
Opera’s song is the language of passion: not just the exaggerating stylization of 
existence but also an expression of the truth that nature prevails in man against all 
convention and mediation, an evocation of pure immediacy. Ever since the 
invention of figured bass and opera, there has been a doctrine of musical affect, 
and opera is in its element wherever it gives itself over breathlessly to passion. In 
this “giving itself over to nature” lies its elective affinity with both myth and the 
modern successor to the epic, the novel. But passion, which thus finds expression, 
is appeased insofar as sung passion comes flooding back like an echo, and insofar 
as the sound of the immediate is reflected, rising above the mediations of the 
hardened life. And thus the constrained existence of those who sing in the opera is 
appeased as well, so that they appear unconstrained. That is why opera is no 
simple copy of myth but its rectification in the medium of music, which is both an 
element of nature and the refraction of nature through the intellect. In opera, song 
                                                
9 Ibid., 21. 
10 Ibid., 23. 
11 Ibid., 24. 
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allows free rein to that which, as passion, incorporates people into the context of 
nature. At the same time, in song, people experience themselves as nature, which 
their prejudice against nature resists, and it is thanks to this that the mythic 
element—that is, passion—is appeased. Their freedom does not lie in the intellect, 
which high-handedly raises itself above creation. Instead, as music, intellect 
becomes similar to nature and, on the strength of that similarity, discards [the 
intellect’s] lordly essence.12 
                                                
12 Ibid., 25 emphasis mine. This piece was first delivered as a talk in 1955 and published with slight 
revisions in Klangfiguren in 1959. David J Levin, Opera Through Other Eyes (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 25. It is interesting to note, as Steve Smith has remarked to me (in conversation), 
that is quite an odd piece in Adorno’s ouvre, since he allows himself to affirm the emancipatory power of 
song, as we find it in this passage, without the qualifications that one would find in Aesthetic Theory or 
Negative Dialectics. Just as interesting, and adding a level of irony which complicates these unqualified 
assertions, is that the musical motivation for this passage is not Orphic song but “such as it sounds at the 
loveliest point in Wagner’s Ring poem, in the words of the forest bird.” Adorno, Sound Figures, 25.  
This passage also presents various aspects of Adorno’s theory of mimesis that can be mentioned here in a 
quick sketch: 1. Artistic mimesis—conceived as the simple imitation of nature—is incapable of truth or 
transformation of what it imitates. Only by remaining at a distance from what appears, by exaggerating 
alienation, is art capable of exposing the truth concealed under the appearance (Schein) of reality. In the 
case of opera, this distance is not through abstraction—as in Schoenberg—but through its “crass” mirroring 
of reality. In both cases, what is really mimetic is not the imitation of reality but the fact that artworks 
“imitate themselves” as totalities; their “truth content” consists not in their being such a totality, but rather 
of giving the “semblance” (Schein) of totality, and this semblance is what artworks share with reality—
exposing, that is, that reality is itself shattered. Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1997), 130ff; Max Paddison, “Mimesis and the Aesthetics of Musical Expression,” 
Music Analysis 29, no. I (2010): 126–48. 
2. But mimesis characterizes not only art but also history through the dialectic of Enlightenment. The 
Benjaminian “mimetic impulse” characterized by a tension between play (Spiel) and semblance (Schein) 
stands opposed to Enlightenment rationality in the form of irrational nature or magic. In fact, art is the 
refuge for the mimetic comportment within Enlightenment: it separates itself from magic and employs 
Enlightenment’s means to preserve the mimetic impulse. This impulse, moreover, makes art resemble 
Enlightenment rationality as much as it makes it regress into literal magic, and in this tension its forces are 
set free, thus opening the space for hope and reconciliation: “Art is rationality that criticizes rationality 
without withdrawing from it.” Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 55. 
3. The dialectic that obtains between nature and culture, by which each seek to overcome each other and 
ends up identifying with its other—and which here illustrates historical development—also can be 
expressed more abstractly: negative dialectics is a form of mimesis in which each pole in an opposition 
tends towards identifying itself with or to be already in what opposes it. Where instrumental reason always 
aims to subsume the particular under the universal, doing violence to the particular’s uniqueness and 
reducing them to the level of exemplars, “mimetic reason” is a compassionate, nonviolent affinity that 
brings the subject and the object together in a nonidentical relation. This sympathetic identification may be 
accomplished as a false semblance (Schein) leading to reification, or as reconciliation where for example 
intellect, as music, becomes similar to nature. Adorno, Sound Figures, 25. There is thus a “bad” mimesis—
which is still associated to semblance—and a “good” mimesis—one that depends on sympathy, magic, and 
play. For more profound accounts of mimesis and music in Adorno and Benjamin, see Joseph Weiss, “The 
Idea of Mimesis: Semblance, Play, and Critique in the Works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno,” 
College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations, August 1, 2012, 
http://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/125; Paddison, “Mimesis and the Aesthetics of Musical Expression”; See 
also Steven Decatur Smith, “The ‘Transfigured Flesh’: Natural History in Theodor Adorno’s Musical 
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If L’Orfeo is a paradigmatic opera, if what it represents is precisely music’s power of 
transforming or correcting myth—which we understand now to be the dialectical 
accomplishment of myth’s enlightened purpose—this is only because music appears there 
as a privileged form of mimesis: a rationalized remnant of its magical origins which, due 
to its nearness to nature as passionate song, accomplishes the reconciliation that 
Enlightenment rationality is unable to. But for Adorno, Orpheus’ turn undoes this work. 
Orpheus, he writes, falls prey “once again to the very fate he had just escaped because of 
his inability to break the spell and to tear his gaze away from that infernal realm.”13 
An enigmatic allegory, perhaps, but the dialectic could not be clearer: while 
Orpheus’s song challenges fate and frees humanity from nature’s bonds—an enlightened 
myth—his spellbound gaze rebinds him, in effect forces him to turn back: the turn is a 
regression into mythical past. Gaze—the privileged sense in Enlightenment—is what 
keeps Orpheus bound to the law of mythical nature. 
 
If we approach L’Orfeo as a “Bourgeois opera,” then, one where the dialectics of music’s 
unstable place between nature and reason is at stake—and not just the sheer enchantment 
of vocal virtuosity—we might hear other things. For example, in how the sober sentence 
spoken by the Infernal Chorus as Orpheus jumps onto Caronte’s boat pre-echoes Bacon’s 
Novum Organum: 
Nulla impresa per uom si tenta invano 
Ne contr’ a lui più sa Natura armarse 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Thought.” (Ph.D. Diss., New York University, 2013); Max Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); For a lucid confrontation of Adorno’s and 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s mimetologies, see Martin Jay, “Mimesis and Mimetology - Adorno and Lacoue-
Labarthe,” in The Semblance of Subjectivity, ed. Lambert Zuidervaart and Tom Huhn, 1997. 
13 Adorno, Sound Figures, 21. 
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No undertaking of man is tried in vain, 
Nor can Nature arm against him further14 
So much for the magical Orpheus; this statement make us reconsider the distance of 
Striggio’s libretto from the natural magic episteme in which we sometimes still try to 
place it.15 We may venture to say that, as “the first authentic opera,” L’Orfeo is as 
enlightened—bourgeois—as opera itself. 
To say it once more, Orfeo’s plea is strangely not at the center of the opera. 
Rather it is Proserpina, whom in Euridice Orfeo addresses without addressing, who 
delivers his plea to the sovereign, having presumably heard “Possente spirto” or Orfeo’s 
“unsung voice” which the brass instruments and strings imitate without imitating with 
their echoes.16 Also as in Euridice, Proserpina appeals to Plutone’s sympathy, reminding 
the sovereign of their shared history, placing herself in the position of Euridice—
although from Orfeo’s perspective, since, it must be recalled, Euridice is by far the most 
silent character in both works (i.e., a fulcrum) constituted only by the gazes of the male 
characters.17 
Plutone gives in. The major displacement from Euridice to Orfeo, which began by 
dividing the Underworld scene across two acts, separating Orfeo from Plutone, giving up 
the progressive build-up of solo lamento to choral finale, is, significantly enough, also 
voiced in Orfeo by Plutone in his response to Proserpina, and also in the form of a 
contrapposto: “Benchè severo ed immutabil fato/Contrasti, amata sposa, i tuoi desiri.” 
Fate—not law—stands between Euridice and Orfeo. Severe and immutable fate, in 
contrast with the Queen’s desires (which are Orfeo’s). 
                                                
14 Bacon in fact includes Orpheus in De Sapientia Veterum (1607), Hollander, The Untuning of the Sky 
Ideas of Music in English Poetry, 1500-1700, 169 offers an interpretation that has its source in Horace’s Ars 
Poetica where Orpheus is a civilizer and law-giver. 
15 Tomlinson, for example, for whom “Peri’s Euridice and Monteverdi’s Orfeo are at an archeological level 
more closely related to ‘Sfogava con le stelle’ than they are to the Lament of the Nymph or L’Incoronazione 
di Poppea” Tomlinson, Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others, 244 To be sure, 
Tomlinson is here discussing the indifference between solo song and polyphonic song that the magical 
episteme allows, and which the representational one begins to enforce. 
16 Abbate, In Search of Opera, 20. 
17 For a suggestive feminist interpretation of the myth, centering on Euridice, see Julia Kristeva, Revolution 
in Poetic Language (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 
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But this reinscription of “fate” in place of “law” is only possible because, as we 
know, Plutone gives a new law: a single glance from Orfeo’s “desirous eyes” will ensure 
Euridice’s eternal loss. As if echoing Caronte’s (in L’Euridice) “make your own laws, O 
great King, as you please,” a “spirito del Coro” declares: 
O degli abitator de l’ombre eterne 
Possente re, legge ne fia tuo cenno, 
Che ricercar altre cagioni interne 
Di tuo voler nostri pensier non denno. 
 
O of the dwellers in eternal shadows 
powerful King, let your order be law, 
that to seek other reasons 
for your will our thoughts must not turn. 
Immutable fate, which the sovereign suspended for a moment, returns as law, as 
sovereign decision, as a new nomos. If in L’Euridice the lieto fine involved producing a 
change of perspective by which the sovereign’s position beyond the law was affirmed 
while at the same time producing the space from where that viewpoint was constituted, 
restoring the mythical ending in L’Orfeo cannot be done without producing a new 
reinscription of fate as law. Fate, said to be immutable—as the laws of nature—is 
immediately transgressed only to become sovereign law. Thus, as Benjamin and Schmitt 
would argue, Orfeo’s plea for mercy works towards constituting the sovereign as such, by 
identifying the figure that can transgress the law (declare an emergency) and posit a new 
law—the Orphic apostrophe of sovereignty. This new law, as we also know, is bound to 
be transgressed as well. Yet the transgression of the second law is not like the first 
transgression. Transgressing fate gave the sovereign the possibility of making a new law, 
of showing or positing himself as that who decides upon the law thus transgressed, upon 
the exception. Plutone already won by having made a new law. If Orfeo breaks the 
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second law—which he will have done—this reaffirms the sovereign decision, and lose 
Euridice on top of that.18 
MA CHE ODO? THE REASON BEHIND THE TURN 
We are back to the most basic question posed by the myth. Why does Orfeo turn? What is 
the necessity of such a turn? L’Orfeo, as it turns out, has a surprising answer to this 
question, riding on a detail of the libretto that, to my knowledge, has hardly been 
mentioned. There are several answers about Orfeo’s turning due to character flaws, his 
lack of control upon his own emotions—an interpretation motivated by Apollo’s moral in 
the final apotheosis and which could be read as the neoplatonic admonishing to the 
ruler—his intemperance, his impulsiveness “as much out of overconfidence as for love” 
(Kerman), giving into doubts whether Euridice “is following him as had been promised” 
(Schrade), or because he “succumbs to panic and self-doubt” (Russano-Hanning).  
For Mladen Dolar, Orfeo responds to Plutone’s act of mercy by a new 
subjectivation, by succumbing to his own humanity, while for Žižek, elaborating on 
Theweleit, a bourgeois Euridice sacrifices herself for Orpheus’s, to make him into the 
great poet he would be, “intentionally provoking Orpheus into turning his gaze towards 
her [by coughing and thus sending her back to Hades.]”19 No one, however, has put it 
more poignantly than Euridice herself, blaming excess of love through a paradigmatic 
contrapposto and an anaphora that emphasizes excess (troppo) through repetition: “Ah, 
too sweet and too bitter a sight:/so through too much love, then, do you lose me?” (“Ahi, 
vista troppo dolce e troppo amara:/Così per troppo amor dunque mi perdi?”). 
Accounting for the reason of the turn seems to be not only a matter of accounting 
for the unity of the libretto, for showing its consistency. It is as if, given that L’Orfeo is 
the paradigmatic opera, where the structure of musical plea, sovereign display of mercy, 
transgression and reinscription of the law determines the history of opera, then giving a 
reasoned account for the turn becomes the crucial task for the interpreter, for any attempt 
                                                
18 Žižek makes a similar point, but draws the opposite conclusion: “the Master ultimately makes a virtue 
out of necessity, in that he promotes as a free act what he is in any case compelled to do - if he refuses 
clemency, he takes the risk that the subject's respectful entreaty will turn into open rebellion.” Žižek, “The 
Ridiculous Excess of Mercy.” 
19 Ibid. 
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to make critical and historical sense of L’Orfeo as an effective telling of the myth, an 
opera. 
But what if there is no reason or justification for the turn? That makes it 
necessary, that accounts for the rationality of Orfeo’s actions, either from the teleological 
perspective of drama and tragedy by which the turn is discovered as necessary at the 
moment of recognition, or as a character fault which the spectator is supposed to see and 
criticize in herself? Accounts like the examples cited above are of this type. 
Characteristically, they ignore—as if they had not heard it, even if Orfeo did, even if he 
asked “ma che odo,” turning around—a noise, a strepito, made behind the curtain (Figure 
13).20  
This noise interrupts the music and even the flow of the printed staves (an 
arrangement that does not occur elsewhere in the score) and frightens Orpheus forcing 
the fated turn. “Ma che odo?” Orfeo asks himself, leaving the answer to us. The 
acoustemological question par excellence, “what do I hear?” requires and implies an 
interpretation of the myth, of the roles of music and sound, equivalent to answering why 
does Orfeo turn, and hence, as argued above, answering “why opera” at all. If all we hear 
is a noise, an irrational sound, does not this make the turn itself, and thus the opera and 
the myth as well, irrational? Is it not a strange situation, a scandal almost, that the reason 
for opera—which we seek to find in song, voice, or drama—rides upon a noise? Perhaps 
this is why no one hears it—or feigns not to. Among the few ones who do hear it is 
Sternfeld, for whom the noise is a reference to Virgil’s account, where a thunderous crash 
                                                
20 Lat. Strepitus: a (wild, confused) noise, din of any kind; a clashing, crashing, rustling, rattling, clattering, 
clanking, rumbling, etc. E. A. Andrews et al., Lewis and Short Latin Dictionary (Online) (Medford, MA: 
Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, Classics Dept.), accessed June 2, 2016. 
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that “marks the breaking of Pluto’s and Proserpine’s stern decree [and which becomes] in 
Orfeo, the unnerving noise which finally causes Orpheus to turn round.”21 
 
In the fourth book of Virgil’s Georgics, the first poetical telling of the myth and 
an acknowledged source for Striggio, especially for the Underworld scene, we read, 
                                                
21 Whenham, Claudio Monteverdi, Orfeo. Sternfeld and Wenham, in the same volume, are the only authors, 
to my knowledge, who make explicit mention of the noise. 
 
Figure 13: Monteverdi, L'Orfeo (1609 score), act IV, 80. (The Turn). 
Orpheus’s Modern Turn—The Noise Behind 
 
387 
cum subita incautum dementia cepit amantem, 
ignoscenda quidem, scirent si ignoscere Manes: 
restitit, Eurydicenque suam iam luce sub ipsa 
immemor heu! victusque animi respexit. ibi omnis 
effusus labor atque immitis rupta tyranny 
foedera, terque fragor stagnis auditus Avernis. 
 
…when a sudden frenzy seized Orpheus, unwary in his love, a frenzy meet for 
pardon, did Hell know how to pardon! He halted, and on the very verge of light, 
unmindful, alas, and vanquished in purpose, on Eurydice, now regained looked 
back! In that instant all his toil was spilt like water, the ruthless tyrant’s pact was 
broken, and thrice a peal of thunder was heard amid the pools of Avernus.” 22 
Perhaps not incidentally, Caronte also appears in Virgil after Orfeo turns, not before; but 
his displacement had already been produced by Rinuccini, a reference that Striggio 
duplicates by also referring to Dante and which, as Whenham argues, helps the audience 
picture Dante’s description of Inferno as well as establishing further references between 
Mantua (with Virgil) and Florence (with Dante).23 
Orfeo stops. Seized by frenzy or dementia—a lack of mind, of mindfulness, but 
also, as Euridice calls it later, a frenzied possession, furor, which does not fail to recall 
Platonic love and enthusiasm. His soul or his will defeated—he turns. To say that the 
thunders represent “fate” would be too rash. But they are truly a dramatic, even operatic 
or cinematographic touch. They make audible for the reader the mythical violence of the 
broken promise, of the fateful backward glance. Virgil does not say that the thunders 
echoed because Orfeo turned: the thunders were heard there or in that instant, ibi, almost 
as if the pact was a branch or a scepter—or the diamantine law in Euridice—which could 
be heard as they were shattered by Orpheus’ mindlessness and excessive love. Three 
thundering clashes that contrast with the lyre, that mark the undoing of what the lyre 
                                                
22Virgil, Virgil, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA, 2000). 
23Whenham, Claudio Monteverdi, Orfeo, 67. 
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accomplished.24 As Sternfeld says, then, the thunders mark the broken law, they belong to 
the pact that Orpheus broke by turning, but only because he turned. 
The lyre, the turn, and even the disembodied head have been kept alive through 
commentary, representations, and adaptations. The thunders were never heard again until 
Orfeo—an instant too early: before he turned. 
Three thunders become one noise, which precede and cause the turn. It is at the 
same time the mythical necessity of the broken pact, of transgressed natural laws in 
Virgil, and a mechanical causality, a material event. It binds them without being either. It 
separates them without reason. The noise is the (modern) efficient cause for Orfeo’s turn, 
an immanent causality that seeks to rationalize the tragic turn by recasting it as a 
contingent event. Here it is noise—and not music—what seeks to correct myth, to fend-
off fated necessity through disenchanted, material means. The tension between the two is 
what gives rise, more often than not, to the rather comical and underwhelming effect of 
this intervention in performance, much like the way Caronte simply falls asleep to 
Orfeo’s music. 
But there is much more to this seemingly unremarkable or comical noise. Its 
timbral indetermination as noise, not a thunder, or coughing (as Žižek would want, nor 
Orfeo’s phantastic clapping, as Theweleit suggests), embodies the two aspects of 
Abbate’s polarity: the unheard/unseen, and the all-too material. The score says “Qui si fa 
strepito dietro la tela,” which we could translate literally to “here a noise is made (or as 
imperative: ‘make a noise’) behind the curtain.” As is well known, the score for L’Orfeo, 
published two years after the original performance, has two kinds of indications, which 
can be distinguished as descriptive and prescriptive ones.25 Both provide timbral 
indications, specifying which instrument or group of voices must be used in the 
realization of the score. Since indications of the first type are in the past tense, they can 
                                                
24 Commentary on Virgil also seems to make deaf ears to such effects. Gary B Miles, Virgil’s Georgics: A 
New Interpretation (Berkeley, CA, 1980), 278. Miles, however, notes that the pact is also called leges 
(478), which in the Georgics are chiefly “the inflexible laws that govern nature,” so that Orpheus’ 
punishment “confirms the inevitability of man’s failures to arrest the natural process of degeneration and 
the stern inflexibility of nature’s laws.” 
25 Mauro Calcagno, “Performing the Self,” The Opera Quarterly 24, no. 3–4 (2008): 248; Anthony R. 
DelDonna and Pierpaolo Polzonetti, The Cambridge Companion to Eighteenth-Century Opera (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 8. 
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be read as referring, as records, to the 1607 performance, for example “this song was 
accompanied by all the instruments” (“Questo canto fu concertato al suono de tutti gli 
stromenti,” 8). The prescriptive ones, such as “Two shepherds sing to the sound of the 
organ and a chitarone (“due Pastori cantano al suono del Organo di legno, & un 
Chitarrone,” 42)” are in the present tense, indicating that the score is not only or not so 
much a record or a souvenir of the performance, but is aimed to be performed again.26 
The indication that mentions the noise, however, belongs to none of these types. It 
appears also in Striggio’s libretto (as given by Solerti) in brackets and cursive type 
between Orfeo’s lines: “(Qui si fa strepito dietro alla Scena.)”27 Four lines below, also in 
brackets and cursive, it states: “(Qui si volta.)” The libretto has no other stage indications, 
besides scene changes at the ends of acts 2 and 4 (for the Underworld, not in brackets). In 
the score, it appears under Orfeo’s blank staff, an empty space that signals the 
unrepresentability of such a strident event. The continuo is interrupted to provide a 
“prescriptive” indication that changes the timbral accompaniment for Orfeo—who has 
been singing to the violins of the ritornello and continuo—to clavicembalo, viola da 
braccio, and chitarrone. This ensemble drops out a few bars later, after Orfeo turns. The 
second indication, the one that properly defines the turn, “Qui si volta Orfeo, & canta al 
suono del Organo di legno” inverts the graphic disposition of the previous mark: the 
continuo line has an empty bar, while Orfeo’s staff is entirely interrupted to introduce the 
indication. He then sings to the organ that accompanied him and Caronte in act 3, and 
which stays for the remainder of act 4. I will return below to this short passage, where a 
new timbre and a new key (F major) separate the noise from the turn. 
In both cases, score and libretto, “Qui si fa” indicates a change in the temporality 
of the performance. Qui, here: where? When? Every libretto and stage indication has an 
orientation towards the future, a prescriptive dimension, which specifies who and what 
performs a specific action. It is a void in the text, a visible lack of referent, like a deictic, 
                                                
26 As Calcagno argues, the score and the performance fulfill two different roles, hence it is unproductive to 
examine the score for traces of the performance. 
27 Angelo Solerti, Gli albori del melodramma, vol. 3 (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1969), 267. 
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that must be filled in performance—it opens the text towards its future performance, 
towards its in-completion. In the score, moreover, it happens outside all meter, following 
a fermata in the melody and the continuo that extends for an undetermined duration. It 
introduces a new temporality, not given by the music and thus not determinable either by 
metrical or affective rhythms. 
But “Qui si fa,” especially when heard as an imperative, occurs within a different 
futurity—unlike, for example, the indications that state that Orfeo sings to the organ, 
which establish a strict synchronicity between the different forms of notation, making it 
possible to adapt gestures to musical time—as in the movements that La Musica performs 
during the prologue in Ronconi’s production in Calcagno’s analysis.28 
Here, both the melody and the continuo are arrested, even as musical inscriptions. 
The fermata, and the blank spaces are not the same as a tacet or even a written out 
silence, as we find at the end of Orfeo’s “Qual onor,” as he stops singing to listen—in an 
anticipation of the noise to come—whether Euridice is following. The blank staff on top 
and the empty space below can be eternally long or infinitely short in performance. They 
exceed or abolish the space and the possibilities of musical representation. Perhaps the 
music is interrupted by the sound, but it can also be stopped earlier to make the noise 
more audible. Both are performance decisions—and thus interpretations—, since the 
inscription itself is undecidable. Thus, “Qui si fa” displaces the sound from the instant of 
its inscription in the text towards an instant that cannot be fixed beforehand. The noise, 
coming from nowhere and having no cause or origin is an event—unpredictable and 
unrepeatable—as much in performance as in the narrative.  
This could be said of any type of musical inscription. The condition for any mark 
to be performed in time, within time, is that it is somehow outside time, expected but 
undetermined, realized in performance under the condition that its eventality is given up 
for its integration as music, for the subordination to all other marks. “Qui si fa” simply 
exacerbates the possibility that a non-musical mark becomes musical, by entering musical 
time, to show it as a necessity for every mark and every sound. 
                                                
28 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 62. 
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For just as “Qui si fa un strepito” leaves undetermined its temporality, it also 
leaves the instrumental source, the agent of the noise, entirely undetermined, and thus 
also its timbre. “Si fa” is an impersonal expression, just as “one” in English or “on” in 
French: it could refer to a collective or an individual, but more literally it refers to no one. 
It is an impersonal fate. Similarly, a Strepito can be any sound, any noise: crackling, 
rattling, clapping or coughing, thunder or clash. Yet any decision upon it abolishes 
precisely the indeterminacy by which the noise is what it is in Orfeo. As in translation, a 
decision in performance to render strepito as a thunder, for example, involves an 
interpretation of the noise’s cause and meaning, not only an answer to Orfeo’s “Ma, che 
odo?” but a decision as to its role in the story, an account of the reason for Orfeo’s turn.  
In both Jordi Savall’s 2002 production with Le Concert des Nations, as well as 
René Jacobs and Ronconi’s 1998 production, the noise is in fact realized with a 
presumably historically accurate thunder sheet, a common decision that points both to 
Virgil and to historical practice that employs artificial sounds to supplement the musical 
depictions of storms and thunders in the baroque. With Virgil, it aims to retain the 
mythical meaning of the thunder, the intimation of catastrophe in the voice of nature that 
announces the imminent broken promise and thus propels the fatal turn. Ponnelle’s 
decision, on the other hand, is no less “historically accurate”: the strepito is rendered as a 
clamor, a collective gasp or a wordless exclamation uttered by the chorus which also 
doubles as the seventeenth-century audience. This audience knows the story all-too-well, 
and is unable to contain itself from gasping at Orfeo’s turn—except in this production 
Orfeo begins to turn before the strepito. The chorus thus interrupts, rather than cause, the 
turn—a first turn, for Orfeo nevertheless turns after delivering the passage in A minor. 
For an instant, for a few bars, the ending of the story could have been different: Orfeo 
could have turned and not turned. 
There is one more aspect of the inscription in the score that needs mentioning. If 
as I have been arguing, the indication “Qui si fa strepito dietro la tela” exceeds the 
temporality of the performance, it nevertheless defines the space of the performance as no 
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other indication does.29 The libretto, as seen above, mentions instead the more 
conventional Scena, a general term indicating any performing space by default, hence a 
more abstract and undefined space (suggesting that the libretto was finished before the 
space where L’Orfeo was to be performed had been chosen). Tela, on the other hand, tells 
us that there was a backdrop in what we know to be—thanks to the dedication—an 
angusta scena, a narrow scene in the Ducal Palace. The backdrop not only defines the 
Scena, the space of the performance, but also, as in the dorsal turn, a space of invisibility 
behind it. The noise is made “behind” the backdrop and thus the action occurs “in front” 
of it. If the space “in front” is the present fictional time, the “behind” is outside of time, it 
is transcendent. The tela, like any theatrical background, is the interface of the Theatrum 
mundi, placing the world on stage and joining the stage with the world. Everything that 
happens in front of the background is for all to see: it is the spectacle, the space of what 
happens and of what is. But it cannot produce this space of visibility without producing 
its own invisibility, a space behind it that is excluded yet belongs to the performing 
space. Only noise, coming from behind the backdrop, can overcome this barrier, which 
thus becomes an acousmatic screen, although acousmaticity is not so much at stake here 
since, as I argued, the impersonal “si fa” and the undefined strepito make the noise more 
ambiguous than the simple separation of sound and source of acousmatic sounds. Rather, 
what makes this noise interesting is its spatialization, which is entirely determined by the 
backdrop. 
DORSALITY RETURNS 
Coming from outside the space of the performance, from the beyond, the noise is as 
transcendent as the unheard voice in Abbate’s reading of “Possente spirto,” and yet we 
hear it, as Orfeo hears it—in her terminology, it is both noumenal and phenomenal.30 
                                                
29 Similar “spatial” indications are at the beginning of the score, stating that the toccata is played before 
rising the curtain; for the ritornello at the beginning of Act 2 and during Orfeo’s “Vi Ricordo Bosque 
Ombrosi”, stating that it was played “from within” (“fu sonato di dentro”). Another one, at the opening of 
Act 5, mentions two organi di legna which play at each side of the scene. More interesting than these 
examples is that there is no stage indication for the placing of Eco. 
30 And Ponnelle’s interpretation of strepito as clamor given by the chorus/audience strongly complicates 
this undecidability. 
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More importantly, Orfeo hears it, and he turns back to find it. The source of the noise is 
unseen, hidden from the audience by the backdrop, and coming from behind Orfeo. 
Before he turns, the noise is already a dorsal event: an answer to Orfeo’s ma che odo is 
that he hears what he cannot structurally see (see chapter 7). He hears what is hidden 
behind and hence is beyond him. The noise undoes the security afforded by his frontal 
perspective, his determination to move forward, to progress, to reach the lieto fine. As in 
Virgil’s description of the turn: victusque animi respexit, his soul or his will 
vanquished—he turns. The dorsal noise reminds him not only that Euridice is behind 
him, but that she might not be, that what lies behind him is unknown as long as he does 
not turn, and the is tela just a dramatization, an affective device, that redoubles this 
structural necessity. 
Still, it is impossible to say if Orfeo turns because of the noise. For one, he does 
not turn immediately—which would be a rather slapstick turn—but indicates instead the 
fateful intrusion in its aural register through a display of interiority, introduced through 
the acoustemological question: 
Ma che odo, ohimè lasso? 
S'arman forse a’ miei danni
Con tal furor le Furie innamorate 
Per rapirmi il mio bene ed io‘1 consento ? 
(Qui si volta) 
 
But what do I hear? Ah me, alas, 
perhaps to my loss there arm themselves 
with such fury the enamored Furies  
to take my love from me, and I let it happen? 
  
(Now Orpheus turns) 
But before turning back, Orfeo turns towards himself. The exclamation introduces 
subjectivity as the gap between material cause (the noise) and effect (the turn) is in fact a 
   394
repetition, or a series of repetitions. It reproduces the contrast between the ornamented 
style and the more direct and “natural” delivery he uses to address Caronte in act 3. When 
Orfeo comes back in act 4, he sings a “number” aria to his lyre: “Qual onor di te fia 
degno/Mia cetra onnipotente.” After three strophes of light music and joyful celebration, 
in rhymed settenari (ABAB) over a walking bass in G major separated by violin 
ritornelli, he interrupts this diegetic song to ask himself: “But while I sing, ah me, who 
can assure me /that she follows me? /Ah me, who hides from me /the sweet light of her 
beloved eyes?” (Error! Reference source not found.). 
Ohimè, in G minor. Silence. Ohimè, in E major. The same expressive 
contrapposto of L’Euridice here sounds like an echo, a repetition, of the laments he 
uttered before recovering Euridice. There is a kind of rhythm articulated by the sequence 
of contrapposti—from the lightness of “Qual honor” to the introspective passage, which 
is introduced by juxtaposing G major and G minor and then with E major—that prepares 
the audience for what Orfeo cannot be prepared for. Orfeo speculates that Plutone is 
spurred by envy and decides, as he regains his G major, that “What Plutone forbids, Love 
commands/The more powerful spirit/that overcomes men and gods I must obey.” He is 
ready to turn backwards, not because of doubt or indecision, nor out of an excess of love, 
but by a sheer misrecognition—and some hubris. He sees Plutone’s mercy as envy. He 
sees the prohibition not as the reinstauration of law but as the selfish act of a challenged 
sovereign (and in this sense he is right, as I suggested above). But he fails to see—and 
this is the true misrecognition—that transgressing the law here amounts to confirming it. 
In obeying to one god he fulfills the other’s (the Other’s) command. 
Orpheus’s Modern Turn—The Noise Behind 
 
395 
The noise leaves him singing, literally, off key: his Ma che odo outlines an F 
major triad—Plutone’s characteristic tonality since L’Euridice. He follows with another 
Ohimè lasso, again over E major, with a poignant diminished fourth (D-G#) that resolves 
one bar later into A minor (Proserpina’s key in L’Euridice; in L’Orfeo she sings in G 
dorian), only to return again to F through G major. All the important tonalities by which 
L’Orfeo repeats L’Euridice occur in a few bars, framed by silence, blank spaces and 
empty bars; interrupted by a noise coming from behind; and a turn backwards—which 
happens over another silence of undetermined duration. In yet another striking tonal 
effect, the second silence is followed by G dorian (changing to the mollis hexachord) 
accompanied by the wood organ, thus returning to the affective, infernal soundscape of 
act 3. If we understand the distribution of tonal regions among characters through their 
reference to L’Euridice to be one of the devices for musical interiority that characterize 
 
Figure 14: L'Orfeo, 79. 
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the Rinuccini-influenced style, as opposed to the superficial style of Marinism, as 
Tomlinson does, then we would have to hear this fragment as the instant in which Orfeo’s 
interiority shatters into a tonal disorientation that leads him to the key of his adversary 
(his supporter, Proserpina), a mimetic identification with the Other, in this case a 
regressive one, turning back to face the sovereign, returning to his original place in front 
of him. 
In his confusion, Orfeo also seems to look forward. He imagines that the Furies—
the maidservants of Necessity or Fate—are stealing Euridice from him, hence fulfilling 
the transgression that he himself is just about to realize. Imagining the enamoured Furies, 
le furie l’innamorate, as the ones who break the law—and are hence the cause of the 
noise—blaming them for the imminent transgression of the law they are supposed to 
preserve, Orfeo anticipates—visualizing, bringing about—his own death: the Maenads, 
angry at Orpheus for scorning them but in fact in love with him, are metonymically called 
Erinys—the Latinized Greek name for the Furies—in Ovid’s telling as they begin to 
throw rocks at the bard at the end of the myth before dismembering him. (They were also 
said to weep for the first time at Orpheus’s song.) 
alterius telum lapis est, qui missus in ipso 
aere concentu victus vocisque lyraeque est 
ac veluti supplex pro tam furialibus ausis 
ante pedes iacuit. sed enim temeraria crescent 
bella modusque abiit insanaque regnat Erinys; (Met. 11.10-14) 
 
Another threw a stone, which, even as it flew through the air, was overcome by 
the sweet sound of voice and lyre, and fell at his feet as if t’would ask forgiveness 
for its furious attempt. But still the assault waxed reckless: their passion knew no 
bounds; mad Fury reigned. 
And in the Bacchic ending, the Maenads are filled with the “divine fury” (divino furore) 
of Lyaeus (Dionysus): 
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Euhoè padre Lieo
Bassareo
Te chiamiam con chiari accenti,
Euhoè liete e ridenti
Te lodiam padre Leneo 
Hor ch’abbiam colmo il core
Del tuo divin furore. 
 
Evoe! Father Lyæus, Bassareus, 
we call on you with clear voices, 
Evoe! Happy and laughing 
we praise you, father Lenæus, 
now that we have our hearts filled 
with your divine fury. 
We are close to Žižek and Theweleit’s interpretation of L’Orfeo, according to which its 
central theme is sublimation tied to the death drive: Euridice is immortalized in the stars 
and in Orfeo’s lyre, to such an extent that Orfeo turns in order to lose her and attain 
sublimation as an artist. In Theweleit’s version, Orfeo turns because he hears the noise as 
a phantastic clapping to his performance; in Žižek’s, because Euridice sacrifices herself: 
she is the noise, she makes him turn back. This seems to me a strange inversion of the 
“normal” order of things, since the drives are primary, while sublimation is simply a 
secondary formation, a displacement of the investments that result from the repression of 
the death drive. Moreover, why should Orfeo’s death drive produce Euridice’s death? But 
this inversion shows that Žižek’s interpretation is too forward-gazing: for him Euridice is 
a figure of Wagner’s characters, the suffering, self-sacrificing bourgeois woman, who, 
is aware of the fact that, by means of her suffering which remains invisible to the 
public eye, of her renunciation for the beloved man and/or her renunciation to him 
(the two are always dialectically interconnected, since, in the fantasmatic logic of 
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the Western ideology of love, it is for the sake of her man that the woman must 
renounce him), she rendered possible man’s redemption, his public social triumph 
- like Traviata who abandons her lover and thus enables his reintegration into the 
social order.31 
Perhaps this reading anticipates too much of bourgeois opera, while failing to point out a 
more specific aspect of L’Orfeo in the context of courtly sovereignty, and is problematic 
too since it goes on to suggest, along the well-trodden mimetological paths of Rousseau 
and Schopenhauer, that the sublimation occurs in early Music will soon be impossible the 
minute music discards its subservience to speech and begins to speak for itself. 
What is clear is that the noise and Orfeo’s evocation of the Furies (we could 
suggest that he either imagines the noise, or that he freely associates a completely 
unrelated event with the Furies) is a hint that his unconscious motivation is the death 
drive, he seeks it by descending into the underworld in search of Euridice, and again 
repeats it when looking back, when seeking to see her, to identify with her in her death. 
This is what Orfeo’s narcissism seeks in his aim to introject Euridice, not her as an Other, 
but as the radical other, as death. 
Incidentally, too, the style in which Orfeo’s line is delivered, a fast, syllabic 
declamation in repeated eight notes that ascends through a tritone (B-F) seems to 
anticipate the stile concitato, especially with the mention of furor, fury, and violence—
not to mention misogyny, the defining affect of the style developed in the Madrigali 
guerreri e amorosi, as Suzanne Cusick shows.32 As Monteverdi would write later, in his 
failed attempt to write the first “mad scene,” musical madness was best accomplished by 
                                                
31Žižek, “The Ridiculous Excess of Mercy.” 
32 Suzanne Cusick, “‘Indarno chiedi’ Clorinda and the Interpretation of Monteverdi’s Combattimento,” in 
Cypess, Glixon, and Link, Word, Image, and Song, 1:130. “Gossip, erotica, and the male spy in Alessandro 
Striggio’s Il cicalamento delle donne al bucato (1567),” in Todd Michael Borgerding, Gender, Sexuality, 
and Early Music (New York: Routledge, 2002); Jean Toscan, Le carnaval du langage: le lexique érotique 
des poètes de l’équivoque de Burchiello à Marino (XV-XVIIe siècles (Lille: Atelier reproduction des thèses 
Université de Lille III, 1981). Seventeenth and Eighteenth-century readings of Orpheus as a signifier for 
homosexuality, as well as the many ways of censoring or indirectly alluding to it are well documented in 
Ellen T. Harris, Handel as Orpheus: Voice and Desire in the Chamber Cantatas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001). 
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imitating “the single word rather than the sense of the phrase.”33 Framed between noise 
and silence, the first opera already contained the first “mad scene,” which Monteverdi 
wrote in advance of himself. In this respect, then, this passage is paradigmatic of 
McClary’s contention that Monteverdi’s depiction of Orfeo precipitated “a crisis that 
perhaps influenced both its own reception and subsequent operatic conventions. While 
sexuality and madness remain favorite themes of music drama, they prove extremely 
problematic when enacted by male characters.”34  
In this interpretation, Orfeo’s own response to “Ma che odo?,” the noise is the 
sound of a mounting series of transgressions: the imagined transgression of the pact by 
the jealous Furies when stealing Euridice from him; the actual transgression he commits 
by turning back, and finally the symbolic transgression of patriarchal, heteronormative 
laws which the original myth inevitably evokes and represses.35 One could suggest, along 
Cusick’s reading of the Combattimento, that Plutone’s condition, and Orfeo’s 
transgression, are in fact to be read as allegorical regulations on same-sex love—hence 
the prominent function of the death drive. Thus, in producing a crisis of representations 
of sexuality L’Orfeo also turns back to the issues of patriarchal filiation in which we 
found Signor &c. (Part II).  
To turn, as Sarah Ahmed notes, is to acquire or retake an orientation, one that 
specifies one’s place in relation to objects in the sense of the direction one takes towards 
them.36 Just as frontality already implies a turn and a dorsal invisibility, it also implies an 
                                                
33 Claudio Monteverdi and Domenico De’ Paoli, Lettere, dediche, e prefazioni (Roma: De Santis, 1973), 
244; translation in Gary Tomlinson, “Monteverdi’s ‘Via Naturale Alla Immitatione,’” JAMS (34: 1, 1981), 
102. See also Tomlinson, “Twice Bitten, Thrice Shy: Monteverdi's ‘finta’ ‘Finta pazza’” JAMS (36:2, 1982) 
303-311. I elaborate on these texts in the introduction and chapter 4. 
34 Susan McClary, “Constructions of Gender in Monteverdi’s Dramatic Music,” Cambridge Opera Journal 
1, no. 3 (1989): 203–33. 
35 One could find it, with Cusick’s “carnivalesque” hearings, in Poliziano’s version: “Io te la rendo, ma con 
queste leggi: che la ti segua per la ceca via.” As Christina Fuhrmann shows, based on Jean Toscan’s 
taxonomy of seventeenth-century sexual double entendres, in carnivalesque hearings “seguire” (to follow) 
also meant “to possess in sodomy,” while “via” could mean either sexual orifice, which the adjective “ceca” 
could specify as referring to the anus. Christina Fuhrmann, “Gossip, Erotica, and the Male Spy in 
Alessandro Striggio’s Il Cicalamento Delle Done Al Bucato (1567),” in Gender, Sexuality, and Early Music, 
ed. Todd Michael Borgerding (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
36 Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Duke University Press, 2006), 21. 
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orientation that is given from behind, just as hailing in interpellation. In a patriarchal, 
heteronormative context, this orientation is naturalized in terms of straightness, of 
regularized directionalities between subjects of opposite sexes, where one’s sex is aligned 
with one’s desire, turned towards the other sex, one that can be argued to structure 
phenomenological space in general, and even an ontological constitution: “The line of 
straight orientation takes the subject toward what it ‘is not’ and what it ‘is not’ then 
confirms what it “is.”37  
What is more, this directionality determines or gets attached to values, such as 
decent, conventional, direct, and honest.38 Plutone’s injunction, “not to turn back,” can be 
heard as a statement of the eternal laws of nature, of the mortality of men, but also as the 
naturalized laws of society: do not turn back, to not turn away from the straight line, from 
the values of rectitude, honor, and especially—Apollo tells us in his final speech—self-
control. In the context of patriarchal nobility, these values are not exclusively moral but 
are the very means of regulating and enforcing the social order, and especially of 
maintaining political power—of ensuring the permanence of the Gonzaga dynasty in 
Mantua and especially Habsburg dominion in the north of Italy. 
That the tension between patriarchal filiation and homoerotic desire is a tension in 
L’Orfeo should be obvious through both endings of the opera, which tacitly suppress—or 
rather, repress—Orfeo’s relinquishing of women after the loss of Euridice. How can we 
tell what Orfeo’s orientation is before he turns? Should we assume, with the myth, that 
Orfeo turns away from women after he loses Euridice, as if after a trauma that he thus 
repeats? Or perhaps suggest, as is often done, that it is the result of a melancholy turned 
into narcissism? Answering this will require not a small deal of hermeneutics and 
guessing, and I must turn towards a conclusion. 
IN-CONCLUSION 
Allegory goes away empty-handed. Evil 
as such, which it cherished as enduring 
profundity, exists only in allegory, is nothing 
                                                
37 Idem., 71. 
38 Idem., 70. 
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other than allegory, and means something 
different than what it is. It means precisely the 
non-existence of what it presents.39 
 
Here, through the dorsal turn, embodied in Orfeo, we return to the question that opened 
this reflection on turns, spectacle, and sovereignty. Why, again, would these courts spend 
so many resources in producing lavish and costly spectacles, in producing libretti, 
descriptions, and other memorabilia employing elaborate allegorical constructions that 
not even the most learned of their humanists could entirely explicate (and not because of 
a lack of knowledge, as we have seen)? What did these performances offer and 
accomplish such that they would be iterated with such insistence? What was so potent in 
the mimetologies that organized not only the composition of these works but also the 
entire humanist framework that they mobilized? But also what satisfaction did they 
derive from gathering to watch these spectacles? As should be clear from my approach in 
the previous chapters, these questions are not simply antiquarian nor motivated by a 
desire to revive them—to speak with the dead, as in Greenblat's famous pronunciation.  
Especially since I do not presuppose that these mimetologies and what they 
mobilize have ceased to have any effectivity in the present. Where the New Historicism 
focuses in shattering the aura of autonomy that these works have attained in our times by 
reconstructing the historical context in which they were produced and reconnecting the 
works within them, I have sought to question the idea that these structures need to be 
reconstructed at all. For I consider them to be everywhere present today. In fact, I suspect 
that the shattering of their aura is rather a displacement of the same aura to history, to the 
creation of the “historical past,” which keeps the historian safe in his own present with 
the satisfaction that the oppressive structures of the past have been replaced with 
enlightened, universal rationality and democracy, one that sees itself as a form of 
conjuring or exorcising away the ghosts of the past. Literary criticism, as Peggy Kamuf 
shows, sets itself as a “strictly filial” inheritor that appropriates the ghost’s power as the 
                                                
39 Benjamin, Origin of Baroque Tragic Drama, 233. 
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power of imagination that can conjure up the ghosts’ realities in order to make them 
disappear. This power of intelligence, besides being thoroughly romantic is, Kamuf says, 
a specular structure.40 Greenblatt, that is, leaves unquestioned the King’s statement in 
Hamlet that he is “thy Father’s Spirit,” he accepts their identity at face value, in a 
statement that reassures the scholar that “the father is indeed dead and buried, hence his 
son need not fear the spirit that he sees, or reads, before him; not only need he not fear it, 
but it is a sign of his own power, the power of his own imagination, the fearsome father is 
not a castrating agent but an agent of his own excitement.41” Against this security, Kamuf 
recalls Derrida’s own reading of the scene in Specters of Marx, where Derrida 
emphasizes “the visor effect,” according to which we cannot see the face of the ghost that 
speaks to us from history. We cannot be sure that the one who says “I am thy Father’s 
spirit” is who he says he is. We have to take him at his word. For Derrida, this determines 
the law of inheritance: we do not know what we receive from history, and we cannot 
presume to be the rightful inheritors of any specific lineage or tradition which is thus 
entrusted to us. For Kamuf, then, history consists in the possibility of the becoming-
historical of that of which one can have no knowledge until it happens (and, we might 
add, this “happening” will always be undecidable). Scholarship refuses to think history 
when it presumes and assumes all-too-well what it is looking at, a specular gesture that 
consists, Kamuf writes, in nothing other than raising an apotropaic mirror that is “put in 
place as a protection against the trope of plurality, against the more than one but also the 
other than one.”42 
This is somewhat different in the case of music history. Even if L’Orfeo ends with 
the death of the singer—both endings, for Orfeo’s “ascent” to heaven is just a slightly 
more sublimated version of it—musicologists seek to preserve his voice while doing 
away with the power structures and values that enabled him to sing. Orpheus’ 
disembodied head, in Abbate’s work, expresses just that (see second excursus). In the 
case of more historicist approaches, the attempt is also to conjure up the power structures 
                                                
40 Peggy Kamuf, “The Ghost of Critique and Deconstruction,” in Deconstruction: A Reader, ed. Martin 
McQuillan (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2001), 205. 
41 Idem., 206. 
42 Idem., 207. 
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to explain them away, putting them out of sight so that their beautiful voices can be heard 
again. The only way of maintaining the illusion and enchantment of music is by 
thoroughly outlining the ideological structures that music helps supports, with the 
presumed conclusion that one must be out of ideology in order to be able to see its 
contours (Martha Feldman’s approach is a good example). What the dorsal turn 
demonstrates, however, is that wherever we turn, there we carry the blind spot from 
which we are always already hailed. There is no pure frontality. The dorsal turn and the 
visor effect have something in common: they both play on the constitutive difference of 
vision and hearing, questioning the possibility of a pure eidetic knowledge that sees what 
is true in its immediacy, and emphasizing the non-coincidence of the voice (or the noise) 
with its source, such that any voice can come from any place. All we know is this 
finitude, which turns into a principle for historiography: history is what comes up 
unexpectedly and makes us turn. 
 
On the other hand, the mimetologies seem to have changed little: everywhere they repeat 
the same inversions of “Platonism,” seeking to abandon one pervasive form for another 
which is just as pervasive. They reveal as much as what they conceal, but precisely not in 
terms of truth.  
I have showed how there is a general process by which originals, paradigms, 
models, or laws are created through repetitions, returns, inversions, and turns. What turns, 
returns, and is repeated in these iterations are always particulars, purely mundane and 
material things that have no priority over the others. Yet, when taken up and carried 
along as examples, they become exemplars, indeed paradigms, which organize and 
reorganize the context from where they are culled. They do not have any more 
universality than the others, or more explanatory power; yet they stand in for the totality. 
It is quite a magical effect. 
This process seems to be as common in the discussions of the humanists as it is in 
the latest theories of performance, ideology, or historiography (which are the disciplines I 
have mostly engaged with). The break between seventeenth-century mimetologies and 
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our own does not seem more radical than the continuity that the humanists had the 
confidence to suppose between them and the ancients, such that they could in fact aim to 
become like them. It might be an effect of what I called Machiavelli’s mimetology of the 
eternal return: events repeat themselves, it is only because subjects do not return that 
history is not purely cyclical.  
The dorsal turn would say: what returns is the turn, and the subject is constituted 
there where he turns. This is the event.  
What this means is that, at the risk of conjuring up eternal structures, 
mimetologies will not disappear. This is not to say that they are outside of time or history, 
that they have some self-identity in a Platonic world of ideas. Rather, that, as I have just 
shown, that they don’t stop repeating themselves. They will continue to return for as long 
as we keep using the same languages, texts, and philosophies, listen to the same music 
and look at the same images. There is no jumping out of mimetology. I hope to have 
showed that narratives of development, discontinuity or emancipation simply replace one 
mimetology with a different one that serves a better purpose (to someone). It is this gap 
between a narrative and its function that has made me grown suspicious of them. In fact, 
it is no less fanciful to propose that one or all mimetologies will disappear, or that we will 
return to this or that mimetology which seems better than the one we currently live in and 
which, as it becomes apparent, has been created through the negative mirroring of the 
current state (examples of this are Foucault’s epistemes and, especially, Attali’s orders). 
But how does this affirmation of the permanence of mimetologies square up with 
the idea that history is the arrival of the unexpected? Does not this presume that 
mimetology will determine the shape of what will arrive, thus making it entirely 
predictable? Recall Kamuf’s characterization of the New Historicist’s gesture: raising an 
apotropaic mirror that protects one from the arrival of the “more than one but also other 
than one.” The apotropaic function and the mirror have been familiar to us since Part I, in 
fact since one of the first extant mentions of the word mimesis and one of the first 
(Greek) accounts of the origin of music: Pindar’s Pythian 12, which speaks of the art, or 
technē which Athena invented by weaving together the dirge of the Gorgons, 
so that she might imitate (mimesthai) with instruments the echoing wail 
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that was forced from the gnashing jaws of Euryale.43 
Athena’s technē was an apotropaic (as was the likeness of Medusa that she carried in her 
shield and which the Romans adopted). Imitating the gorgon’s cry, the art of weaving 
together a melody with every sound was the protection that she gave mortals against the 
monster (against what shows itself, what appears as an omen). Plato reproduced the 
gesture, banishing mousikē and using a mirror to reduce mimesis into a simple trick. 
Whatever was threatening to Plato—disorder, madness, “hysteria,” femininity—it was a 
matter of keeping it under control. Mimetologies are such attempts to fend off the 
unknown, to reduce difference into sameness and plurality into unity. They have an 
immunitary function and we have incorporated them everywhere to the point of making 
them invisible (we have seen often that mimesis is a matter of contagion). But at the same 
time, as per the structure of the immunitary, these modes of protection have become 
coextensive with our ideas of sovereignty, power, and life. The task of outlining 
mimetologies is not to conjure anything away, but to make these apotropaic gestures 
visible and to underline the conditions of finitude and vulnerability that the modern 
ideologies and metaphysics everywhere seek to repress. Being open to the unexpected is 
a matter of constant vigilance, vigilance of one’s own immunitary practices, denegations, 
and evasions.  
What the dorsal turn and the visor effect teach us, in the end, is that understanding 
how these inescapable structures operate is, if not the only possibility, at least the 
necessary condition for surviving in a time when the very ideas of openness and 
difference seem to be in crisis. The affirmation of difference as such has been 
transformed into a forceful tool of a pervasive neoliberalism which thrives on producing 
fragmentation and disempowerment on the name of values such as individuality, 
originality, and all the epithets of the entrepreneur. Difference has been integrated 
seamlessly into a conception of sovereignty based on the liberal ideology that presents 
                                                
43 Pindar. Olympian Odes, Pythian Odes, (Trans. William H Race, Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1997). Translation modified after Steiner, “The Gorgon’s Lament,” 206. 
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freedom and ownership of oneself as the ultimate values while reducing individuals to the 
status of bare life.  
In this light, the rigorous theoretical work done in the past decades, for which 
mimesis as simulacrum was central, seems to be in a dangerous complicity with the 
spread of neoliberalism. The limitations of postmodern simulacrum are many, and I hope 
that this account mimetology might serve to outline them as such. But it is all the more 
important to resist the straightforward assimilation of these discourses to the form they 
have been taken in—and transformed—by neoliberalism. This too is a consequence of 
iterability. Just as it is possible for ultra-right demagogues in Colombia to adopt the 
language of opposition and civil resistance, nothing keeps neoliberalism (nothing, it 
seems) from taking up the words and concepts that have been forged precisely in the 
name of what opposes it. Nothing keeps it, either, from also producing bodies that are 
disempowered, fragile, and exposed, and setting them against each other.  
As an immigrant in a nation that has produced the most contradictory (the best 
and the worst, but there’s no count on either) statements on difference and alterity, an 
immigrant however in what I still think are the best possible conditions, I wake up every 
day (especially when trying to bring this dissertation to a close) to read about millions of 
forced displacements, of the radical uprooting of entire communities which are expelled 
from wherever they are and placed on a drift with no seeming end. Only to be received 
here and in Europe with the most vicious xenophobia (which is worse than no reception 
at all). And, in the starkest contradiction, the people that have become more vocal in their 
rejection of difference are precisely those that have paid the highest price for the 
totalization of neoliberalism. Two equally disempowered and fragile groups are then set 
against each other on account of a “difference” that is reduced to identity (of religion and 
race). That the same ideology that has “coopted” difference as one of its commercial war-
horses is also bringing back a discourse against difference is enough to see that we are 
not, and will not, be done with a thinking of difference. A practice of identifying 
mimetologies—mechanisms of defense against alterity—is at least a form of keeping this 
thought alive. 
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These are some of my conclusions (and they are offered here as an interlude; I 
return to L’Orfeo and history below). Others might follow and others have been left out. I 
have always found it problematic to reach conclusions, to settle the matter. Perhaps this is 
what has attracted me to deconstruction and what has motivated me to return to a 
problem and a set of texts and works that will never be closed. What I have learned from 
this practice is that returning to texts, places, songs, is not only to keep them alive but to 
make them do something they never did before, to open and transform themselves and 
transform anything that comes near them. In this sense, they are new: they incomplete 
themselves every time. It is this condition that enables deconstruction and that keeps me 
coming back to them, returning to their side—as Orpheus keeps coming back, as he keeps 
turning, knowing that he will lose what he seeks—and yet keep turning, hoping they will 
incomplete me as well: this is why deconstruction is love.  
SIC ERAT IN FATIS (THUS IT WAS FATED)44 
Assuming, then, that there is an allegorical identification between Orfeo and Prince 
Francesco, L’Orfeo, and recalling the perspectival structure of L’Euridice in which the 
sovereign is only put on stage the better to be advised by his subordinates, then we can 
return to the “moral” of the story in the Apollonian ending. As in L’Euridice, it can be 
read as a stern reminder to the Prince—“now listen to me”—of his role in preserving the 
Gonzaga dynasty and clearly stating what the values of a true noble should be in terms 
that echo Machiavelli’s advice to the Prince: that above all he must show himself as 
being both generous and stern—in control of his emotions—in order to gain “praise.”  
Apollo (descende in una nuvola cantando) 
Perchè a lo sdegno ed al dolor in preda
Così ti doni o figlio?
Non è, non è consiglio 
Di generoso petto 
                                                
44 Pieter Paul Rubens, mourning the fall of Mantua to Emperor Ferdinand II in 1630. Parisi, “Ducal 
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Servir al proprio affetto; 
Quinci biasmo e periglio 
Già sovrastar ti veggio,
Onde movo dal ciel per darti aita.
Or tu m’ascolta e n’avrai lode e vita. 
 
Apollo (descending on a cloud, singing) 
Why to anger and grief in prey 
do you so give yourself, O son? 
It is not, it is not the counsel 
of a generous heart 
to serve its own feelings. 
Since with reproach and danger 
already I see you overcome, 
I come from heaven to give you aid. 
Now listen to me and you shall have praise and life. 
Thus heard, L’Orfeo seems to be uncannily prophetic: the Gonzaga dynasty was entering 
a period of intense crisis, not only because of the European wide conflicts that would 
escalate into the Thirty Years’ War, but more locally since, as Susan Parisi has shown in 
her fascinating study of the Mantuan court, Duke Vincenzo was less Apollonian than the 
opera would like us to believe. Having inherited sovereignty of Mantua and Monferrat at 
age twenty-five he lived at the end of a relatively prosperous and peaceful time, during 
which his frugal father Gugielmo had managed to amass a considerable fortune. Unlike 
his father, however, Vincenzo quickly spent the fortune and debt quickly rose. Parisi 
notes imprudent economic decisions such as lavish celebrations for his coronation and 
decreasing the tariff on wine—which was the second largest source of income for the 
city-state. He had four illegitimate children and kept a mistress, Agnes di Argotta, 
Marchesa of Grana, in the Palazzo del Tè. More problematic was Vincenzo’s fondness of 
warfare, which led him into several careless military endeavors in Hungary and Turkey, 
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and his conspicuous gambling problem: he lost 50,000 ducats in Florence in 1598 and 
100,000 in Genoa in 1607. In addition, he was so fond of traveling and hunting and 
fishing (in the company of Alfonso II d’Este), that he was constantly absent from his 
duties at court. A 1608 letter by the Venetian Francesco Morosini, quoted by Parisi, in 
fact reads as the very opposite of Apollo’s admonishing to Orfeo: 
The duke, now forty-six years old, is not in the best of health, in fact, he has many 
light illnesses which often plague him, made worse by the lack of order in his life 
and by his continued conviction that he will nevertheless keep doing what gives 
him pleasure and enjoyment, such that, for good reason, what the Grand Duke of 
Tuscany has said is quite right: that his youth has never ended, because he has not 
yet put an end to any of the pleasures and delights of his earlier years.45 
He seems as little Apollonian, then, as he looks Machiavellian. Another of his 
unreasonable economic expenditures was building a citadel and military garrison for the 
cost of one million ducats in Casadel, Monferrato to protect it from Spanish and 
Savoyard interest—a decision Parisi declares to have been “a serious error in political 
and economic judgment.”46 The Venetian ambassador to Mantua said that it had not 
served to protect the territories but had rather increased the envy of foreign states: in fact, 
the Savoyard had a first attempt at taking the castle in 1613. The ambassador was simply 
repeating Machiavelli, who had warned about such endeavors in chapter XX of The 
Prince—his example was the Sforza castle in Milan—warning they are often more 
harmful than productive. As always, it depends on the circumstances: “if a ruler is more 
afraid of his own subjects than of foreigners, he should build fortresses; but a ruler who is 
more afraid of foreigners than his own subjects should not build them.”47 Instead of 
fortresses, Machiavelli advises, the ruler should focus in fending off hatred from their 
own people, since no fortress can protect him from an uprising: “Hence, the best fortress 
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a ruler can have is not to be hated by the people.”48 This seems to have been the only 
thing in which Vincenzo followed Machiavellian as well as Apollonian advice. He was 
admired because of his good nature and compassion for others, and his spending, which 
after all remained within the principality, contributed to his popularity—or, as in the 
more abstract terms of chapter 5, produced his value as noble by putting in circulation his 
economic and symbolic capital instead of accumulating it. Parisi mentions an anonymous 
chronicler who states that Vincenzo’s “long tenure in office also endeared him to his 
subjects who, by the early 1600s, began to grow accustomed to his human faults and to 
accept them—even to hold them dear.”49 
As we know, Vincenzo made music and spectacle a central part of his economic 
performance of nobility, aiming to recruit the best musicians in Europe—including 
Monteverdi—and engaging in the courtly agonistic emulatio of Florentine spectacle, his 
most lavish event being the performance of Guarini’s Il Pastor Fido in 1598 and the 
celebrations for Prince Francesco’s marriage to Margherita, daughter of Carlo Emanuele I 
of Savoy, in 1608, which featured Guarini’s Idropica with a prologue by Monteverdi and 
intermedi by Gabriele Chiabrera, along with the Rinuccini-Monteverdi collaborations 
Arianna and Balletto delle ingrate. These celebrations, Parisi notes, where over four 
times as expensive as the Medici weddings of 1600 and 1608.50 Thus, the carnival of 
1607 when L’Orfeo was premiered and the wedding events of 1608 were to be the last of 
the great spectacles produced by Vincenzo. The cost of these events and other wedding 
spending meant that in the next few years, such productions declined. In 1610 the Po 
overflowed, causing such illnesses, deaths, and damage, that Leonora wrote to 
Francesco—who was enjoying carnival in Turin—that “if you were here it would almost 
seem to you as if it were not carnival; for the misfortunes that happened around here this 
year have taken away everyone’s desire to indulge in carnival amusements and 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 Parisi, “Ducal Patronage of Music in Mantua, 1587-1627,” 114. 
50 Machiavelli, The Prince, 144. 
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pastimes.”51 Gone were the times of allegrezza. Orfeo’s turn, in 1607, would have been a 
prophetic event, anticipating the crisis to come. 
 Leonora and Vincenzo died two years later, one month apart, leaving Prince 
Francesco in charge. Parisi notes that he took it upon himself to set aright the court 
finances after decades of spending by his father. The strict measures he took in correcting 
Vincenzo’s excess—including the dismissal of the artists and personalities then employed 
at court, including Monteverdi—and a more circumspect personality, earned him a 
negative reputation among his people, used as they were to the lavish personality and 
spending of Vincenzo. But the wars were coming. In 1611 the equally warlike Duke of 
Parma seized in territories in Parma by accusing the landowners of plotting with 
Vincenzo Gonzaga against him. Francesco sought to defend his father’s honor by 
diplomatic means, but was finally forced to move troops in preparation for war, a move 
that was countered by Parma. The Spanish king intervened and the troops retired. The 
feud was never solved, and in 1612 Francesco’s children, Princess Leonora and Prince 
Lodovico—heir to the throne—died. Francesco followed them a year later, leaving no 
male heir to the throne. 
Francesco’s brother Cardinal Ferdinando arrived in haste as Duke Carlo 
Emanuele I of Savoy sought to claim succession rights for Mantua through Princess 
Maria—then aged three—and Francesco’s widow Margherita. This is where the 
patrilineal descent allegorized in L’Orfeo, if nothing else, was to help the Gonzaga, for 
the Savoyan scheme was thwarted. Thus, Duke Emanuele I changed his approach and 
invaded Monferrat—which had been Savoy territory in the fourteenth century—and Nice, 
thus bringing Spain into the conflict. The Spanish army interceded and five years later, an 
international court declared Monferrat to be rightfully under Mantuan rule.52 This is 
where, in another turn, patrilineal descent was to become more problematic. Ferdinando 
transferred his cardinalate to his brother Vincenzo II and married Caterina de’ Medici, 
                                                
51 Parisi, “Ducal Patronage of Music in Mantua, 1587-1627,” 151. 
52 Ibid., 275. 
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but Vincenzo II secretly married his distant relative, Isabella di Noevellara, and was 
stripped of the cardinalate. Both couples failed to produce male heirs. 
Vincenzo II died in 1627, designating as his successor a member of the French 
side of the family, Carlo I Gonzaga of Nevers-Rethel and married Maria Gonzaga to 
Carlo’s son, Carlo II. Both Habsburg Spain and Savoy saw this as an incorporation of 
Mantua to France, and together invaded Monferrat and laid siege to Casale, while 
advancing Ferrante II Gonzaga, Duke of Guasalla, as the legitimate heir (since the Savoy 
effort to advance Maria had failed). France sent troops to defend Mantua, and Emperor 
Ferdinand II intervened, declaring himself in control of the principate until the succession 
was defined—thus making the internal conflict an official theater of the Thirty Years’ 
War. The Emperor’s troops sieged Mantua in 1629, the same year as the plague broke, 
and the city fell in 1630. All of this could have been avoided if Maria Gonzaga had been 
recognized as rightful inheritor: even if Mantua defended patrilineal descent, Monferrat 
had been annexed through marriage, and thus was inheritable by women. As Rubens put 
it, Emperor Ferdinand’s decision to negate her the privilege was a truly sovereign 
decision: “In fact, I see here no grounds for exclusion, unless sit pro ratione voluntas (it 
be will instead of reason).”53 In the end, it was an perverse kind of deus ex machina that 
restored peace in Mantua: as the papacy mediated to end the conflicts, King Gustavus 
Adolphus was invading the German states, forcing Emperor Ferdinand to abandon his 
three-day control of Mantua and return to the north.
                                                
53 Quoted in ibid., 364. 
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Harmonia Mundi: Music, Mimesis, and Cosmopolitics in 
Kircher’s Musurgia Universalis (1650) 
 
The “Lion of the North” began his attack on Germany with the disembark of a small 
army in Pomerania, in 1630. Or at least it seemed small to Emperor Ferdinand II of 
Austria, until he realized he would not be able to move his troops across the continent, 
from Mantua to the north, in time to offer any resistance.1 To be sure, King Gustavus 
Adolphus was only attempting to fend off Habsburg attempts to control commerce in the 
Baltic, and his first move only led him as far as the Prussian coast—like the emperor, he 
could not foresee the coming events. It was persuasion (and money) from the French—
who, to Richelieu’s regret, had agreed not to directly attack the Empire after the Mantuan 
war—which motivated him to continue moving south.2 But Ferdinand II and his army’s 
commander, Tilly, did not expect that Protestant Brandenburg and Saxony would also 
support Gustavus. And so, when attempting to defend Breitenfeld in 1631, the 
Imperialists were not only tired and outnumbered, but they could not compete with the 
Swedes’ now famous military technique. Tilly’s army was defeated in two hours, with 
two-thirds of the troops captured or killed. As Gustavus Adolphus advanced at full tilt 
towards the south, Franconians—both Catholic and Protestant—preferred to flee the king 
or to be forced to join him—in either case, the consequences seemed similar.3 No one 
was prepared for the attack. Finding virtually no opposition, the king subjugated the 
entire region in two weeks. 
                                                
1 Geoffrey Parker, The Thirty Years’ War (Routledge, 2006), 103. 
2 Ibid., 109–11. 
3 After the Lutheran Margrave Christian of Brandenburg-Kulmach surrendered and swore allegiance to 
Gustavus, the king’s troops proceeded to sack the town. “When the peasants attempted to drive out the 
intruders, in November 1632, they were massacred: a chronicler who visited the site of the peasants’ last 
stand was appalled to find the vineyards and fields red with blood, with corpses scattered in bizarre 
positions over a three-mile radius. Meanwhile, the margrave locked himself in his only defensible castle, 
the Plassenburg, and waited for the storm to subside. Such were the consequences for the former “neutrals” 
of Sweden’s victory at Breitenfeld.” Ibid., 114. 
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In the Catholic town of Würzburg—whose army of 1700 surrendered before the 
Lion’s arrival—it seemed as if the world had been turned upside down.4 But there, a 
thirty-year old priest teaching mathematics and Syriac at the Jesuit university after the 
recent defense of his dissertation on magnetism, saw the sack of the town six months 
before it happened: 
In 1631, when the whole of Germany was subject to the emperor, and the 
Catholics were enjoying the most profound peace, when no one had the slightest 
idea that the enemy [Haereticorum] could so easily raise his head again, I was in 
the middle of one night disturbed in my sleep by an unusual noise and I saw my 
window lit up by a sort of twilight glow. I promptly slipped out of bed to find out 
what the unusual glow meant. I could clearly observe that the entire spacious 
courtyard of the college was filled with horses and armed men drawn up in rank 
and file. Gripped by fear, I hurried to the adjoining cubicles. 
On finding everyone sound asleep, I thought I had been deceived in the depths of 
my own sleep. I sought out yet again my window. But the same spectacle was still 
there. Again I hastened away to summon witnesses for what I had seen, but I soon 
discovered that the vision had vanished. During the days which followed I was 
tortured by such intense mental agony that I could not bear to stay anywhere in 
one place and ran to and fro as if mad. 
I pictured to myself the casualties which would ensue with such graphic certainty 
that I could see them depicted as if in a mirror. Many, noticing my distress, asked 
me what was bothering me so much, among others my superior. I told him. 
‘Father let us pray to God, for I can sense that great disaster is impending not only 
for our college but also for Franconia and the whole of Germany. Reverend 
Father, give orders for the valuables in our church to be put somewhere safe. The 
new building too, which Your Reverence has begun, will not be completed’.5 
                                                
4 “Ecce novi et repentini bellorum turbines omnia susque deque verterunt.” Athanasius Kircher and H. A. 
Langenmantel, Vita. Fasciculus Epistolarum, (Augsburg: S. Utzschneider, 1684), 38. 
5 The majority of the information we have about Kircher’s early years is given in his autobiography, 
transcribed in Athanasius Kircher and Giunia Totaro, L’autobiographie d’Athanasius Kircher (Peter Lang, 
2009); English translation in John Edward Fletcher, A Study of the Life and Works of Athanasius Kircher, 
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 This prophecy, however, only met with laughter, so that when Gustavus Adolphus took 
the city in October 1631, leaving it without food, garrison, or defense, “each and every 
person threw together what he owned and tried to save his life by fleeing.” The Jesuits 
fled first, dissolving the entire college within twenty-four hours, having heard the enemy 
would spare no Jesuits.6 This would have been the third time that the immortal Kircher 
escaped from enraged Protestants, the first having been in 1622, when “the heretical 
bishop of Halberstadt,” a.k.a “The Mad Christian,” self-declared mortal enemy of the 
Jesuits, invaded Westphalia and eventually attacked the city of Paderborn, where Kircher 
was enrolled at the Jesuit University. Escaping to Cologne, Kircher finished his studies, 
before being transferred to Heiligenstadt.7 Enroute he was attacked—second time—by 
“Lutheran horsemen,” probably the remnants of Christian’s army after their defeat to 
Tilly.8 After threatening to kill him Kircher was released in a fit of tears. As a member of 
the order of Jesus’s soldiers, Kircher’s place seemed to be among books (he would be 
denied his request join missions to North Africa and China). Gustavus Adolphus was 
killed in 1632, but since “everything in Germany had been overturned and there was no 
hope at all of returning,” Kircher was sent to France. 
He was not to remain there long. The already famous priest was appointed as 
mathematician to replace Kepler at the imperial court in Vienna, but he never filled the 
post. He embarked from Marseilles, was shipwrecked on his way to Genoa, and landed 
eventually in Civitavecchia. Having lost his money and provisions, he set out to Rome 
instead, where none other than Pope Urban VIII and his nephew, Cardinal Francesco 
Barberini, awaited him. In Avignon, Kircher had met parliament senator Nicolas Claude 
Fabri de Peiresc, a learned nobleman who shared an interest in ancient languages. When 
Kircher was summoned to Vienna, Pereisc interceded, contacting Barberini to arrange for 
                                                                                                                                            
“Germanus Incredibilis”: With a Selection of His Unpublished Correspondence and an Annotated 
Translation of His Autobiography. (BRILL, 2011). For a highly entertaining and light-humored biography, 
see John Glassie, A Man of Misconceptions: The Life of an Eccentric in an Age of Change (Penguin, 2012). 
For a soberer account, see Paula Findlen’s introductory essay in Paula Findlen, Athanasius Kircher: The 
Last Man Who Knew Everything (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
6 Kircher, Vita. Fasciculus Epistolarum, 40; Fletcher, A Study, 485. 
7 Fletcher, A Study, 476, 480. 
8 Ibid., 513. 
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Kircher’s transfer to the Collegium Romanum where he could continue his work on 
Egyptian hieroglyphs—this, Kircher had not predicted. He remained in Rome for the rest 
of his life. 
ART OF CONSONANCE—ART OF POLITICS 
When Kircher published the Musurgia Universalis, Ars Consoni e Dissoni in the Jubilee 
year of 1650, he did not dedicate it to Cardinal Barberini or to Urban VIII—the latter had 
died in 1644—nor to the new pope, Innocent X, who commissioned him to erect the 
famous obelisk at Piazza Navona and translate its hieroglyphs. Neither did he dedicate it, 
like many others, to his new patron, Emperor Ferdinand III.9 Instead, he addressed it to 
the Emperor’s brother, Archduke Leopold William of Austria.10 
From the outset, Kircher makes it clear that the Ars Consoni, et Dissoni, the art of 
consonance and dissonance, is a thoroughly political matter. He presents it to the 
Archduke as that art by which Germany—father of the Roman Empire and many 
Princes—restores to the tranquil harmony or consensus [concentum] of peace the too-
dissonant character [mores, or ethos] of the Christian Republic.11 The Musurgia, then, is 
                                                
9 Nor to Cardinal Pamphili, who showed early interest in Kircher’s combinatorial methods and was, as Eric 
Bianchi holds, one of the early motivators for the Musurgia. Eric Bianchi, “Prodigious Sounds: Music and 
Learning in the World of Athanasius Kircher” (Ph.D. Diss., Yale University, 2011), 31. Cardinal Pamphili 
renounced the cardinalate for marriage at the same time as Ferdinand III showed interest in Kircher’s work 
on music. Ferdinand III declined the dedication of the Musurgia since, as his confessor Johannes Gans 
wrote, “not every work has to be dedicated to the same person.” Quoted in Gábor Almási, A Divided 
Hungary in Europe: Exchanges, Networks and Representations, 1541-1699; Volume 1 – Study Tours and 
Intellectual-Religious Relationships (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), 163. 
10 Leopold William had a modest role, to say the least, at the end of the war. He led the Spanish troops 
against France in August, 1648. The army was crushed and Ferdinand III was forced to capitulate to France, 
as Bohemia was falling again to the Swedes. Incidentally, Leopold William also fought against the Swedes 
near Breitenfeld led by Torstensson, who “won a victory almost as complete as that of Gustavus, on the 
same terrain, eleven years before.” Parker, The Thirty Years’ War, 152, 167. 
11 Sistit se conspectui fulgentissimo Serenitatis tuae Ars Magna Consoni, et Dissoni, quo potissimum 
tempore plus nimio dissonantes Christianae Reip mores ad tranquillum pacis concentum revocat TUA, et 
Imperii Romanum et magnorum Principum parens Germania. Athanasius Kircher, Musurgia Universalis 
Sive Ars Magna Consoni Et Dissoni: In X. Libros Digesta : Quà Vniuersa Sonorum doctrina, & 
Philosophia, Musicaeque tam Theoricae, quam practicae scientia, summa varietate traditur; admirandae 
Consoni, & Dissoni in mundo, adeoque Universa Natura vires effectusque, uti nova, ita peregrina variorum 
speciminum exhibitione ad singulares usus, tum in omnipoene facultate, tum potissimum in Philologia, 
Mathematica, Physica, Mechanica, Medicina, Politica, Metaphysica, Theologica, aperiuntur & 
demonstrantur. (Rome: Corbelletti, 1650); I have consulted various copies available through Google Books, 
plus copies in the Rare Books collection of the University of Pennsylvania and in the Biblioteca Nacional 
de Colombia, Bogotá. I have also used the facsimile edition by Ulf Scharlau, Musurgia universalis 
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an ars politica, a means to bring harmony, to command and control the mores of the 
people. Or, more precisely, the Ars Consoni, et Dissoni explains consonance and 
dissonance as an all-pervasive ontological condition, a universal principle, that we know 
from studying the world: “Consonum sine dissono, dissonum sine consono subsistere 
nequaquam posse Deus, Natura, Politice, docet.” Neither consonance without dissonance 
nor dissonance without consonance can subsist. This is what God, Nature, and Politics 
teach us, and so the Musurgia will demonstrate. 
As Tiziana Pangrazi writes, the dedication synthesizes the entire work. Music is 
not so much a discipline but the principle common to these three ontological registers—
God, Nature, and Politics. God created the world according to number, weight, 
measure—that is, harmony—and Nature expresses it everywhere. Politics, Kircher goes 
on, consists in leading the Empire and the people towards happy ends [felicitatis fines 
dirigendis]; it is the maximum order and the basis for all human action. For achieving his 
goal, the Prince participates of divine power, a harmonic force [vis harmozousa12]—that 
Kircher will elsewhere call amor or magnetism, according to the context—which binds 
everything together. Thus, Princes are like God: just as He harmonizes the heaven, so do 
the kings of the people imitate Him when ruling through admirable decrees. Princes are 
Aemuli and Vicars of God. In this respect the Prince is the center of a political microcosm 
which reflects the macrocosmos, one which operates according to the laws—as music 
does—of dissonance and consonance. 
                                                                                                                                            
(Hildesheim.; New York: G. Olms, 1970). There is an abriged German translation from 1662, also 
published as facsimile. Athanasius Kircher, Kircherus Jesuita Germanus Germaniae Redonatus Sive Artis 
Magnae de Consono & Dißono Ars Minor Das Ist Philosophischer Extract Und Auszug, Aus Deß Welt-
Berühmten Teutschen Jesuitens Athanasii, trans. Andreas Hirsch (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1988). According to 
the scholarship on the Musurgia and after Kircher’s own practice, the two volumes of the Musurgia will be 
referred to as Mus. A and B, respectively. 
12 As Pangrazi explains, this Kircherian word combines harmonia and harmozō. Before recalling the 
musical sense, this word expresses, in Homer, for example, the action and criterion for ship-building. Its 
early Greek sense—from which the musical sense derives—is more that of planning and the correct 
following of rules for achieving balance and equilibrium. Tiziana Pangrazi, La Musurgia universalis di 
Athanasius Kircher: contenuti, fonti, terminologia (Olschki, 2009), 18. A related term is harmostes, joiner 
of adaptor, which was the Spartan term for a military commander. Elsewhere, Kircher calls God the divine 
harmostes. 
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The dedication contains all the elements of Kircher’s theory of political theology, 
as analyzed at depth by Felicia Englmann.13 Focusing on Kircher’s 1670 Principis 
Christiani Archetypon—the Jesuit’s most elaborate political work—Englmann has noted 
the rigor of Kircher’s political thinking, which integrates the Hermetic Neo-Platonism of 
Nicolas Cusanus and Marsilio Ficino—where God, although unknowable, is present in 
everything, omnia in omnibus, and binds everything together through amor—with the 
Christian anthropology and politics of Erasmus of Rotterdam, in which the only possible 
society is a Christian monarchy led by a virtuous prince. Kircher, Englmann argues, 
presented not only an ideal State or a perfect Prince, but through his incorporation of 
hermetic philosophy, ancient history, and natural philosophy he presented a way of 
understanding the place of men in the universe so that they could benefit from Divine 
Providence. Understanding human society as a microcosmos and an image of God means 
bringing divine order into the world, uniting men in the most direct way towards the 
divine spheres.14 
Kircher, therefore, occupies the place that Benjamin and Schmitt described, of a 
political theology in a Catholic context that mobilized all the resources of baroque 
mimesis towards establishing and legitimizing the absolute ruler as an image of God (see 
Part III). Why then, as Englmann herself asks, did Kircher’s political theology have 
barely any reception or resonance?15 It is indeed puzzling. Kircher was a dear protégée of 
Emperor Ferdinand III and Archduke Leopold, and a favorite of all the popes who ruled 
through his life; he was the true center of the respublica literaria and, even as his fame 
began to wane, he continued to be highly admired throughout the eighteenth century.16 
For Englmann, the reason is not that Kircher was outmoded, or that the polymath’s heady 
tracts and allegorical constructions were beyond the reach of his readers, dazzled by a 
meraviglia not unlike the audiences of the intermedi (see chapter 7). Rather, she argues, it 
                                                
13 Felicia Englmann, Sphärenharmonie und Mikrokosmos: das politische Denken des Athanasius Kircher 
(1602-1680) (Köln: Böhlau, 2006). 
14 Ibid., 366. 
15 Ibid., 367. 
16 Englmann finds little to no evidence for the reception of the Principis Christiani Archetypon, a 
resounding silence that contrasts with the often clamorous reception his larger works, the Musurgia 
included. For Kircher’s epistolary relations, see Fletcher, A Study; John Fletcher, Athanasius Kircher Und 
Seine Beziehungen Zum Gelehrten Europa Seiner Zeit (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1988). 
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is because history took a different course. Far from being outmoded or simply a 
conservative, Kircher was writing an alternative theory of political theology for the future 
in a time of crisis and sweeping transformations of the very notions of the cosmos and its 
epistemology. Where Kircher sought for universal integration under a single, divine 
principle that encompassed everything from the cosmos to the individual—from his 
position the best option after the Thirty-Years’ War—Cartesian mathesis and mechanistic 
materialism sought for disintegration as a means for expanding instrumental reason.17 If 
history took a different course, it was not Kircher’s fault. 
ONTO-THEO-COSMO-MUSICOLOGY 
To recall the terms of Part III, if modernity was a turn towards a perspectival, vision-
centered and mechanized universe, Kircher occupied the dorsal space produced by the 
turn, a position that necessarily gave him a different perspective. But if modernity turned 
its back on Kircher, he wasn’t left behind. This is perhaps better seen through the 
Musurgia than through the more political or Hermetic works (the Musurgia, I insist, is 
both). The Musurgia had a global resonance that lasted much longer than any of 
Kircher’s works. It became the main reference book on music for more than a hundred 
years, until it was replaced by more “modern” musical dictionaries and encyclopedias.18 
Most importantly, as we know from a letter by Kircher, the Musurgia was disseminated 
across the globe faster and with more efficiency than any of his works at the time (and 
arguably than any single author): of the 1500 copies of the Musurgia, 300 were given to 
Jesuits coming from around the world for the meeting of the Congregation General in 
1650. It was thus immediately distributed around the globe: ‘et in Africam, Asiam et 
Americam distracta fuerunt’.19 This gives the Musurgia a unique role which I believe has 
                                                
17 Englmann, Sphärenharmonie und Mikrokosmos, 370. 
18 Bianchi, “Prodigious Sounds,” 214; John Zachary Mckay, “Universal Music-Making: Athanasius Kircher 
and Musical Thought in the Seventeenth Century” (Ph.D. Diss., Harvard University, 2012). 
19 Kircher to Joannes Jansson, n.d., Kircher MS 561, fol. 79r., Archivio della Pontificia Università 
Gregoriana, Rome. Quoted in Mckay, “Universal Music-Making,” 2. 100 copies were sent to Austria, 
England, and Spain; 250 remained in Italy, and the publishers kept 700 for sale. Fletcher, A Study, 417. A 
copy in the Biblioteca Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, is registered as “Ex-libris: ms. Provincia Novi Regni 
donum authoris.” Even in 1825, Kircher’s tuba stentorophonica (from the Phonurgia Nova) was studied in 
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not been emphasized by the many recent studies devoted to it, which invariably describe 
it as a summa or an encyclopedia that collects all the musicological knowledge— as an 
universal knowledge—available to Kircher’s time and thus serves to paint an accurate 
portrait of baroque musical thought, such as the classification of styles or the first 
affektenlehre.20 Englmann’s repositioning of Kircher not as a reactionary but as a 
visionary, on the other hand, presses us to consider the Musurgia in its political and 
global dimensions, as well as a cosmopolitics. 
There is no agreement as to what the main purpose of the Musurgia was—a 
political text, an encyclopedia, or a demonstration of a method of composition based on 
combinatorics. It hardly matters. For all we know—based on the Vita—Kircher wrote 
almost as a distraction from his main interest, translating the Egyptian hieroglyphs.21 But 
we can tell from the work itself what role and function he assigned to it. In the 
frontispiece of the second volume, Kircher quotes (freely) from chapter VI of the 
Hermetic Asclepius: “Music is nothing other than understanding the order of 
                                                                                                                                            
Bogotá in lectures on physics. José Félix de Restrepo, Lecciones de fisica para los jovenes del Colejio 
Mayor Seminario de San Bartolome (Bogota: Impreso por F.M. Stokes, 1825), 78. Kircher’s most 
illustrious readers in the New World were Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz and Carlos Sigüenza y Góngora, 
arguably the most important intellectuals from New Spain. Moreover, as Paula Findlen argues, “it is no 
exaggeration to say that a Mexican nun was one of the best readers Kircher ever had.” Findlen, Athanasius 
Kircher, 349. Bianchi recorded mentions of the Musurgia in Kircher’s correspondence coming from Manila 
in 1654 (APUG 562 14r); Puebla, Mexico, 1661 (APUG 568 73r.); Lisbon, October, 1656. Bianchi, 
“Prodigious Sounds,” p. 10. For a more general account of Kircher’s reception around the globe, see the 
essays in Findlen, Athanasius Kircher section V: The Global Shape of Knowledge. 
20 Appreciation of the Musurgia in the twentieth century has grown since Fletcher first described the work 
in his 1966 thesis (published as Fletcher, A Study., its examination still follows the guidelines set by Ulf 
Scharlau, Athanasius Kircher (1601-1680) Als Musikschriftsteller Ein Beitrag Zur Musikanschauung Des 
Barock (Marburg: Görich & Weiershäuser, 1969). See Melanie Wald, Welterkenntnis Aus Musik: 
Athanasius Kirchers “Musurgia Universalis” Und Die Universalwissenschaft Im 17. Jahrhundert (Kassel: 
Bärenreiter, 2006); Pangrazi, La Musurgia universalis di Athanasius Kircher; Bianchi, “Prodigious 
Sounds,” 3; Mckay, “Universal Music-Making.” 
21 “Since I was, however, filling the chair of mathematics in Rome, I felt it also incumbent upon me to 
publish some samples from the area of my specialist expertise, all the more so since my opponents were 
casting doubt on my experience in this field. During the period in which I held my chair I wrote then three 
works: the Magnes sive de arte magnetica, the Ars magna lucis et umbrae and the Musurgia universalis. 
On their appearance these works were greeted—praise be to God—with no light applause. But this same 
applause provided also the stimulus for more importunate attacks against me. It was said that I was now 
exclusively occupied with mathematical studies since I had come up against irreconcilable difficulties with 
my hieroglyphic researches. I was further said to have despaired of the possibility of deciphering the 
hieroglyphs and to have given up all hope of writing a book on the subject.” Fletcher, A Study, 492. 
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everything.”22 Following this thought, Book 10 is not so much the cosmos represented as 
music but music presented as a mode of understanding of the cosmos: philosophia 
musica. It is assumed that Kircher borrowed the title Universalis (among other things) 
from Marin Mersenne’s own treatise, Harmonie Universelle.23 It is indeed a fitting title, 
not only because of the musical dimension of the universe that Kircher sets out to 
demonstrate, but also, or moreover, because of how the Musurgia uniquely exemplifies 
the role of encyclopedic treatises in what can arguably be the globalization of knowledge 
in the early modern period. Traveling around the globe, the Musurgia was itself a 
performance of its own claims. The Musurgia, after all, was not a pedagogical or 
hermeneutical treatise like those of his predecessors—Gaffurio, Zarlino, Mersenne, et 
al.—but a mousiké ergon, a musical deed or even an opera, an action and an 
actualization, to recall the terms of Part III: a setting in action of music in the universe, as 
the universe. As an Ars Magna, a science of the universe, it is not just a “universal music-
making,” not simply a work about the production of music in the world, but itself a 
musical work, an ergon: a productive and accomplishing activity. Not so much a summa 
of all knowledge on music but its praxis, a production of universal knowledge through 
knowledge. The double genitive of universalis makes it clear: it is the mousikē ergon of 
the universe, of all the forms of music contained in it, but also the mousikē that belongs to 
the universe, the ergon, the actuality or effectivity of the universe as music. And what 
enables this ergon, of course, is mimesis—an excessive assemblage (not a synthesis at 
all) of all the ancient and modern musical mimetologies. 
 
When composing it, Kircher collected information from all the corners of the world 
through the epistolary network of the Jesuits, and crafted it into a complete system that 
aimed to integrate the most ancient knowledge of the Egyptians with the most recent 
reports from the Jesuit missionaries. By being shipped across the globe, the Musurgia 
                                                
22 Musica nihil aliud est, quam omnium ordinem scire. Mus. B. 2. 
23 Bianchi, “Prodigious Sounds,” 73; Findlen, Athanasius Kircher, 23. 
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would reencounter itself in the world and verify its universality. It would become the 
ergon, the actuality that it claimed for itself. 
Thus, the universality of this knowledge/praxis is not only limited to the scope of 
the work, to its character of summa, or to its factual distribution around the globe. 
Starting from the Hermetic dictum of the second frontispiece (quoted above), the 
Musugia theorizes universality as such and presents music—understood in a thoroughly 
mimetic way—as the best means to know it. The Musurgia collected a form of 
knowledge that presented itself as universal—Hermetism and Neo-Platonism in the 
figures of Ficino and Cusano—described it as music and through music—as an art of 
consonances and dissonances—to then recirculate this musical universe around the globe, 
in the hands of travelers and especially Jesuit missioners. 
However, the universe of Cusano is not the same as the globe that the Musurgia 
would then circumnavigate: this is what makes the Musurgia an exemplary work. At the 
same time it theorizes and participates in a transition from one cosmology to another, a 
process Peter Sloterdijk describes as the passage from the first to the second 
globalization. In fact, we have to conceive ancient Greek cosmology as a spherology, a 
philosophy of the world and of God as all-encompassing globes. Sloterdijk names this the 
“cosmic-uranian globalization.” The Renaissance marks the climax and decline of this 
spheric metaphysics. The navigations of the Portuguese, the ‘revolutions’ of Copernicus 
and Kepler, signal the passage to the terrestrial globalization, “realized practically 
through Christian-capitalist seafaring and politically implanted through the colonialism of 
the Old European nation-states,” two major chapters of what our own times experiences 
as an “electronic” globalization.24 For Sloterdijk, what distinguishes these three chapters 
are their symbolic and technical media: 
It makes an epochal difference whether one measures an idealized orb with lines 
and cuts, sails around a real orb with ships, or lets airplanes and radio signals 
circulate around the atmospheric casting of a planet. It makes an ontological 
difference whether one envisages the one cosmos, which fully encloses the world 
                                                
24 Peter Sloterdijk, In the World Interior of Capital: Towards a Philosophical Theory of Globalization 
(Polity, 2013), 9. 
Epilogue 
 
423 
of essences, or the one earth, which serves as the bearer of various world-
formations.25 
What is crucial about the Musurgia, I argue, is that it falls precisely in the passage from 
one sphere to the other and partakes of the two epochal symbolic and technological media 
separating the ancient cosmos from the modern world. Moreover, just as Kircher’s 
politics are not simply a reactionary absolutism or an empty utopianism, the Musurgia 
does not just measure an idealized world through a musical metaphor. It examines all 
forms of music-making available for a figure sitting at the very center of that globe, and 
aims to prove the universal validity of that musical conception of the cosmos, while 
employing the most advanced symbolic technologies—emblems, allegories, tables—and 
material ones—the press, epistolary networks, global missionaries—to distribute that 
knowledge around the world. 
This is even clearer we take the political motivation of the dedicatory to Archduke 
Leopold William. The dedicatory presents itself as a celebration of the end of the Thirty 
Years’ War, an event that arguably gave Europeans their first real sense of the global 
dimensions of the world, of the consequences produced by the interconnections of 
Europe’s Imperial enterprises: events in the Caribbean and Brazil would deprive Spain of 
the power to control the Low Countries or helping Austria fend off the invasion of 
Gustavus, while events in Italy and Turkey would bring Spain and France into a war they 
could not maintain.26 Most evident for Kircher, perhaps, was the religious fault line over 
which the conflict was fought, in which the Cusanian universe, where God is a circle 
whose circumference is everywhere, sharply contrasted with the barren world that the 
Protestants—to his Jesuit eyes—wanted to impose. As Englmann would argue, aiming to 
maintain the spheric metaphysics of the cosmic-uraninan globalization was an obvious 
political move. In this sense, then, in addition to encyclopedia and ars politica, the 
Musurgia Universalis is a war machine, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s terms: a nomad 
                                                
25 Sloterdijk, In the World Interior of Capital, 10. 
26 Parker, The Thirty Years’ War, 92; For a more sober statement of the point, see Roger Chickering and Stig 
Förster, War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815 (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
   424
assemblage that circulates outside or alongside the State and produces transformations of 
the nomos through affect.27 
There was something very concrete in Kircher’s approach, nonetheless, which 
formed part of new modes of spatial organization. In Sloterdijk’s narrative, the task of 
designing “the new image of the world” in modernity could not belong to metaphysicians 
after the sharp opposition between human mortality and cosmic perfection became 
unbearable. Rather, it fell to the geographers and seafarers: 
It was their mission to present the last orb in pictorial form. Of all large round 
bodies, only shell-less humanity’s own planet would henceforth have any 
meaning. The world-navigators, cartographers, conquistadors, world traders, even 
the Christian missionaries and their following of aid workers who exported 
goodwill and tourists who spent money on experiences at remote locations—they 
all behaved as if they had understood that, after the destruction of heaven, it was 
the earth itself that had to take over its function as the last vault. This physically 
real earth, as an irregularly layered, chaotically folded, storm eroded body, now 
had to be circumnavigated and quantified. Thus the new image of the earth, the 
terrestrial globe, rose to become the central icon of the modern world picture.28 
Kircher occupies several of these places. He traveled as much as he could—more as a 
tourist than as a cartographer or missionary—and sought to reconcile this “chaotically 
folded, storm eroded body” in his Mundus subterraneus (1665) with the spheric 
metaphysics of Cusanus. Similarly, he mobilized the Tychonian system to mediate 
between philosophy, the church, and experimental science in making sense of 
cosmological models after the “destruction of the heaven” in a cosmic-dream allegory, 
the Iter extaticum (1656). But before penning these works, Kircher addressed them more 
musico—in a musical mode or manner—mobilizing, or rather actualizing a centuries-old 
tradition of the harmony of the spheres, with modern astronomical observation, hermetic 
mythology, Cusanian spherology, and musical examples and experiments to produce an 
                                                
27 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
28 Sloterdijk, In the World Interior of Capital, 212. 
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onto-theo-cosmo-musicology, a theory of being and the universe as a musical divine 
creation. Everything that the humanists had accomplished by turning towards the past, 
Kircher integrated into a futuristic, allegoric cosmic opera to be distributed around the 
globe. 
Again, this onto-theo-cosmo-musicology is not an abstract treatise. Its 
incorporation of history, philosophy, description of musical practices ancient and 
contemporary, with musical examples culled from all around the world, along with its 
allegorical apparatus and the new composing methodology it advances, makes it a 
particularly effective type of what Sloterdijk calls a “canopy,” a portable symbolization 
of the sky, a means by which Europe made itself present across the ocean and beyond its 
own geographical limits. They produce a spatial poetics that contribute to the “epochal 
task of making the outside livable for the voyagers and invaders or feigning its 
integration and domination.”29 Sloterdijk mentions five types: nautical mythology; the 
Christian religion; loyalty to the princes of one’s mother country; the scientific 
documentation of the external space, and linguistic translation.30 In its theoretical aim and 
material construction, the Musurgia belongs, uniquely, in all these types. Carried across 
the globe, the Musurgia brought with it a musical image of the universe. Science, 
European history and mythology were uniquely unified through the principle of consoni 
dissoni, whose political aim, as we have seen, was explicit from the beginning. Music, 
then, was a system of translation that allowed Kircher to synthesize the self-excluding 
spheres of politics, religion, and science, and to distribute this synthesis as a unified 
whole across the globe. Most importantly, insofar as such a universe could only be 
comprehended from within Christian ontotheology—the Cusanian principle of omnia in 
omnibus—the determination of the universe as musical also meant that music became a 
constitutive part of the world-ecumenical, colonial enterprise of the church—especially in 
its Jesuit form. 
                                                
29 Sloterdijk, In the World Interior of Capital, 121. 
30 Ibid. 
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For Sloterdijk, this is the general, double function of the clerics on board: to 
provide seafarers with spiritual and metaphysical comfort—an insurance system—in case 
they perished in the outside, but also to ensure that such an outside could be effectively 
incorporated in its own cosmos.31 Furthermore, the loyalty to one’s princes meant that 
every emanation had to return to its origin. Every effigy and dedication to a European 
prince—such as Leopold William—not only brings his image into the New World, but 
also ensures that it returns to its origin. Characteristically, Kircher employs the trope of 
Memnon’s statue in the dedication to the Archduke.32 The sovereign is like the rays of 
light by which the author and hence the book are moved to sing [“ad cantum sum 
excitatus”]. This means, then, that the entire cosmos sings to the sovereign, from 
anywhere in the world. More pointedly, Sloterdijk credits the Jesuits with having 
developed the first global communications network: an Internet of fervent obedience 
formed by distant devotees of the center. This was the model for the worldwide 
operations of today’s telecommunications companies; the long-distance call was 
prefigured by the long-distance prayer of the pope. The Jesuits were the prototypical 
news group, communicating via their organization specific network.33 
Kircher benefited from this network in spectacular ways. The most elaborate and 
infamous of his attempts to produce an encyclopedia based on reports from the Jesuits 
was the China ilustrata (1667), which, as J. Michelle Molina shows, Kircher compiled 
using the latest reports from the missionaries, to document their findings and to broadcast 
them across the globe to entice more missionaries to join the worldwide enterprise.34 But, 
as various musicologists have noted, he also employed this strategy with the famous 
“singing sloth.”35 
                                                
31 Ibid., 128. 
32 Ego verò qui Aegyptii instar Memnonis non semel radiis munificae Serenitatis TUAE ad cantum sum 
excitatus; nae ipso saxeo Memnonio durior essem, nisi beneficentiae TUA sanè regiae perpetuà grati animi 
fide utcumque resonarem. (MUS A, dedication). See chapter 5 for Calcagno’s suggestion that Monteverdi’s 
dedication to Prince Francesco Gonzaga employs the same trope. 
33 Sloterdijk, In the World Interior of Capital, 129. 
34 Findlen, Athanasius Kircher, 21. 
35 Bianchi, “Prodigious Sounds,” 183ff; Suzannah Clark and Alexander Rehding, Music Theory and 
Natural Order from the Renaissance to the Early Twentieth Century (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3ff. 
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Finally, there was the role of translation in distributing Christianity around the 
globe when faced with the discovery of an unmanageable diversity of languages. The 
bible was translated into 1800 languages in what Sloterdijk calls “the continuation of the 
Pentecost miracle by Gutenbergian means. This project is inseparable from the search for 
a universal language. Here, once again, Kircher’s experiments on musical cryptography 
and combinatorics illuminate an aspect of the Jesuit baroque that went unexplored in 
Benjamin’s work. It is not so much the idea of an universal language, but the “The 
Reduction of All Languages to One” and the “The Extension of One Language to All” 
that Kircher advances on his Polygraphia nova et universalis of 1660 (also dedicated to 
Leopold William), a work that expands on several combinatoric, crypto-and stenographic 
techniques first developed in the Musurgia. But besides this restricted language of 
combinatorics, Kircher developed an even more universal and all-encompassing one: the 
mimetology of analogy and allegory, whose importance goes unremarked in Sloterdijk’s 
analysis. 
The Jesuits employed allegory for multiple purposes.36 As Benjamin argued, it 
was the Jesuits who perfected the genre of the mystery play that allowed for the 
reconciliation of pagan mythology and Christian theology.37 They also developed what 
we could call a principle of diplomatic mimeticism which, from Ignatius’s advice to be 
“all things to all people,” omnia omnibus, permitted and encouraged the missionaries to 
adapt to the different customs of the cultures they visited, performing a type of 
                                                
36 For example, the latin odes performed in conferral of degrees in the Collegium Romanum, as Saverio 
Franchi shows, which accomplished “l’unione ideale delle arti (lettere, musica, disegno) e della scienza 
filosofica o teologica, nel momento in cui il grado dottorale o magistrale conferito al laureando lo 
aggregava alla ‘respublica litterarum’ del mondo catolico. in Markus Engelhardt and Michael Heinemann, 
eds., Ars magna musices: Athanasius Kircher und die Universalität der Musik : Vorträge des deutsch-
italienischen Symposiums aus Anlass des 400. Geburtstages von Athanasius Kircher (1602-1680) : 
Musikgeschichtliche Abteilung des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom, in Zusammenarbeit mit der 
Hochschule für Musik “Carl Maria von Weber” in Dresden : Rom, Deutsches Historisches Institut, 16.-18. 
Oktober 2002 (Laaber: Laaber-Verlag, 2007), 282. 
37 See excursus in this dissertation and further the essays by O’Malley and Körndle in John W O’Malley, 
ed., The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). 
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“accommodation” or “cultural translation” in Peter Burke’s words.38 Kircher, a 
missionary working from within the library, also made use of this faculty, which he 
elaborated through the theory of allegory borrowed from Hermeticism and the doctrine of 
the prisca theologia, of the sacred, esoteric doctrine concealed in hieroglyphs.39 To this 
powerful amalgam Kircher added modern science, in a strategy that allowed him both to 
avoid being seen as a heretic after the recent condemnation of Galilei, and would further 
the Jesuit cause against the Protestant one, insofar as his multiple works bore the 
approval of the censors.40  
Furthermore, Carlos Ziller Camenietzki has emphasized the specificity of allegory 
and metaphor in Kircher’s hybrid writings, noting that although contemporary scientists 
like Galileo and Descartes used the same devices, they did so in ways that were 
constitutively different. “Cartesians made use of these cultural resources, but the 
expression ‘harmony of the world’ only had the function of embellishing their discourse 
and of suggesting precise numerical relationships between the things in the world,” 
whereas for Kircher it was “a specific way of conceiving the organization of the created 
world.”41 This difference, as I show below, consists precisely in what Kircher understands 
as the Mousikē ergon in and of the universe.  
ALLEGORY AND CREATION IN THE MUSURGIA UNIVERSALIS 
We can see the role that Kircher assigned to allegory by following Melanie Wald in her 
reading of the visual elements of the Musurgia, specifically of the allegory of the birth of 
the world, harmonia nascentis mundi, which opens the tenth and last book of the 
Musurgia Universalis [Figure 15].  
                                                
38 Peter Burke, “The Jesuits and the Art of Translation in Early Modern Europe” in ibid. [what ibid? in this 
chapter?] 
39 Findlen, Athanasius Kircher, 303ff. 
40 As Ingrid Rowland notes, sometimes he barely managed to do it. Two censors criticized him for his 
“pallid” rejection of the Copernican system in the Iter Extaticum, writing that “he is evidently prevaricating 
on the matter…and he is not doing so from the heart, but in order not to say anything openly contrary to the 
decrees and institutions of the Holy Roman Church.” Ingrid Rowland, The Ecstatic Journey: Athanasius 
Kircher in Baroque Rome (Chicago: University of Chicago Library, 2000), 19; See also Daniel Stolzenberg 
“Utility, Education, and Superstition: Jesuit Censorship and Athanasius Kircher’s Oedipus Aegyptiacus” in 
O’Malley, The Jesuits, 336ff. 
41 Carlos Ziller Camenietzki, “Baroque Science between the Old and the New World; Father Kircher and 
His Colleague Valentin Stansel (1621–1705)” in Findlen, Athanasius Kircher, 324. 
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All the other plates in the book are straight-forward illustrations of Kircher’s 
arguments, machines, and examples, from the dissection of the ear to the famous 
automata. They fulfill the double function of being illustrations and examples: paradigms, 
in short. On the other hand, this image and the frontispieces of the two tomes are not 
illustrations of Kircher’s arguments but are themselves arguments, summing up the 
different themes of the book in an allegorical unity, that is, expressing the unity of the 
book itself. Yet, unlike the frontispieces, the Iconismus of the harmonia nascentis mundi 
does have a text that elaborates on its meaning: a two-page “prelude” which narrates the 
creation allegory, and ten chapters entitled Registrum—like those of the organ—devoted 
to an exploration of the chain of beings connecting everything in the universe, from the 
four elements to God.42 
Kircher describes how first God created the organ, complete with pipes, registers 
manual, then produced matter, hyle, out of formless chaos through the word, then shaped 
it to create the four elements and gave them musical qualities, and so on. Kircher’s 
baroque prose flows freely as the prelude he is describing, unconcerned about theological 
conundrums or harmonic specifications, such as how is it that the organ precedes matter, 
or why are the black keys arranged in six groups of three. Kircher paints in broad strokes 
an allegory about the world being created as a musical work. Of obvious Platonic 
inspiration already commonplace in the seventeenth century, the closing book of the 
Musurgia seems to be most likely the result of one of Kircher’s ecstatic music listening 
nights in baroque Rome, just like the later Iter Exstaticum. 
This sensorial transduction is what makes this image a true allegory, a symbol, in 
Kircher’s words. “A symbol is a notation signifying some arcane mystery…it leads our 
soul by a certain similarity to the intelligence of something very different form the things 
                                                
42 The explanation of the Iconismus mentions six registers—one for each day of the creation—but Book X 
is divided into ten parts which do not entirely correspond to this previous division. Furthermore, Book X 
begins with a division in Pars I, Caput I, yet there are no more divisions of this type. This, along with 
differences in the chapter’s title in the index, might suggest that “the organization of Book X was changed 
late in the process of composition,” as McKay remarks. Mckay, “Universal Music-Making,” 140ff. 
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of sense-perception.”43 It is through some kind of notation, music, visual representations 
of music, that we can understand the cosmos, which even if musical has nothing to do 
with these visual representations. The meaning of the allegory and its claim on the 
musical nature of the cosmos, is in no way expressed by the allegory itself; its materiality 
overdetermines the transcendent meaning it aimed to portray, while its totality remains 
only partially illuminated. The tension latent in allegory between mimesis and 
materiality, its intimation of a totality through fragmented and incomplete aspects of the 
whole gathered through the unbound power of similarity, is here in full force and presents 
us with crucial questions about Kircher’s work, the role of music in his system as well as 
the notion of baroque mimesis in itself and how we can begin to read it. 
Kircher’s allegory does not just portray the cosmos as he saw it. Entitled 
Analogicus, the final book of the Musurgia constitutes a baroque allegorical machine 
that, as the divine organ that plays itself, allegorizes itself, en abyme. It allegorizes 
Kircher’s own modes of seeing and hearing while using music as an epistemological and 
philosophical tool for the understanding of the cosmos. In this operation, grounded on a 
syncretic framework of Hermeticism, Neo-Platonism, and Catholicism, the allegorical 
method becomes visible as the medium in which mimesis works to produce the 
distinctions between disciplines, between science and religion, between nature and 
culture, that for us seem so evident. 
                                                
43 Oedipus Aegyptiacus II, p. 6, quoted in Joscelyn Godwin, The Harmony of the Spheres: A Sourcebook of 
the Pythagorean Tradition in Music (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions International, 1993), 21. The most 
tragic meaning of this definition which dates back to Ficino, however, is that this was Kircher’s approach to 
deciphering Egyptian hieroglyphs, his life-long project and biggest intellectual mistake. [ß editors don’t 
like claims like this, sweeping but not documented] 
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 In other words, what in Kircher seems to be a mixed form of representation of the 
 
Figure 15: Harmony of the Birth of the World. Mus. B 367 
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world—allegory—is in truth a form of mimetic production of these differences. The idea 
of the musical universe, of the macrocosm and microcosm, of consonance and dissonance 
as the harmonic forces that hold everything together are but the end results of a more 
general process that becomes visible as these ideas accumulate in Kircher’s baroque 
encyclopedia. Kircher’s concern with the materiality of sound interrupts—like allegory—
the quiet, deep mimetic drift of the Renaissance episteme. What becomes evident is that 
music is less a means of understanding the cosmos than the production of the idea of the 
cosmos itself, through the mimetic strategy of postulating music as its copy and 
simultaneously as its model. In Kircher, the difference between musica mundana, 
humana and instrumentalis is eliminated as its analogical principle folds back onto itself. 
Kircher’s universe is mimetically created and mimetically structured by the ruling 
concept of the Renaissance episteme: analogy. Analogy works both as an ontological 
claim and as a method to disclose the analogically structured universe. Nature is an 
ordered cosmos, a mundum harmonicum, and science and art coincide in demonstrating 
and reproducing the necessary aspect of their ordering. This claim is expressed clearly by 
Nicholas Cusanus’s metaphysics. For Cusanus, the order of the universe is created after 
the image of God’s wisdom which guarantees the pacific persistence of the “beautiful 
machine” of the world.44 Divine order is proportion and harmony, but its importance for 
Cusanus does not lie in beauty itself. It is not an aesthetic appeal but the condition of 
possibility of knowledge of the world. It produces the two overlapping but distinct 
aspects of analogy, as an ontological claim about the nature of the world, and an 
epistemological ground for a method for knowledge. It also grounds the whole tradition 
of natural magic from Ficino to Campanella, for whom the analogies are not only means 
of understanding the universe but also for benefiting from its hidden powers. Cusanus 
postulates an absolute incommensurability between the empirical and the ideal, 
radicalizing the Platonic chorismos but affirming the possibility of empirical knowledge, 
the docta ignorantia, which sees the ordered nature of experience and follows it 
asymptotically, moving from the conditioned to the unconditioned without ever reaching 
                                                
 44 Est igitur ordo universi prima et praecisior imago aeternae et incorruptibilis sapientiae, per quam tota 
mundi machina pulcherrime et pacifice persistit (ven. sap. c. 32 n. 95) quoted in Leinkauf, 173. 
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full knowledge of God.45 However, this means that it is impossible to immediately see the 
similarity between the sensible and the intelligible. The difference between the copy and 
the archetype remains absolute. But the world nevertheless participates of divine order 
and their relation is still mimetically grounded. To properly know the copy means to 
understand it as copy, and not as a means to an understanding of the model. Docta 
ignorantia, learned ignorance, consists in understanding this dialectic relation. 
Kircher picks up from this in a particularly baroque manner. The allegory from 
Genesis is but a prelude to a book-long, numerologically organized explication of the 
Hermetic dictum of music as a means to know the cosmos based on the philosophical 
ground of Cusanus’s metaphysics. Kircher begins by recalling the notion of the ordered 
cosmos, which astounded the ancients and led them to postulate demons, world-souls, 
agent intellects, and all sorts of gross errors. Despite that, he seems to say, they were 
correct in seeing the universe as something resembling a living being. Nature, Kircher 
writes is in fact God’s work, who rejoices in hiding himself from the world, thus 
reaffirming Cusanus’s principle of incommensurability between the intelligible and the 
sensible. But, Kircher goes on, God does not hide without leaving his signature in the 
laws of the ordered universe, the cosmic machine, so that man can recognize the 
inexhaustible power of its author, and “by recognizing admire, and admiring investigate, 
and investigating love Him and in love and worship finally forever possess Him.”46 
Kircher then justifies the allegory of God as organ builder as follows: God made the 
world according to number, weight, and measure; and music itself is nothing other than 
of number, weight, and measure, as he had demonstrated in the preceding 1000 pages of 
the Musurgia. 
Moreover, in Plato’s testimony, the world is an all-bounding harmony, harmonia 
panta katexousa. Nature is truly God’s artwork, a harmonic force that binds 
                                                
45 Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy. (New York: Harper & Row, 
1964), 21. 
46 “…homo mundi filius, vel huius machine kosmon id est ornatum rerumque omnium inuiolabili quadam 
lege connexarum ordinem contemplans, inexhauste potentiae Authorem cognosceret, cognoscendo 
admiraretur, admirando desidedaret, desderando diligeret, diligendo eum colendoque aeternum tandem 
possideret.” Mus B 365. 
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everything. Since the world is a perfect likeness of God, it necessarily follows that 
the cosmos, that is, the harmonic world, is grounded on analogy and similarity to 
His Archetypical harmony, so in God’s nature and art He looked back to musical 
proportions in all worldly operations.47 
In this convoluted fragment Kircher claims the world is organized mimetically in two 
levels. Important consequences can be drawn from this articulation. First, the world is a 
perfecta Dei similitudo, the perfect image of God. This dramatic baroque expression is at 
first sight only a paraphrase of Cusanus, for whom the order of the world was an image of 
divine wisdom. Cusanus stipulated divine order as the model, but for Kircher the entire 
creation is an image of God. A perfect image, moreover, without any debasement or 
limitation to restrict human knowledge of God. Second, he affirms that the cosmos is 
itself organized according to proportions that are musical, harmonic. God uses a musical 
model to organize the world. This model is preserved in worldly music, as well as in 
everything else. Kircher labors with describing as precisely as possible all the forms of 
music making and in gathering those examples from experience to then inquire into the 
nature of the cosmos. This is evident in his application of harmony, which emphasizes the 
ontological opposition of consonance and dissonance—consonis dissonis—over the pure 
nature of number. This logic of opposition is adapted expressly by Kircher as an analogy 
to that between light and shadow that organizes his 1646 Ars Magna Lucis et Umbrae. 
Sound imitates light, but only because both partake of the ontological opposition that 
grounds Kircher´s concept of harmony. 
It is this move that shows how Kircher hypostasizes analogy as an ontological 
reality which becomes identical with its epistemological function, which Cusanus 
carefully distinguished. By calling the cosmos a perfecta Dei similitudo, Kircher grants 
analogical knowledge an ontological power. It hypostasizes what for Cusanus was a 
method into a claim about the real nature of the cosmos and of the God that it perfectly 
resembles. Furthermore, without the Platonic restriction about true knowledge of the 
                                                
47 “Mundus autem Platone teste sit harmonia panta katexousa. Natura verò ars Dei, vis harmozousa 
omnium adaptatrix; Mundus quoque perfecta Dei similitudo, necessariò sequitur, ad harmoniae illius 
Archetypicae similitudinem & analogiam, kósmon, id est mundum harmonicum esse conditum, naturamque 
Dei artem, in omnibus mundanis operationibus ad musicas respexisse proportiones.” Mus B 366. 
Epilogue 
 
435 
sensible, Kircher’s more modern side steps forth. Safely grounded on analogy, it is now 
possible to take mere experience as a true account of the world. In fact, it is Kircher’s 
distinctive trait that he will use experiments, observations, and data from his modern 
contemporaries as much as he uses his classical sources, and even against them. This 
does not mean, however, that he uses them as a modern; his notion of number is still on 
the other side of the abyss from Kepler’s and Mersenne’s mathematics and methods. 
Arguing against Kepler, Kircher declares that his concept of number is “numero 
numerans,” meaningful in itself because it expresses proportions and harmonies a priori, 
not an empirical numero numeratus applied to measurement and quantifiable entities. 
And so, while quoting at large from Kepler’s measurements of planetary motion, for 
example, Kircher dismisses those numbers that, while accurate in measurement, fail to 
conform to Pythagorean proportions and instead retains Kepler’s own “idealized” 
adjustments.48 
Kircher’s account of planetary song is decidedly non-modern. After discussing 
the nature of Platonic solids and their relation to the four elements as the first register of 
the world-organ, Kircher moves on to discuss the music of celestial bodies, a business 
which, in his opinion, tempted many and yet had not been accomplished correctly—every 
prior attempt having been insolently deaf to the harmonic symphony.49 Kircher has two 
main objections to the way the question of planetary song had been approached so far. 
Since Pythagoras, everyone agrees that the universe is organized musically and that 
instrumental music imitates their harmonies. Now, everyone claims to hear a wonderful 
harmony yet, as Agustin says in De Civitate Dei, God put dissonance in the world to 
make the worldly symphony more agreeable; the beauty of the universe is accomplished 
through the opposition of things.50 This is, by the way, the site of Kircher’s theodicy: 
arguing for a harmonic force that binds the universe together would be naive without 
                                                
48 McKay, 152. Kircher, however, also suspects capuchin astronomer Antonio Maria Rheita for doing the 
same with his own calculations. cf. Bianchi, 162. 
49 “Rem sanè perarduam aggredior, dum Musicum illum coelestium corporum concentum inuestigare 
conor; negotiom uti a multis tentatum, ita a nemine hucusque recte peractum, omnibus ad tam insolentis 
harmonie symphonismus obsurdescentibus.” Mus. 376 B 373. 
50 Agustin, De Civ. XI, 18. 
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being able to account for the dissonances of the universe. In fact, as he writes in the 
dedication of the Musurgia to the Archduke of Austria, consonance cannot exist without 
dissonance, nor dissonance without consonance. To Kircher’s ear, those accounts that fail 
to portray the rich harmonies of the universe, the chiaroscuro of consonance and 
dissonance, are of no use. 
Furthermore, recent astronomers have shown that the planets do not follow 
rational courses. However, it is also true that since God is a perfectly ordered cause then 
no disorderly effects can follow from Him. It seems, therefore, that “the ancient 
disposition of the celestial harmony has been blown away. Neither the firmness of the 
heavens nor the order of the spheres remains today as it seemed to the ancients.”51 
Kircher thus declares previous accounts of the heavenly order as frivolous and unreliable, 
dismissing with one modern blow the whole tradition of Timaeus commentaries. 
Contemporary attempts are no better, especially Kepler’s vain and obscure calculations 
which glorify in mysticism and arcane harmonies. Yet Kepler’s defense against Fludd 
had been that he argued as a mathematician, whereas Fludd argued as a hermetic.52 The 
distance is again here measured by the role of analogy and its function in the system. 
Kircher speaks like Cusanus in forbidding any attempt to affirm that the measurements of 
the planet’s orbits can be taken to be musical in themselves or to represent true 
knowledge. Analogy is not the bridging of the sensible and the intelligible, it is a form of 
mediation that keeps the two worlds separate yet even more entwined, grounding and 
bounding human reason to its limits. The true harmony of the spheres, Kircher writes, is 
not for human ears, it is reserved solely for the supra-mundane Organist. But in this way, 
Kircher also makes the point that the harmony of the spheres is neither a poetic 
commonplace, nor a just a problem of harmonics; it is an experience that combines 
admiration with knowledge, it travels and binds everything. To presume it exists only or 
primordially as number, or that it can be perceived only as a particular kind of music, is 
to misunderstand the ontological nature of the forces that compose the universe. 
                                                
51 “Quod enim antiqui sensibilem harmoniam ex corporum coelestium harmoniam dispositam collisione 
exortam crediderint, hisce novissimis temporibus passim exploditur. cum nec coelorum soliditas, nec ordo 
spheararum iuxta veterum dispositionem subsistat.” Mus. B 376. 
52 Yates, 444. 
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[The] harmony of the spheres consists not in their periodic motions, nor in that 
perceptible collision of heavenly bodies, but in nothing other than their wonderful 
arrangement & in a certain ineffable proportion conspiring in union… Indeed, this 
harmony consists. . . also in the most precise analogy of quantity or magnitude 
appropriate to each in order that it might achieve its proper end. 
Having dealt with the musical structure of the heavens it is now a matter of explaining the 
musical structure of the earth. Attending to these will show the real effects of Kircher’s 
mimetic war machine. Observation gives way to manipulation in Registrum III, which 
deals with the relation of the planets with the earth, the order of things in the chain of 
being and the affective forces that bind it. The Harmonia Mundi Sympathica is a diagram 
in which everything from God to colors is organized according to ten sets of nine strings, 
laying out the consonances and dissonances of nature in the span of a tenth [Figure 16]. 
The purpose of this universal scheme is not for mere contemplation but for giving the 
natural magician a map of the harmonic relations between all things in the world. The 
effect is amplified with the next Registrum, dealing with the doctrine of the macrocosm 
and the microcosm, which places man at the center of the harmonic arrangement of the 
universe, neatly expressing man’s affective connection to the cosmos. Natural magic 
consists in understanding these relations and manipulating them by exciting the 
sympathetic resonances between them. In Aby Warburg’s words, natural magic is applied 
cosmology [Figure 17].53 
                                                
53 This representation of the microcosm and macrocosm, as so often happens with Kircher, is by no means 
his original creation, and it is reprinted in several of its works. Having its origin in the Kabbalistic notion of 
Adam Kadmon, the primordial man, it travelled through gnosticism and hermeticism to the Renaissance 
through Cornelius Aggripa’s Three Books of Occult Philosophy and has an evident counterpart in Da 
Vinci’s “Vitruvian Man,” a version of which also appears in the Musurgia. For a thorough analysis of the 
relation between the Kabbala (in Scholem’s interpretation) and the idea of the macro- and microcosmos, 
see Englmann, Sphärenharmonie und Mikrokosmos, 311ff. 
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For us, these arrangements of the universe may seem arbitrary and ludicrous. Yet 
its effects are beyond magical: by their mere formulation, instrumental music ceases to be 
a degraded imitation of cosmic harmony to become a means to partake of it and 
manipulate it. Here mimesis passes into participation, or methexis, in the Neo-Platonic 
sense. In magical terms, sympathy becomes contagion. Crucially, the distinction that 
analogy had maintained between an epistemological medium and an ontological ground 
is here conflated, and the musical copy becomes the paradigm for the order of the 
universe. Contemplation and knowledge pass magically into action, while magical 
activity demonstrates the validity of the scheme. We get a dialectical picture of the 
enlightened aspect of the magician who aims to understand the world, and the magical 
aspect of the Enlightenment that does not consider a form of knowledge valid if it doesn’t 
have a practical and universal application.  
 
 
Figure 16: Enneachord of Nature. Mus. B 393 
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To conclude, and to return to what I argued from the outset was a determinant aspect of 
the Musurgia Universalis, let us examine the passages in which Kircher sketches the 
theory of political ontotheology more musico. If the human microcosm is a copy of the 
cosmic macrocosm, Registrum VII uses this microcosm to model the political world. Man 
can be seen as a harmonious republic, and so it can be used as a model to think, as musica 
politica, about politics itself. Thus, just as all the members of the human body are 
 
Figure 17: Microcosmic Man. Mus. B 402 
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directed and preserved by one soul, which ensures their movements are concordant, and 
just as in music all the different voices and different sounds are arranged towards one 
single harmony, so must the plurality in the Republic must be unified towards one single 
harmony, or concordia. And further, just as there is only one mind that rules upon the 
body, and just as there is one God whose providence keeps everything in harmony, then 
there cannot be more than one supreme power in the Republic. In Aristocracy and 
Democracy, the ruling power is itself a multitude. Only in monarchy is the plurality 
commanded by the one: "In Monarchià, verò penes unum rerum omnium potestas est." 
[Mus B. 433]. Furthermore, order is necessary in everything, and everything is organized 
in diverse degrees and different orders, where the lesser ones show reverence to the 
higher ones, while the higher ones are devoted to the love of the lesser ones.54 Here again, 
musical experience demonstrates it: beautiful melody is born out of the low, middle, and 
high sounds. Similarly, in the Republic society is divided between those who rule and 
those who obey; between the rich and poor; nobility and plebes; doctors and artists, and 
so on.55 A Republic cannot subsist if everyone is equal. It is evident that its harmonic 
equality arises from the different forms in which divine providence made men—some 
reach the summit of knowledge, while others are submerged in the abyss of ignorance, 
and so forth. God did not make everyone in the same conditions, and it is only the 
impious who dare to object to what is evidently the work of His divine providence.56 The 
symphony of the political world consists in that, out of the diversity of temperaments and 
professions in which everyone has been thrown by fortune, conspire altogether towards a 
single, good, indivisible unit, just as the different members of the body works towards a 
                                                
54 “Ordo itaque in omnibus necessarius est…Ab hoc, inquit, dispensationis divinae promisso, gradus 
diversus & ordines constituit esse distinctos, ut dum reverentiam minores potentioribus exhiberent, & 
potentes minoribus dilecitonem impenderent.” Mus. B. 433 
55 sicuti enim ut supra quoque dictum est ex diversi toni fidibus ad symetriam intensis, sonus dulcissimus, 
imò gravibus, mediis &acutis coniunctis, melodia nascitur suavissima: ita Societas in Republica 
imperantium & obedientium; divitum, pauperum; Nobilium, plebeiorum; Doctorum Artificum, & id genus 
diversorum graduum, personarum, statuum efficitur pulcher quidam concentus, concordia laudabilis, felix 
& penè divina. Mus. B. 433 
56 Ita Respublica consistere minimè posset, si omnes essent aequales; apparet harmonica haec aequalitas ex 
ipsis diversis statibus, quibus divina providentia homines constituit, dum alium summum sapientiae apicem 
attingere; alium in ingnorantiae abysso submersum vix à bestiis distare…cur itaque bonitas DEI non omnes 
aequalis conditionis fecit? Hanc iniquam mortalium sortem nobis obiiciunt ii, qui omnem providentiamp 
impiè negantes, omnia casu evenire arbitrantur. Mus. B. 433. 
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single end.57 Similarly, just as the soul is “tota in toto, & tota in quadlibet parte” (all in 
the whole and in any part), so does Religion—and Kircher makes it clear that he speaks 
only of the orthodox, Catholic religion—preserves the harmony of the Republic, as 
everyone believes and observes its articles, from the vices that attack it like bodily 
disease.58 
Now, since nature’s gifts are variously assigned, it is necessary to examine the 
proportion in which these gifts are best distributed. That is, which is the most appropriate 
form of government. Again, it is by looking at the work of God, the archetype whose 
image the world is, which of these proportions is best—in other words, it is music which 
provides the means for evaluating and justifying a particular form of government.59 
Kircher describes quickly the Pythagorean proportions: arithmetic (where each term 
varies from the preceding by a constant value), geometric (where each term varies from 
the preceding by a constant ratio), and the harmonic (where the harmonic means exceeds 
and is exceeded by the same fraction of the extremes), and refers the reader to book 3 of 
the Musurgia for more on the means.60 Democracy corresponds to the arithmetic 
proportion, aristocracy to the geometric, and monarchy to the harmonic proportion. Thus, 
in democracy there is the same number of rich and poor; everyone shares the same 
burdens and advantages; but since everyone aspires to the same right [ius], it will be 
given either to the noble or the ignoble, to the rich or to the poor. Thus, it has to be 
                                                
57 Si enim, omnes Doctores, Sapientes, Principes, divites, mundim perire necesse foret: in hac igitur 
diversitate ingeniorum, professionum, in hoc diverso fortunae iactu, politici mundi symphonismus primario 
consistit, & sicut in humani corporis structura, diversa membra diversis officis destinata in bonum unum, 
bonam conservationem individui conspirant: ita & diversa politici mundi membra in Reipublicae salutem 
consevationemque conspirare debent. Mus. B. 433. 
58 Et sicuti corpus harmonicum mox destruitur, vbi vehemens humorum discrasia suas habenas, laxauerit; 
ità Republica vbi iniuria regum, morumque pessimorum consuetudo insurrexeritl Contrà vti corpus per 
animam perficitur, ità Respublica per Religionem (loquor autem hic de vera illa & solum Sautifica 
Religione orthodoxà, Catholicà) Nam vti anima est tota in toto, et tota in qualibet parte, it¡a ad harmoniam 
Reipublicae conseruandam, Religio vna, vni omnibus fidei articuli, quos credant, tenendi & obseruandi 
sunt. Mus. B. 434. 
59 Englmann, Sphärenharmonie und Mikrokosmos, 354. 
60 Kircher’s explanation is remarkably obscure. He introduces two subdivisions for the Arithmetic and 
Geometric proportions, conjunct and disjunct, but does not employ them further on); I borrow the 
explanation of the different means from Oliver Strunk, ed., Source Readings in Music History (New York: 
Norton, 1998), 21. 
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apportioned among many by lot. This is a blind luck [“quia sors caeca est”]: it does not 
distinguish between the noble and the ignoble, the wise and the stupid, and so forth. Since 
everyone believes to be equal to the others, then any place over the others, and whatever 
anyone can acquire, depends on luck.61 In aristocracy, the excess is given to the larger 
number, so all burdens, awards, offices and duties will be given to the best [Optimatus], 
and the rest will be distributed among the people. But then either the different parts are 
distributed arithmetically, or else they will tend to privilege the best, and if the Prince 
always comes from the best, then the city will not be a Republic but a kingdom.62 The 
most appropriate form of government, Kircher reasons, is monarchy, where the sovereign 
rules not with blind impetus, i.e. luck, but by distributing everything among the best and 
the people according to their virtue and merits—this is justice. The best political 
organization, he concludes, follows from the Pythagorean tetractys and from the division 
of the parts of the soul: 1 is the intellect [mens sive intellectus architectonicus], or God, 
represented by his Vicar on earth; 2 is reason [ratiocinativa facultas] or Religion, which 
preserves harmony in the political world; 3 is the faculty of passions, the Platonic thumos 
[irascibilis] or the military forces, which guide the dissidents towards harmony like 
musical syncopations; and 4 is the appetitive part [concupiscibilis], standing in for the 
people.63 After discussing the vicissitudes of fortune [Fortuna] by which this order might 
be threatened—consonance turns into dissonance—and showing how the Prince must 
seek to find the mean between extreme affections to avoid breaking the harmonic order, 
                                                
61 Sic in Republica populus vult aequalia esse omnia onera & commoda, & honores & Magistratus, nec vult 
tolerarere respectum ullum personarum. Ut cum vult omnibus esse ius venandi, sive nobiles sint, sive 
ignobiles, sive divites sive pauperes. Quodsi quae reset, que non patitur divisionem inter multos; eam 
populus vult sortiri; quia sors caeca est, nobilem ab ignobili, divitem a paupere, benemeritum ab immerito, 
virtuti deditum a vitioso, ingeniosum a stupido minime internoscens, tum etiam aliquis se putat aequari 
coeteris, si cum iis super talibus, sive iam bona, sive mala sorte adipiscatur, sortitur; ubi sortis loco etiam 
alia possunt esse acquirendi media. Mus B. 435. 
62 Contra sicut in geometrica proportione excessus numerorum assimilantur numeris ispis, ut magnus 
numerus mangum habeat excessum; Sic in Optimatum Republica distinguuntur perosnae, distinguuntur 
onera, praemia, magistratus, munia, & praestatnissima reservantur Optimatibus, reliqua relinquuntur 
populo; ubi necese est seorsim inter singulas factiones admitti etiam Arithmeticam proportionem, de iis 
enim quae sunt populi, sortientur omnes, qui sunt in populo: de iis, quae sunt Optimatum, omnes 
Optimates; nisi enim hoc fiat, peretui erunt in populo gradus Optimatum usque ad ultimam populi faecem; 
perpetui quoque inter Optimates usque ad Reipublicae Principem, qua ratione non Respublica, sed regium 
quoddam Civitatis genus erit. Mus B. 436. 
63 Mus B 438-9 
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Kircher closes with a graphic representation of the structure of his cosmomusicopolitics 
[Fig. 16]. 
 
This scheme differs in various aspects from the description given above, starting for the 
ordering in groups of three, as opposed to the four of the tetractys. The State is now 
divided into Anima, Spiritus, and Corpus, and this hierarchy organizes the sources of 
knowledge: from common notions to history; from natural right to habit; and form the 
Prince to the people. Ethos becoming nomos. The concentric circles imply that, as the 
God of Cusanus, everything is everywhere and in each part. Everything is held together 
by harmonic force [vis harmozousa] or amor This final allegory, (which will not make it 
through to Kircher’s future political writings), presents the distillation of Kircher’s 
political thought, its quintessence, as Engelmann remarks.64  
                                                
64 Englmann, Sphärenharmonie und Mikrokosmos, 364. 
 
Figure 18: Kircher’s Cosmopolitics. Mus. B 440. 
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The Jesuits were often accused of being Machiavellian due to the strategic 
associations they sought the powerful figures in their societies. Starting from the Ignatian 
principle of “accomodation,” the Jesuits tended to exploit the same disjunction between 
being and appearing, or between ethics and politics, that Machiavelli first theorized, 
specifically by their advocacy for using amphibology in the practice of casuistry, 
sometimes recommending secrecy, simulatio, and dissimulatio as effective political 
strategies, as in the case of Piedmontese Jesuit Giovanni Botero. As Maria Iglesias-
Rondina puts it, it was a matter of using dissimulation, partially hiding a truth, in order to 
preserve and reinforce power.65 These accusations led them to produce a series of works 
in which they sought to distance themselves from Machiavelli, works of political theory 
on reason of State, explicitly mirroring and inverting Machiavelli’s concepts, as Iglesias-
Rondina writes.66 Similarly, as Englmann shows throughout her study of Kircher’s 
political works, his political theology aims to be a point-by-point refutation of 
Machiavelli, insisting in the inseparability of ethics and politics, the need for a truly wise 
Prince, and especially the need for an “organic interconnection” in the entire community, 
as opposed to Machiavelli’s state in which the entire state is organized around the 
sovereignty of the Prince.67 
By employing the hyperbological mimetology of his allegorical practices to 
model the structure of the State upon the human body, Kircher’s attempt to overcome 
                                                
65 Clara Iglesias-Rondina, Machiavelli and the Jesuits: An Introduction (CreateSpace, 2014). The most 
famous of these attacks was a libellum entitled Monita privata Societatis, which started circulating in 
Kraków around 1614, which claimed to contain the true instructions of the Society of Jesus, a behavior 
protocol for the Jesuits that “invited the members of the Society to extend their political and economic 
power by means of a slow but steady infiltration of society at all levels.” As Sabina Pavone writes, it was 
soon recognized as a forgery, but it nevertheless shows the common perception that the enemies of the 
Jesuits had during the sixteenth and seventeenth century.O’Malley, The Jesuits, 50. 
66 Iglesias-Rondina, Machiavelli and the Jesuits, loc. 268. The most famous of these works, as analyzed by 
Iglesias-Rondina, are Giovanni Botero, Della ragione di stato, libri dieci Con tre libri delle cause della 
grandezza delle città. Del Sig. Giovanni Botero Benese. Di nuouo in questa impressione, mutati alcuni 
luoghi dall’ istesso autore, & accresciuti di diuersi discorsi ... (Venetia: Appresso i Gioliti, 1598), 
http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/34047600.html; Pedro de Ribadeneira and Pantaleon Aznar, 
Tratado de la religion y virtudes que debe tener el Principe Christiano, para gobernar y conservar sus 
Estados, ... (En Madrid: : En la Oficina de Pantaleon Aznar, 1788); Francisco de Quevedo, Politica de 
Dios: govierno de Christo : tirania de Satanas (Navarra: C. de Labàyen, 1631); See also Donald W. 
Bleznick, “Spanish Reaction to Machiavelli in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 19, no. 4 (1958): 542–50, doi:10.2307/2707922. 
67 Englmann, Sphärenharmonie und Mikrokosmos, 301ff. 
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Machiavelli ends up producing a spectacularly baroque version of Machiavellian 
mimetopolitics. Just as Jesuit political theory ended up reaffirming reason of state as the 
central political problem of their time, imitating and inverting Machiavelli while 
employing his own techniques and formulations—in both cases it is after all a matter of 
preserving the state and maintaining power—, so does Kircher’s work produce a theory 
which aims to unify ethics and politics by mobilizing the performative assemblage of 
mousikē in its most hyperbolic formulation.  
In chapter 6 I suggested that Machiavelli had been crucial in defining the 
mimetology of the humanist turn towards the past, where it was not only a matter of 
reconstructing a lost past, but more importantly of establishing future sites for the arrival 
of something that does not return as a copy, but rather as an unrepresentable space 
determined by incompletion. In Kircher’s work, this mimetology reaches its extreme 
form: the Musurgia Universalis, the mousikē ergon of the universe is such a return. All of 
musical knowledge is in-corporated—made into a body by taking the human body as its 
model, and thus conversely politicizing the human body, making it the paradigm of the 
political. What the nineteenth century will understand as the “King’s two bodies,” is here 
a multiplicity of bodies, a microcosmos of bodies upon bodies. God, the Prince, and the 
State coincide in a multiplicity that is one: tota in totius. Unlike the Cartesian one, this 
body is everywhere affected and affective: it is first and foremost the object of magical 
transformations which seek above all to maintain its health and harmony through or, as 
music. From this it follows that all the “strictly musicological” elements of the Musurgia 
(the classifications of styles and affections, the organology, the experiments and theory 
about the physics of sound, the compositional machine) are also made part of this 
nosotheopolitical assemblage while determining it. They are mobilized for the production 
of a total political theater of the universe and the elaboration of techniques, practices, and 
technologies for its government and healthy maintenance: it is a form of musicological 
governmentality (sensu Foucault). Circulating around the globe, this is the paradigmatic 
theory of baroque sovereignty and political theology. Not so much an aesthetization of 
politics but a spec(tacu/tra)lization of affective mimetopolitics, which accomplished what 
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the intermedi and early opera had already begun to do: the actualization of the political 
mimetology of ancient Greek mousikē in the modern world. Employing allegory and all 
other mimetological strategies, Kircher’s political theology is, as a text, also a 
performance, in the senses elaborated in chapter 5: most crucially, it has incompletion as 
its condition of possibility and impossibility. Kircher’s politics did not have any lasting 
resonance or influence that we can ascertain. And it does not so much represent or reflect 
the Weltanschauung of his time, or obey to either of the two epistemes that overlapped as 
folds in the baroque. Rather, it actualizes and expresses potentialities in humanist thought 
that only coincide in his work. By being neither a purely allegorical work of art nor a 
purely scientific or philosophical theory, by incompleting the restricted mimetologies of 
these presumably independent spheres, the Musurgia produces a mimetic cosmopolitics 
that keeps returning without ever being the same—in Wagner’s Gesamtkuntswerk, in 
postmodern theories of the spectacle, and in neoliberal forms of governmentality. From 
this perspective, Kircher is not so much a reactionary thinker as much as a “proactionary” 
one: his mimetology aims neither for the resurrection of an ancient past nor for the 
installation of an absolute beginning, but for the actualization of the productive force of 
mimesis in its most extreme, baroque mode.
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